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Abstract 
This thesis explored the role of negation in conditional reasoning by looking at how 
different types of negation affected responses to reasoning questions. Previous research 
has observed several systematic biases in conditional reasoning with negations 
(Manktelow, 2012). Prior reasoning research has looked at negation as a simple logical 
operator. However, negation can take a range of forms and provide different 
implications (Horn, 1989). These experiments tested the effect of different types of 
negation on conditional reasoning.  
 
The first set of experiments looked at how using different types of negation in 
propositions affected people’s probability ratings of those propositions. The three 
experiments identified differences when using several different types of negation. 
However, the differences observed were small. These results confirmed that people do 
take different implications from different types of negation. 
 
The second set of four experiments used an extension of Evans’ (1977) conditional 
inference paradigm to compare two types of negation (using “not” and affix “un-”). The 
experiments looked at whether responses reflected the different probabilistic 
implications of those negative forms. Any effect of different types of negation appears 
overwhelmed by plausibility and other material effects. Broadly these results provide 
are consistent with probabilistic models of reasoning. However, inconsistencies in the 
results suggest further work is necessary to rule out other models. 
 
The final set of three experiments used a novel learning task to test the effect of 
frequency information on inference endorsement tasks. The first experiment confirmed 
Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) prediction of MP inference suppression when implicit 
negation is used instead of “not” negation and participants are provided with appropriate 
frequency information. Two further experiments confirmed that this effect was the 
result of the frequency information and extended it to AC, DA and MT inferences. 
These results provide support for a probabilistic approach to reasoning.  
  
  
 
 5
Contents  
 
Declaration ........................................................................................................................ 2 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 4 
Contents ............................................................................................................................ 5 
List of Tables................................................................................................................... 12 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. 14 
1. Conditional Reasoning Biases and Negation .......................................................... 16 
1.1. Conditional Reasoning ..................................................................................... 17 
1.2. Systematic Biases in Conditional Reasoning ................................................... 19 
1.2.1. Biases Involving Negation ........................................................................ 20 
1.2.1.1. Matching Bias ........................................................................................... 20 
1.2.1.2. Negative Conclusion Bias ......................................................................... 22 
1.2.2. Conditional or Biconditional? ................................................................... 24 
1.3. Accounts of Reasoning ..................................................................................... 25 
1.3.1. Mental Logics............................................................................................ 26 
1.3.2. Mental Models .......................................................................................... 29 
1.3.3. Probabilistic Approach .............................................................................. 32 
1.3.4. Multiple Processes .................................................................................... 34 
1.3.5. Alternative Models .................................................................................... 36 
1.4. Accounts of Negation ....................................................................................... 37 
1.4.1. Logical Operator ....................................................................................... 37 
1.4.1.1. Other Logics .............................................................................................. 38 
1.4.2. Natural Language ...................................................................................... 40 
1.4.2.1. Scope of Negation ..................................................................................... 41 
1.4.2.2. Pragmatic Ambiguity ................................................................................ 42 
1.4.3. Contrast Classes ........................................................................................ 43 
1.5. The Psychology of Negation ............................................................................ 44 
1.5.1. Processing Time ........................................................................................ 44 
1.5.1.1. Contexts of Plausible Denial ..................................................................... 44 
1.5.2. Probing Negations ..................................................................................... 45 
1.6. Approach .......................................................................................................... 46 
  
 
 6
2. Different Types of Negation and Probability .......................................................... 48 
2.1. Reasoning and Probability ................................................................................ 48 
2.1.1. Probability Rating Tasks ........................................................................... 52 
2.2. Different Types of Negation ............................................................................. 53 
2.2.1. Affixal Negation........................................................................................ 54 
2.2.2. Implicit Negation ...................................................................................... 57 
2.3. Experiment 1 .................................................................................................... 60 
2.3.1. Predictions ................................................................................................. 63 
2.3.2. Method ...................................................................................................... 63 
2.3.2.1. Design ....................................................................................................... 63 
2.3.2.2. Participants ................................................................................................ 64 
2.3.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................... 64 
2.3.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................... 65 
2.3.3. Results ....................................................................................................... 66 
2.3.3.1. Overall Differences between Different Types of Negation ...................... 66 
2.3.3.2. Affixal Negation........................................................................................ 67 
2.3.3.3. Implicit Negation ...................................................................................... 68 
2.3.4. Discussion ................................................................................................. 69 
2.4. Experiment 2 .................................................................................................... 71 
2.4.1.1. Online Recruitment of Participants ........................................................... 73 
2.4.2. Predictions ................................................................................................. 73 
2.4.3. Method ...................................................................................................... 74 
2.4.3.1. Design ....................................................................................................... 74 
2.4.3.2. Participants ................................................................................................ 74 
2.4.3.3. Materials .................................................................................................... 74 
2.4.3.4. Procedure................................................................................................... 75 
2.4.4. Results ....................................................................................................... 76 
2.4.4.1. Responses to Each Scenario ...................................................................... 77 
2.4.5. Discussion ................................................................................................. 79 
2.5. Experiment 3 .................................................................................................... 81 
2.5.1. Predictions ................................................................................................. 83 
2.5.2. Method ...................................................................................................... 84 
2.5.2.1. Design ....................................................................................................... 84 
2.5.2.2. Participants ................................................................................................ 84 
  
 
 7
2.5.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................... 85 
2.5.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................... 87 
2.5.3. Results ....................................................................................................... 87 
2.5.3.1. Probability Rating Tasks – Overall Responses ......................................... 87 
2.5.3.2. Probability Rating Tasks – Responses to Each Scenario .......................... 89 
2.5.3.3. Probability Rating Tasks – Possible Other Factors ................................... 89 
2.5.3.4. Plausibility Ratings of Conditional Rules ................................................. 91 
2.5.4. Discussion ................................................................................................. 92 
2.6. General Discussion ........................................................................................... 94 
3. Different Types of Negation in Conditional Inference ........................................... 97 
3.1. Evans’ (1977) Negation Paradigm ................................................................... 97 
3.1.1. Extending the Negation Paradigm .......................................................... 100 
3.2. Causal Relationships and Plausibility ............................................................ 101 
3.2.1. The Conditional as Causal Relationship ................................................. 102 
3.2.2. Context and Plausibility in Causal Conditionals ..................................... 103 
3.2.3. Causal Models ......................................................................................... 105 
3.3. Experiment 1 .................................................................................................. 110 
3.3.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 111 
3.3.2. Method .................................................................................................... 114 
3.3.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 114 
3.3.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 114 
3.3.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 114 
3.3.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 116 
3.3.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 117 
3.3.3.1. Conditional Inference – Levels of Endorsement ..................................... 117 
3.3.3.2. Effect of Polarity on Plausibility Ratings................................................ 119 
3.3.3.3. Interaction Between Plausibility and Conditional Inference .................. 122 
3.3.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 123 
3.4. Experiment 2 .................................................................................................. 126 
3.4.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 127 
3.4.2. Method .................................................................................................... 128 
3.4.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 128 
3.4.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 128 
3.4.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 129 
  
 
 8
3.4.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 131 
3.4.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 132 
3.4.3.1. Results for Each Scenario ....................................................................... 134 
3.4.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 138 
3.5. Experiment 3 .................................................................................................. 141 
3.5.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 142 
3.5.2. Method .................................................................................................... 143 
3.5.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 143 
3.5.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 143 
3.5.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 143 
3.5.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 145 
3.5.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 146 
3.5.3.1. Pattern of Inference Scores ..................................................................... 146 
3.5.3.2. Negative Conclusion Bias ....................................................................... 150 
3.5.3.3. Role of Plausibility .................................................................................. 150 
3.5.3.4. Other Possible Factors ............................................................................ 154 
3.5.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 156 
3.6. Experiment 4 .................................................................................................. 159 
3.6.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 160 
3.6.2. Method .................................................................................................... 161 
3.6.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 161 
3.6.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 161 
3.6.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 162 
3.6.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 162 
3.6.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 163 
3.6.3.1. Pattern of Inference Scores ..................................................................... 164 
3.6.3.2. Negative Conclusion Bias ....................................................................... 167 
3.6.3.3. Role of Plausibility .................................................................................. 169 
3.6.3.4. Other Possible Factors ............................................................................ 171 
3.6.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 173 
3.7. General Discussion ......................................................................................... 176 
4. Contrast Classes in Conditional Inference ............................................................ 179 
4.1. The Contrast Class Account of Negation ....................................................... 179 
4.1.1. Contrast Classes in Reasoning ................................................................ 181 
  
 
 9
4.1.2. Implicit Negations Using Contrast Class Members ................................ 187 
4.1.3. Implicit negation effects and other theories of reasoning ....................... 191 
4.2. Experiment 1 .................................................................................................. 193 
4.2.1. Approach to providing contextual information ....................................... 193 
4.2.2. Predictions ............................................................................................... 195 
4.2.3. Method .................................................................................................... 196 
4.2.3.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 196 
4.2.3.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 196 
4.2.3.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 197 
4.2.3.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 198 
4.2.4. Results ..................................................................................................... 199 
4.2.4.1. Engagement with Learning Phase ........................................................... 201 
4.2.4.2. Participants’ Probability Estimates ......................................................... 204 
4.2.5. Discussion ............................................................................................... 205 
4.3. Experiment 2 .................................................................................................. 206 
4.3.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 207 
4.3.2. Method .................................................................................................... 209 
4.3.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 209 
4.3.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 210 
4.3.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 210 
4.3.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 212 
4.3.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 213 
4.3.3.1. Engagement with Learning Phase ........................................................... 215 
4.3.3.2. Materials Effects ..................................................................................... 218 
4.3.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 220 
4.4. Experiment 3 .................................................................................................. 221 
4.4.1. Predictions ............................................................................................... 222 
4.4.2. Method .................................................................................................... 224 
4.4.2.1. Design ..................................................................................................... 224 
4.4.2.2. Participants .............................................................................................. 225 
4.4.2.3. Materials .................................................................................................. 225 
4.4.2.4. Procedure................................................................................................. 227 
4.4.3. Results ..................................................................................................... 228 
4.4.3.1. Engagement with Learning Phase ........................................................... 230 
  
 
 10
4.4.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 232 
4.5. General Discussion ......................................................................................... 234 
5. Negation in Reasoning – Conclusions and Next Steps ......................................... 236 
5.1. Key Findings .................................................................................................. 236 
5.1.1. Different Types of Negation and Probability .......................................... 236 
5.1.2. Different Types of Negation in Conditional Inference ........................... 238 
5.1.3. Contrast Classes in Conditional Inference .............................................. 240 
5.2. Accounts of Reasoning ................................................................................... 242 
5.2.1. Mental Logics.......................................................................................... 242 
5.2.2. Mental Models ........................................................................................ 244 
5.2.3. Probabilistic Approach ............................................................................ 245 
5.2.4. Multiple Processes .................................................................................. 246 
5.2.5. Alternative Models .................................................................................. 246 
5.3. Next Steps ....................................................................................................... 247 
References ..................................................................................................................... 249 
List of Appendices ........................................................................................................ 260 
Appendix 1. Materials Used in Chapter 2 Experiments ........................................... 261 
A1.1. Experiment 1 .................................................................................................. 261 
A1.1.1. Task Instructions ..................................................................................... 261 
A1.1.2. Task Questions ........................................................................................ 261 
A1.2. Experiment 2 .................................................................................................. 268 
A1.2.1. Task Instructions ..................................................................................... 268 
A1.2.2. Task Questions ........................................................................................ 268 
A1.3. Experiment 3 .................................................................................................. 270 
A1.3.1. Task Instructions for Part 1 ..................................................................... 271 
A1.3.2. Task Questions for Part 1 ........................................................................ 271 
A1.3.3. Task Instructions for Part 2 ..................................................................... 275 
A1.3.4. Task Questions for Part 2 ........................................................................ 276 
Appendix 2. Materials Used in Chapter 3 Experiments ........................................... 281 
A2.1. Experiment 1 .................................................................................................. 281 
A2.1.1. Task Instructions for Part 1 ..................................................................... 281 
A2.1.2. Task Questions for Part 1 ........................................................................ 282 
A2.1.3. Task Instructions for Part 2 ..................................................................... 283 
A2.1.4. Task Questions for Part 2 ........................................................................ 284 
  
 
 11
A2.2. Experiment 2 .................................................................................................. 284 
A2.2.1. Task Instructions ..................................................................................... 285 
A2.2.2. Practice Questions ................................................................................... 286 
A2.2.3. Task Questions ........................................................................................ 287 
A2.3. Experiments 3 and 4 ....................................................................................... 289 
A2.3.1. Task Instructions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 1 .................................. 289 
A2.3.2. Task Questions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 1 ..................................... 290 
A2.3.3. Task Instructions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 2 .................................. 306 
A2.3.4. Task Questions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 2 ..................................... 307 
Appendix 3. Materials Used in Chapter 4 Experiments ........................................... 312 
A3.1. ‘Animals’ Scenario ......................................................................................... 312 
A3.1.1. Task Instructions for Experiment 1 ......................................................... 312 
A3.1.2. Task Instructions for Experiment 2 ......................................................... 315 
A3.1.3. Learning Phase ........................................................................................ 317 
A3.1.4. Inference Questions ................................................................................. 330 
A3.1.5. Verification Task ..................................................................................... 331 
A3.2. ‘Vehicles’ Scenario ........................................................................................ 332 
A3.2.1. Task Instructions ..................................................................................... 332 
A3.2.2. Learning Phase ........................................................................................ 335 
A3.2.3. Inference Questions ................................................................................. 345 
A3.2.4. Verification Task ..................................................................................... 347 
A3.3. ‘Shapes’ Scenario ........................................................................................... 347 
A3.3.1. Task Instructions ..................................................................................... 347 
A3.3.2. Learning Phase ........................................................................................ 350 
A3.3.3. Inference Questions ................................................................................. 359 
A3.3.4. Verification Task ..................................................................................... 361 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 12
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 – Summary of responses to chapter 2, experiment 1 ...................................... 66 
Table 2.2 – Comparing proportion estimates from Bianchi et al. (2011) and present 
experiment ....................................................................................................................... 69 
Table 2.3 – Summary of responses in chapter 2, experiment 2 ...................................... 76 
Table 2.4 – Mean responses to each scenario in chapter 2, experiment 2 ...................... 78 
Table 2.5 – Responses to probability rating tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3 ................ 88 
Table 2.6 – Summary of responses to plausibility tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3 ...... 91 
Table 3.1 – Comparisons between antecedent and consequent polarity conditions ..... 121 
Table 3.2 – Effects of antecedent and consequent negation on plausibility of conditional
 ....................................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 3.3 – Varying polarity conditions ....................................................................... 131 
Table 3.4 – Percentage of inferences endorsed in experiment 2 ................................... 132 
Table 3.5 – Percentage of inferences endorsed using scenario 1 .................................. 135 
Table 3.6 – Percentage of inferences endorsed using scenario 2 .................................. 137 
Table 3.7 – Mean (standard deviation) inference scores by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity ................................................................................... 147 
Table 3.8 – Mean (standard deviation) responses to inference questions in chapter 3, 
experiment 3 .................................................................................................................. 150 
Table 3.9 – Mean plausibility ratings by antecedent polarity and consequent polarity 151 
Table 3.10 – Proportion of responses in each polarity condition allocated to each 
plausibility group .......................................................................................................... 153 
Table 3.11 – Mean (standard deviation) inference scores by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity ................................................................................... 164 
Table 3.12 – Mean (standard deviation) responses to inference questions in chapter 3, 
experiment 4 .................................................................................................................. 168 
Table 3.13 – Mean plausibility ratings of conditionals by antecedent polarity and 
consequent polarity ....................................................................................................... 169 
Table 3.14 – Mean plausibility ratings of antecedent statements by polarity ............... 169 
Table 4.1 – Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) illustrative examples of contingency tables 
for a conditional rule where, e.g. ¬a = {b c} ................................................................. 190 
Table 4.2 – Contextual information provided about animals ........................................ 195 
Table 4.3 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 1 .................................... 200 
  
 
 13
Table 4.4 – Contextual information provided – MP manipulation ............................... 208 
Table 4.5– Contextual information provided – AC manipulation ................................ 209 
Table 4.6 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 2 .................................... 214 
Table 4.7 – Contextual information provided – DA manipulation ............................... 223 
Table 4.8 – Contextual information provided – MT manipulation ............................... 224 
Table 4.9 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 3 .................................... 229 
 
Table A1.1 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 1............................................................. 262 
Table A1.2 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 2............................................................. 269 
Table A1.3 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3, part 1 ................................................. 272 
Table A1.4 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3, part 2 ................................................. 277 
Table A2.1 – Scenarios in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 1 ........................................... 282 
Table A2.2 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 1 ............................ 283 
Table A2.3 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 2 ............................ 284 
Table A2.4 – Scenarios in chapter 3, experiment 2 ...................................................... 288 
Table A2.5 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 2........................................ 288 
Table A2.6 – Scenario introductions in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4 ...................... 292 
Table A2.7 – Inference tasks in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4, part 1 ....................... 294 
Table A2.8 – Inference tasks in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4, part 2 ....................... 308 
Table A3.1 – Learning task stimuli for ‘animals’ scenario ........................................... 318 
Table A3.2 – Inference task stimuli for ‘animals’ scenario .......................................... 331 
Table A3.3 – Learning task stimuli for ‘vehicles’ scenario .......................................... 336 
Table A3.4 – Inference task stimuli for ‘vehicles’ scenario ......................................... 346 
Table A3.5 – Learning task stimuli for ‘shapes’ scenario ............................................ 351 
Table A3.6 – Inference task stimuli for ‘shapes’ scenario ............................................ 360 
 
 
  
  
 
 14
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 – Fernbach and Erb’s (2013) CBNs for (i) simple MP, (ii) extended MP and 
(iii) AC inferences. ........................................................................................................ 106 
Figure 3.2 – Chart showing percentage of inferences by inference and antecedent 
polarity in experiment 1. ............................................................................................... 119 
Figure 3.3 – Chart showing mean plausibility ratings by antecedent and consequent 
polarities in experiment 1. ............................................................................................. 120 
Figure 3.4 – Chart showing percentage of inferences by inference and antecedent 
polarity in experiment 2 (combined scenarios). ............................................................ 133 
Figure 3.5 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity 
(scenario 1). ................................................................................................................... 136 
Figure 3.6 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity 
(scenario 1). ................................................................................................................... 137 
Figure 3.7 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity 
on inference responses in experiment 3. ....................................................................... 148 
Figure 3.8 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity 
on inference responses in experiment 3. ....................................................................... 149 
Figure 3.9 – Chart showing interaction between antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity on inference responses in experiment 3. .......................................................... 149 
Figure 3.10 – Chart showing interaction effect between antecedent and consequent 
polarity on probability ratings of conditionals in experiment 3. ................................... 152 
Figure 3.11 – Chart showing mean inference responses in experiment 3 by inference 
type and standard negation paradigm conditional formats. .......................................... 156 
Figure 3.12 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity 
on inference responses in experiment 4. ....................................................................... 166 
Figure 3.13 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity 
on inference responses in experiment 4. ....................................................................... 166 
Figure 3.14 – Chart showing interaction between antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity on inference responses in experiment 4. .......................................................... 167 
Figure 3.15 – Chart showing interaction effect between antecedent and consequent 
polarity on probability ratings of conditionals in experiment 4. ................................... 171 
Figure 3.16 – Chart showing mean inference responses in experiment 4 by inference 
type and standard negation paradigm conditional formats. .......................................... 174 
  
 
 15
Figure 4.1 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for MP and AC Inferences of 
Participants that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 1. .......................................... 204 
Figure 4.2 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for MP and AC Inferences of 
Participants that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 2. .......................................... 218 
Figure 4.3 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for DA and MT Inferences of 
Participants that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 3. .......................................... 232 
 
  
  
 
 16
1. Conditional Reasoning Biases and Negation  
In everyday life, people need to infer the unknown from the known. They need to 
consider the facts that they know and draw conclusions on which basis they can act. For 
example, a person may know that if they flick a light switch, a light will come on. 
Based on this rule, they act to turn on the switch based on the conclusion that the light 
will come on. As this example illustrates, potentially the most important form of 
reasoning uses conditionals, sentences of the form ‘if p, then q’ (Oaksford & Chater, 
2010). Conditional sentences and the inferences they licence can be defined logically. 
However, human reasoning often shows biases that are inconsistent with the classical 
logic interpretation of the conditional (Manktelow, 2012). Some have suggested that 
such results undermine the assumption that humans are rational (Stich, 1985) but others 
suggest that the biases are consistent with alternative standards of rationality (Oaksford 
& Chater, 1994). Understanding how people reason with conditionals is therefore 
central to our understanding of humans as an animal capable of rational thought, as 
Aristotle argued.   
 
Several biases observed in conditional reasoning are associated with the use of 
negations (e.g., Evans, 1972a; Evans, 1977). Negation is a concept that has a clear 
meaning in classical logic but a range of different implications in everyday natural 
language (Horn, 1989).  
 
The present study aims to explore the effects that the use of negation has on conditional 
reasoning and what they can tell us about how people reason.  
 
In this initial chapter, I will discuss the background to the present study. Firstly, I will 
discuss prior research in conditional reasoning and what previous studies involving 
negation in conditional inferences have found. I will consider the different models that 
have been proposed to account for the biases observed in human reasoning. I will then 
describe some different accounts of negation and how prior research has explored the 
processing of negation. Finally, I will set out the structure of the current thesis and 
outline the approach that the present research will take. 
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1.1. Conditional Reasoning 
Conditional sentences describe a relationship between two propositions in which one 
proposition must be true if the other is true. Being able to describe and use such 
relationships is crucial to understanding of causal structures (e.g. If I flick the switch, the 
light will come on), law-like behaviour (e.g. If Gill buys lunch at Pret, she gets a 
cappuccino), conditional promises (e.g. If you give me a lift tonight, you can keep the 
car for the rest of the week), regulations (e.g. If you drive, you must be aged at least 17) 
and alternative possibilities (e.g. If it had not rained, Button would have won the race) 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2010). People need to be able to understand and use the 
relationships codified in conditional sentences to draw inferences about states of affairs 
that go beyond the known premises.  Conditional rules are expressed in different, 
logically equivalent, forms including ‘if p then q’, ‘p only if q’, ‘q if p’ or symbolically 
as ‘p  q’. According to classical logic, material conditionals are truth functions (‘if p 
then q’ is false only if p is true and q is false, otherwise it is true).  
 
Several tasks have been used to look at how people use conditionals in reasoning, 
asking them to evaluate, construct or select terms in a conditional inference. In a rule of 
the form ‘if p then q’, the p term is referred to as the antecedent and the q term as the 
consequent. 
 
Evaluation (or verification) tasks often provide participants with an inference (which 
consists of: the major premise – the conditional sentence; the minor premise – a 
proposition related to either the antecedent or consequent; and, a conclusion – a 
proposition about the other term not referenced in the minor premise). They ask 
participants whether they would endorse the conclusion or not. For example, using 
abstract materials, Evans (1977) presented two statements like ‘If the letter is G, then 
the number is not 9’ and ‘The number is not 9’ and a conclusion like ‘The letter is G’. 
In each task, participants were asked to decide whether the conclusion followed from 
the premises. Four forms of inference have typically been investigated using 
conditionals: Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus Tollens (MT), which are valid forms of 
inference under classical logic, and invalid forms Denying the Antecedent (DA) and 
Affirming the Consequent (AC). These take the following logical forms (symbolically 
‘’ is used to negate the following proposition and ‘∴’ means ‘therefore’): 
  
 
 18
 MP: p  q, p ∴ q 
 MT: p  q,  q ∴ p 
 DA: p  q,  p ∴ q 
 AC: p  q, q ∴ p 
While DA and AC are not valid inferences based on conditionals, the premises do not 
preclude the conclusions occurring (they are simply insufficient to infer the given 
conclusion, although see §1.2.2 below for a discussion of the biconditional 
interpretation of conditional relationships). While there are other valid and invalid 
inferences, some combinations of conditional, additional premise and conclusion have a 
conclusion that is mutually exclusive of the premises (e.g. p  q, p ∴ q) or irrelevant 
(e.g. p  q, p ∴r).  
 
Construction (or generation) tasks present participants with part of an inference (often 
as part of a truth table) and invite them to suggest conditions that would complete the 
inference. For example, Evans (1972a) gave participants a conditional such as ‘If there 
is a red triangle on the left then there is not a green square on the right’ and sixteen 
cards representing four different shapes each of four different colours. They were either 
instructed to construct a case which made the conditional true or instructed to construct 
a case which falsified the conditional and were expected to take two cards and place 
them together in an appropriate form. So, to show a case in which the example rule was 
true, the card representing the red triangle might be placed to the left of the card 
representing the blue circle. To falsify the rule, the participant could place the card 
representing the green square to the right of that representing the red triangle. Similar 
materials are also used in an alternative form of evaluation task which presents 
participants with a rule and stimulus that relates to the rule. Participants then say 
whether the stimulus confirmed or falsified the rule (e.g. Marcus & Rips, 1979). 
 
Selection tasks provide a participant with options that they should choose to meet the 
terms of an inference. For example, Wason’s (1968) selection task provided participants 
with four cards and told them that each card had a letter on one side and a number on 
the other. Two of the cards had letters on the sides facing the participant (e.g. ‘E’ and 
‘K’) and the other two had numbers (e.g. ‘3’ and ‘8’). Participants were given a 
conditional relating what was on each side of a card (like, ‘if there is an E on one side 
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then there is a 3 on the other’) and asked to select the cards that they would need to turn 
over to prove that the conditional was true or false. Using classical logic, you need to 
check the cards which could potentially falsify the conditional to show that it is true 
(Popper, 1959). In this example, classical logic suggests that participants should select 
the ‘E’ card and ‘8’ card. Each of these cards would falsify the conditional if they had a 
‘3’ or ‘E’ respectively on their reverse sides. 
 
Logical terms are normally used to define conditional sentences. Researchers might, 
therefore, expect participants to provide a logical response to each of these tasks. 
However, studies have often shown systematic biases in responses which do not reflect 
expectations based on classical logic. 
1.2. Systematic Biases in Conditional Reasoning 
If human reasoning in conditional inference evaluation tasks followed the tenants of 
classical logic, we would expect to see people consistently endorse MP and MT 
inferences and consistently reject DA and AC inferences. However, this pattern is rarely 
observed in experimental results. In a meta-analysis of experimental evaluation tasks, 
Schroyens, Shaeken and d’Ydewalle (2001) found that, while endorsement of abstract 
MP inferences did approach the ceiling (96.8%, as expected based on classical logic), 
MT inferences were endorsed only 74.2% of the time. Schroyens et al. (2001) also 
showed that DA inferences were endorsed more than half of the time (56.0%) and 
endorsement of AC inferences (64.0%) approached the level of MT endorsement – 
despite classical logic suggesting that DA and AC endorsements should approach zero. 
Therefore classical logic cannot fully account for all the biases that people demonstrate 
biases in responses to reasoning questions. 
 
Similarly, in Wason’s (1968) selection task, only a minority of participants routinely 
choose both cards required to test the truth of the rule and no others.  Oaksford and 
Chater (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of studies using the selection task and found 
that while 89% chose the card equivalent to the ‘E’ card in the above example, only 
25% chose the also required card equivalent to ‘8’ in the example. They also found that 
16% of participants would turn over the card equivalent to ‘K’ and 62% would turn over 
the card equivalent to ‘3’. This result could be an example of confirmation bias – where 
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people select cards that might provide confirmatory evidence of the conditional rather 
than the cards which could falsify it (as is required to show the rule is true). 
1.2.1. Biases Involving Negation 
There are also two well-established effects that are related to the negation of 
propositions in conditional reasoning tasks: matching bias (Evans, 1972a; Evans & 
Lynch, 1973); and, negative conclusion bias (Evans, 1977). 
1.2.1.1. Matching Bias 
Evans (1972a) first noticed that people showed a bias in participants’ response to 
conditional reasoning questions towards answers that matched the terms used in the 
question. Evans (1972a) conducted a truth table task in which participants were 
provided with a condition rule and were asked either to generate an example showing 
the rule is true or an example falsifying the rule. The task used rules like ‘If there is a 
red triangle on the left, then there is not a green square on the right’. Participants saw a 
4x4 matrix of figures of different shapes (circle, triangle, cross, square) and colours 
(red, yellow, green, blue) from which to generate responses. Participants showed a 
tendency to select coloured shapes named in the rule (so, in the example given the red 
triangle and green square) and use them in their responses. For example, almost all 
participants provided responses intended to verify all of the rules which reflected the 
terms of the rules. So, the coloured shape described by the rule where the rule used an 
affirmative proposition and a different coloured shape where it used a negative 
proposition (e.g. a red triangle on the left and blue circle on the right being used to 
verify the example rule above). The only exception to this in the verification tasks were 
two participants (out of 24) who verified rules of the form ‘if not p then not q’ with 
responses representing propositions p and q (which is also consistent with the rule being 
true). This tendency to match the terms of the rule was more pronounced when 
participants gave examples to falsify the rule. A correct falsification of the rule requires 
the choice of a coloured shape consistent with the antecedent and another inconsistent 
with the consequent (e.g. a red triangle on the left and green square on the right would 
correctly falsify the example rule above). Participants were significantly less likely to 
provide a correct falsification when the antecedent was negative (i.e. they picked 
examples that matched the positive version of the antecedent). Participants were 
significantly more likely to provide a correct example falsifying the rule where the 
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consequent was negative (i.e. they picked examples that matched the positive versions 
of the consequent).  
 
Matching bias has also been observed in tests based on Wason’s (1968) selection task 
paradigm. Evans and Lynch (1973) conducted an abstract selection task experiment. As 
with Evans’ (1972a) truth table task, this task used abstract conditional rules (of the 
form ‘if p then q’) which systematically presented affirmative and negated antecedent 
and consequent terms. As with all selection tasks, they provided participants with cards 
representing the true antecedent (p where the antecedent is affirmative and not-p where 
it is negative), the false antecedent (not-p and p where the antecedent is affirmative and 
negative respectively), the true consequent (q and not-q where the consequent is 
affirmative and negative respectively) and the false consequent (not-q and q where the 
consequent is affirmative and negative respectively). They anticipated a matching bias 
in which participants would be more likely to choose the cards representing p and q in 
preference to the cards representing not-p and not-q respectively. This drove the specific 
predictions that: the card representing the true antecedent would be picked more where 
an antecedent was affirmative than where it was negative; the card representing the false 
antecedent case would be more selected where the antecedent was negative than where 
it is affirmative; the card representing the true consequent would be picked more where 
a consequent was affirmative than where it was negative; and, the card representing the 
false consequent case would be more selected where the consequent was negative than 
where it is affirmative.  Their results were consistent with these predictions. Similar to 
Evans (1972a) truth table results, Evans and Lynch’s (1973) results suggest a bias 
towards the selection of cards which match affirmative versions of the conditional’s 
terms. This bias shows that participants are not responding in a logically equivalent way 
to each condition.  
 
Subsequent research has shown that the matching tendency in truth table and selection 
tasks are robust phenomena (Evans, 1998). Using conditional rules of the form ‘p only 
if q’ or ‘q if p’ instead of ‘if p then q’ also yields matching bias (Evans, Clibbens & 
Rood, 1996). However, no similar matching effect is observed in disjunctive reasoning 
which uses rules like ‘It is either p or q’ (Evans & Newstead, 1980). Experiments have 
shown that naturalistic materials, like ‘If I finish my work, then I'll be home in time for 
dinner’, can reduce or remove matching bias (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992) although 
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matching bias is still observed where the naturalistic materials lack context (e.g. 
Manktelow & Evans, 1979).  
 
These observations of a matching bias show that people do not respond to conditional 
reasoning tasks using rules with negation in a logically equivalent way to tasks using 
entirely affirmative rules. For example, classical logic would require people to falsify 
the conditionals given in Evans’ (1972a) truth table task by giving examples that 
affirmed that antecedent and contradicted the consequent. Participants were 
significantly less likely to correctly falsify the conditional where antecedents were 
negative and more likely to correctly falsify the rule where consequents were 
affirmative suggesting a tendency to match terms in a manner inconsistent with classical 
logic. 
1.2.1.2. Negative Conclusion Bias 
Roberge (1971) used conditional inference evaluation questions which asked whether 
given inferences (each with an abstract rule, minor premise and conclusion) were valid.   
The rules systematically varied the negation of the antecedent and consequent terms. 
The minor premise and conclusion either created a valid MP inference or an incorrect 
inference form with the opposite conclusion (of the form p  q, p ∴ q). Roberge’s 
(1971) results showed more errors when participants were expected to deny an inference 
of the form  p  q,  p ∴ q than the logical equivalent with an affirmative 
conclusion (p   q, p ∴ q). Similarly, participants made more errors where they were 
expected to endorse an affirmative conclusion in inferences of the form  p  q,  p 
∴ q than the logically equivalent form with a negative conclusion (p   q, p ∴  
q). These results suggest that people are more inclined to endorse a conclusion with a 
negation in it than the logically equivalent affirmative conclusion. A similar bias was 
demonstrated by Evans (1972b) using MT and AC inferences in an evaluation task. 
Evans (1972b) presented conditionals about letters and numbers with affirmative and 
consequent polarities systematically and minor premises related to the consequent. For 
example, forms like ‘If the letter is not G then the number is 9’ and ‘Not 9’ were used to 
describe the conditional  p  q, and minor premise  q. Participants were given a 
choice of p,  p and indeterminate and asked which represented the appropriate 
conclusion (e.g. in the example, the choices would have been ‘G’, ‘Not G’ and 
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‘indeterminate’). Evans (1972b) found that the conclusion required to endorse MT 
inferences was selected significantly less where the conclusion required was affirmative 
than where it was negative. For example, participants selected  p as a response to p  
 q, q and p  q,  q more frequently than they selected p as a response to  p  q,  
q and  p   q, q. Similarly, the conclusion required to endorse AC inferences was 
selected significantly more where the conclusion required was negative than where it 
was affirmative. So, participants selected  p as a response to  p   q,  q and  p 
 q, q more frequently than they selected p as a response to p  q, q and p   q,  
q.  
 
Evans (1977) investigated this apparent bias using all four types of conditional 
inferences (MP, MT, AC and DA) with abstract conditional rules that systematically 
varied the polarity of the antecedent and consequent terms (i.e. ‘if p then q’, ‘if not p 
then q’, ‘if p then not q’ and ‘if not p then not q’). Each trial asked a participant in one 
of two groups (one group used rules in the ‘if p then q’ form while the other used the ‘p 
only if q’ form) whether they would endorse the conclusion which followed the rule and 
a minor premise. There were no differences between the polarity conditions in the level 
of MP inference endorsement, which appeared at ceiling. AC, MT and DA inferences 
were more likely to be endorsed when the conclusion was negative for the group that 
used the ‘if p then q’ form. However, there were no differences in AC, MT and DA 
inference levels where participants saw the ‘p only if q’ form.  
 
Further research has shown that this observation of negative conclusion bias is robust 
(e.g. Pollard and Evans, 1980). Evans, Clibbens & Rood (1995) used large samples of 
participants (at least 42 in each group) to demonstrate a highly significant bias for DA 
and MT inferences (although not MP or AC where endorsement responses often 
approached the ceiling). They observed this effect when using all of the ‘if p then q’, ‘p 
only if q’ and ‘q if p’ forms of the conditional. Evans, Clibbens & Rood (1995) found 
no evidence that this negative conclusion bias reduced when they used naturalistic 
materials.  
 
The consistent observation of a negative conclusion bias in conditional inference 
evaluation tasks suggests that the use of negation does have an impact on participants’ 
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responses. Whether participants find a negative conclusion easier to understand or 
harder to deny (Evans, 1972b) than the equivalent affirmatives, it is clear that people 
have a complex interpretation of negative form which go beyond the single, simple 
operator suggested by classical logic.  
1.2.2. Conditional or Biconditional? 
Conditional statements could be confused with biconditional statements. A 
biconditional rule (written as ‘if and only if p then q’ or in logical form ‘p ↔ q’) 
functions as the intersection of two conditionals: (i) ‘if p then q’ and (ii) ‘if q then p’. If 
a biconditional relationship is used in place of a conditional relationship between two 
propositions: an AC inference of the form (i) is equivalent to a MP inference of form 
(ii); and, similarly, DA with (i) is equivalent to MT with (ii). Therefore, both AC and 
DA inferences are valid under a biconditional interpretation of a conditional. It is, 
therefore, possible that the endorsement of AC and DA observed in previous studies 
could be because some participants interpret the conditional statements as biconditional 
statements. 
 
Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973) observed that 64% of their participants made 
consistent conditional inference evaluation judgements in line with a biconditional 
interpretation of a conditional rule. However, when participants were allowed to 
indicate that a conclusion was ‘always true’, ‘sometimes but not always true’ or ‘never 
true’ (rather than having to label a conclusion as ‘true’ or ‘false’), only 15% consistently 
gave responses implying a biconditional interpretation. This second task increased the 
number of participants consistently responding in line with propositional logic from 3% 
in the earlier task to 36%. However, the majority of participants were still not 
consistently responding according to the tenants of propositional logic which suggests 
that systematic biases are not simply due to a substantial proportion of participants 
making biconditional interpretations.  
 
Subsequent studies have confirmed that, while biconditional interpretations of 
conditional relationships can be made (e.g. Markovits, 1988), conditional reasoning 
biases are not simply caused by a proportion of participants making biconditional 
interpretations of conditional rules (e.g. Wildman & Fletcher, 1977; Marcus & Rips, 
1979; Rumain, Connell & Braine, 1983). A more sophisticated account of human 
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reasoning is therefore required to explain the discrepancy between participants’ 
responses to reasoning tasks and the responses predicted by classical propositional 
logic.  
1.3. Accounts of Reasoning  
Researchers have proposed a range of models to explain reasoning biases (Manktelow, 
2012). These include accounts which regard classical logic as the normative standard 
for human reasoning. These explain biases in terms of characteristics of the algorithms 
that the accounts suggest are used in human reasoning to approximate classical logic. 
Such accounts include those based on mental logic processes (e.g. Braine & O’Brian, 
1991, and Rips, 1994) and the representation of propositions using mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Shaeken, 1992). Other accounts suggest that a different 
normative standard should be used to understand human reasoning (such as probability 
theory, Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Finally, some models combine different systems or 
processes in an account of human reasoning (such as Evans’, 1984, 2006, heuristic-
analytic or dual-process approach).  
 
Any account of people’s reasoning will seek to account for observed results. The model 
can be evaluated based on its power to explain the observations considered in its 
development and its ability to predict further results. Beyond this, a full account of 
reasoning should be coherent and plausible. Marr (1982) set out three levels on which 
we can understand complex information-processing systems: Computational; 
Algorithmic; and Implementation. A computational level account provides the 
theoretical goal of a process and explains why it is appropriate. An algorithmic (or 
representational) account considers how the computational theory is implemented 
through a representation of the input and output and algorithm through which the 
transformation is achieved. Finally, an implementation account shows how the 
algorithmic account is physically realised. Marr (1982) argued that a complete account 
of a complex information-processing system in cognitive psychology must address all 
three levels.  
 
Algorithmic-level accounts of cognitive processes are required to show how people may 
understand inputs and then process them to deliver an output. Most accounts of 
reasoning seek in the first instance to provide a model at the algorithmic level. 
  
 
 26
 
People physically process information in their brains and therefore a full account of 
human information processing should ultimately address the brain’s operation. 
However, an account of cognitive processes at the biological level is complex and a lack 
of a full biological explanation should not preclude the proposal of algorithmic and 
computational level accounts. In the absence of sufficient information about how the 
brain implements a process, the proposed model should at least be plausible given what 
we know about operations within the brain.  
 
A computational level theory may not be as obviously necessary as an implementation 
and algorithmic account, but it is important to understand what an information-
processing activity is seeking to achieve. A computational account provides an account 
of why a process exists where the algorithmic account explains how the process could 
work. We can only judge the effectiveness of a process against a standard which reflects 
the process’s purpose. A computational account should motivate an algorithmic 
account. Without a computational account, we cannot see whether an algorithmic 
account provides consistency or fully understand the process. For example, a heuristic 
might provide a good match to some experimental data but, without clarity of what 
motivates the reasoning processes that underpin the data, we cannot tell whether the 
heuristic provides an accurate algorithmic account. It may be that the heuristic matches 
some data by chance but may extend to other tasks. Oaksford and Chater (1995) have 
sought to apply Marr’s (1982) framework to reasoning, arguing that deference to 
classical logic is inadequate as a computational-level account. 
1.3.1. Mental Logics 
Some accounts of reasoning use classical logic as both the computational level account 
and also the basis of their algorithmic model (e.g. Braine & O’Brien, 1991, and Rips, 
1994). These approaches suggest the human cognitive system implements a classical 
logic at the algorithmic level, but memory and processing capacity constraints limit this 
system. The resulting divergences between internal logic and classical logic explain 
reasoning biases like those discussed above (O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010).  
 
Braine and O’Brien (1991) provide a model for the treatment of conditional statements 
based on a mental logic. The model uses inference schema supposedly linked to the 
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lexical entry for ‘if…’. This schema provides a rule for MP and the schema for 
conditional proof. The schema for conditional proof states that the form ‘If p then …’ is 
derived and evaluated by assuming p and allowing the assertion of ‘if p then q’ for any 
proposition q that is suggested by other assumed information. In this mental logic, 
Braine and O’Brien (1991) suggest that the rule for MP is applied straightforwardly. 
However, other inferences require a more sophisticated process which combines the 
schema for conditional proof with other inferences. For example, Braine and O’Brien 
(1991) suggest that MT inferences can be verified as correct either through a simple 
process (mistakenly interpreting the conditional as a biconditional – see §1.2.2 – and 
applying the MP process) or a complex process (constructing a reductio ad absurdum 
argument – e.g. to evaluate p when told that ‘if p then q’ and ‘q is false’ you would need 
to reason "if p were true, then q would have to be true, but it is not, so p must be false"). 
However, the usual intermediate process in their model which would be applied where 
people reject a biconditional interpretation but do not develop the complex argument is 
inconclusive (which would restrict MT endorsement). The need for a complex process 
to correctly solve MT problems (unless biconditionality is incorrectly assumed), 
explains why endorsement levels as typically much lower than for MP – even though 
both are logically correct. 
 
Similarly, Rips (1994) proposes the ‘Psychology of Proof’ (PSYCOP) model of 
reasoning which provides for a series of rules and a system to apply them. For example, 
a rule called ‘Backward IF Elimination’ is equivalent to MP. Inconsistencies in 
responses to reasoning tasks occur because some rules are more likely to be applied than 
others. As with Braine and O’Brien’s (1991) approach, there is no single rule equivalent 
to MT.  
 
Both of these models, therefore, have an explanation for the basic bias observed in 
conditional inference evaluation task, the low endorsement of MT compared to MP 
despite both being equally logically valid. Similar biases can also be explained using 
these models through limitations and constraints on the internal logic that does not 
apply to classical logic (Braine & O’Brien, 1991; Rips, 1994, chapter 5). However, by 
assuming that conditional reasoning tasks are treated as problems to be solved using 
internal logical processes, these models have a harder time accounting for differences in 
responses to logically equivalent tasks. For example, how would the same flawed 
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internal logic create context effects like the tendency for responses to naturalistic 
materials to be more in line with classical logic than for responses to abstract materials 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002)? It is similarly unclear how these models could account 
for the systematic biases observed when using negations.  
 
Noveck and O’Brien (1996) have sought to address these questions by proposing that, 
in some contexts, pragmatic reasoning schemas interact with Braine and O’Brien’s 
(1991) model. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that people reason using ‘pragmatic 
reasoning schemas’, abstract knowledge structures derived from experiences such as 
‘permissions’, ‘obligations’ and ‘causations’. For example, a permission schema would 
apply where meeting a precondition was required before an action could be carried out. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) suggested that a permission schema, for example, would 
suggest the following rules relating antecedent and consequent terms in conditions as a 
precondition and action respectively: 
 If the action is taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
 If the action is not taken, then the pre-condition need not be satisfied. 
 If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
 If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) conducted two experiments with conditions that emphasised 
the potential permissive meaning of conditional rules or provided the conditional rules 
without that emphasis. Participants then used the conditional rules in tasks using 
Wason’s (1968) selection paradigm. The emphasis on the permissive meaning 
significantly increased the number of participants selecting the logically correct cards 
(61% selected the logically correct cards in their second experiment when the 
permissive meaning was emphasised in a task with abstract materials compared to 19% 
when the task used more traditional framing). This is in line with participants making 
use of a permission schema as hypothesised. Noveck and O’Brien (1996) criticised the 
task and suggested that the enriched features of the pragmatic schema task and 
relatively impoverished control confounded the results. Their experiments suggested 
that the permission schema itself did not account for much of the improved performance 
demonstrated on the task. However, they did suggest that in some contexts such schema 
may provide participants with the ability to evaluate more inferences correctly 
according to classical logic than Braine and O’Brien’s (1991) mental logic process 
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alone. Rips (1994) also attempts to address negation effects within the PSYCOP model. 
He suggests additional rules for the processing of negation that interact with the other 
rules to produce biases. The use of pragmatic schemas or additional rules potentially 
extends mental logic accounts to cover content, context and negation effects. However, 
it remains that case that these theories greatest predictive power in conditional reasoning 
tasks is over the more basic biases (like higher endorsement of MP than MT).  
 
The internal logical processes within mental logic accounts provide an algorithmic-level 
explanation of reasoning processes. At the computational-level, they all assume that 
reasoning aims to emulate classical deductive logic. One could, therefore, describe 
reasoning biases as flaws within the representation and processing of the task which 
constrain people’s ability to carry out full logical reasoning.  
1.3.2. Mental Models 
The mental models approach (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992) recognises that 
classical logic may not be the most appropriate model for everyday reasoning. As its 
computational-level aim, mental models theory assumes that people reason by using the 
meaning of premises, and general knowledge, to imagine the possibilities under 
consideration (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). At the algorithmic level, it sets out how 
these possibilities are represented by the ‘models’ people generate. 
 
The mental models over which this approach suggests people reason each represents a 
possibility or set of possibilities in which each of the assertions in the model is true 
(Johnson Laird & Byrne, 2002). Each model represents a clause in the premises only 
when the clause is true within the possibility set out in the model. A model is analogous 
to a diagram with structures which represent the structure of a particular possibility 
(although models can also be used to represent possibilities which consist of abstract 
concepts that cannot be visualised, Johnson-Laird, 2008).  Creating models consumes 
time and retaining them in working memory consumes limited capacity. Therefore, the 
mental models theory anticipates that inferences requiring fewer models will be more 
readily made and endorsed than inferences requiring the evaluation of models 
representing all possibilities.  
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The mental models approach anticipates that a person doing a conditional reasoning 
problem will initially consider models which satisfy the antecedent terms of a rule 
(Johnson Laird & Byrne, 2002). Given a rule of the form ‘if p then q’, a person will first 
generate a model which represents the possibility of ‘p and q’. This model is 
represented as follows (the squared brackets indicate that p is ‘exhausted’ and that it 
cannot appear in any other models because it cannot appear without q; the ellipsis 
indicates that other models, not yet generated, are possible): 
 
[p]  q 
… 
 
This initial model alone would allow a person to make or endorse a MP inference 
because it shows the only available possibility when p is true is one where q is also true. 
Someone using this model at a very simple level – for example, to avoid the time and 
memory resources required to generate further models – may not take into account that 
q has not been exhausted and make or endorse an AC inference. This initial model does 
not provide enough information about the available possibilities to facilitate MT 
inferences. Someone wanting to test an MT inference would need to generate the 
‘implicit models’ which represent the other allowed possibilities. The initial and 
implicit models are as follows: 
 
[p]  q 
 p  [ q] 
 p  q 
 
Someone using the initial model and the first implicit model in a primitive way (not 
reflecting that  p is not exhausted by the first implicit model) could also make DA 
inferences. The final model needs to be generated to show that DA and AC are false. 
 
Mental models theory, therefore, provides a plausible account of lower MT than MP 
inference as MP inferences can be drawn using an initial model while MT inferences 
require an implicit model. The theory also shows how a person who did not fully spell 
out all possibilities in models could make AC and DA inferences.  
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Mental models theory integrates ‘the principle of semantic modulation’ and the 
‘principle of pragmatic modulation’ (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). The former 
principle allows the meaning associated with antecedent and consequent clauses, and 
information known about the link between them, to affect the development of models. 
The latter principle states that contextual knowledge related to propositions in a 
conditional is normally represented in explicit models. These principals both propose 
that semantic and pragmatic information can be added to models, suppress the 
generation of otherwise acceptable models or enable the construction of a full set of 
models. For example, given the conditional ‘if you turn the key, then the car will start’ 
and the contextual information, ‘if there is no fuel the car cannot start’, the generation of 
a model representing the possibility ‘you turn the key, there is no fuel and the car starts’ 
will be suppressed. Mental models theory uses these principals to account for a range of 
content and context effects.  
 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) also seek to explain the commonly observed negation 
effects using mental models theory. They suggest that negative conclusions are easier to 
derive from mental models than affirmative conclusions (which requires resolution of 
double negations occurring in the models) which may account for negative conclusion 
bias. They seek to explain the observed matching bias on the basis that it is hard to 
understand one that assertion (like “The number is nine”) refutes another (like “The 
number is four”). As mental models represent true assertions, people tend to select items 
based on the terms in the initial mental model – and not necessarily items which reflect 
assertions that should refute those terms.  
 
The mental models approach can, therefore, provide a plausible account for a diverse 
range of experimental data (Johnson-Laird, 2008). However, there remain questions that 
it cannot address. For example, given the apparent constraints on quick model 
generation and model retention, how do people apply the principles of semantic and 
pragmatic modulation which appear to require consideration of many more models – 
particularly if subtle differences in interpretation need to be addressed?  
 
The mental models approach also provides an algorithmic account of reasoning that 
assumes that at the computational level people reason over possibilities generated using 
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information in front of them and wider knowledge. The approach explains how capacity 
constraints lead to responses that reflect different experimental findings. However, it is 
not clear how the computational level aim would motivate this quite specific 
algorithmic approach. The theory draws on some detailed principles and other caveats 
on different occasions to explain different results. There would also appear to be a risk 
with this approach that the theory is insufficiently constrained in its flexibility because a 
computational level theory cannot motivate the algorithmic model. It could then be 
adapted to address different results in ways that may have limited computational 
justification.  
1.3.3. Probabilistic Approach 
Classical logic typically deals with propositions and inferences that are certain and 
indefeasible. However, people often deal with uncertain situations and it may often be 
right to overturn a prior conclusion given new information. Oaksford and Chater (1991) 
argued that the need to allow for uncertainty and defeasibility suggested that that 
classical logic may not provide the best computational level theory of human reasoning. 
The probabilistic approach, therefore, proposes probability theory – which provides a 
calculus for uncertainty rather that indefeasible conclusions based on full information – 
as a more suitable model for a computational level theory of human reasoning 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2001).  
 
Under the probabilistic approach, responses to reasoning problems that are apparently 
illogical occur because participants use reasoning strategies which reflect probability 
theory (which better suits their everyday experiences) rather than classical logic. For 
example, the probabilistic approach suggests, in responding to the selection task, the 
inference process may aim to pursue the best chance of getting the greatest reduction of 
uncertainty about the truth of the rule (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). This means that, 
rather than using an approach to reasoning that aims to yield the correct answer in 
classical logic, people use an approach that is likely to provide the greatest information. 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) supported this theory by showing that a model based on 
optimal data selection predicted matching bias and provided a good fit for data from 
previous selection task studies.  
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Oaksford, Chater and Larkin (2000) extended the probabilistic account to cover 
conditional inference tasks. They predicted that the level of endorsement of a given 
inference would correlate with participants’ perceived likelihood that the inference is 
true, given what they knew. Therefore, their model considers how people would assign 
probabilities to propositions p and q used in a rule of the form ‘if p then q’. The key 
parameters required in the model are the conditional probability of q occurring given p 
has occurred (written ‘P(qǀp)’), the probability of q not occurring (written ‘P(q)’) and 
the probability of p occurring (written ‘P(p)’). The model sets the following parameters: 
 
P(qǀp) = a This can be represented as ‘P(qǀp) = 1 – ϵ’ where ‘ϵ’ represents 
the probability of exceptional circumstances under the 
conditional where q does not occur despite p occurring. 
P(q) = b 
P(p) = c 
 
Using these parameters, the model includes conditional probabilities derived for each 
inference.  
 
MP P(qǀp) = a 
DA P(qǀp) = (b – (1 – a)c) / (1 – c) 
AC P(pǀq) = (ac) / (1 – b) 
MT P(pǀq) = (b – (1 – a)c) / b 
 
Oaksford et al. (2000) conducted several experiments in which the probabilities of 
propositions in conditional inference tasks were varied. Responses were consistent with 
the probabilistic model’s predictions.  
 
As with the optimal data selection account of the selection task, the probabilistic 
account of conditional inference predicts the commonly observed negation effects. 
These predictions use the assumption that a negated proposition has a much higher 
probability of being true than the non-negated original proposition. The contrast class 
account of negation, which will be discussed further below (Oaksford & Stenning, 
1992), informs this assumption.   
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The probabilistic approach, therefore, provides a computational level account that 
would predict the standard reasoning biases and effects associated with negation in 
conditional reasoning tasks. It is also easier to account for revised understandings of the 
likelihood of propositions using probability logic than classical logic so content and 
context effects can be explained as functions of the computational level theory rather 
than necessitating the introduction of additional representational principles, schemas or 
heuristics (Oaksford & Chater, 2007).   
 
Accounts that treat classical logic as the computational level model have well developed 
algorithmic theories which the probabilistic account initially lacked. However, the 
development of Causal Bayesian Networks applied to artificial intelligence has 
provided an algorithmic account which applies probabilities to reasoning (e.g. Pearl, 
2000; Sloman, 2005). An algorithmic account that uses Causal Bayesian Networks and 
is consistent with the probabilistic account may better predict reasoning responses than 
the mental models approach (e.g. Ali, Chater & Oaksford, 2011).  
1.3.4. Multiple Processes 
Some accounts of human reasoning and the observed reasoning biases suggest that it 
may involve the interaction of two or more processes (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
 
One dual-process approach is the Heuristic-Analytic Theory proposed by Evans (1984). 
This theory suggests that reasoning uses an analytical process capable of drawing 
inferences but that this is dependent on initial pre-attentive heuristic processes. These 
heuristic processes select ‘relevant’ information. Matching bias is therefore explained 
using this theory as caused by the heuristic processes identifying matching cards as 
relevant rather than as a failure of analytic reasoning (Evans, 1984). Evans (2006) 
updated this theory, replacing the simple serial structure of the earlier version with 
greater interaction between analytic and heuristic systems. The analytic processes are 
still dependent on heuristic processes but three principles are applied which mediate 
those processes:  the singularity principle – that people only consider one hypothetical 
possibility at a time; the relevance principle – people consider the most relevant model 
of the current context; and the satisficing principle – that models are accepted if they 
satisfy current goals. Evans’ (2006) revised theory still accounts for matching bias with 
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reference to heuristic processes which satisfy a person’s need for an answer before 
completing a full analysis. However, it better reflects content and context effects 
through its additional principles.  
 
Other dual-process models make a similar separation of processing systems. Sloman 
(1996) divides reasoning processes between an associative system (which provides 
outputs based on similarity and temporal structure) and a formal system based on 
logical rules. Epstein (1994) provides a model which incorporates psychoanalytic ideas 
by proposing separate experiential and rational systems.  
 
Stanovich and West (2000) reviewed a range of dual-process approaches. They 
suggested that many models made a distinction between an associative, automatic and 
quick ‘System 1’ which places little burden on cognitive resources and an analytic, 
controlled and slow ‘System 2’ which requires a high level of cognitive resources. 
However, Stanovich and West (2000) found less commonality in the mechanisms 
different models proposed for the interaction between systems. Some suggest that the 
two systems operate in serial with one process dependent on the other (e.g. Evans, 
2006) while others suggest that both systems operate in parallel – simultaneously 
generating different responses to reasoning problems (e.g. Sloman, 1996). Subsequent 
research has considered the relationship between System 1 and System 2. Thompson’s 
(2010) metacognitive dual-process theory suggests that System 1 may provide an initial 
response to a given task before System 2 is activated and either supports or revises the 
response. This interaction is dependent on a metacognitive feeling of rightness – the 
extent to which an answer is sufficient or further analysis is required – and judgement of 
confidence – an evaluation of confidence in the answers derived – to determine how 
System 2 is engaged. Verchurren and Schaeken (2010) look at how a dual-process 
framework can integrate several different accounts of reasoning. Their model sets out 
three levels at which dual-processes (a System 1 and a System 2) may be distinguished: 
decisions to incorporate background information; where background information is 
needed; two ways of taking background information into account (they suggest that 
probabilistic and mental models approaches suggest heuristic and analytic systems at 
this level); and, where counterexample information is needed, two approaches to 
counterexample retrieval. 
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Multiple process models of reasoning normally provide algorithmic-level accounts of 
reasoning which suggest complex computational-level accounts that are trying to meet 
multiple goals. For example, Evans’ (1984, 2006) model suggests that people are 
aiming to respond logically to reasoning tasks but that other factors, such as quick 
response time, are also important. Verchuren and Shaeken (2010) appear to suggest that 
different types of logic may be useful at different times (particularly if you treat their 
dichotomy between probabilistic and mental models approaches as a computational-
level distinction between probabilistic and propositional logic aims). Superficially such 
an integrative approach has some attraction: People can reason using formal 
propositional logic when required to but this is a slow and deliberate process that 
experiments have suggested is not engaged in everyday reasoning. Even scientists 
appear to routinely use other processes which demonstrate systematic biases from the 
correct responses under propositional logic (e.g. Kern, Mirels & Hinshaw, 1983). 
However, it may also simply be that deliberative reasoning with formal logic is a special 
case of higher cognitive functions which uses processes unconnected with everyday 
reasoning and is therefore not helpfully integrated into a single model. 
1.3.5. Alternative Models 
Some other models have also been proposed to account for systematic reasoning biases. 
These include Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) account based on the use of pragmatic 
reasoning schemas and Politzer and Bonnefon’s (2010) proposal of a calculus of 
possibilities. 
 
Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) approach has already been discussed above as Noveck and 
O’Brien (1996) sought to partially integrate it into Braine and O’Brien’s (1991) mental 
logic model to help account for context effects. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) suggest that 
pragmatic schemas are domain specific inference forms (a set of rules which govern 
inferences which are selected based on context). When activated, these schemas have 
the effect of applying a different ‘logic’ depending on whether the participants aim to 
respond to a conditional as representing a permission, causation or obligation. This 
suggests an alternative algorithmic-level view which recognises that people may 
approach different problems with different computational-level aims. However, it 
ultimately seeks to distil the processing of reasoning problems into the implementation 
of logical rules like other approaches based on internal mental logics.  
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Politzer and Bonnefon (2010) suggested that neither the logics of propositions nor 
probabilities are adequate to explain the basis for human reasoning. They suggested that 
a calculus of possibilities may better account for all observed phenomena. Such an 
approach would place substantial weight on the level of plausibility a person assigns to 
a task’s premises and conclusions (under this proposal plausibility is an indication of the 
credibility attached to a conjecture on the basis of its source’s reliability). This is an 
interesting idea which requires further testing.  
1.4. Accounts of Negation 
As shown above, the concept of negation has been widely used in conditional reasoning 
experiments and associated with the often observed matching and negative conclusion 
biases. However, many experiments have simply used the word ‘not’ to negate a 
statement and assumed that it functions as the negation function in propositional logic (a 
denial). Some other experiments have used a form of implicit negation (which asserts an 
affirmative proposition which contradicts a presupposition – an otherwise assumed or 
suggested proposition – thereby negating it). These two forms of negation may have 
different implications, but the reasoning literature rarely considers these. The study of 
reasoning has not considered other forms of negation which may frequently occur in 
natural language. 
 
Propositions involving negation may also be understood differently depending on the 
context, form of the negation and content. People use different negative operators in 
different ways to specify the scope of the negation and create different implications. 
Sometimes the scope of the negation may be ambiguous and sometimes it may be 
specific. Cognitive processes may also consider propositions with negation differently 
from affirmative propositions (for example, some propositions with negation take 
longer to process and understand, Clark, 1974). Therefore, consideration of the role of 
negation in logic and language is needed to understand the role of negation in reasoning 
processes. 
1.4.1. Logical Operator 
Modern formal logic is based on the operation of propositions (Sommers, 1970). Such 
logic interprets negation as an operator on a proposition that is external to the 
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proposition and has the function of denying it (Horn, 1989). So the negation of the 
proposition ‘The bike is blue’ is treated as ‘It is not the case that the bike is blue’ (a 
proposition that would allow all possibilities apart from that a given bike is blue – the 
logical complement of the proposition that the bike is blue).  
 
Logically a given proposition and its negation are mutually exclusive and any given 
proposition or its negation must be true. In propositional logic, the law of double 
negation – that the negation of an already negated proposition (e.g. it is not the case that 
the bike is not blue) is equivalent to the proposition without negation (e.g. the bike is 
blue) – also applies.  
 
Within the calculus of propositions, treating negation as a logical complement operator 
is clear and may be sufficient. However, it is hard to apply propositional logic to many 
of the circumstances that we may face in everyday life. For example, when the truth or 
falsity of a proposition is irrelevant (such as statements about nonexistent subjects ‘the 
king of France is not bald’ and ‘the king of France is bald’ or subjects to whom the 
proposition is not appropriate ‘the number twelve is bald’ and ‘the number twelve is not 
bald’), unknown (‘Schrödinger’s cat is alive’ and ‘Schrödinger’s cat is not alive’ could 
both be true or false prior to observation of the cat), indeterminate (such as a reference 
to the future ‘there will be rain tomorrow’ and ‘there will not be rain tomorrow’) or 
when seeking to use negation to indicate a more precise oppositional state (such as the 
contrary operators and approaches to narrow the scope of negation discussed below). 
1.4.1.1. Other Logics 
Aristotle (trans. 1923) used the logic of terms, rather than the logic of propositions, 
which recognised that different forms of denial are possible (Englebretsen, 1976). 
Aristotle’s logic of opposition (which provided an early and influential account of 
negation as a concept, Horn, 1989) used two laws to define its approach to negation: the 
law of contradiction (Met. 1005b19-23) and the law of the excluded middle (Met. 
1011b23-24). The law of contradiction states that a something cannot be both a thing 
and not that thing at the same time in the same respect. The law of the excluded middle 
states that anything must either be or not be. Aristotle defined two types of negation 
based on these laws: contradictory and contrary negation. The law of contradiction 
applies to both types of negation (Met. 1011b17-19), but the law of the excluded middle 
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only applies to contradictory negation (Met. 1057a34-35). So, contrary negation implies 
an opposite. A situation could occur that cannot be represented by either an affirmative 
proposition or its contrary negation (for example the contrary negation of ‘the cat is 
white’ would lead you to believe that ‘the cat is black’ and so also rule out the 
possibilities that the cat is grey or ginger). Contradictory negation of a proposition 
describes all possible states not accounted for by the affirmative proposition (so the 
negated proposition ‘the cat is not white’ would allow for the possibilities that the cat is 
black, grey, ginger or any other colour but white).  
 
Since Aristotle, philosophers have proposed a range of multivalued logical systems that 
seek to create a dichotomy between two types of negation. Horn (1989) lists 27 
approaches which distinguish two types of negation. These include: Russell’s (1905) 
‘secondary occurrence of description’ (wide scope – the negation applies to a whole 
proposition) versus ‘primary occurrence of description’ (narrow scope – the negation 
applies to an element within a proposition); Von Wright’s (1959) weak versus strong; 
and, several definitions of external versus internal (e.g. Clark, 1974). Scope is discussed 
further in §1.4.2.1. These approaches all have different definitions of their two types of 
negation, but Horn (1989) notes some commonalities. For example, one of each pair of 
negation types (e.g. wide scope, weak or external in the examples above) is generally a 
propositional operator and more like Aristotle’s contradictory operator. The other 
operator in each pair (e.g. narrow scope, strong or internal) operates more narrowly, 
either on or within a predicate (the part of the sentence that modifies the subject) and is 
more like Aristotle’s contrary operator. Despite these options for alternative 
understandings of negations, some logicists have continued to maintain that within a 
two-valued logic (where the only truth values are ‘true’ and ‘false’) only an external 
reading is necessary (Horn, 1989). Karttunen and Peters (1979) offer a compromise 
approach that allows a sentence to have a single logical meaning but multiple potential 
implications which are not truth-conditional. This ambiguity based on the conventional 
and conversational implications of sentences may be acceptable to some logicists, but it 
has not been investigated experimentally for people’s everyday reasoning. 
 
If negation is treated as having more than one different implication in different logics, 
then it must have wider everyday usage than as a complement forming operator creating 
a proposition symmetrical to its affirmative counterpart. This could affect how people 
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process negations in reasoning tasks – particularly if they are approaching them naïve to 
their formal logical implications. In developing reasoning tasks that use negation, we 
should, therefore, consider what different understandings negation has and what impact 
these might have on participants’ reasoning.  
1.4.2. Natural Language 
Symbolic logics can define and articulate the form and role of negation. In natural 
language, the roles and forms of negation have evolved and allow for many different 
articulations of negation with subtle distinctions and different implications. Subtle 
distinctions in sentences that use negations leading to different implications can create 
ambiguity in the understanding that the use of negation should provide. 
 
In natural language, negation takes a large number of forms. For example: using words 
like ‘not’, ‘no’ or ‘never’; using affixes applied to words like ‘un-’, ‘dis-’ or ‘-less’; and 
using statements which implicitly deny a prior statement (‘Was that a bird?’ / ‘It was a 
plane’). These different forms of negation can be used to create more contrary or 
contradictory interpretations.  
 
The different ways of using negation in language can also carry a range of implications 
which don’t always match the logical treatment of negation. For example, the double 
negation in a suspect’s claim that they “didn’t not kill the man” is likely intended to 
emphasise the denial of the proposition “kill the man”. In propositional logic, the double 
negation would cancel out and so the former statement would be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the latter proposition. Such use of additional negators to emphasise rather 
than disregard negation can be seen in many languages and can emerge in languages as 
they change over time (Mazzon, 2004). Applications of negation can vary between 
dialects (Mazzon, 2004) and between spoken and written modes (Tottie, 1982, found 
twice as many instances of negation in spoken English when comparing spoken and 
written corpora). It seems reasonable to assume that naïve experimental participants 
interpret logical statements involving negation as they would interpret negation in 
natural language. Therefore, to understand the effect that negation has on logical 
reasoning we should consider the different implications that the use of negation in 
language can create and the potential for ambiguity in interpretation.  
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1.4.2.1. Scope of Negation 
In language, a negative operator can have scope over different elements of a statement. 
The scope of the negation can be affected by the form, context or intonation of the 
statement (Horn, 1989). For example, by changing the speaker’s emphasis, the negation 
in the sentence “David did not travel to Manchester by car” can refer to either David not 
going to Manchester or not going by car (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). As in this 
example, with no emphasis added the target of negation could be ambiguous. 
Experiments have shown that article cues (such as preceding the negated item with ‘a’ 
rather than ‘the’) are more influential than position cues (like the order of nouns) in 
helping people identify the target of negation in a written sentence (Rumain, 1988).  
 
Klima (1964) explored the ambiguity that can occur when a sentence like ‘The bike is 
blue’ is negated as ‘The bike is not blue’. The sentence could be intended as a denial of 
the whole proposition (sentential negation, ‘It is not the case that the bike is blue’) or as 
a negation of term ‘blue’ (constituent negation, ‘The bike is not-blue’). Klima (1964) 
highlighted the importance that context plays in interpreting the negation of such a 
sentence where there are insufficient cues within the sentence itself. The potential to 
identify different potential scopes in such negative sentences does affect the logical 
interpretation of the sentence. For example, Russell (1905) argued that an externally 
negated interpretation (in this example, ‘It is not the case that the bike is blue’) would 
be logically true if there was no bike but the internally negated interpretation (i.e. ‘The 
bike is not-blue’) would be false. Some others (e.g. Strawson, 1950), suggest that there 
is a limit to the extent to which such external negations are possible. Further cues can 
also be added to clarify the scope of negation (e.g. ‘It is not the case that the bike is a 
blue one’ initially appears externally negated but the use of the indefinite article implies 
that the colour is the scope of negation and it is not true if there is no bike).  
 
Hilton (1995) reviews the effects that conversational inference can have on 
psychological experiments. This includes consideration of Grice’s (1975) maxims of 
conversation. Grice (1975) suggested that people exchanging information normally 
cooperate to gain mutual understanding using certain shared assumptions. These 
assumptions included maxims of quality (be truthful), quantity (provide the least 
information necessary for understanding), relation (be relevant) and manner (be clear). 
Where these assumptions are apparently broken, conversationalists and likely to 
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interpret that as having meaning (e.g. where more information than apparently 
necessary is provided or where a statement does not seem relevant or unambiguous). 
Hilton (1995) reviews experimental tasks which may have led participants to draw a 
different understanding to that the researchers intended. This could make the results 
misleading. For example, the maxims of quantity and relation may lead experimental 
participants to assume that all the information that they are given is relevant and should 
be used in a task. This may lead to a weight being given to irrelevant details in decision 
making tasks. 
 
Negative sentences, therefore, need careful consideration when developing experiments 
to make sure the scope of the negation is understood consistently in the same way by all 
participants.  
1.4.2.2. Pragmatic Ambiguity 
Horn (1989) suggests an alternative way to interpret some ambiguity with negations. He 
argued that rather than being logically or semantically ambiguous, descriptive negation 
is pragmatically ambiguous (a sentence like 'John's killer is mad' has a single semantic 
interpretation but in different contexts could be understood as ‘Anyone who would kill 
John is mad’ or ‘The individual that killed John is mad’). Horn (1985, 1989) also 
describes a use of negation that is metalinguistic rather than descriptive (simply denying 
a proposition). Such metalinguistic negation can be used to register objection to an 
utterance on any grounds whatsoever, such as a statement’s implication, morphology or 
even intonation. For example, the statement ‘it isn’t cool, it’s cold’ does not deny the 
assertion ‘it is cool’ but rejects it because ‘cool’ is insufficiently descriptive of the 
weather. When negation is used, this potential for pragmatic distinctions and 
metalinguistic interpretations further suggests that the interpretation of negative 
sentences is more complex and involves different processes to the interpretation of 
affirmative statements.  
 
The possibility that different types of negation – or the same type of negation in 
different contexts – can create different understandings may affect how people process 
negation in reasoning problems. Experimenting with different types of negation and 
observing any differences in responses may, therefore, help us understand how people 
process reasoning tasks. 
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1.4.3. Contrast Classes 
Contrast classes provide a psychological account of negation based on the philosophical 
account of negation as ‘otherness’ (Oaksford, 2002). The otherness account suggests 
that the use of negation implies that something ‘other’ than the item negated is the case. 
The contrast class account exploits this notion by suggesting that negation activates 
possibilities that could be true if the negated item is not.  
 
People are likely to have formed cognitive categories into which they can place items 
they encounter or are aware of into (e.g. Rosch, 1973). For example, most people will 
recognise that items like ‘red’, ‘blue’ and ‘purple’ belong to a category known as 
‘colours’. The set of items someone will have in a given category provides a reference 
class of items that people can access when discussing a topic. So, when the context of a 
discussion requires consideration of a colour, a person might come up the example of 
‘blue’ rather than ‘seagull’ (which is more likely to belong to sets categorised as ‘birds’ 
or ‘coastal animals’). Items within sets may be more or less typical of the set (more 
typical items will have more characteristics in common with other items in the set and 
fewer in common with items in other sets) and items may belong to more than one 
categorical set (Rosch, 1973). People can use these reference sets to derive contrast sets 
for an item. The contrast set of a target item will consist of other items which share 
characteristics with the target item (and so are included in the same categories as the 
target item) but which are not the target item (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
 
The contrast class account of negation therefore suggests that, when an item is negated, 
people consider other items in the contrast set of the negated item. A contrast class 
consists of items that would be relevant in the same context as the negated item which a 
person considers as possibilities in processing the negation. This class is much smaller 
than the logical complement of the negated item as it only includes items that the 
individual considers relevant. 
 
Oaksford and Stenning (1992) used contrast classes in their probabilistic ‘processing 
negations’ account of Wason’s (1968) selection task. They suggested that the contrast 
class of a given item is normally more likely than the given item itself (the contrast 
class representing more possibilities). Their experimental results supported the resulting 
probabilistic model. However, those experiments and others since (e.g. Oaksford and 
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Moussakowski, 2004) did not show direct evidence of spontaneous contrast class 
construction or activation when participants address reasoning problems. Further 
research is therefore needed to understand whether contrast classes are relevant to 
everyday reasoning and what circumstances may mediate their use. Asking whether 
people sometimes activate contrast classes to understand negation in reasoning also 
suggests a wider question: How do people process sentences with negation? 
1.5. The Psychology of Negation 
To understand how people use negation in reasoning, we need to understand how 
people process negation more generally. There has been a long-running debate among 
philosophers about whether negation is read in the same way as equivalent affirmatives 
or if it is somehow marked, more complex and less basic (Horn, 1989). In 
psycholinguistics, a number of effects can be noted when negation is used which 
suggest an asymmetry between negative and affirmative statements.   
1.5.1. Processing Time 
Early studies noted that it takes participants longer to understand statements that used 
negation than equivalent statements without negation (Clark, 1974). For example, Just 
and Carpenter (1971) asked participants to verify statements like ‘The dots are 
[red/black]’ and ‘The dots aren’t [red/black]’ with reference to a picture of dots that 
were either red or black. They found that people responded significantly faster to the 
affirmative statements than the statements with negation. Such effects would appear to 
suggest that negation is inherently more complex and takes longer to comprehend than 
equivalent affirmative statements.  
1.5.1.1. Contexts of Plausible Denial 
Wason (1959, 1961) had also observed longer processing times for statements with a 
negation (such as “Forty-six is not an odd number”) than statements without negation 
(e.g. “Sixty-five is an odd number”). He also observed that people verified true 
statements without negation faster than false statements without negation (“Thirty-nine 
is an even number”). However, he observed the converse with statements containing 
negations (so a false statement with negation like “Ninety-two is not an even number” 
yields a quicker response than a true one like “Ninety-three is not an even number”). 
Wason (1961) suggested that this core difference between affirmative and negative 
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statements was that negatives are transformed into affirmative equivalents (e.g. “not 
odd” becomes “even”) taking additional processing time before participants respond. 
Wason (1965) built on these results with an evaluation task that used statements and 
related pictures of coloured circles. He observed faster responses where a negated 
property in the statement might have been expected to be true (for example, saying a 
single red circle amongst blue circles is ‘not blue’) than where it would not be expected 
(saying a red circle is ‘not blue’ when most circles are red). Based on these results, 
Wason (1965) suggests that negative sentences are more easily understood within 
‘contexts of plausible denial’. So, understanding of a statement involving a negated item 
is easier if the negated item could plausibly have been thought true had it not been 
negated. This may suggest that statements using negation are processed differently 
depending on whether the reader recognises the appropriateness of the negation.  
1.5.2. Probing Negations 
MacDonald and Just (1989) looked at what negation did to the activation of the negated 
word. They conducted a series of probe tasks giving participants a statement including 
two nouns (conditions were that neither noun was negated or that one or the other was). 
They then presented a probe word (one of the nouns in the experimental trials – 
normally an unrelated word in controls) and asked participants to indicate whether the 
word had appeared in the sentence (in their first experiment) or say the word aloud (in 
experiments 2 and 3). There was then a comprehension question. They looked at 
reaction times to the probe word and found that participants responded fastest to either 
noun when the sentence had used no negation. They found that where a given noun was 
negated, responses were significantly slower when that noun was the probe than where 
the other noun was negated.  This suggests that negation represses activation of the 
negated item. In their third experiment, MacDonald and Just (1989) also used words 
associated with the nouns that were not included in the original sentence as probes. 
They found that reaction times to associated words were slower where the relevant noun 
had been negated in the sentence.  
 
Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) looked in more depth at the semantic activation of 
associated words after the presentation of a statement in which a relevant item may or 
may not be negated. They conducted lexical decision tasks that started 150ms, 500ms or 
1,000ms after the presentation of the priming statement.  They found no difference in 
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responses at the 150ms and 500ms intervals whether the relevant item was negated or 
not: Participants responded faster where target words were associated with the relevant 
item and slower where the target work was associated with the opposite of the relevant 
item. However, at 1,000ms participants responded faster to words associated with the 
opposite of the relevant item if it had been negated in the priming statement. This 
suggests that the negated statements were processed in the same way as affirmative 
statements for up to a second after they were presented. At that point, the negative 
statements were priming items with opposite associations which the affirmative 
statements were not. This may be consistent with the contrast class account discussed 
earlier (see §1.4.3). 
1.6. Approach 
The use of negation in conditional reasoning tasks has been studied extensively and 
associated with frequently observed biases. A large number of studies seek to explain 
the biases. However, there has been relatively little consideration of the different 
implications that negation can have. While the contrast class account provides a 
psychological account of negation which goes beyond its role in propositional logic as a 
complement operator, there is limited direct evidence of contrast class activation in 
reasoning tasks. Therefore, further exploration of the use of negation in reasoning may 
be helpful in understanding how people reason and evaluating the proposed accounts. 
 
The current study will investigate the interaction between the use of negation and 
people’s conditional reasoning biases. By considering how negation affects conditional 
reasoning, it aims to help understand how people reason. As its starting point, this study 
will look at how different types of negation affect reasoning. Differential effects of 
different types of negation may suggest that different processes are used to process 
different types of negation. This study will then consider the role of contrast classes in 
reasoning. This thesis is organised as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 uses probability rating tasks (Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999) to look at 
whether using different types of negation affects people’s judgement of the likelihood 
of a proposition. Previous studies (e.g. Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 2000) have 
suggested that changing the likelihood of propositions affects how people reason with 
them. 
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Chapter 3 looks directly at whether different types of negation affect conditional 
reasoning. Different types of negation will be used in conditional inference evaluation 
tasks (based on an expansion of Evans’, 1977, design) to see how responses differ. 
 
Chapter 4 will investigate the contrast class account of negation and how it applies to 
reasoning tasks (testing a hypothesis proposed by Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Reasoning 
task experiments will explore whether people can reason when explicitly provided with 
contrast classes and whether they spontaneously use contrast classes when presented 
with reasoning problems involving negation. 
 
Chapter 5 will consider what conclusions can be drawn from the current study and 
potential next steps. 
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2. Different Types of Negation and Probability 
Understanding of the interaction between the use of negation and reasoning task 
performance requires consideration of the nature of negation. Negation can take many 
different forms and provide many different implications (Horn, 1989). Studies of the 
use of negation in reasoning have typically used the word ‘not’ to negate the following 
proposition (e.g. Evans, 1977) or have used an affirmative proposition to implicitly 
negate another proposition through contradiction (e.g. Evans & Lynch, 1973). 
Therefore, only a narrow range of forms that negation can take have been used to 
investigate the effect of negation on reasoning. In this chapter, I look at how other forms 
of negation in natural language, notably affixal negation (Zimmer, 1964) may affect 
performance. 
 
Before exploring how different types of negation affect conditional reasoning 
performance (which is considered in chapter 3), I will provide an initial study of 
whether different types of negation are used differently in likelihood estimation tasks 
related to reasoning. People’s perception of the likelihood of given propositions has 
been previously related to their responses to reasoning tasks using those propositions 
(Evans, Handley and Over, 2003).  
 
In this chapter, I describe experiments which look at whether people respond differently 
in probability rating tasks (Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999) when using different 
types of negation. First, though, I discuss the relationship between reasoning and 
likelihood estimates and consider some different types of negation. 
2.1. Reasoning and Probability 
Human reasoning with probabilities, like logical reasoning, is subject to systematic 
biases. For example, people often violate the conjunction rule (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1983) or demonstrate overconfidence in their judgements (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and 
Kleinbölting, 1991). 
 
According to probability theory (which respects standard logic), the conjunction rule 
demands that the probability of two events both occurring must be less than or equal to 
the lesser probability of either event occurring individually. However, Tversky and 
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Kahneman (1983) demonstrated that people’s probability estimates often violated the 
conjunction rule, with people often estimating that the conjunction of both events was 
more likely than either one of the events. They explained their results in terms of 
representativeness and availability heuristics. As an example of the availability 
heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) described an experiment in which people 
could list more seven letter words ending in “-ing” than with “n” as the penultimate 
letter (even though the former set is a subgroup of the latter) which affects people’s 
estimates of the frequency of words in those sets. They explain representativeness as 
overestimation of the probability of events where they conform to a relevant stereotype. 
This could be a typical example (albeit one that might be narrow and so apply to few 
examples of the group described). It could also be a diagnostic example (an unusual 
characteristic but one which is more common in the group in question than the general 
population, e.g. having divorced four times may be perceived to be more common 
amongst Hollywood actresses than the general population and is therefore more 
diagnostic of this group than voting democrat, which may apply to more Hollywood 
actresses but at a level more typical of the general population).  
 
An overconfidence effect was observed by Gigerenzer et al. (1991) who asked 
participants a series of general knowledge questions. They showed that participants’ 
estimates of the number of answers they had correctly answered were consistently 
higher than the number of correct answers they had provided. This implies an 
overestimation of the likelihood of providing a correct answer. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) 
suggest that this overconfidence is related to a ‘hard-easy’ effect in which people show 
greater overconfidence for more difficult questions (those answered incorrectly more 
often).   
 
Biases showing people violate the conjunction rule and have over-confidence in some 
situations might suggest that people are poor at applying probability theory in 
reasoning. However, there is evidence in these same studies that people can make 
effective use of frequency data in reasoning and appear to apply the standard calculus of 
probability. For example, when they asked about the likelihood of one of the conjoined 
propositions before asking about the likelihood of the conjunction, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) observed fewer instances of the conjunction fallacy. Gigerenzer et al. 
(1991) eliminated and inverted the overconfidence and hard-easy effects based on their 
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probabilistic mental models theory. This theory proposes that people iteratively generate 
internal models to make inferences. These probabilistic mental models use relevant 
reference classes if the required information for a ‘local’ mental model (like those 
applied in Johnson-Laird et al.’s, 1992, mental models approach – see §1.3.2) is 
unavailable. The relevant reference class is the set of all the objects or events of interest 
in the model. People represent members of the relevant reference class in probabilistic 
mental models as potential objects connected to cues (wider knowledge about the 
object). Probabilistic mental models are considered iteratively to identify the objects 
which have cues that most likely match the requirements of the task. Gigerenzer et al. 
(1991) attribute overconfidence or underconfidence in a person’s response to the nature 
of the probabilistic mental models on which it is based (for example, a person will be 
overconfident if they use probabilistic mental models based on a reference class that 
seems appropriate to the subject of the question but for which the associated cues to not 
provide a good match to the detail of the question). Other studies have attributed the 
effects to different causes. Griffen and Tversky (1992) explored this effect and 
suggested that overconfidence is mostly observed when the evidence for the answer had 
high strength (i.e. the forcefulness with which the evidence suggests the answer) and 
low weight (credibility). They further suggested that an under-confidence effect occurs 
when the evidence for an answer has low strength and high weight. This suggests that 
people’s use of probability evidence might be influenced by the context in which is 
presented (e.g., presentation of information about a small sample – even a single 
instance – with a highly biased result may lead to overconfidence). Cosmides and 
Tooby (1996) demonstrate that reasoning better emulates probability theory when 
people are obliged to consider the frequency of events.  
 
Although people may not base their beliefs on a precise theory of probabilities, studies 
have shown that people’s responses to inference problems are related to the probabilities 
associated with the propositions used.  
 
Oaksford, Chater and Larkin (2000) presented conditional inference tasks following 
scenarios which varied the probability of different propositions. Their inference tasks 
provided a conditional relationship (e.g. ‘If a card has an S on the front, then it has a 5 
on the back’), a proposition (e.g. ‘This card has an S on the front’) and conclusion (e.g. 
‘Therefore this card has a 5 on the back’ – in this case, based on MP inference – see 
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§1.1). Oaksford et al. (2000) demonstrated that the probability that a proposition is true 
has an effect on people’s willingness to endorse inferences using the proposition. The 
probability of the propositions was initially manipulated explicitly using scenarios 
based on a machine that printed cards with different shapes of different colours on them. 
The scenarios suggested that the probability of a proposition like ‘the card is red’ is high 
with statements like, ‘out of every 60 cards, 40 are red’. They suggested that the 
probability of a proposition stating that any card was a given colour is low with a 
statement like, ‘roughly 12 out of every 60 cards are of each colour’. Oaksford et al. 
(2000) found a strong influence of the probabilities given in these explicit scenarios on 
participants’ ratings of the conditional inferences. They also used implicit variation of 
probabilities by presenting conditional rules made up of pretested propositions that had 
low probability (e.g. ‘an animal is a chipmunk’) or high probability (e.g. ‘an item of 
furniture is heavy’). These implicit manipulations also affected participants’ willingness 
to endorse inferences using the propositions given although the results were not as 
strong as where probabilities were explicitly provided. 
 
Subsequent studies have also shown that people use probability information to provide 
estimates of the likelihood of propositions. Evans, Handley and Over (2003) asked 
participates to judge the likelihood that ‘if p then q’ was true given frequency 
information about instances where p and q were true, not p and q were true, p and not q 
were true and not p and not q were true. They found that the estimated likelihood of the 
conditional statement was related to either the conditional probability (P(q|p)) or the 
probability of the conjunction (P(p and q), sometimes written P(p∩q)). Similar results, 
showing the importance of the conditional probability P(q|p) to people’s evaluation of 
the conditional ‘if p then q’, were reported by Over and Evans (2003) and Oberauer and 
Wilhelm (2003). These results demonstrate the psychological relevance of the 
conditional probability hypothesis. This hypothesis arises in the philosophical literature 
and states that the probability that a statement of the form ‘if p then q’ is true is 
equivalent to the conditional probability P(q|p) (Ramsey, 1931; Adams, 1987; 
Edgington, 1995). 
 
Ohm and Thompson (2006) explored this conditional probability hypothesis. They 
provided participants with scenarios that used conditional inducements (threats and 
promises) and conditional advice (warnings and tips). For each scenario, participants 
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were asked to estimate the probability that each of four possibilities was true (p and q; 
not p and q; p and not q; not p and not q). For example, a scenario that provided 
conditional inducement (a warning) was “John is not attending all of his classes at 
university. While talking to his roommate, he is told that ‘If you skip classes, you will 
fail your courses’”. Conditional probabilities P(q|p) and P(q|not-p) were derived from 
participants’ responses and compared to participants’ evaluation of the conditional 
rules. As predicted the by the conditional probability hypothesis, participants’ 
evaluation of conditional inferences varied as a function of P(q|p). Ohm and Thompson 
(2006) also looked at how pragmatic factors in the conditional statements led to 
different estimates of P(p) suggesting the different likelihoods that participants 
attributed to the conditionals’ ability to change behaviour. They found a better 
correlation between P(q|not-p) and these differences than between P(q|p) and these 
differences. 
 
Research looking at people’s naïve application of probability theory has shown a range 
of biases as with the naïve application of formal logic. This may suggest that people are 
not able to use probability information and estimates of likelihood in reasoning. 
However, a range of studies have shown that people do appear to use evidence about the 
probability of propositions in responding to deductive reasoning tasks. It is possible that 
this use of likelihood influences the negation effects observed in tasks that are 
notionally intended to test formal logic. This can be tested by looking at whether 
different types of negation, that give rise to different estimates of likelihood, lead to 
different responses in reasoning tasks. Before looking directly at the use of different 
types of negation in conditional reasoning tasks, this chapter will first explore how the 
type of negation used in a proposition influences participants’ estimates of the 
likelihood of that proposition.  
2.1.1. Probability Rating Tasks 
The experiments reported in this chapter each provided participants with a series of 
scenarios followed by probability rating task questions (Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 
1999). Probability rating tasks present a description of a group of people and ask how 
many of these people meet the circumstances of the given proposition. The response 
provides information about the perceived probability that the given proposition is true 
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for a person in the group described. These experiments looked at whether responses 
vary when propositions use different types of negation.  
 
In particular, the present experiments considered whether people respond differently 
depending on whether the word “not” or an affix like “un-” is used to negate a 
proposition. As discussed below, different types of negation can have different 
implications (e.g. Horn, 1989). However, the reasoning literature on negation has not 
considered these implications. Propositions that use forms of negation with different 
implications would be expected to have different probabilities (for example a 
proposition using “not” negation with large scope might be expected to have a larger 
probability than the same proposition using narrow scope affixal negation). If such 
propositions were shown to have a differential effect on responses to reasoning 
problems, this would undermine models of reasoning which assume that all types of 
negation have a single logical function. 
2.2. Different Types of Negation 
The previous chapter observed that there were many different ways of expressing 
negation which could give rise to different understandings and emphasises of the scope 
of negation and what the negation means. Different forms of negation can imply 
different levels of strength and different scope. Although negation can be seen as having 
the single, simple, logical implication of denying a proposition in classical logic, other 
forms of logic allow it to fulfil different logical roles such as Aristotle’s contrary and 
contradictory operators (Horn, 1989). 
 
The most obvious use of negation in language is the application of a clear, separate 
negative operator, like ‘not’, before the proposition or term being negated. Words like 
‘no’, ‘never’, ‘none’ and ‘nobody’ act as clear negative operators in appropriate 
contexts. The present chapter will look at whether negation using a clear negative 
operator ‘not’ in propositions is interpreted differently to two other forms of negation: 
affixal and implicit negation. Affixal negation uses prefixes, like ‘un-’, or suffixes, like 
‘-less’ to negate the meaning of a stem word. Implicit negation uses an affirmative 
statement to negate a proposition which might otherwise have been understood to be 
true. 
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2.2.1. Affixal Negation 
Affixal negation uses prefixes or suffixes to negate a base word. Common prefixes in 
modern English include “un-”, “iN-” (which includes prefixes “in-”, “il-”, “ir-” and 
“im-” depending on the first letter of the base) and “non-” (Mazzon, 2004). Where 
statements using ‘not’ tend to create a contradictory interpretation of the negation, these 
affixal operators tend to create a more contrary interpretation (Zimmer, 1964). For 
example, the statement ‘I am unhappy’, is normally interpreted as analogous to ‘I am 
sad’ (the opposite of ‘I am happy’). However, ‘I am not happy’ could indicate that the 
speaker has one of many emotional states besides happiness (such as ‘I am angry’ or ‘I 
am disappointed’).  
 
Jespersen (1917) hypothesised that only words with emotionally positive implications 
(e.g. decisive, happy) could be subject to negative affixes and the negative compounds 
created were emotionally negative (e.g. indecisive, unhappy). Compounds like “unsad” 
or “inhesitant” do not routinely occur in English providing superficial support for this 
proposal. However, a thorough analysis of the corpus of affixally negated words in 
several languages found that Jespersen’s (1917) hypothesis would not allow many often 
observed uses of affixal negation (Zimmer, 1964). In English, Zimmer (1964) found 
that most base words that were affixally negated using “un-” are neither emotionally 
positive or negative (e.g. uncaught, uneaten). He also found that “un-” could be used to 
negate bases with negative connotations (e.g. unobjectionable). Going further, he 
showed that the “un-” prefix can be used to negate any base words with deverbal 
suffixes (“-able”, “-ed”, “-ing”). Zimmer (1964) also analysed corpora of affixally 
negated words in other languages and found that they can apply affixes with even fewer 
restrictions. For example, the use of the Russian prefix “ne-” is not limited or biased at 
all by the emotional implications of the base. Therefore, each affix may have different 
applications and implications and we must, therefore, look at each form of affixal 
negation separately. 
 
In English, compounds using the prefix “iN-” are normally understood to be contrary 
opposites of their base words. For example, ‘indiscrete’, ‘illogical’, ‘irretrievable’ and 
‘immaterial’ are interpreted as opposites of ‘discrete’, ‘logical’, ‘retrievable’ and 
‘material’. There is a relatively narrow corpus of compound words which incorporate 
the affix “iN-” (Zimmer, 1964, found around 300 adjectives in his study of English 
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corpora). This appears to be because the prefix has limited productivity in modern 
English, it is no longer used to create novel compounds of negated bases (Zimmer, 
1964). The prefix was most productive during the late Middle English and early Modern 
English periods when many new compounds were generated (Mazzon, 2004). New 
applications of the “iN-” prefix only occur when an author wants to sound formal 
(Zimmer, 1964). The prefix “iN-” is generally recognised as a negative operator that 
modifies a base word and novel formulations can be understood even if they sound odd. 
However, most compounds using “iN-” in modern English appear to have their own 
lexical entry as part of people’s learned vocabulary (Mazzon, 2004). There are some 
“iN-” compounds, like ‘impeccable’, where the lexicalised compound is the more 
widely recognised base (while ‘peccable’ may still be in some dictionaries it is not as 
well recognised as the derived compound, Zimmer, 1964). As they are highly 
lexicalised, words affixally negated using “iN-” can develop specific meanings in their 
own right. They are therefore typically interpreted as having highly contrary 
implications compared to other forms of affixal negation which are less lexicalised 
(Horn, 1989).  
 
In Modern English, the prefix “un-” is observed much more frequently than “iN-”. 
Zimmer (1964) found around 2,700 adjectives derived using “un-” in his review of 
English corpora. Mazzon (2004) describes “un-” as highly productive in Modern 
English and is frequently used to create novel compounds. Zimmer (1964) also found 
“un-” to be highly productive. He pointed to readily understandable compounds which 
are not in dictionaries (like uncommemorated, uninitialled and unconstructive). Mazon 
(2004) showed that “un-” could be prefixed to most types of adjectives and Zimmer 
(1964) showed that it could also be applied to many other types of word. However, the 
application of “un-” is not unrestricted. It is unusual for compounds to be formed using 
“un-” when there is already a lexicalised “iN-” compound available (although such 
compounds are likely to be readily understood, Zimmer, 1964; Mazzon, 2004). Where 
“un-” has been found in written corpora compounded with a base that already has an 
“iN-” derivation, it is typically where the “un-” compound yields a useful different 
understanding (see below for examples). These “un-” compounds normally have a less 
contrary and more contradictory interpretation to their “iN-” equivalents (Horn, 1989). 
A similar restriction to the application of “un-” applies to adjective words where there 
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are short words available in the lexicon which provide contrary opposition. For 
example, ungood is readily understood by English speakers, but the uncompounded 
alternative, bad, is normally favoured (Zimmer, 1964). The prefix “un-” can be used to 
suggest complementary and contrary understandings (Mazzon, 2004). Horn (1989) 
therefore suggested that “un-” has a function between not (which typically yields 
contradictory interpretations) and “iN-” (which provides a highly contrary form of 
negation).  
 
The prefix “non-” appears to be increasingly used in Modern English (Mazzon, 2004). It 
is readily productive and often used to generate novel compounds (Zimmer, 1964). It 
has few restrictions (although it is less often applied to simple adjectives with well used 
short, simple antonyms, like ‘short’ where a person would tend to use ‘long’ rather than 
‘nonshort’, Zimmer, 1964). In contrast with “un-” and “iN-”, “non-” can even be used 
with already affixally negated bases to create new compounds like ‘noninfinite’. 
Compounds using “non-” are interpreted as negating the descriptive meaning of their 
base rather than the evaluative meaning (Zimmer, 1964). For example, compare the 
different understandings of ‘unnatural’ (which is something that does not have the 
‘value’ of natural) and ‘nonnatural’ (which is simply something that does not occur 
naturally). This provides a more contradictory understanding of “non-” negation than 
“un-” or “iN-” negation, an understanding closer to “not” negation (Horn, 1989). 
However, unlike “not” negation, “non-” negation has a very narrow scope – applying 
just to the base word. This means that “non-” compounds are rarely ambiguous in the 
way that “not” negation can be (Zimmer, 1964). 
 
Other types of affixal negation in the English language (including prefixes “dis-” and 
“a(n)-” and suffix “-less”) only have very limited productivity (Mazon, 2004). The 
experiments in this chapter will, therefore, apply the types of affixal negation described 
above. These provide a spectrum from low productivity and highly contrary 
interpretation (“iN-”) through fairly productive and intermediate contrary and 
contradictory interpretation (“un-”) to high productivity, more contradictory 
interpretation (“non-”).  Looking at some of the base words to which all three affixes are 
readily applied demonstrates the different understandings that they create in their 
compounds. For example, “human” can be negated to create inhuman, unhuman, 
nonhuman and “religious” generates irreligious, unreligious, nonreligious. The words 
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in these sets have more contrary meanings in their “iN-” form, intermediate 
interpretations in their “un-” form and more contradictory interpretations in their “non-” 
form (Horn, 1989). Looking at how people process different forms of negation with 
different implications may help to show how people interpret the implications of 
negation when reasoning. If responses vary when using different forms of negation, this 
would suggest probabilistic effects that are easier for some models of reasoning to 
explain than others. 
2.2.2. Implicit Negation 
One of negation’s core roles is to reject propositions that might otherwise be assumed 
true. This can obviously be observed when using a clear negative operator in a sentence 
like ‘David is not in Manchester’ (which rejects any notion of David being in 
Manchester) or ‘Patricia is unwell’ (rejecting the proposition that ‘Patricia is well’). 
Such application of negative operators is described as ‘explicit negation’ (Horn, 1989). 
However, propositions can also be rejected without the application of a clear negative 
operator. An affirmative statement that contradicts a proposition implicitly negates the 
proposition. For example, the sentences ‘David is in Birmingham’ or ‘Patricia has the 
flu’ used to reject the propositions in the previous examples. The word ‘implicit’ has 
been used to describe several negation phenomena in studies of language. 
 
Tottie (1982) conducted analyses of spoken and written English corpora and proposed a 
categorisation of the forms of negation observed. She divided occurrences of negation 
into the categories of ‘rejection’ (in spoken language, this would typically take the form 
of ‘No’ and then a negative statement) and ‘denial’ (which is used to state that a 
supposition is false). The ‘denial’ category was subdivided into ‘explicit denial’ and 
‘implicit denial’. Tottie’s (1982) subcategory of ‘implicit denial’ referred to a statement 
that negated a proposition without explicitly referencing the negated proposition.  
 
Alternative attempts to categorise implicit negation have focused on affirmative 
statements which are analogous to negative expressions but which do not use obvious 
negative operators. For example, the use of ‘forbid’ for ‘not allow’ or ‘absent’ for ‘not 
present’. Klima (1964) sought to provide criteria for the identification of negative 
sentences. He proposed that negative elements were those that can co-occur with any in 
a clause or with either when the negative is the latter of two clauses conjoined with 
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and). For example, these criteria define ‘none’ as negative but not ‘all’ (‘none of the 
people did any work’ is acceptable while ‘all of the people did any work’ is not). They 
also categorise words such as few, seldom and little as negative but not those like absent 
or forbid. Klima (1964) therefore suggested that these latter phrases, which did not meet 
his criteria for negative elements but could be used to express negative sentiments, were 
examples of ‘inherent negation’ (Horn,1989, also used this phrase as a label for implicit 
negation). Clark (1974) discussed the suggested distinction between those phrases 
identified as negative by Klima’s (1964) criteria and implicit negation. Clark (1974) 
argued that the former asserted that a supposition was false (e.g. ‘Pete didn’t remember’ 
denies the supposition that Pete remembered) while the latter affirmed a negative 
supposition (e.g. ‘Pete forgot’ a statement which affirms the negative supposition that 
Pete did not remember).  
 
Context appears to be very important in how we use and understand implicit negation. 
Clark (1974) looked at a series of studies that had compared participants’ processing 
time when completing tasks using explicit negation, implicit negation or affirmative 
propositions. He found that responses to tasks using implicit negation were quicker than 
where the negation was explicit and slower than responses to tasks using affirmative 
propositions. Clark (1974) related this finding to Wason’s (1965) ‘contexts of plausible 
denial’ theory. Wason (1965) hypothesised that people understand negative propositions 
by transforming them into affirmative propositions to understand them. He suggested 
that such transformations would be made more quickly where there was reason to 
believe that the proposition being negated might be true (i.e., the negated proposition 
existed within a context of plausible denial).  For example, Wason (1965) suggests a 
statement that “the whale is not a fish” is more easily understood than “the whale is not 
a bird”. This is because the former statement contradicts a proposition that someone 
who did not know better might assume whereas the latter statement contradicts a 
proposition that no one is likely to believe.  
 
Some explanations have been suggested for this context effect. Wason (1965) sought to 
explain plausible denial as a property of sets (the negated proposition is an exception or 
low incidence case). Clark (1974) suggests more simply that negative sentences 
combine a supposition and a negation and are easier to process if the context makes the 
supposition plausible. Clark (1974) uses the example that if a sports team was 
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predominantly male the supposition that a given team member is male is plausible so 
combining that supposition with a negation (e.g. ‘player number ten isn’t male’) is 
easier to process. The opposite supposition, that a given team member is female, is not 
plausible in this context and therefore it takes longer to process that supposition 
combined with a negation (e.g. ‘player number one isn’t female’). 
 
Horn (1989) builds on this, suggesting that implicitly negative statements are only used 
where the supposition being negated is explicitly suggested in context (and therefore 
that in processing the statement the supposition being negated does not need to be 
constructed as it might be if explicit negation is used). Giora, Fein, Metuki and Stern 
(2010) found that using explicit negation did not remove or reduce the negated concept 
in a person’s mental representation but may enhance information within the scope of the 
supposition allowing a metaphorical interpretation. For example, the statement ‘I am not 
your maid’ in response to being asked to clear something up does not suppress the 
notion of ‘maid’. Rather, it uses the concept to create a metaphoric interpretation in a 
manner that a positive statement (e.g. ‘I am your maid’) does not. Giora et al. (2010) 
also observed this metaphor inducing effect with implicit negation (for example, the 
statement ‘What am I, your secretary?’ implies negation and was interpreted 
metaphorically rather than literally by most of their respondents). 
 
Statements using implicit negation do not generally display the logical ambiguity seen 
in “not” negation which often relates to the perceived scope of the negative operator. 
Clark (1974) suggested that his review of prior studies supported the ‘scope of negation’ 
hypothesis. This hypothesis says that the wider the scope of negation in a proposition 
the longer the processing time required to deal with the proposition. For example, a 
statement with wide scope, like ‘A isn’t present’, would take longer to process than one 
with narrow scope, like implicit near equivalent ‘A is absent’. The hypothesis is based 
on the idea that the wider the scope of a proposition, the more difficult it is to 
comprehend. Based on this hypothesis, Clark (1974) suggested that, because implicit 
negation asserts an affirmative proposition with narrower scope than an equivalent 
statement using explicit negation, processing times are lower for implicit negation than 
“not” negation.  
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Previous studies of human reasoning have used implicit negation extensively, 
particularly tests using Wason’s (1968) selection task. For example, Evans and Lynch 
(1973) provided participants with cards marked ‘S’, ‘9’, ‘G’ and ‘4’. They asked them 
which they should turn over to verify the rule ‘If there is an S on one side then there is a 
9 on the other side’. In this context, the ‘G’ card represents ‘not-S’ and the ‘4’ card ‘not-
9’. These cards, therefore, constitute implicit negations of the propositions referred to in 
the rule. Evans and Lynch (1973) observed that participants selected cards labelled with 
the propositions in the rule rather than the logically correct responses. This suggests a 
matching bias in line with other selection task experiments (Evans, 1998) but Jackson 
and Griggs (1990) have claimed that subsequent studies show that other factors may 
help to reduce matching bias when cards use explicitly negative statements. For 
example, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) presented the selection task and compared 
responses to rules like “If one is to take action ‘A’, one must first have fulfilled pre-
requisite ‘P’” and cards which used explicit negation (e.g. ‘has taken action A’, ‘has not 
taken action A’, ‘has fulfilled prerequisite P’ and ‘has not fulfilled prerequisite P’) to 
rules like “If a card has an ‘A’ on one side, then it must have a ‘4’ on the other side” and 
cards using implicit negation (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘4’, ‘7’). They found that participants gave 
responses more in line with the logically correct answer when explicit negations were 
used because these materials were more deontic (that is, used rules with a stronger sense 
of obligation). 
 
Because implicit negation has been used widely in the reasoning literature, the first 
experiment will look at its effect on people’s estimates of the degree to which they 
should draw a particular conclusion alongside other forms of negation.  
2.3. Experiment 1 
The experiments in this chapter are aiming to explore whether using different types of 
negation in propositions gives rise to different estimates of the likelihood of the 
proposition. As previous research has suggested, different likelihood estimates may 
influence responses to logical reasoning tasks using negation. This first experiment 
(previously reported by Vance, unpublished Masters dissertation, 2011) is intended to 
provide an initial test of whether different types of negation leads to different estimates 
of the likelihood of propositions.  
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This experiment will look at people’s responses to three probability rating tasks 
(Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999) for each scenario. The rating tasks will ask how 
many of 100 people in the scenario are truly described by a given proposition. In one 
question for each scenario, the proposition will be affirmative. In another, it will be 
“not” negated. The third question for each scenario will use an alternative form of 
negation, either affixal negation (using one of three prefixes, “non-”, “un-” or “iN-”) or 
implicit negation.  
 
The implicit negation used in previous reasoning studies has taken a range of different 
forms. For the current experiment, the implicit negation propositions used terms which 
were contrary opposites of the affirmative proposition. These terms were selected from 
those used by Bianchi, Savardi and Kubovy (2011) who developed a model to describe 
the perception of opposite terms within a multidimensional conceptual space. Bianchi et 
al. (2011) presented participants with a series of concepts and their opposites and asked 
them to consider spatial scales representing the full range of spatial experiences between 
those opposites. For example, the provided opposites like ‘large’ and ‘small’ at either 
end of a horizontal scale. People were asked to use the scale to indicate where on the 
scale the boundary between the opposites would occur (e.g. the line between ‘large’ and 
‘small’). They were then asked to mark the space on the scale that was neither one 
concept nor its opposite (e.g. the part of the scale that would represent neither ‘large’ 
nor ‘small’). The proportions of the spatial scales identified by Bianchi et al. (2011) 
may relate to the probability estimates made by participants in the present experiment 
about the concepts and their opposites. 
 
For each of the 100 hypothetical people described in one of the scenarios in this 
experiment, the affirmative version of the proposition could either be true or not true. 
Therefore, the number of hypothetical people in a scenario for which the proposition is 
either true or not would, in reality, total 100. Judgements made by a single participant 
asked both for how many of the hypothetical people a proposition is true and for how 
many it is not true are therefore not independent. A participant that made a high 
judgement for the likelihood of a given affirmative proposition would be expected to 
make a low judgement for the “not” negated proposition related to the same scenario. 
For example, if someone thought 90 of the people described were ‘large’, you would 
expect them to think 10 were ‘not large’. Whereas, if that person thought the probability 
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of the affirmative proposition was low (e.g. they thought 10 would be ‘large’) then you 
would expect them to think the probability of the “not” negation proposition would be 
high (they would think 90 would be ‘not large’). To compare the effects of different 
types of negation within this experiment’s within-participants design, we will, therefore, 
compare participants’ additive scores for their responses to each question using 
negations. These additive scores are simply the response to the negation question added 
to the response to the relevant affirmative question with 100 subtracted (e.g. if someone 
though 54 people would be ‘large’ and 48 ‘not large’ the additive score for ‘not large’ 
would be 54 + 48 - 100 = 2). Using additive scores mitigates the effect of differences in 
perceptions of the likelihood of the affirmative proposition in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Macchi, Oshero and Kranz (1999) also looked at people’s estimates of the probability of 
events which could be divided into mutually exclusive sub-events. They described 
estimates of the probability as ‘superadditive’ if the sum of the perceived probabilities 
of two mutually exclusive sub-events was less than the perceived probability of the 
event combining them. They found such judgements were more likely where 
participants had limited knowledge about the events considered. Similarly, they 
described estimates as ‘subadditive’ where the sum of probabilities given for sub-events 
exceeded the probability of the overall event. Macchi et al. (1999) suggested that people 
may make such interpretations in contexts where they have extensive knowledge of the 
events. In this experiment, a negative additive scores would indicate superadditive 
results and positive additive scores would indicate subadditive results.  
 
The placement of the word ‘not’ in “not” negation may affect its understanding – for 
example, it can affect the scope of negation (Horn, 1989). Statements like ‘... how many 
would you not expect to be ....’ would appear to be more natural English language 
statement than the form ‘... how many would you expect to be not ....’ where the scope 
of negation is logically clearer – placing the negative function immediately before the 
item to be negated. As the present study is interested in how the uses of negation in 
natural language influence people’s responses to logical reasoning tasks, this 
experiment will also explore whether people respond differently to these two forms of 
“not” negation. The results will inform whether it is reasonable to use more naturalistic 
forms of “not” negation in further experiments. 
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2.3.1. Predictions 
This experiment will present scenarios that provide participants with very limited 
information on which to make a judgement on the likelihood of different propositions. 
Macchi et al. (1999) found predominantly superadditive responses in similar 
circumstances. This suggests that all additive scores will be negative.  
 
The key question in this chapter is whether different types of negation lead to different 
estimates of the likelihood of propositions using negation. The alternative forms of 
negation used (affixal and implicit negation) both normally have more contrary 
interpretations than “not” negation (Horn, 1989). More contrary statements of negation 
tend to have narrower interpretations than those provided by related contradictory 
statements. We would, therefore, expect estimates of a proposition’s likelihood to be 
lower where the proposition uses an alternative form of negation (affixal negation with 
“iN-”, “un-” and “non-”, and implicit negation) than where the proposition uses “not” 
negation. This would be observed as a more negative additive score. 
 
Within the three different types of affixal negation used, “iN-” typically has a more 
contrary interpretation than “un-” which, in turn, normally takes a more contrary 
interpretation than “non-” (Zimmer, 1964; Mazzon, 2004). This suggests the prediction 
that propositions using “iN-” will give rise to lower (more negative) additive scores than 
propositions using “un-” which in turn will be lower than those involving “non-”.  
2.3.2. Method 
2.3.2.1. Design 
A within-participant design was used with additive scores calculated as described above 
as the dependent variable. The independent variable was type of negation which had 
five levels (“not” negation, affixal negation with “iN-”, “un-” and “non-”, and implicit 
negation). An additional between participants variable, position of ‘not’ in questions 
using “not” negation was also included to look at whether this mattered to people’s 
interpretation of the task. 
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2.3.2.2. Participants 
An opportunity sample of 20 participants (12 female) aged between 24 and 63 (median 
age 40) took part in the experiment. Participants were all fluent in English (18 had 
English as their first language) and participated in groups of between one and three 
(each participant worked silently on their question booklet at their own pace). 
2.3.2.3. Materials 
Eight scenarios for each of four alternative negation conditions (Thirty-two scenarios in 
total) were prepared. The scenarios each consisted of two statements. The first statement 
in each scenario briefly set out something about the circumstances of 100 hypothetical 
people. The second statement was intended to indicate that there would be differences 
between the hypothetical people in relation to the propositions that participants would 
be asked about. The second statements were intended to be ambiguous and not indicate 
whether the affirmative or negative versions of the proposition would be true for greater 
or fewer numbers of the hypothetical people. For example: 
 
100 people are asked to change their shift patterns at work. 
 
The boss knows that their workers will have different levels of flexibility in being 
able to change shifts. 
 
For each scenario, three questions were provided: for the affirmative and two relevant 
negation conditions (“not” negation and whichever of the alternative negation the 
scenario used, either “iN-”, “un-”, “non-” or implicit negation). For example, the 
following questions were provided for the scenario above (which used “iN-” negation as 
its alternative negation): 
 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be flexible? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be flexible? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be inflexible? 
  
Examples of questions from other scenarios using the other forms of alternative 
negation are as follows (with “un-”, “non-” and implicit negation respectively): 
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Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be fit? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be fit? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be unfit? 
 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be traditional? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be traditional? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be nontraditional? 
 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be large? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be large? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be small? 
 
Response booklets provided instructions on the first page followed by 96 question 
pages. Each question page presented a scenario followed by one of the three questions 
related to it (so each scenario was provided three times within each booklet, once with 
each question). There were 96 question pages in total, 32 with an affirmative polarity 
question, 32 with a “not” negated question and 8 for each of the four alternative 
negation conditions. Each booklet had the questions pages in random order.  
 
To test whether the placement of the word ‘not’ in “not” negation affected people’s 
probability estimates based on propositions using it, two different forms of the “not” 
negated questions were used. Half of the booklets used “not” negation questions of the 
form ‘Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be ...’. The other half 
used the form ‘Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be not …’.  
 
Full information about the materials used is provided in appendix 1 (see §A1.1). 
2.3.2.4. Procedure 
Prospective participants read an information sheet and, if they agreed to participate, 
signed a consent form and completed a demographic questionnaire. They were then 
given the test booklet and the experimenter read the instructions (which were also 
printed on the front of the booklet). The experimenter responded to any questions by 
referencing these instructions. The participant was then invited to open the booklet and 
complete each question in turn. They were given as much time as needed to complete 
  
 
 66
every question. Once finished, participants were able to ask any questions that they had 
about the study. 
2.3.3. Results 
Participants were asked to answer 96 questions each. However, six participants 
provided no answers to fourteen questions between them. The mean response to the 
given question provided by other participants was substituted for these missing 
responses in the following analysis. The responses were then converted to additive 
scores as follows: 
 
 Additive score =  [response to question using negation in proposition] 
+ [response to question with affirmative proposition] 
- 100 
 
To look at whether the position of ‘not’ in the questions using “not” negation had any 
effect, half the participants saw questions using “not” negation with the form ‘be not’ 
and the other half saw the form ‘not expect’. An independent samples t-test compared 
the average scores for “not” negation between these groups and found no significant 
effect (t(18) = -0.024, p=.981). It, therefore, appears that this variable did not affect 
responses. Therefore, responses from both groups to “not” negation questions were 
combined for subsequent analysis. 
2.3.3.1. Overall Differences between Different Types of Negation 
Table 2.1 shows the overall average score for each negation condition. As predicted, 
they are all negative. This is consistent with Macchi et al.’s (1999) previous finding that 
people make superadditive estimates when they have very limited information about the 
scenarios considered.  
 
Table 2.1 – Summary of responses to chapter 2, experiment 1 
Type of 
Negation 
“not” 
negation 
iN- affixal 
negation 
un- affixal 
negation 
non- affixal 
negation 
Implicit 
negation 
Mean Score -3.0 (6.0) -4.6 (7.3) -2.0 (10.9) -4.4 (5.1) -21.7 (14.0) 
Mean additive score (standard deviation) to 1 decimal place 
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Participants’ mean scores for each type of negation were compared using a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA. This found a significant effect (F(4,76) = 20.480, p<.001) 
of substantial size (ηp2 = .519). A series of paired samples t-tests with Bonferroni 
adjusted significant levels (p≤.005) compared each type of negation with each other 
type of negation to understand the nature of this effect. Significant differences were 
only found between implicit negation and each of the other forms of negation (“not” 
negation: t(19) = 5.857, p<.001); “iN-” negation: t(19) = 6.141, p<.001; “un-” negation: 
t(19) = 5.5.642, p<.001; and “non-” negation: (t(19) = 5.417, p<.001). Therefore the 
effect of type of negation appears to represent a difference between the implicit 
negation condition and all of the other negation conditions which yielded similar results. 
2.3.3.2. Affixal Negation 
Each type of affixal negation was tested using a different set of eight scenarios. 
Therefore, it is interesting to look at each set of eight scenarios separately to consider 
how responses when each type of affixal negation was used varied from responses when 
“not” negation was used with the same set of scenarios. This analysis, therefore, breaks 
down responses to tasks where “not” negation is used into four groups (one for each set 
of scenarios in which a different type of alternative negation used – three different 
affixes and implicit negation). The additive scores for “not” negated questions referred 
to below, therefore, vary slightly from the overall average score given above in table 
2.1.   
  
For the scenarios which used “iN-”, the mean additive score for the “not” negation 
questions was -3.1 (standard deviation 10.5), a little higher than the mean scores for 
“iN-” negation questions. A one-tailed paired-samples t-test found that this difference in 
average scores was not significant (t(19) = 0.723, p=.239). Looking at each of the eight 
scenarios which used “iN-” negation in turn, mean additive scores for “not” negation 
were higher than scores for “iN-” negation for five scenarios. However, when compared 
using one-tailed paired samples t-tests, these differences only approached significance 
for one scenario (t(19) = 1.572, p=.067). This scenario used the terms ‘not significant’ 
and ‘insignificant’ in its “not” negated and affixally negated conditions respectively. It 
is possible that participant familiarity with statistical methods provided a better 
understanding of the difference between these terms. 
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The scenarios using “un-” negation provided a mean additive score for the “not” 
negated condition of -3.0 (standard deviation 10.9). The mean additive score for “un-” 
negated quested is therefore slightly higher than for the equivalent “not” negated 
questions, but this difference was not significant (t(19) = -0.551, p=.588). Within each 
scenario’s scores for “not” negation were higher than for “un-” negation in four 
scenarios but this order was reversed in the other four. Paired-samples t-tests found no 
significant, difference between scores for not- negation and “un-” negation for any 
scenario.  
 
Where scenarios used “non-” in their alternative negation condition, the mean additive 
score for responses to the “not” negated questions was -3.8 (standard deviation 6.7). 
Therefore “non-” negation scores are lower than “not” negation scores, but this is not 
significant based on a one-tailed paired-samples t-test (t(19) = 0.422, p=.339). Across 
the eight scenarios, four yielded higher additive scores for “not” negation and four for 
“non-” negation. No significant differences between “not” negation and “non-” negation 
scores were observed for any of the eight scenarios in paired-samples t-tests.   
2.3.3.3. Implicit Negation 
Like the individual forms of affixal negation, implicit negation was used in only eight 
scenarios. For just these scenarios, responses to “not” negation questions had a mean 
additive score of -2.2 (standard deviation 8.3). Therefore, average implicit negation 
scores are lower than “not” negation scores. A one-tailed paired-samples t-test 
demonstrated that this difference was highly significant (t(19) = 6.164, p<.001).  
 
Seven of the eight scenarios which used implicit negation showed this predicted order 
of scores (with responses to questions with “not” negation being higher on average than 
responses to questions with implicit negation). One-tailed paired-samples t-tests showed 
that the differences in average scores were significant for three scenarios. These were: 
those using ‘not fat’ and ‘slender’ (t(19) = 5.097, p<.001); those using ‘not large’ and 
‘small’ (t(19) = 5.913, p<.001); and those using ‘not top’ and ‘bottom’ (t(19) = 9.652, 
p<.001). 
 
As explained above, the affirmative stem words and implicitly negating opposite 
phrases used in this experiment were drawn from amongst the words used for 
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affirmative concepts and their spatial opposites by Bianchi et al. (2011). Table 2.2 
shows the proportions of the spatial space that each concept occupied for participants in 
Bianchi et al.’s (2011) task and the proportion suggested by the average responses to the 
present experiment. Overall, the proportions established by Bianchi et al. (2011) were 
not significantly correlated with the proportions based on responses to the current 
experiment (r = .255, p=.341). However, just the eight affirmative concepts had a 
correlation which approached significance (r = .676, p=.066) and the eight opposite 
concepts showed a significant correlation (r = .763, p=.028) between the results of this 
study and that of Bianchi et al. (2011). Bianchi et al.’s (2011) task derived estimates of 
proportion from group work between participants so participant level data cannot be 
statistically compared with the results of the present experiment. However, it is apparent 
from the data reported in table 2.2 that responses differed. Only three of the sixteen 
concepts considered show estimates of proportion from Bianchi et al.’s (2011) study 
within 0.1 of the estimate derived from the results of the current experiment.   
 
Table 2.2 – Comparing proportion estimates from Bianchi et al. (2011) and present 
experiment  
Concept Opposite Concept 
Label Bianchi et al. 
estimate of 
proportion 
Present 
experiment 
estimate of 
proportion 
Label  Bianchi et al. 
estimate of 
proportion 
Present 
experiment 
estimate of 
proportion 
moving .82 .64 still .15 .34 
above .47 .52 below .33 .57 
fat .46 .33 slender .22 .37 
open .76 .45 closed .10 .49 
large .44 .27 small .21 .32 
top .31 .11 bottom .10 .12 
in front .56 .14 behind .37 .76 
deep .39 .34 shallow .18 .47 
 
2.3.4. Discussion 
This experiment sought to test the hypothesis that different types of negation would 
have different effects on estimates of a proposition’s probability. The experiment found 
an overall effect of type of negation as expected. However, this effect can be attributed 
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to the difference between implicit negation and all the other types of negation. The 
predicted differences between “not” negation and the forms of affixal negation tested 
were not observed.  
 
It was anticipated that estimates of the probability of propositions using a highly 
contrary form of negation would be lower than for propositions using “not” negation. 
The result that implicit negation led to lower scores than “not” negation in probability 
rating tasks is consistent with that hypothesis. By showing that people perceive different 
probabilities to statements using explicit and implicit negation, this result supports a 
probabilistic rationale for previous results showing differences in responses to reasoning 
tasks when implicit and explicit negation are used (e.g. Jackson and Griggs, 1990; 
Cheng and Holyoak, 1985).  
 
It was not anticipated that all forms of affixal negation would show significantly 
different response levels to implicit negation. Such a difference for more contradictory 
forms of negation (like “non-”) was expected. However, a much smaller difference – or 
no difference – was predicted where the negation was more contrary (like “iN-”) where 
its interpretation was expected to be closer to that of implicit negation.  However, 
different word stems were used to test each different form of alternative negation 
making direct comparison problematic. It was anticipated that, overall, affixal negation 
would provide a more contrary implication than implicit negation. Therefore, the 
differences observed may not be inconsistent with the view that different forms of 
negation with different levels of contradictory or contrary implication would have 
different effects. 
 
It was anticipated that probability ratings would be lower when using different forms of 
affixal negation than when using “not” negation. However, no significant overall 
differences between any type of affixal negation and “not” negation were found. While 
the results did not support the hypothesis overall, they did not contradict it either. Some 
results suggest the hypothesis is plausible, even if the present experiment is not 
sufficiently sensitive to detect what may be small effects. Mean scores were lower for 
two of the three types of affixal negation (iN- and “non-”) than for “not” negation. More 
than half of the scenarios showed average scores in the direction proposed by the 
hypothesis. The only scenario where the difference between affixal and “not” negations 
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approached significance showed lower scores in response to affixal negation than “not” 
negation as expected. This result was also observed with “iN-” negation. This form of 
affixal negation is generally interpreted to be a more contrary form than “not” or “non-” 
negation (Zimmer, 1964; Mazzon, 2004). It may be that any effects would be more 
easily observable with this form of affixal negation (i.e., “iN-”) than with the other 
forms tested. Demonstrating significant differences between the probability ratings of 
propositions using different forms of negation could have implications for our 
understanding of reasoning processes. If different forms of negation have different 
probabilistic implications, then probabilistic models of reasoning (e.g. Oaksford et al., 
2000) would be able to account for these differences better than other models that treat 
negation as a simple operator. 
 
If there are systematic differences between responses using affixal negation and “not” 
negation, they are likely to be small and a more sensitive methodology may be required 
to observe them. It is also not possible to compare the results for different forms of 
affixal negation in the current experiment because each form of alternative negation 
used different scenarios. Scenario effects are quite likely, potentially obscuring the 
effects of different types of negation. This interpretation is consistent with the reduction 
in the size of negation effects seen when the results were analysed by scenario. The 
responses previously obtained by Bianchi et al. (2011) which showed people would 
distinguish between a given proposition and its implicitly negating opposite were not 
seen here which also suggests that the method used may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
observe established effects. 
2.4. Experiment 2 
This experiment is intended to provide a further test of the hypothesis that people will 
make lower probability rating task judgements when affixal negation is used than when 
“not” negation is used. It makes several changes to the previous method intended to 
make the tasks more sensitive to detect small effects. 
 
The within-participants design of the previous experiment meant that every participant 
was answering questions for each scenario covering each of the negation conditions. 
Although we would expect participants to interpret affixal negation differently to “not” 
negation, participants may have noted the similarity in the questions and sought to 
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answer them consistently. This could have obscured any differences in the interpretation 
of different types of negation that might exist. The present experiment, therefore, uses a 
design in which participants answer only one question for each scenario. This should 
avoid the risk of participants perceiving similarity between questions and seeking to 
provide consistent answers. 
 
The previous experiment allowed comparison of each type of affixal negation with 
“not” negation. However, each type of affixal negation was presented using a different 
set of scenarios. This could have limited any potential conclusions had any differences 
between the affixal negation conditions been observed. The current experiment will, 
therefore, seek to create scenarios that can be used in affirmative, “not” negated and 
three affixally negated conditions (“non-”, “un-” and “iN-”). There are a small number 
of stem words that are equally acceptable when negated using each of these three 
prefixes (Horn, 1989). However, while “iN-” negation is highly lexicalised and is only 
understood when applied to certain words, “non-” and “un-” are both productive and 
readily understood as part of novel compounds (Mazzon, 2004). However, “un-” is less 
frequently used as a prefix with stem words which form part of frequently used “iN-” 
compounds (Zimmer, 1964). To find suitable words that would be readily understood, a 
shortlist of stem words which form part of a compound with “iN-” were drawn up. 
Questions using affirmative and “not”, “un-” and “non-” negated versions of the stem 
were tested using a small pilot group. This group were asked whether they readily 
understood the question (even if they would not use the negated form themselves). All 
proposals were readily understood when “non-” negation was used. Some proposed 
stem words were rejected because the “un-” formation was confusing to the pilot group.  
 
The final key change in this experiment will be the use of a much larger sample with 
participants completing the experiment online. The large sample is required to obtain 
the same amount of data as each participant will be answering fewer questions in a 
between-participants design compared to the previous experiment. It also helps to 
identify significant differences where effects are small as we expect here. Conducting 
the survey online makes it more practical for a large, diverse group to be recruited and 
to complete the experimental tasks. 
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2.4.1.1. Online Recruitment of Participants 
This experiment sought a much larger number of participants than the prior experiment. 
Therefore, an online survey was used to enable sufficient participants to be recruited 
and participate. Participants were recruited and paid through the ‘Amazon Mechanical 
Turk’ service (www.mturk.com). This service advertises short tasks to a pool of 
‘workers’ who can choose to complete the task for the financial credit offered. Paolacci, 
Chandler and Ipeirotis (2010) reviewed the results of an experiment using the 
Mechanical Turk, comparing it to the results of the same experiment completed using a 
sample recruited within an academic setting and a sample recruited through internet 
discussion fora. They concluded that participants recruited through the Mechanical Turk 
were a reliable source of experimental data in judgement and decision making. 
Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling (2011) also reviewed the use of the Mechanical Turk 
to recruit participants for psychology research. They found that participants were more 
diverse than typical internet samples and much more diverse than samples recruited 
within academic settings. They similarly concluded that the quality of data provided by 
Mechanical Turk participants met or exceeded standards required for published 
research. 
2.4.2. Predictions 
As with the previous experiment, the participants were given limited information about 
the scenarios under consideration. It was expected that participants would respond 
consistently with superadditive judgement (Macchi et al., 1999). This prediction 
suggests that the average response to the affirmative and “not” negated condition 
questions combined in each scenario will be less than 100.  
 
The previous experiment found that people made lower estimates of the likelihood of a 
proposition where implicit negation was used than where explicit “not” negation was 
used. However, the expected differences between “not” negation and affixal negation 
were not observed. The present experiment has been designed to be more sensitive to 
the anticipated small differences between the interpretation of “not” negation and the 
different types of affixal negation. Therefore, it was expected that each probability 
rating task using affixal negation would give rise to lower average answers than the 
equivalent question using “not” negation.  
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Within the three different types of affixal negation tested, “non-” is generally 
interpreted as the most contradictory (Mazzon, 2004). Therefore “non-” is expected to 
reveal the highest probability rating of the affixal negation conditions and the closest 
responses to “not” negation. Negation using “iN-” is generally interpreted as the most 
contrary of the three prefixes tested (Mazzon, 2004). It is therefore anticipated that 
probability rating tasks using “iN-” will receive the lowest probability ratings. 
Probability rating tasks using “un-” are expected to get responses between the other two 
forms of affixal negation tested. 
2.4.3. Method 
2.4.3.1. Design 
This experiment used the type of negation used in the question (five levels: affirmative 
– no negation; ‘not’; ‘non-’; ‘un-’; “iN-”’) and the scenario (five levels) as factors. Each 
participant saw five tasks, one for each scenario and one for each polarity condition in a 
Latin Square Confounded experimental design (Kirk, 1995).  
2.4.3.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited through the ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’ system which paid 
them US$0.25 to complete the experimental survey. After potential duplicate responses 
(based on the respondent having the same IP address) were removed, the sample 
consisted of 464 participants aged between 16 and 67 (median age 26, 37% female, 73% 
with English as their first language)  
2.4.3.3. Materials 
Five scenarios were developed which provided some information about a hypothetical 
group of 100 people. The first part of the scenario set out the context. The scenario then 
had four bullet point which each described a characteristic that ‘some’ of the 100 would 
share. These statements were intended to create ambiguity about how many of the 100 
people would meet the criteria which would be asked about. This would leave the 
response to the participants’ instinctive judgement. For example:  
 
100 people live in their parents' house.  
 
 Some of those people pay a commercial rate of rent.  
  
 
 75
 Some of those people also use a parent's car.  
 Some of those people have parents who are away for most of the year.  
 Some of those people also go on holiday with their parents. 
 
Five questions were prepared for each scenario asking how many of 100 hypothetical 
people in the scenario the participant would expect to satisfy a proposition. One for 
these five questions used an affirmative proposition and the other four used different 
forms of negation (“not” negation and affixal negation using “non-”, “un-” and “iN-”). 
For example, the following questions were prepared for the scenario above: 
 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be dependent? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be dependent? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be nondependent? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be undependent? 
Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to be independent? 
 
A web-based survey was prepared (using www.surveygizmo.com) with the scenarios 
and the questions. The survey asked each participant a single question from each 
scenario (so five experimental questions in total). The survey presented the scenarios in 
random order. Across the scenarios, participants were asked one question for each 
polarity condition. The polarity condition assigned to each scenario was randomly 
determined for each participant.  
 
Full details of the materials used in this experiment are provided in appendix 1 (see 
§A1.2) 
2.4.3.4. Procedure 
Prospective participants were directed to the web survey which started with an 
information page and a consent statement which had to be accepted to allow them to 
proceed. They were then asked for some demographic information before being given 
the instructions for the experimental questions. The experimental questions then 
followed – one to a page – and each participant had to answer five. They had to enter a 
number between 0 and 100 in response to each question before being able to move on. 
The final pages included a code to enter into the Mechanical Turk system to claim 
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payment, thanked participants for their time and provided a contact e-mail address for 
any questions. The five questions that each participant answered represented one using 
each scenario and one in each polarity condition. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the 120 different combinations of the 25 prepared questions which were 
available under these criteria. The question order was then also randomised for each 
participant. 
2.4.4. Results 
Table 2.3, below, sets out the mean responses for each polarity condition across all five 
scenarios. As anticipated, all three forms of affixal negation led to lower scores than 
“not” negation. The mean responses to the affirmative and “not” negated responses sum 
to less than 100. This is consistent with participants making, on average, superadditive 
judgements (where their estimate of the probability of all possible scenarios sums to less 
than 1). However, we cannot look at whether individual participants made superadditive 
or subadditive judgements as no individuals responded to both affirmative and “not” 
negated conditions for the same scenario. 
 
Table 2.3 – Summary of responses in chapter 2, experiment 2 
Polarity 
Condition 
Affirmative 
“not” 
negation 
non- affixal 
negation 
un- affixal 
negation 
iN- affixal 
negation 
Mean 
Response 
48.2 (23.8) 45.1 (24.7) 44.2 (24.7) 45.0 (24.2) 41.5 (23.7) 
Mean of 
Standardised 
responses 
0.14 (0.87) 0.09 (0.89) -0.00 (0.90) -0.01 (0.88) -0.14 (0.90) 
Mean response (standard deviation) to 1 decimal place 
Mean standardised response (standard deviation) to 2 decimal places 
 
Each participant only saw one task for each scenario and one for each polarity 
condition. For this reason, additive scores – as used in the previous experiment – were 
not appropriate. Instead, participant effects were factored out by standardising 
responses. The means and standard deviations of each participant’s five responses were 
calculated (these included a response for each scenario and each polarity condition). 
Each response was then standardised by subtracting the participant’s mean response and 
dividing the result by their standard deviation. 
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A 5x5 between participants ANOVA was conducted on the standardised responses with 
scenario and question polarity as the factors. This found significant main effects for 
scenario (F(4,2295) = 15.777, p<.001), polarity (F(4,2295) = 5.189, p<.001) and a 
significant interaction between scenario and polarity (F(16,2295) = 6.556, p<.001). The 
main effect of polarity in this test could be attributed to a substantial difference between 
the affirmative condition and all of the negated conditions which is not salient to our 
hypotheses. A 5x4 between participants ANOVA with scenario and question polarity as 
factors – with the affirmative condition removed – was therefore conducted. This still 
showed a main effect of polarity (F(3,1836) = 2.901, p=.034) but the effect size was 
very small (ηp2 = .004). With the affirmative condition removed there was also still a 
main effect of scenario (F(4,1836) = 23.471, P<.001) but no interaction between 
scenario and polarity (F(12,1836) = 1.554, p=.098). 
 
To understand the nature of this main effect of type of negation (after the affirmative 
condition was removed), comparisons were made using Tukey’s HSD test. These 
comparisons showed a significant difference (p=.009) between responses when “iN-” 
negation was used (mean 0.31, standard deviation 0.87) and responses when “not” 
negation was used (mean 0.07, standard deviation 0.86).  No other significant 
differences were found using Tukey’s HSD comparisons. 
 
2.4.4.1. Responses to Each Scenario 
The results above showed a highly significant main effect of the scenario condition. 
While we have no hypothesis about the effects of different scenarios, the pattern of 
results might help to show how the use of different types of negation is context 
sensitive.  
 
Comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test were performed following the significant main 
effect of scenario found in the standardised responses after the affirmative condition 
was removed. These comparisons showed significant differences (p<.001) between 
responses to the fifth scenario (using stem word ‘offensive’) and each other scenario 
(means and standard deviations set out in table 2.4).  No other significant differences 
were found using Tukey’s HSD comparisons. 
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Table 2.4 – Mean responses to each scenario in chapter 2, experiment 2 
Scenario (stem 
word used) 
A 
(dependent) 
B  
(active) 
C  
(religious) 
D  
(polite) 
E  
(offensive) 
Mean 
Response 
42.9 (25.8) 42.6 (23.3) 42.0 (21.9) 44.1 (21.7) 52.5 (26.9) 
Mean of 
Standardised 
responses 
-0.18 (0.91) -0.18 (0.82) -0.20 (0.86) -0.02 (0.85) 0.39 (0.91) 
Mean response (standard deviation) to 1 decimal place 
Mean standardised response (standard deviation) to 2 decimal places 
 
The overall standardised results are in the anticipated pattern (responses to the 
affirmative condition are higher than all of the negated response; the negated responses 
decrease in the anticipated order: “not”; “non-”; “un-”; “iN-”). Scenarios A, B and C are 
all very close to this pattern individually. For Scenario A, responses when “un-” was 
used were higher than for all other types of negation. For scenario B, responses to “iN-” 
questions were higher on average than responses when “non-” or “un-” were used. For 
scenario C, responses when “un-” was used were higher than when “non-” was used. 
All of these differences which contradicted the anticipated pattern of results in the first 
three scenarios were very small and t-tests showed that they were not significant.  
 
Standardised responses to scenario D were very close together. Although some of the 
mean responses did not fit the anticipated pattern (for example, responses when each 
form of affixal negation was used were higher than when not was used) t-tests were not 
significant for any of these differences.  
 
As observed above, post-hoc tests showed that responses to scenario E were 
significantly different to each of the other scenarios. The pattern of results was quite 
different to that of the other scenarios. Responses to all of the negation conditions were 
uniquely higher than responses to the affirmative condition. Responses to questions 
where “non-” or “un-” were used were higher than responses where “not” negation was 
used. 
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2.4.5. Discussion 
The observed main effect of polarity, which remained after the affirmative condition 
was removed, supports the basic hypothesis that the use of different types of negation in 
a proposition affects the perception of the probability of that proposition. The greatest 
difference between the negation conditions (and the only difference significant in post-
hoc tests) was between “iN-” and “not” negation. This is consistent with the specific 
prediction that “iN-” would give rise to the lowest responses to probability rating tasks 
of the negation conditions and “not” the highest. This supports the expectation that 
using more contrary forms of negation will normally lead to lower estimates of the 
likelihood of a proposition than when more contradictory forms are used. The previous 
experiment showed that implicit negation based on contrary opposites yielded lower 
likelihood estimates than “not” negation. These results build on this finding by showing 
that similar differences are also observed when using different types of explicit 
negation. 
 
However, there are several features of these results which do not directly support the 
hypothesis which need further consideration: The predicted differences between the 
other forms of affixal negation (“non-” and “un-”) and “not” negation; The 
inconsistency in the pattern of results when certain scenarios were used; and, the small 
size of the observed effects. 
 
No significant differences were found between responses to tasks using “not” negation 
and “non-” and “un-” affixal negation (or between “non-” and “un-” negation). It was 
anticipated that response to both other types of affixal negation would be lower than 
“not” negation. Of the three forms of affixal negation tested, “non-” represented the 
most contradictory and least contrary form (Zimmer, 1964). We would, therefore, 
expect responses to be closest to those for “not” negation. In this context, it is 
unsurprising that no difference was found between “not” negation and affixal negation 
using “non-”. 
 
Responses to questions using “un-” affixal negation were expected to fall between 
responses to questions using “non-” negation and responses to questions using “iN-” 
negation. It is possible that these effects were very small. The difference between 
responses to “not” negated questions and “un-” negated questions were expected to be 
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smaller than the difference between responses to “not” negated questions and “iN-” 
negated questions. The observed difference between responses to “iN-” negated and 
“not” negated questions was very small.  It is therefore possible that any difference 
between responses to “not” and “un-” negated questions was too small to detect. 
 
Another reason why questions using “un-” negation may not have elicited the expected 
differences, is that the scenarios may not have used this negator as participants would 
normally encounter it. The stem words used in the questions were chosen to work in 
affirmative, “not” negated and three affixally negated forms (“non-”, “un-” and “iN-”). 
As explained above, the “iN-” prefix is highly unproductive in modern English and it is 
only normally used with a narrow set of stem words in lexicalised compounds (Zimmer, 
1964; Mazzon, 2004). Therefore, appropriate stem words for use in the scenarios for the 
current experiment were selected from words to which the “iN-” prefix is routinely 
applied. The other prefixes used, “non-” and “un-”, are both readily productive in 
modern English and people understand their use with a wide range of words (Zimmer, 
1964; Mazzon, 2004). When piloting potential scenarios, the “non-” forms were readily 
accepted, but some other proposed scenarios were rejected because the “un-” forms 
confused people. Zimmer (1964) observed that the learned appropriateness of the “iN-” 
prefix to a given stem word might suppress the productivity of the “un-” prefix (even 
where the word otherwise had all the characteristics of a word that would be readily 
negated by “un-”). This may have made the words negated using “un-” seem unusual to 
participants – affecting their normal interpretation of this form of negation.  
 
Looking at the pattern of results for each scenario may provide some support for the 
interpretation. Notably, responses to scenario B are close to those anticipated. However, 
responses to the question where ‘inactive’ was used were very slightly higher on 
average than responses when ‘nonactive’ or ‘unactive’ were used. This may be because, 
although ‘inactive’ is a widely used word, it is may normally be used to describe 
inanimate objects rather than people. In the context of describing people, participants 
may have seen ‘unactive’ as more natural, facilitating a response closer to expectations.  
 
This experiment provided further evidence that context is important in how people 
interpret negations. In particular, scenario D (‘polite’) showed very little difference 
between the polarity conditions and scenario E (‘offensive’) reversed the normal pattern 
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of responses following affirmative and negated questions. A key difference between the 
first three scenarios (‘dependent’, ‘active’ and ‘religious’) and scenario E (‘offensive’) 
is that the former have positive or neutral emotional valance while the latter has 
negative valance. Jespersen (1917) argued that affixal negation was only used with 
stems that have positive emotional valance based on the perception that it is used to 
create negative expressions like ‘unhappy’ but not positive expressions like ‘unsad’. 
Others have since shown that affixal negation can be used with negative stems although 
this may be less common (Zimmer, 1964; Horn, 1989; Mazzon, 2004). It may be this 
distinction that led to the different pattern of results observed with this scenario. 
 
Only a small effect from different types of negation was found. It may be that such 
effects are always very small. However, the present experiment also only found a small 
difference between responses to affirmative and “not” negated conditions. A large effect 
would often be expected between these conditions if a person had reason to believe that 
the affirmative proposition was highly likely or highly unlikely (with the negation of it 
correspondingly unlikely or likely). As we did not see such an effect, it is possible that 
that the small differences observed are related to the scenarios which were designed to 
create ambiguity about the likelihood of affirmative and negative conditions. Different 
scenarios might, therefore, elicit a larger difference in responses.  
 
Finding differences in the probability ratings assigned to negated propositions 
depending on the type of negation used may affect how people reason with those 
propositions (e.g. Ohm & Thompson, 2006). 
 
Therefore this experiment has built on our understanding of how different types of 
negation affect estimates of likelihood by showing how responses when extremely 
contrary “iN-” negation is used differ from when contradictory “not” negation is used. 
However, questions remain about whether a similar effect can be found when “un-” is 
used as a negator, how content effects interact with the use of affixal negation and 
whether effect sizes can be increased. 
2.5. Experiment 3 
The previous two experiments suggested that people give different probability ratings to 
propositions based on the type of negation used in the proposition. However, these 
  
 
 82
experiments may not have been sensitive enough to detect potential differences between 
people’s estimates of the probability of a proposition using “not” negation and the 
probability of the same proposition using “un-” affixal negation instead. This 
experiment seeks to provide a further test for this anticipated difference. Also, this 
experiment seeks to provide an initial test of how people understand conditional 
statements that use affixal and “not” negation. It looks at how people rate the 
plausibility of conditionals that use affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated 
propositions in their antecedent and consequent clauses. 
 
The previous experiment showed that differences between the perception of “not” 
negation and affixal negation using “iN-”  could be observed using probability rating 
tasks (Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999). However, any difference between “not” 
negation and “un-” negation may have been obscured by the scenarios used. The 
previous experiment’s scenarios used stem words which readily negated with “iN-”. As 
the availability of negation using “iN-” sometimes suppresses the productivity of “un-” 
as a negator (Zimmer, 1964; Mazzon, 2004), participants may have found the 
application of “un-” negation unusual. The present experiment will, therefore, use 
scenarios for which negation using “iN-” is normally inappropriate and with which the 
“un-” prefix is routinely used.  
 
The previous two experiments have also provided scenarios which are designed to 
create ambiguity and which provide no overall sense of whether the test proposition is 
likely to be true or false for a given hypothetical person. This may have reduced 
observable differences between the negation conditions by clustering responses around 
50%. In the current experiment, the scenarios’ context statements will seek to imply a 
difference between the likelihood of affirmative and negated conditions. The stem 
words that are the subject of negation will also all have a positive or neutral emotional 
valance. As observed in the prior experiment, negating negative stems may affect their 
interpretation.   
 
The experiments in this chapter aim to provide an initial test of the impact of different 
types of negation on estimates of a propositions likelihood. This is motivated by prior 
research which has shown that the likelihood of propositions used in conditional 
statements effects reasoning using those statement (e.g. Oakford, Chater & Larkin, 
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2000). Factors that affect the perceived probability of propositions are therefore 
expected to affect how people reason using conditionals using those propositions. It is 
therefore relevant to consider the effect on people’s perception when propositions are 
presented as part of conditional rules rather than in isolation. The second part of this 
experiment will provide an initial test of how the use of different types of negation 
affects how people perceive conditional statements.  
 
The perceived plausibility of a conditional statement is a feature which affects people’s 
willingness to draw inferences using the statement (e.g. Quinn & Markovits, 2002). 
People might judge plausibility based on factors affecting the likelihood of the 
propositions in the conditional (De Neys, Shaeken & D’Ydewalle, 2002). This 
experiment will, therefore, look at how participants’ perceptions about the plausibility 
of a conditional are affected when antecedent and consequent clauses are varied 
between affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated conditions.  
2.5.1. Predictions 
As before, it is anticipated that probability ratings of affirmative propositions will be 
higher than ratings of propositions that use negation. It is also expected that probability 
ratings for propositions using “not” negation will be higher than for those using “un-” 
negation.  
 
The second part of the experiment looks at how participants rate the plausibility of 
conditional statements which use antecedent and consequent clauses that are 
systematically varied between affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated versions. In 
line with the first part of the experiment, we might expect affirmative clauses to be 
perceived to be more likely than “not” negated clauses – which will, in turn, be 
perceived as more likely than “un-” negated versions. For a consequent to be true if the 
antecedent is true, the consequent must occur with at least the same frequency as the 
consequent. Conditional statements with high probability antecedents and low 
probability consequents are therefore likely to be interpreted as less plausible than 
statements with low probability antecedents and high probability consequents. The 
following pattern of results is therefore predicted: 
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 Conditionals with negated antecedents (i.e. lower probability) will have lower 
plausibility ratings when the consequents are affirmative (i.e. higher probability) 
rather than negated; 
 Similarly, conditionals with “un-” negated antecedents will have lower 
plausibility ratings when consequents are affirmative or  “not” negated; and  
 Conditionals with “un-” negated consequents (lowest probability) will be rated 
less plausible than those with “not” negated consequents which, in turn, will be 
rated as less plausible than those with affirmative consequents (highest 
probability). 
This pattern may be mediated by participants’ interpretations of the propositions 
relationships with each other, but no specific predictions are made. 
2.5.2. Method 
2.5.2.1. Design 
The first part of this experiment with probability rating tasks used polarity as the 
independent variable (three levels: affirmative; ‘not’; and, ‘un-’). All participants 
responded to a question with one polarity condition randomly selected for each of nine 
scenarios presented.  
 
The second part of the experiment used the antecedent and consequent polarity of the 
presented rule the factors (each with three levels: affirmative; ‘not’; and, ‘un-’). All 
participants were presented with one of nine questions chosen randomly for each of four 
scenarios.  
2.5.2.2. Participants 
As in the previous experiment, participants were recruited through the ‘Amazon 
Mechanical Turk’ system to receive a small payment (in this case US$0.13 each to 
complete a short survey). After responses from the same IP address were excluded (to 
avoid the risk that the same participant responded twice), 413 people aged between 16 
and 68 participated (38% female, 49% with English as their first language). A small 
number of participants entered text in response to some of the questions requiring 
numerical responses and these answers have been excluded (none provided a clear 
numerical answer in text form). The total number of responses reported below is 
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therefore slightly lower than the number expected if all of the participants had submitted 
a complete set of responses.   
2.5.2.3. Materials 
For the first part of the experiment, nine scenarios were generated that provided context 
for the probability rating questions. These stated the situation of 100 people and then 
made four further statements. The statements were designed to indicate that more 
people would meet the criteria of the following probability rating question in the 
affirmative condition than in the negative conditions. This was achieved by including 
two statements beginning ‘Many of those people…’ and ‘Several…’ consistent with the 
affirmative proposition, one statement beginning ‘Some…’ which was mildly 
inconsistent with the affirmative proposition and a statement beginning ‘A few…’ that 
was strongly inconsistent with the affirmative proposition.  For example: 
 
100 people were asked how they felt about their neighbours.  
- Many of those people often spoke with their neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked their neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes socialised with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see their neighbours. 
 
These scenarios were followed by a probability rating question in one of three polarity 
conditions (one question was randomly assigned for each trial). For example, one of the 
following questions based on the stem-word ‘friendly’ was used each time the scenario 
above was given: 
 
 Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to say their neighbours 
were friendly? 
 Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to say their neighbours 
were not friendly? 
 Out of the 100 people, how many would you expect to say their neighbours 
were unfriendly? 
 
The second part of the experiment used eight of the scenarios used in the first part. Two 
scenarios from the first part were combined into each of four scenarios. For example: 
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100 people were asked how they felt about their neighbours.  
- Many of those people often spoke with their neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked their neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes socialised with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see their neighbours. 
The same 100 people are asked how they behave in a room full of new people.  
- Many of those people would try to make conversation.  
- A few of those people would find the situation so difficult they would want to leave 
the room. 
- Several of those people would want to use the opportunity to make new friends. - - 
- Some of those people would stay quiet. 
 
For each of the four scenarios, nine conditional rules were prepared and one of these 
rules was presented at random in each trial using the scenario following the statement 
that ‘An observer looks at the 100 people and suggests the following rule’. These 
conditionals represented three antecedent polarity conditions and three consequent 
polarity conditions. For example, for the scenario above, the following conditionals 
were prepared: 
 If a person is friendly, then the person is social 
 If a person is friendly, then the person is not social 
 If a person is friendly, then the person is unsocial 
 If a person is not friendly, then the person is social 
 If a person is not friendly, then the person is not social 
 If a person is not friendly, then the person is unsocial 
 If a person is unfriendly, then the person is social 
 If a person is unfriendly, then the person is not social 
 If a person is unfriendly, then the person is unsocial 
 
Full details of the materials used in this experiment are included in appendix 1 (see 
§A1.3). 
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2.5.2.4. Procedure 
Participants took part through a web-based survey. They confirmed their consent to 
participate and completed demographic questions before being given instructions for the 
probability rating tasks. Participants were presented with nine tasks, one for each 
probability rating scenario, one on each page in random order. For each scenario, the 
survey presented one of the three polarity conditions at random and the participants had 
to enter a number between 0 and 100 in response to the given question before they were 
allowed to move on. After the probability rating tasks, participants were given 
instructions for the plausibility rating questions. Participants were presented with each 
of the four plausibility rating scenarios on a page each in random order. For each 
plausibility rating scenario, they were given one of the nine possible conditional rules 
(three antecedent polarities combined with three antecedent polarities) at random. 
Participants were asked to indicate how plausible they thought the conditional rule was, 
given the context provided, using a Likert type scale with eight levels. After completing 
their tasks, they were thanked for their time and invited to return to the Mechanical Turk 
system and enter a code for payment. 
2.5.3. Results 
2.5.3.1. Probability Rating Tasks – Overall Responses 
Table 2.5 sets out the mean responses given to each question in the first part of the 
experiment. This shows that the overall mean responses and mean responses for five of 
the nine scenarios were in line with the hypotheses that the probability of affirmative 
propositions would be rated higher than the probability of the negative propositions and, 
between the negative propositions, the “not” negated propositions would have higher 
probability ratings than the “un-” negated propositions.   
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Table 2.5 – Responses to probability rating tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3 
 Polarity 
 Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated 
 overall* 57.6 (40.8) 37.4 (23.0) 36.0 (22.7) 
Scenario’s stem 
word 
believing 61.1 (20.3) 37.7 (22.2) 38.8 (23.1) 
friendly* 57.4 (21.3) 35.9 (23.6) 35.1 (23.1) 
grateful* 67.6 (82.8) 38.3 (23.7) 32.1 (23.9) 
happy 59.9 (22.6) 38.0 (22.4) 38.4 (22.9) 
romantic 67.5 (61.8) 31.7 (22.0) 34.1 (22.7) 
stylish* 57.0 (23.5) 39.0 (25.2) 33.7 (21.7) 
wise* 50.5 (24.4) 38.4 (20.8) 36.2 (22.2) 
charitable 40.5 (22.8) 40.6 (24.7) 40.7 (22.0) 
social* 55.4 (22.2) 37.7 (21.5) 34.0 (21.3) 
Mean response (standard deviation) to 1 decimal place 
* Mean responses to these scenarios (and the overall mean responses) were in line with the 
hypothesised pattern of results. 
 
Participants’ responses were standardised by subtracting from each response the 
participant’s mean response and dividing by the standard deviation of the participant’s 
responses. Unless otherwise stated, subsequent results described here are based on these 
standardised scores rather than the raw responses. This standardisation leads to 
responses to the scenario based on the stem ‘happy’ also taking the hypothesised order, 
with the mean standardised affirmative score higher than the mean standardised ‘not’ 
score which is, in turn, higher than the mean standardised ‘un-’ score. Therefore, once 
the scores have been adjusted for participant biases in this way, six of the nine scenarios 
led to results in the hypothesised direction. 
 
A 3x9 between participants ANOVA was performed with polarity and scenario as the 
factors. This found main effects for scenario (F(8,3650) = 3.029, p=.002) and polarity 
(F(2,3650) = 316.223, p<.001) and an interaction between scenario and polarity 
(F(16,3650) = 6.832, p<.001). Our main focus was on whether there is a difference 
between the two negative polarity conditions, so a 2x9 between participants ANOVA 
was conducted using polarity (with only ‘not’ and ‘un-’ as levels) and scenario as 
factors. This found a main effect for scenario (F(8,2413) = 3.267, p=.001). The main 
effect of polarity was not quite significant (F(1,2413) = 3.155, p=.076). No significant 
interaction between scenario and polarity was found. As well as being non-significant, 
the polarity effect was small (ηp2 = .001). 
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2.5.3.2. Probability Rating Tasks – Responses to Each Scenario 
As we have seen above, six of the nine sets of mean standardised scores for each 
scenario exhibited difference in the predicted direction between each polarity condition. 
As we have previously observed, context is important to participant’s ratings of 
likelihood and it is likely that each scenario will have influenced any negation effect 
observed.  
 
For the three scenarios where the mean responses did not show the predicted pattern, 
two (based on stem words ‘believing’ and ‘romantic’) did show the anticipated 
difference between responses to the affirmative condition and each of the two negated 
conditions but not between the two negated conditions. However, the difference 
between responses to the negated conditions for each scenario was not significant 
(t(265) = -0.418, p=.676; t(261) = -0.496, p=.620). The final scenario where the mean 
responses did not display the predicted pattern (based on the stem word ‘charitable’) did 
not even show the expected difference between the affirmative condition and the 
negated conditions with almost identical mean responses given to questions in each 
polarity condition. Looking just at responses to questions on the six scenarios where the 
mean scores were in the anticipated order (based on stem words ‘friendly’, ‘grateful’, 
‘happy’, ‘stylish’, ‘wise’ and ‘social’), a 2x6 between participants ANOVA using 
polarity (with only ‘not’ and ‘un-’ as levels) and scenario as factors found a significant 
main effect for polarity (F(1,1608) = 7.874, p=.005) but no main effect for scenario or 
interaction between polarity and scenario. The size of this main effect for polarity was 
larger than before the three scenarios described above were excluded (ηp2 = .004).  
 
When each scenario was tested individually, only one set showed a significant 
difference between scores for the negated conditions (the scenario based on the stem 
‘grateful’ (t(266) = 2.877, p=.002, one-tailed).  
2.5.3.3. Probability Rating Tasks – Possible Other Factors 
The high proportion of participants who do not have English as a first language and the 
random allocation of polarity condition to each trial (without reference to the other trials 
that participants had responded to) may have been factors in these results. 
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More than half of the participants (51%) reported that English was not their first 
language. This reflects the global use of the Mechanical Turk system used to recruit 
participants (although it is much higher than for the previous experiment which also 
used the Mechanical Turk system). The difference between different types of negation 
in English was expected to create subtle differences in the perception of the questions 
and therefore responses. non-native English speakers might be less likely to pick up on 
and understand these differences in implication. A 3x9x2 between participants ANOVA 
was, therefore, conducted with whether English is the participant’s first language as an 
additional factor alongside polarity and scenario. This found no significant effect of 
language (F(1,3623) = 0.038, p=.846) and no significant interactions with scenario 
(F(8,3623) = 1.455, p=.168), with polarity (F(2,3623) = 1.310, p=.270) or with scenario 
and polarity (F(16,3623) = 0.409, p=.981). When the participants that did not speak 
English as a first language were removed from the sample, the overall pattern of results 
remained the same (with higher standardised probability ratings given on average to 
affirmative propositions than negated conditions and higher ratings for “not” negated 
questions than “un-” negated questions). The 2x6 between participants ANOVA using 
polarity (with only ‘not’ and ‘un-’ as levels) and scenario (with the three inconsistent 
with the anticipated pattern removed) as factors was rerun with this reduced sample. As 
before it found a significant main effect for polarity (F(1,784) = 6.334, p=.006, one-
tailed) but no main effect for scenario or interaction between polarity and scenario. The 
size of this main effect for polarity was slightly larger than when this test was 
performed with the full sample (ηp2 = .007). 
 
Polarity conditions (either affirmative, “not” negated, or “un-” negated) were randomly 
allocated to each trial as participants answered one question for each scenario. This 
meant that each participant answered a different number of questions in each polarity 
condition. For example, a participant may have been randomly allocated to five 
questions in the affirmative condition, two in the “not” negated condition and two in the 
“un-” negated condition. A different participant may have been allocated to one 
affirmative trial, five “not” negated trials and three “un-” negated trials. The expectation 
was that any effects of this random distribution would be evened out over the whole 
sample. To check whether this may have led to any effects, the sub-group of 23 
participants who each answered three questions in each polarity condition was 
identified. The overall pattern of results for this sub-group was the same as for the 
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overall group (with mean standardised probability ratings highest for responses to 
affirmative questions and lowest for “un-” negated questions with responses to “not” 
negated questions in the middle). Again the 2x6 between participants ANOVA using 
polarity (with only ‘not’ and ‘un-’ as levels) and scenario (with the three inconsistent 
with the anticipated pattern removed) as factors was repeated with this small sub-group. 
A main effect for polarity (F(1,76)=3.085, p=.043, one-tailed) was found as before and 
no main effect for scenario or interaction between polarity and scenario were found. 
Again, the size of this main effect of polarity was larger than when this test was 
performed with the full sample (ηp2 = .029). 
2.5.3.4. Plausibility Ratings of Conditional Rules 
Participants used an eight-point scale to evaluate the plausibility of the conditional rules 
which were provided (the response options were ‘Completely implausible’, ‘Very 
implausible’, ‘Implausible’, ‘A little implausible’, ‘A little plausible’, ‘Plausible’, ‘Very 
plausible’, ‘Completely plausible’ presented in that order). Responses were converted to 
scores between 1 and 8, with 1 representing ‘Completely implausible’ and 8 
‘Completely plausible’. Mean responses are provided in table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 – Summary of responses to plausibility tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3 
  Consequent Polarity  
  Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated Overall 
Antecedent 
Polarity 
Affirmative 5.7 (1.7) 3.8 (2.0) 3.7 (1.9) 4.4 (2.1) 
“not” negated 3.9 (2.0) 4.8 (2.1) 4.8 (1.9) 4.5 (2.0) 
“un-” negated 3.7 (2.0) 5.1 (1.7) 4.7 (1.8) 4.5 (1.9) 
 Overall 4.4 (2.1) 4.6 (2.0) 4.4 (1.9) 4.4 (2.0) 
Mean response (standard deviation) to 1 decimal place 
 
The overall pattern of results suggests that, where the polarity of antecedent and 
consequent terms aligned (i.e. both affirmative or both using either form of negation), 
plausibility ratings are generally above average. However, where the polarity of 
antecedent and consequent terms differed (i.e. one is affirmative and the other uses a 
form of negation), plausibility ratings are generally below average.  
 
A3x3x4 between participants ANOVA was performed with antecedent polarity, 
consequent polarity, and scenario as the factors. This found a main effect of scenario 
(F(3,1604) = 3.679, p=.012) and significant interactions between antecedent polarity  
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and consequent polarity (F(4,1604) = 45.406, p<.001) and between antecedent polarity, 
consequent polarity and scenario (F(12,1604) = 5.017, p<.001). To understand the 
interaction between affirmative and consequent polarity a series of independent samples 
t-tests were used with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels (p=.006). Where 
consequent polarity was affirmative, an affirmative antecedent clause led to 
significantly higher plausibility ratings than both a “not” negated (t(356) = 8.595, 
p<.001) or “un-” negated (t(351) = 9.730, p<.001) antecedent. Where consequent 
negation was “not” negated, an affirmative antecedent clause led to significantly lower 
plausibility ratings than both a “not” negated (t(364) = -4.744, p<.001) or “un-” negated 
(t(332) = -6.296, p<.001) antecedent. Finally, where consequent negation was un 
negated, an affirmative antecedent clause also led to significantly lower plausibility 
ratings than both a “not” negated (t(367) = -5.297, p<.001) or “un-” negated (t(379) = -
5.248, p<.001) antecedent. No significant differences were found between the two 
negated antecedent conditions in any consequent negation condition.  
2.5.4. Discussion  
This experiment has shown some very small significant effects when we focus on the 
difference between the two negative polarity conditions only when certain materials are 
excluded (scenarios that showed differences in unanticipated directions). The removal 
of these materials could be justified on the basis that they are insufficiently sensitive to 
the factor of interest (polarity) because of the scale of other content effects. However, 
this justification is limited and no firm conclusions can be drawn without substantial 
caveats and a need for further research. These small differences may indicate that the 
use of “un-” negation in a proposition could lead to significantly different estimates of 
the probability of the proposition compared to where “not” negation is used. Both forms 
of negation lead to lower probability ratings in their propositions than the affirmative 
case but the key, predicted, difference is that propositions using “un-” would be rated 
with lower probability than those using “not”. This is in line with the expectation that 
“un-” negation would lead to a more contrary implication and “not” a more 
contradictory implication. This experiment was designed to highlight this effect which 
was obscured in the earlier experiments which sought to look at a wider range of 
negative operators.  
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Finding a potential difference between probability ratings for propositions when “not” 
and “un-” are used also addresses one of the issues with the previous experiment where 
this predicted relationship was not observed. The result, therefore, builds tentatively on 
the prior two experiments by providing evidence that may be consistent with the overall 
hypothesis that using different types of negation affects people’s perception of the 
probability of a proposition. This may suggest that the use of different types of negation 
will affect how people respond to reasoning problems. For example, Oaksford et al.’s 
(2000) model suggests that if the probability of the propositions in a conditional differ, a 
persons willingness to draw an inference based on that conditional will change.  
 
However, this finding is still limited. The size of the potential effect was still very small 
and the effect of scenario was also still very significant. However, it is likely that some 
issues with this experiment continued to obscure the full significance and size of the 
effect.  
 
Focusing on the three scenarios that did not provide the predicted pattern of results, the 
results suggest that these were not sufficiently sensitive to pick up the anticipated 
difference in negated conditions. In particular, it is worth reviewing the scenario which 
did not provide even the expected difference between affirmative and negated 
conditions. It may be that the participants did not relate the statements in the scenario 
(which referred to whether people would think a suspect guilty) with the probability 
rating questions (which asked how many people would be charitable, not charitable or 
uncharitable). While this relationship had apparently been understood by a small 
number of pilot participants, they may not have been representative of the wider 
experimental sample. This is why it may be reasonable to exclude these scenarios from 
the analysis but – as mentioned above – such analysis should be treated very cautiously. 
 
The results also considered whether the proportion of participants who did not speak 
English as a second language and whether the distribution of the polarity conditions 
may have had an effect. In both cases, it looks like these did not affect the pattern of 
results but that the effect size might have been bigger if these had not been factors. 
There may be scope for a future study to be developed which further refines the current 
paradigm and provides a more sensitive test of the effect of using different types of 
negation on responses to probability rating tasks.  
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Looking at the effect of different types of negation in conditional statements on 
perceptions of the statements’ plausibility, the results showed that the use of negation 
has an effect. However, the results did not show any significant difference between 
responses where negation was used based on the type of negation. The results, therefore, 
supported the prediction that conditionals with negated antecedents would have lower 
plausibility ratings when the consequents are affirmative rather than negated. However, 
the other specific predictions were not supported. From that pattern of results, it appears 
that participants interpretations of the relationship between the propositions were strong 
and so if one proposition was true that made the other more likely and vice versa. This 
would have led to the observed interaction with higher ratings of plausibility where both 
antecedent and consequent were affirmative and where both antecedent and consequent 
were negated. Lower plausibility ratings were observed when one clause was 
affirmative and the other negated. The next chapter will consider the role of plausibility 
in conditional reasoning further.  
2.6. General Discussion 
People conduct deductive reasoning over propositions. The interpretation of 
propositions is, therefore, an important part of the reasoning process. Understanding 
what people perceive about propositions that use negations should, therefore, help us 
understand the process of reasoning and may provide insight into how and why biases 
occur.   
 
Perceived probability is one of the features of propositions which has already been 
shown to affect reasoning using that proposition (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). The 
experiments in this chapter have looked at whether using different types of negation in a 
proposition effects people’s expectations of the probability that the proposition is true. 
Each experiment found some evidence that this was the case, although the size of the 
effects observed was small.  
 
In the first experiment, a clear difference between responses was seen when implicit 
negation was compared to explicit negation. In the second experiment, an overall 
difference between people’s probability ratings when “not” and “iN-” negation were 
used showed that different forms of explicit negation could have an effect. In the third 
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experiment, this effect was also demonstrated between “not” negation and affixal 
negation using “un-” where the effect was anticipated to be smaller.  
 
Implicit negation has been widely used in previous reasoning studies (e.g. Evans & 
Lynch, 1973). It has already been observed that when “not” negation is used in place of 
implicit negation some of the reasoning biases associated with negation are affected. 
For example, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) found that matching bias in Wason’s (1968) 
selection task was reduced when explicit negations were used in place of implicit 
negation. The finding that using implicit negation in place of explicit negation in a 
proposition affects its perceived likelihood may provide further insight into why these 
differences occur. They suggest that effects such as matching bias may not be down to 
people’s inability to reason with negations but down to probabilistic reasoning with low 
probability propositions that use implicit negation. This supports the probabilistic model 
for reasoning in the selection task proposed by Oaksford and Stenning (1992). 
 
The further findings that different types of explicit negation (affixal negation using 
“iN-” and possibly “un-” and “not” negation) can affect likelihood estimates of 
propositions suggests that further consideration needs to be given to the application of 
negation in logical reasoning tasks. It often appears assumed that negation works as a 
simple contradictory operator with clear, logical meaning and implication. However, 
studies of negation in language have shown that the interpretation of negation can be 
complex and it can carry different implications (Horn, 1989). This suggests that any 
account of negation biases in reasoning tasks needs to consider how the different 
implications of negation may have been incorporated into the participants reasoning 
process. As we have seen, different types of negation affect the probability ratings of 
propositions using negation. The probabilistic model (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 2001) 
which explicitly considers the probability of the propositions that make up the 
conditional statements that are reasoned over provides a mechanism for incorporating 
such effects. It is not clear how alternative models of reasoning based on mental logics 
(e.g. Braine & O’Brien, 1991) or mental models (e.g. Johnson-Laird, Byrne & 
Schaeken, 1992) can do this. 
 
In the final experiment, the effect of different types of negation in conditional 
statements was explored. While it did not show any significant effects of different types 
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of negation, it did show how the use of negation has a significant effect on people’s 
perception of the plausibility of a conditional. These differences may affect how people 
reason with a given conditional – and their willingness to draw inferences from it (e.g. 
Quinn & Markovits, 2002).  
 
There is some evidence that the final experiment could be further refined to allow a 
more sensitive test of how different forms of negation affect the probability ratings of 
propositions. A further study would want to ensure that all scenarios provided a context 
that participants’ found relevant to the probability rating question and evenly distribute 
questions with each polarity condition to each participant. It may also want to restrict 
the sample to prospective participants with English as a first language. However, for the 
purposes of the current study, the results in this chapter demonstrate that different types 
of negation can influence people’s probability estimates. Previous research has shown 
that manipulating the probability of propositions within conditionals affects reasoning 
with those conditionals (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). The next chapter will, therefore, 
seek direct evidence of an effect of type of negation in conditional reasoning.  
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3. Different Types of Negation in Conditional Inference 
The previous chapter showed that different types of negation, like “iN-” and “not”, 
could have different effects on estimates of likelihood (albeit with small effect sizes). 
The probability assigned to propositions is a feature often associated with deductive 
reasoning over the propositions (e.g. Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 2000). In this chapter, 
I will, therefore, look directly at whether the use of different types of negation leads to 
different responses when participants evaluate statements of conditional reasoning. I 
will use an extended version of Evans’ (1977) negation paradigm in conditional 
inference evaluation tasks. 
3.1. Evans’ (1977) Negation Paradigm 
As set out in §1.1, conditional inference evaluation tasks require participants to evaluate 
whether a given inference is true or false. The inference consists of a major premise (the 
conditional statement), a minor premise (whether the antecedent or consequent is true or 
false) and a conclusion (also whether the antecedent or consequent is true). As discussed 
in §1.2, when asked to evaluate a series of MP, DA, AC and MT inferences, all forms 
are typically endorsed more than half the time. Responses for MP inferences typically 
approach the ceiling, with MT yielding fewer endorsements but more than AC which, in 
turn, is more widely endorsed that DA (Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2001). 
However, these results can be varied when materials are changed. For example, Evans 
and Handley (1999) found that when abstract materials are used, MP endorsement still 
approaches ceiling (95%) but MT endorsement (58%) is lower than AC endorsement 
(79%). Evans and Handley (1999) still reported that DA endorsement was lowest 
(32%). 
 
A widely used evaluation task paradigm was proposed by Evans (1977) and has 
subsequently been described as the ‘negations paradigm’ (Oaksford and Stenning, 
1992). Experiments using this paradigm present MP, DA, AC and MT inferences with 
each of four forms of conditional statement (providing a total of sixteen combinations of 
inference and conditional form). These four forms systematically varied the conditional 
statement’s antecedent and consequent terms between affirmative and negative 
polarities. These forms are described as AA, NA, AN and NN with the first letter setting 
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out whether the antecedent is affirmative or negative and the second letter setting out 
whether the consequent is affirmative or negative. The four forms are: 
 p  q (AA) 
  p  q (NA)  
 p   q (AN) 
  p   q (NN) 
 
Using this paradigm Evans (1977) observed a negative conclusion bias (discussed in 
§1.2.1.2) when conditional statements of the form ‘if p, then q’ were used (although not 
when the ‘p only if q’ form was used). For DA, AC and MT inferences, endorsement 
levels were higher when the conclusion presented was negative (for MP, endorsement 
approached ceiling when the conclusion was both affirmative and negative).  
 
The lack of negative conclusion bias observed when Evans (1977) used an alternative 
form of conditional statement highlights the importance of interpretation of the 
inference in the generation of negation effects. Showing that participants do interpret 
different conditional forms in different ways does suggest that if negations used in the 
conditionals are interpreted differently, there may be differences in the negation effects 
observed. Thompson and Mann (1995) suggested that “only if” statements are 
understood as having a more necessary relationship than “if, then” statements and a 
greater sense that one of the propositions must proceed the other. 
 
Other experiments have sought to explore other factors that could influence the level of 
endorsement of different inferences. For example, Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis and Rist 
(1991) showed that people might endorse an inference in one context but reject it in a 
different context. They found that providing a context with a greater number of 
alternative causes (reasons why the consequent might occur that are not the current 
antecedent) or more disabling conditions (events which would prevent the truth of the 
consequent even where the antecedent occurred) reduced the level of inference 
endorsement.    
 
Classical logic does not take account of context and when reduced to symbolic logic the 
temporal order of propositions described by Thompson and Mann (1995) does not 
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influence the truth function of a conditional statement. Therefore, whether the 
conditional is interpreted as a conditional or as a biconditional, classical logic does not 
provide an account for people endorsing different numbers of inferences depending on 
context.  
 
Experiments using Evans’ (1977) negations paradigm have been used to evaluate 
several models of reasoning. In particular, the mental models theory which implies that 
participants tend to represent affirmative propositions in internal models more easily 
(Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992). Evans (1993) suggested that, while this 
might provide a plausible explanation of responses to Wason’s (1968) selection task (in 
which participants pick cards that match their internal models), it did not predict 
negative conclusion bias in evaluation tasks. Evans (1993) said that the mental models 
approach would predict an affirmative premise bias which had not been observed. 
Evans and Handley (1999) again found evidence of a negative conclusion bias (for DA 
and MT but not MP and AC) but no affirmative premise bias. Evans and Handley 
(1999) did find limited evidence for an affirmative premise bias when the materials used 
in evaluation tasks were very similar to those used in Wason’s (1968) selection task 
suggesting that observed effects were potentially quite complicated. They suggested 
amendment to the mental models theory to better account for the data. Thompson and 
Mann (1995) used mental models theory to explain their analysis of the interpretation of 
“only if” conditional statements. They incorporated an indicator of temporarily prior 
events into the mental models approach and showed that their interpretation of “only if” 
would not lead to negative conclusion bias in the same way as statements using the “if, 
then” form.  
 
Evans’ (1977) negations paradigm has also been used to evaluate the probabilistic 
approach to explaining reasoning biases. Oaksford et al. (2000) developed a 
probabilistic account of conditional inference with reference to the contrast class 
account of negation (as previously discussed in §1.3.3). This model assumed the notion 
implied by the contrast class account of negation (discussed in §1.4.3) that negated 
propositions would normally have a higher probability than their affirmative 
contradictory (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). Oaksford et al. (2000) showed the model 
was a good fit with data from a meta-analysis of previous conditional inference 
experiments and was supported by two experiments that manipulated the probabilities 
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of the propositions used directly. Oaksford and Chater (2007) looked at how well the 
probabilistic approach could account for results using Evans’ (1977) negation paradigm 
when a different form of conditional rule was used. They suggested that different 
interpretations of the form of the rule and different ordering of propositions would 
affect the utility placed on different types of inference using decision theory. They 
showed that the results are consistent with facilitation of more useful inferences (those 
with higher utility) and suppression of less useful inferences. Oaksford et al. (2000) also 
look at how the probabilistic approach can account for negation effects. They created a 
probabilistic model which suggested that the likelihood a given inference would be 
endorsed is proportional to the conditional probability that the conclusion is true given 
the premises. This model was a good fit for their data.  
3.1.1. Extending the Negation Paradigm 
The negations paradigm (Evans, 1977) has been used to test participants’ evaluation of 
inferences with and without negations using different types of materials. This includes 
abstract (e.g. Evans, 1977) and more naturalistic materials (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). It 
also includes the use of both “not” negation and implicit negation (e.g. Evans, 1983). It 
has not previously been used to compare the effects of different types of explicit 
negation on inference endorsement levels. In order to compare the use of “not”  
negation and a different type of explicit negation, the range of conditional statement 
forms used needs to be expanded to systematically vary antecedent and consequent by 
three conditions: affirmative (‘A’), “not” negated (‘N1’) and alternatively negated 
(‘N2’). This produces nine forms of conditional sentence (the first letter represents the 
antecedent polarity and the second, the consequent polarity): AA, AN1, AN2, N1A, 
N1N1, N1N2, N2A, N2N1 and N2N2. 
 
The experiments in this chapter will compare “not” negation with affixal negation using 
“un-” as well as using affirmative terms in conditional inference tasks. Negation using 
not has been widely used in prior experiments using the negations paradigm (Evans, 
1977). The experiments in chapter 2 demonstrated that different forms of negation can 
have different effects on people’s probability estimates of propositions using negation. 
Negation using “un-” only showed a small effect when certain materials were used (a 
larger effect was seen with affixal negation using “iN-”). However, the prefix “un-” is 
more productive in modern English than “iN-” (and other negative affixes like dis- and 
  
 
 101
–less; Zimmer, 1964). It can be applied to a wider range of concepts and used to create 
novel compounds (Mazzon, 2004). It is, therefore, more relevant to everyday negation 
using modern English and easier to accommodate into experimental tasks without 
looking odd to participants or narrowing the range of materials available for the 
experiment.  
  
As discussed in §2.2.1, explicit negation using the prefix “un-” creates a proposition 
with a more contrary interpretation than were the prefix “non-” or negation using “not” 
used. However, negation using “un-” is less contrary than negation which uses the 
praxis “iN-” (Zimmer, 1964; Horn, 1989). Previous models of reasoning based on the 
probabilistic approach have successfully modelled the data based on the assumption that 
negated propositions are high probability drawn from contrast class theory (Oaksford et 
al., 2000). This may be appropriate where highly contradictory “not” negation is used. 
However, more contrary interpretations of negation are likely to lead to a proposition 
with the negation being interpreted as lower probability. As “un-” negation typically 
takes a more contrary interpretation than “not” negation (but less than other forms of 
negation, like “iN-”) we might expect to see reduced negation effects when it is used 
(but still see some evidence of the previously observed biases). 
3.2. Causal Relationships and Plausibility 
The experiments in this chapter will use different types of negation in conditional 
sentences. They will look at the effect these differences have on participants’ 
willingness to endorse inferences based on these conditional statements. Using different 
types of negation can alter people’s perception of a proposition’s likelihood as shown in 
chapter 2. It could affect people’s’ perception of the plausibility of a proposition or 
conditional statement using the proposition. It could also relate to people’s beliefs about 
the likelihood that the conditional describes a causal relationship. This chapter will, 
therefore, consider how people might look at the conditional as a causal relationship. It 
will also consider the impact of the people’s perceptions of the plausibility of 
propositions and conditional relationships between propositions on inference 
judgements. 
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3.2.1. The Conditional as Causal Relationship 
 
 
Some factors that could affect the perceived plausibility of conditional statements have 
been shown to affect the level at which people make or endorse inferences that use 
them. The plausibility of a conditional relationship is normally related to the perception 
that the relationship is causal, i.e. that ‘if p, then q’ implies that q happens as a result of 
p.   
 
As mentioned above, Cummins et al. (1991) showed that people were less likely to 
endorse an inference where they had been provided with a greater number of alternative 
causes (‘enablers’) or more disabling conditions (‘disablers’). In relation to a 
conditional ‘if p then q’ (e.g. ‘if I turn the key, then the car starts’), enablers are 
alternatives to p that would also lead to effect q (e.g. hot-wiring the car) and disablers 
are things that might prevent p leading to effect q (e.g. no petrol). Cummins (1995) built 
on this in two experiments. Cummins’ (1995) first experiment used materials that had 
been selected based on pre-testing by a group that generated potential enablers and 
disablers in relation to the presented conditionals. The conditionals chosen for the 
experiment fell into four groups based on the pre-test: those with a high number of both 
enablers and disablers; those with a low number of both enablers and disablers; those 
with a high number of enablers and low number of disablers; and those with a low 
number of enablers and high number of disablers. Cummins’ (1995) experimental task 
again showed that people’s willingness to endorse inferences was affected by the 
number of enablers and disablers that could be generated for the conditional. She found 
that people’s evaluation of MP and MT inferences was more affected by the number of 
enablers (more enablers reduced certainty in the inferences), whereas DA and AC 
inferences were more affected by the number of disablers (more disablers reducing 
certainty in these inferences). This showed that people’s reasoning with a conditional 
was affected by factors that would affect the strength of the causal relationship 
described by the conditional. In a second experiment, Cummin’s (1995) showed that 
people were less certain in endorsing inferences using the conditional ‘If it rains, then 
the streets would be wet’ based on a scenario that would be familiar to people (and for 
which they would be easily able to generate alternative causes and disablers) than a 
conditional that used essentially the same form of scenario but in a foreign setting (‘If it 
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thardrons, then the streets will be sticky’ based on an alien planet which experiences 
‘thardronning’ making the streets sticky in a manner similar to the ‘raining’ we 
experience making streets wet). This suggested that some conditional relationships – 
where people have no context to evaluate the likelihood of the propositions or the 
strength of the causal relationship – are interpreted logically. This also demonstrated 
that where people have information about the context, this affects their willingness to 
rely on the conditional when drawing inferences. 
 
Ahn, Kalish, Medin and Gelman (1995) presented participants with potential causal 
relationships and investigated how people sought to understand and evaluate those 
relationships. They observed that people looked at the relationship presented and 
typically asked questions which tested hypotheses about the relationship or potential 
mechanisms through which the relationship might operate. Such results led Ahn and 
Kalish (2000) to argue that people perceived causal relationships to have a sense that 
one event necessarily leads to another. This distinguishes such relationships from 
correlations. They argued that where such a necessary relationship exists, people believe 
there a mechanism underpinning it. They argued that, although people are capable of 
identifying and testing relationships between events that regularly co-occur through 
induction, abduction is more likely to be relevant and useful to real-world tasks. 
Abduction is the development of the best available explanation for a relationship based 
on evaluation of alternative hypotheses. This proposal implies that a person’s perception 
of the plausibility of a relationship (which must be a part of the judgement of best 
available explanation for the relationship) is central to their willingness to draw 
inferences from causal relationships.  
3.2.2. Context and Plausibility in Causal Conditionals 
The use of naturalistic or thematic materials has been seen to reduce negation biases 
otherwise observed in reasoning tasks (e.g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). Essentially, when 
working with naturalistic materials, people appear to rely on existing world knowledge 
to inform the task. For example, Oaksford and Stenning (1992) argued that naturalistic 
material may be more amenable to everyday approaches to reason – which they suggest 
includes access to contrast classes for negated propositions.  
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As discussed above, knowledge of alternative antecedents to a causal conditional can 
reduce people’s willingness to make inferences relying on the conditional. Chan and 
Chau (1994) provided supplemental conditionals of the form ‘if r then q’ alongside 
conditional statements of the form ‘if p then q’ and looked at the effect this had on 
participants drawing inferences using the latter conditional. Their results suggest that 
people are less willing to draw inferences of any type where the additional antecedent, r, 
is perceived to be more salient than the antecedent, p, to the consequent, q. Providing 
this additional information about the factors that the consequent is conditional on 
therefore appears to have changed people’s perception of the relationship set out in the 
conditional over which they are asked to reason. This also shows that people use their 
prior knowledge (for example, of the salience of p and r to q) where it is available in 
reasoning to alter their perception of the conditional statement. The use of prior 
knowledge to evaluate the rule may not be relevant where materials are abstract 
(materials such as those used by Evans, 1977, like ‘If the letter is G, then the number is 
not 9’).  
 
Context to propositions can also be provided through information about how many 
times the events described occurred or didn’t occur in different circumstances 
(contingency information). White (2000) provided participants with contingency 
information to explore how they would identify an event’s cause. He found that people 
sought narrative explanations describing causal relationships (like conditionals) in 
preference to explanations based on simple co-variation between two events. The 
desired explanations were as complete as possible where information about all common 
factors and enabling factors was available (particularly when the level of confirmatory 
instances described by the contingency data was higher).  
 
Quinn and Markovits (1998) compared people’s perception of the strength of the 
relationship between antecedent and consequent in a conditional and their confidence in 
the inferences that they drew using it. Their participants were more certain of the AC 
and DA inferences that they made (suggesting a greater willingness to make them) 
where they perceived a strong association between the antecedent and consequent terms. 
In a further study, Quinn and Markovits (2002) provided participants with causal 
conditional relationships and context statements which altered the number of available 
alternative causes. These context statements changed the likelihood of a given 
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antecedent being responsible for a consequent event. Again they showed that AC and 
DA inferences were endorsed with more certainty where the plausibility of the 
conditional relationship was high (i.e. the number of available alternative causes was 
low). 
 
To consider the effects of different types of negation in conditional reasoning, the 
current study must use somewhat naturalistic materials (while abstract tasks can use 
explicit and implicit negation it is hard to apply different forms of explicit negation and 
ensure they are universally understood). Given this, the current study will need to 
consider the context and plausibility of the conditionals used as part of the experiments. 
3.2.3. Causal Models 
Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs) are a type of Bayesian network (a probabilistic 
graphical model that sets out random variables and their conditional dependencies via a 
directed acyclic – i.e. not cyclic and therefore finite – graph). CBNs provide a way of 
illustrating the mental representations and processes that may underlie causal reasoning 
(Sloman, 2005). They treat causal dependences that people believe are operative as 
basic (Pearl, 2000) and are represented with nodes representing Bayesian random 
variables and arrows which run from cause to effect.  
  
Fernbach and Erb (2013) provide recent CBN models (see figure 3.1) which show the 
relationship between p and q in a causal conditional ‘if p then q’. In their models for MP 
and AC: Wp represents the strength of the causal relationship set out by that conditional; 
di* represents the strength of potential disablers; and, Wa represents the strength of 
alternative causes that also result in proposition q. Fernbach and Erb (2013) argued that 
it was not simply the number of alternative causes which lessened Wp but also the 
strength of the alternatives. An increased number of alternative causes might reduce the 
strength of a causal relationship – and reduce the level of inferences people are willing 
to make based on the relationship. However, they proposed that a single strong 
alternative might have a greater effect than multiple weaker (or less likely) alternatives. 
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Figure 3.1 – Fernbach and Erb’s (2013) CBNs for (i) simple MP, (ii) extended MP and (iii) AC 
inferences. 
 
Fernbach and Erb’s (2013) initial, ‘simple’, CBN model for MP inferences treats the 
relationship as straightforward, with a single parameter: the strength of the causal 
relationship, Wp (as set out below with a representing potential alternative causes of q – 
the disablers to the proposed causal statement). 
 
MP = P(q│p, ¬ a) = Wp 
 
Fernbach and Erb’s (2013) model for AC was parameterised using the base probability, 
Pp, and causal power, Wp, of the antecedent clause and the strength of alternative causes 
for the consequent clause, Wa: 
 
 
 
AC = P(p│q) = 1 – (1 – Pp) 
Wa 
PpWp + Wa - PpWpWa 
p q 
Wp 
p q 
Wp 
d1* 
p q 
Wp 
Wa 
dn* … 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
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Fernbach and Erb (2013) noted that the data from Cummins’ (1995) first experiment 
(discussed above, §3.2.3) showed some characteristics which were not entirely 
predicted by the quantity of enablers or disablers. For example, AC was more endorsed 
where there were many enablers and few disablers than where there were few enablers 
and few disablers although the quantity of enablers and disablers was similar in both 
conditions. Fernbach and Erb (2013) used the conditionals from Cummins’ (1995) first 
experiment, but asked participants to provide judgements of the prior probabilities of 
the causes in the conditions, the causal power of the cause and the strength of alternative 
causes. They used a sampling procedure to take these parameters and generate model 
predictions for AC and MP inferences using their AC and simple MP models. They 
found that their model predictions, which considered the strength of enablers, were 
highly correlated with the responses observed by Cummins’ (1995) for AC. For MP, 
their initial model was less conclusive. 
 
Fernbach and Erb (2013) conducted a further experiment which sought judgements 
about the likelihood and strength of disablers related to the conditionals used. They used 
an ‘extended’ MP model. This model considered the role of disablers in reducing the 
strength of the causal relationship described by the conditional (the potential 
alternatives to the causal conditional being true). Pdi represents the likelihood and di* 
represents the strength of the i-th disabler, di:   
 
 
Using this model, Fernbach and Erb (2013) did demonstrate a good fit for the MP 
judgements made by their participants in their second experiment with a larger and 
more significant correlation than models based on the number of disablers alone and 
mental models theory.  
 
In a final experiment, Fernbach and Erb (2013) looked at causal and “non-”causal 
conditionals (like ‘If it is over 80 degrees then a marathon runner will sweat’ and ‘If the 
marathon is on a Tuesday then a marathon runner will sweat’ respectively). Given the 
high likelihood of the consequent, a conditional probability model that predicts the level 
of inferences based on ‘if p then q’ will be related to P(q│p) predicts that inferences 
 n      n  
MP = P(q│p, ¬ a) = Wp =1 – ( Σ Pdidi* - Σ Pdidi* Pdjdj* + Σ Pdidi* Pdjdj* Pdkdk* - … + (-1)n-1 Π Pdidi* ) 
 i=1  i,j;i<j  i,j,k;i<j<k  i=1  
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using both conditionals will be similarly endorsed. However, Fernbach and Erb (2013) 
showed that casual conditionals led to more highly endorsed inferences than non-causal 
conditionals. This supports their model which looks at conditional inference as a causal 
relationship.   
 
The current study will consider what models like that proposed by Fernbach and Erb 
(2013) might suggest when different types of negation are used in reasoning problems. 
 
Ali, Chater and Oaksford (2011) looked at how CBNs could provide an algorithmic 
account of conditional reasoning that was consistent with a probabilistic computational 
account. They compared the predictions based on a CBN account with those made by 
the mental models account (e.g. Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992), the main 
competitor in providing an algorithmic level account of conditional reasoning.  They 
considered certain predictions that probabilistic CBN models and mental models made 
about people’s estimates of the likelihood of propositions used in conditional 
inferences. For each task, they presented two conditionals with different antecedents but 
the same consequent. Participants were either told that the consequent was the case (the 
‘consequent’ condition) or not told anything further about the consequent (the ‘non-
consequent’ condition). They were asked to rate the likelihood of one of the antecedents 
presented both before and after being told that the other antecedent is true and measured 
the difference between these ratings. They also varied the type of conditionals used. 
Some tasks using conditionals which placed cause before effect (e.g. ‘if I have no oil, 
then my car breaks down’, called the ‘causal’ cases). Others using conditionals which 
placed effect before cause (e.g. ‘If it is warm outside, then it is sunny’, the ‘diagnostic’ 
cases).  
 
Ali, Chater and Oaksford (2011) made a series of predictions based on the mental 
models and CBN accounts. Using a CBN representation then providing two diagnostic 
conditionals and the fact that the consequent is true, knowing that one of the antecedents 
is true does not affect the likelihood of the other (which is also a consequence of the 
consequent) leading to the prediction of no differences between likelihood ratings. 
However, when the truth of the consequent has not been established, the knowledge that 
one consequence of the antecedent happens will increase the likelihood that the 
consequent is true and therefore a person would anticipate an increased likelihood rating 
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between the questions before and after the alternative antecedent is asserted to be true. 
Where a causal conditional is used, then, if the truth of the consequent is not known, the 
likelihood of a given cause is likely to be similarly low both before and after finding out 
that an alternative cause is true. However, knowing that the consequent is true will 
increase the likelihood that a given cause is true only for this likelihood to be 
suppressed when an alternative cause is established leading to a substantial negative 
difference in the likelihood ratings. Consideration of mental models led to a different set 
of predictions. They considered initial and full mental models. Initial mental models do 
not change with confirmation that an alternative antecedent is true in any of the 
experimental conditions so suggest no difference between likelihood ratings in each task 
should be anticipated. Similarly, where the truth of the consequent is known, then the 
full mental models generated before and after the truth of the alternative antecedent are 
established are the same, so no differences in the perceived likelihood of the subject 
antecedent are anticipated (for both causal and diagnostic conditional). Where the truth 
of the consequent is not known, then the full mental model representation does change 
when the truth of an alternative antecedent is asserted – the number of possibilities is 
reduced and the number in which the subject antecedent is true increase as a proportion 
of the number of possibilities. This would lead to an anticipated positive difference 
between likelihood responses in each task. This effect will be greater for causal 
conditional than diagnostic conditionals (because a greater proportion of possibilities 
where the target antecedent are true remain in the causal case than the diagnostic case 
after the alternative antecedent has been asserted and cases inconsistent with this have 
been removed from the full mental models). 
 
Ali, Chater and Oaksford (2011) conducted two experiments to test whether the CBN or 
mental models approaches better accounted for responses. The first treated the presence 
of the statement that the consequent was true as a between-subjects variable and asked 
for two likelihood ratings for each task as described above. The second treated the 
presence of the statement that the consequent was true as a within-subjects variable and 
only asked for a single view of how likelihood had changed after the alternative 
antecedent was asserted in each task. In both experiments, a larger number of CBN 
predictions were shown to be true than those derived from either initial or full mental 
models’ theory.   
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3.3. Experiment 1 
This initial experiment using conditional inference tasks is intended to explore whether 
the extended negation paradigm will show different levels of inference when different 
types of negation are used. It will also collect information about the plausibility ratings 
participants assign to the conditional statements used. This will help to consider any 
interaction between negation and plausibility effects on participants’ willingness to 
endorse inferences using the conditionals. It will also help to identify scenarios where 
plausibility differences between negation conditions are minimised for use in a future 
experiment which seeks to focus only on negation effects. The results of this experiment 
were previously reported in Vance (2011, unpublished masters dissertation), but the 
discussion is updated. 
 
As an initial test, this experiment will not use the full extended negation paradigm for 
its conditional inference evaluation tasks. Instead, only the antecedent term of the 
conditional statements will be varied systematically through the three polarity questions. 
This will allow a large number of different naturalistic scenario forms to be tested 
(twelve) with four different inferences (MP, DA, AC, MT) in a within-participants 
design with a manageable number of trials. By only varying the polarity of the 
antecedent term, each participant will only need to respond to 144 trials – rather than the 
432 required if the full extended negation paradigm is used. The antecedent term was 
selected over the consequent term as the target of the polarity condition (with three 
levels: affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated) based on prior research which has 
shown a higher level of negation effects with the antecedent is varied than the 
consequent (e.g. Evans, 1977; Oaksford et al., 2000).  
 
The second part of the experiment gathers plausibility rating information for all of the 
conditional statements required by the extended negations paradigm using the twelve 
scenarios (108 conditionals). This will provide information on the perceived plausibility 
of the 36 conditional statements used in the first part of the experiment. This will allow 
the results to this part of the experiment to be considered in the light of the plausibility 
ratings assigned to the conditional. By using the full extended negation paradigm, 
responses to the plausibility rating questions can be analysed to see if they show any 
systematic effects of using different types of negation in the antecedent and consequent 
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terms. Such an effect may suggest a potential mechanism by which negation in 
conditionals affects inferential reasoning responses. Collecting information about 
conditionals covering the full extended negation paradigm for all twelve scenarios will 
also help select a smaller set of scenarios for use in a further experiment using 
conditional inference evaluation tasks. It will allow the scenarios that show the least 
variability in perceived plausibility across polarity conditions to be selected. This will 
allow the next experiment to focus on the effects that different types of negation may 
have with lower risk that plausibility factors confound the result. 
 
Each participant’s plausibility ratings will be measured using a visual analogue scale. 
Participants will be presented with a line with each end labelled with opposite extreme 
conditions (‘Extremely implausible’ and ‘Extremely plausible’). They will be invited to 
indicate where on the line they would site their perception of the plausibility of the 
conditional sentence given. Grant, Aithison, Henderson, Christie, Zare, McMurray, and 
Dargie (1999) suggest that such scales can provide increased sensitivity and 
replicability to the measurement of subjective perceptions compared to Likert type 
scales. 
3.3.1. Predictions 
The use of contrary “un-” negation in the antecedent term is expected to create an 
interpretation of that term which behaves more like the affirmative case (despite having 
opposite meaning) than the case using highly contradictory “not” negation. Typically, 
the use of negation in antecedent terms is thought to provide a higher probability 
proposition than the affirmative alternative. Oaksford and Stenning (1992) and studies 
which reflect its contrast class account of negation (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000) argue this 
is because the negation triggers generation of a contrast class of options that typically 
combines to be more probable than the single option provided in the alternative. The 
potential access to alternative options is also relevant to typical CBN models (e.g. 
Fernbach & Erb, 2013) where the strength of the conditional is affected by the 
perceived strength of alternative causal conditionals with different causes causing the 
same effect. While a “not” negated affirmative proposition may give rise to 
consideration of a contrast class – or alternatives to the affirmative proposition, the 
same affirmative proposition with “un-” negation which has a narrower implication. 
Therefore, while “not” negation is likely to lead to the same – high probability – 
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interpretation of the negation proposition seen in prior studies, “un-” negation will lead 
to a lower probability interpretation, more like the affirmative version of the 
proposition. For example, if someone is “not happy”, there are a wider range of 
alternative emotional states that might be considered in scope of the proposition (e.g. 
neutral, bored or stressed) than would be considered if the person was described as 
“unhappy”. While “unhappy” may still generate a range of alternatives larger than the 
affirmative proposition (e.g. “sad”, “angry”) these are also fully included in the wider 
scope of “not happy”. Therefore, even where an “un-” negated proposition covers a 
wider range of possibilities than the unnegated proposition, it will always have fewer 
than the “not” negated equivalent statement.   
 
Therefore, we anticipate a pattern of inference endorsement where “un- ” negation is 
used on a proposition that is more like that where the affirmative proposition is used 
than the pattern seen where “not” negation is used on the proposition (although it might 
not completely match if “un-” negated statements still generate some alternatives). Any 
such effect is likely to be most observable where all the conclusions for a given 
inference have the same polarity (i.e. in this experiment for MP where they are all 
affirmative and DA where they are all negative). Such patterns may not be observable 
where conclusions have different polarities where might also expect to see the 
replication of the well-established negative conclusion bias (for example, Evans, 
Clibbens & Rood, 1995) when responses to inferences using “not” negation in their 
conclusions are compared to inferences with affirmative conclusions. This means that a 
higher level of endorsement of DA, AC and MT inferences is anticipated where the 
conclusion is “not” negated compared to when the conclusion is affirmative. As in 
previous studies, we do not anticipate seeing this negative conclusion bias in trials using 
MP inferences where all responses are likely to approach the possible ceiling obscuring 
any observable differences (as in, for example, Oaksford et al., 2000).  
 
In this experiment, AC inferences using affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated 
conclusions will be used. As discussed above, we would expect those conclusions using 
“un-” to behave more like affirmative propositions than equivalents using “not” 
negation. We would, therefore, expect to see less negative conclusion bias demonstrated 
in AC trials which used “un-” in their conclusion than the equivalent trials using “not”.  
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Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) discussed the mental models approach to explaining 
negation effects. Where negations are used in a condition, these are incorporated into 
the relevant mental models. Where a proposition is then negated, they can lead to the 
need to negate a negation in the mental model to generate an affirmative solution. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) argue that this requirement to process a double 
negation makes some affirmative conclusions harder to process and endorse than 
negative conclusions. Whether “not” or “un-” negation is used in the proposition, the 
requirement mental model would still require consideration of double negations (in 
some cases the “not un-” double negation). Therefore, the mental models approach 
would not anticipate any differences in inference responses between different types of 
negation.  
 
Any effects will be moderated by the strength of the causal relationship perceived by the 
conditionals with different antecedent terms. For example, where there is a strong 
perceived causal link described by the relationship “if p then q” then the causal link 
described by “if not p then q” and “if un-p then q” is likely to be weak. This is likely to 
be reflected in high plausibility ratings for “if p then q” and low plausibility ratings for 
the similar conditionals with negated antecedents. A lower level of inference 
endorsement would be expected where the plausibility of the conditional is lower. 
 
For the second part of this experiment, there is no specific prediction for the impact that 
different polarity conditions will have on the plausibility ratings given to the 
conditionals. This experiment will seek to find scenarios that minimise the differences 
in the plausibility of conditional statements when different polarity conditions are 
applied to the antecedent and consequent. Where differences in the plausibility ratings 
given to the conditionals used in the first part of the experiment, inferences using more 
plausible conditionals would be expected to have higher endorsement levels than 
inferences using less plausible conditionals. This is in line with prior findings that 
people are more willing to endorse conditional inferences where the conditional is more 
plausible (e.g. Quinn & Markovits, 1998, 2002).  
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3.3.2. Method 
3.3.2.1. Design 
This experiment used a 4x3 within-participants design for its first part. The independent 
variables were inference type (with four levels: MP, DA, AC and MT) and antecedent 
polarity (with three levels: affirmative, “not” negation and “un-” negation). The 
dependent variable was the responses to each conditional inference provided, whether 
they endorsed the inference or not. 
 
The second part of the experiment looked at the impact of different types of negation on 
plausibility using a 3x3x12 within-participants design. The independent variable factors 
were antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (each with three levels: affirmative, 
“not” negation and “un-” negation) and scenario (with twelve levels: one for each 
scenario). A visual analogue scale was used to capture participants’ responses to the 
question of how plausible they thought the given conditional relationship was. These 
were recorded as a number between 1 and 100 and used as a dependent variable.  
3.3.2.2. Participants 
A total of nineteen participants were recruited for this study. This represents an 
opportunity sample and all the participants were known to the experimenter. 
Participants were provided with an information sheet before being asked to confirm 
informed consent and were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. The median age of participants was 35 (ages ranged from 24 to 57) and thirteen 
were female. English was the first language of seventeen participants – the other two 
were fluent in English. Participants were each tested individually using a laptop 
computer running E-Prime.  
3.3.2.3. Materials 
Twelve scenarios were prepared which could be used to form conditional statements 
and each form of inference in the different polarity conditions required. Each scenario 
consisted of a person’s name (e.g. “Andrew”), a first proposition (e.g. “predictable”, a 
statement which placed the proposition geographically and/or temporarily (e.g. “in the 
kitchen tomorrow”), a pronoun (e.g. “he”) and a second proposition (e.g. “clean”). The 
two propositions in each scenario were all single words which could be used 
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affirmatively or negated using both  “not” and “un-”. The statement placing the 
proposition geographically and/or temporarily was intended to make the conditional 
seem less abstract without altering the logical implication. For example, the following 
DA inference was used with “not” negated antecedent: 
 
If Melanie is not predictable in the kitchen tomorrow then she will be tidy.  
Melanie is predictable in the kitchen tomorrow. 
Therefore Melanie won’t be tidy. 
 
For the first part of the experiment, these scenarios were used to provide 144 inference 
statements which could be presented to participants. This represented each of the twelve 
scenarios being used in each of the four inference types (MP, DA, AC and MT) for each 
of three antecedent polarity conditions (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated). 
The following forms were used to generate the inference statements for each type of 
inference:  
 
 MP 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will be [second proposition].  
o [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] will be [second proposition]. 
 DA 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will be [second proposition].  
o [person’s name] is[n2] [first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] won’t be [second proposition]. 
 AC 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will be [second proposition].  
o [person’s name] will be [second proposition]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when 
and/or where]. 
 MT 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will be [second proposition].  
o [person’s name] won’t be [second proposition]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] is[n2] [first proposition] [statement of when 
and/or where]. 
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The antecedent polarity was varied by altering the text in the [n1] and [n2] placeholders. 
For the affirmative condition, [n1] was blank and [n2] was “n’t”. The “not” negated 
condition used “not ” and the “un-” negated condition used “un” for [n1]. Both negation 
conditions left [n2] blank.  
 
The second part of the experiment used conditional statements generated using the same 
twelve scenarios as the first part of the experiment. The basic form of the conditional 
statements was: 
 If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or where] 
then [pronoun] will [n2][second proposition].  
 
Nine different versions of this conditional form were generated for each of the twelve 
scenarios creating 108 conditionals to be tested. These nine versions represented all 
combinations of antecedent polarity in three conditions (affirmative, “not” negated and 
“un-” negated) and consequent polarity in the same three conditions. The [n1] 
placeholder was varied to create the antecedent negation conditions. It was blank for the 
affirmative condition, “not” in the “not” negated condition and “un” in the “un-” 
negated condition. The [n2] placeholder was varied to create the consequent negation 
conditions. It was “be ” for the affirmative condition, “not be ” in the “not” negated 
condition and “be un” in the “un-” negated condition.   
 
Further information about the materials is included in appendix 2 (see §A2.1). 
3.3.2.4. Procedure 
After participants agreed to participate, they were asked to sign a consent form and 
complete a short demographic questionnaire. They were seated in front of the computer 
monitor with a keyboard and mouse in front of them. The experiment began after they 
confirmed that they were comfortable and ready. 
 
For the first part of the experiment, they were shown a screen providing instructions on 
responding to the conditional inference tasks. This explained that on each of the 
following screens, they would be shown an inference and they should press ‘A’ if they 
believed that the conclusion given followed from the relationship and circumstance 
provided as the premises and ‘L’ if they did not. The 144 conditional inference trials 
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were then presented one at a time in random order. Participants had to respond before 
moving onto the next trial. 
 
Once the conditional inference tasks were completed, participants were provided with a 
screen setting out the instructions for the plausibility questions. On each screen that 
followed, they would be shown a conditional relationship and a line labelled ‘Entirely 
implausible’ on the left end, ‘Neither plausible nor implausible’ in the middle and 
‘Entirely plausible’ on the right end. They were asked to move a cursor along the line 
with the mouse and click on the line to indicate how plausible they thought the 
statement given was. Once they had understood the instructions and were happy to 
proceed the plausibility tasks followed on 108 screens in random order. Participants had 
to click on the line on each screen to move onto the next task.  
 
Once finished, participants were thanked for their time and given a chance to ask the 
experimenter any questions that they had about the study.  
3.3.3. Results 
In the first part of the experiment, 79.3% of all inferences were endorsed overall. This 
was made up of 95.9% of MP, 73.8% of DA, 76.9% of AC and 70.7% of MT 
inferences. In the second part of the experiment, the mean plausibility ratings assigned 
to any given conditional statement ranged from 25.5 to 83.5 with a mean rating across 
all statements of 53.9. 
3.3.3.1. Conditional Inference – Levels of Endorsement 
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of inferences of each type and in each antecedent 
negation that participants’ endorsed. Two 4x3 within participants ANOVAs were 
conducted with inference type and antecedent negation as factors. The first looked at the 
proportion of trials that each participant endorsed inferences with each type of inference 
and antecedent negation. This found a significant main effect of inference type (F(3,54) 
= 6.321, p=.001) and a main effect of type of antecedent polarity which approached 
significance (F(2,36) = 2.897, p=.068). The second ANOVA compared the proportion 
of trials that were endorsed for each of the twelve scenarios with each type of inference 
and antecedent polarity. This found significant main effects of inference type (F(3,33) = 
121.936, p<.001) and antecedent polarity (F(2,22) = 4.112, p=.030). This also found an 
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interaction between inference and antecedent negation which approached significance 
(F(6,66) = 2.116, p=.063). 
 
The specific prediction that, for the AC inferences, endorsement would be higher where 
the antecedent was “not” negated than where it was “un-” negated was tested using a 
paired samples t-test. This only approached significance (t(18) = 1.353, p=.097, one-
tailed). A further series of twelve t-tests were conducted to investigate whether some 
scenarios might be more sensitive to the anticipated effect than others. This found 
significant a significant effect for scenario 7 (t(18) = 2.191, p=.042, one-tailed) and an 
effect approaching significance for scenario 9 (t(18) = 1.372, p=.094, one-tailed). 
 
In order to look at whether changes to antecedent polarity had other effects on each type 
of inference, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted for each type of inference 
with antecedent polarity as the factor. The results of these ANOVAs approached 
significance for MP (F(2,36) = 2.939, p=.066) and DA (F(2,36) = 2.636, p=.085) 
inferences. No significant effect was found overall for MT or AC inferences.  
 
A series of three 4x2 within participants ANOVAs were also conducted with inference 
(MP, DA, AC, MT) and antecedent polarity (each used two out of three of affirmative, 
“not” negated and “un-” negated) as factors. Inference had a main effect in each case 
(F(3,54) = 6.542, p=.001; F(3,54) = 5.650, p=.002; F(3,54) = 6.362, p=.001). 
Antecedent polarity had a main effect which approach significance when the affirmative 
and “not” negated conditions were compared (F(1,18) = 4.230, p=.055) but not when 
the affirmative and “un-” negated conditions or the “not” negated and “un-” negated 
conditions were compared. There were no interactions between inference and 
antecedent polarity in any of these tests. For each inference type, a set of three planned 
comparison t-tests compared each antecedent negation condition with the others. None 
of these comparisons for any inference reached the required level of significance 
(Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.017 was used). 
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Figure 3.2 – Chart showing percentage of inferences by inference and antecedent polarity in 
experiment 1. 
 
3.3.3.2. Effect of Polarity on Plausibility Ratings 
Figure 3.3 shows the mean plausibility ratings assigned to conditional statements by 
antecedent and consequent polarity conditions. To look at any effects created by the 
variation in polarity of antecedent and consequent terms on the plausibility ratings 
assigned to the condition statements, a 3x3x12 within participants ANOVA was 
conducted. This ANOVA had antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors 
(each with three levels: affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated) and as well as 
scenario used (which had twelve levels). This found a significant interaction between all 
three factors (F(44,792) = 8.924, p<.001). This also found significant interactions 
between consequent polarity and scenario (F(22,396) = 4.504, p<.001), between 
antecedent polarity and scenario (F(22,396) = 2.050, p=.004) and between antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,72) = 46.984, p<.001). Main effects of antecedent 
polarity (F(2,36) = 8.765, p=.001) and scenario (F(11,198) = 2.114, p=.021) were also 
found.  
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Figure 3.3 – Chart showing mean plausibility ratings by antecedent and consequent polarities in 
experiment 1. 
To help interpret the interaction effect between the antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity factors, each participants’ responses across all 12 scenarios to each combination 
of the antecedent and consequent polarity conditions was combined to provide the 
participant’s mean ratings for each polarity combination. Three post hoc comparisons 
were then carried out for each of the three antecedent polarity conditions, comparing the 
affirmative and “not” negated consequents, the affirmative and “un-” negated 
consequents and the “not” negated and “un-” negated consequents. Similarly, three post 
hoc comparisons were then carried out for each of the three consequent polarity 
conditions, comparing the affirmative and “not” negated antecedents, the affirmative 
and “un-” negated antecedents and the “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedents. 
These used a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.002. Significant differences 
were found between affirmative consequents and each of the negated consequents for all 
three antecedent conditions and between affirmative antecedents and each of the 
negated antecedents for all three consequent conditions. No significant differences were 
found between the two negated consequent conditions for any antecedent condition or 
between the two negated antecedent condition for any consequent condition. The 
significant results are shown in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 – Comparisons between antecedent and consequent polarity conditions   
Antecedent polarity Test between polarities of consequents 
Affirmative and “not” 
negated 
Affirmative and “un-” 
negated 
“not” negated and 
“un-” negated 
Affirmative t(18) = 8.017, p<.001 t(18) = 8.341, p<.001 NS 
“not” negated t(18) = -5.550, 
p<.001 
t(18) = -4.610, 
p<.001 
NS 
“un-” negated t(18) = -5.305, 
p<.001 
t(18) = -5.483, 
p<.001 
NS 
 
Consequent polarity Test between polarities of antecedents 
Affirmative and “not” 
negated 
Affirmative and “not” 
negated 
Affirmative and “not” 
negated 
Affirmative t(18) = 7.033, p<.001 t(18) = 6.771, p<.001 NS 
“not” negated t(18) = -6.768, 
p<.001 
t(18) = -5.543, 
p<.001 
NS 
“un-” negated t(18) = -6.549, 
p<.001 
t(18) = -6.316, 
p<.001 
NS 
NS = not significant; Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.002 used. 
 
To consider how different scenarios might affect the impact that changing the 
antecedent and consequent polarity conditions will have on plausibility ratings, a 3x3 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity as factors for each scenario. The results of these ANOVAs are set out in table 
3.2. 
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Table 3.2 – Effects of antecedent and consequent negation on plausibility of conditional 
  F-statistics for 3x3 ANOVAs 
  Antecedent 
Negation 
Consequent 
Negation 
Antecedent 
Negation x 
Consequent 
Negation 
Scenario Scenario 1 0.764 3.879** 11.431**** 
Scenario 2 4.237** 10.617**** 11.568**** 
Scenario 3 4.888** 2.002 14.657**** 
Scenario 4 16.350**** 5.896*** 33.256**** 
Scenario 5 0.026 1.763 7.219**** 
Scenario 6 0.023 2.875* 0.712 
Scenario 7 2.376 0.074 12.846**** 
Scenario 8 3.274** 1.633 24.621**** 
Scenario 9 6.807*** 5.177** 32.510**** 
Scenario 10 1.626 2.792* 9.943**** 
Scenario 11 0.905 8.244**** 14.047**** 
Scenario 12 0.543 5.744*** 0.503 
* p≤.1, ** p≤.05, *** p≤.01, **** p≤.001 
3.3.3.3. Interaction Between Plausibility and Conditional Inference 
Of the 108 conditional statements that were rated for plausibility in the second part of 
this experiment, 36 had been used in the first part of the experiment (those with 
affirmative consequent terms).  To understand how the plausibility attributed to these 
statements may have influenced responses to the conditional inference tasks, the three 
conditionals with the highest mean plausibility ratings for each of the three antecedent 
polarity conditions were identified. These were scenarios 6, 11 and 12 with affirmative 
antecedents, scenarios 1, 4 and 8 with “not” negated antecedents and scenarios 4, 8 and 
9 with “un-” negated antecedents. Responses to these tasks were combined into a group 
labelled ‘high plausibility’. Overall, 82% of responses in the high plausibility group 
endorsed the given conditional inference. Similarly, the three conditionals with the 
lowest mean plausibility ratings for each of the three antecedent polarity conditions 
were identified. These were scenarios 4, 8 and 9 with affirmative antecedents and 
scenarios 6, 11 and 12 for both “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedents. Responses 
to these tasks were combined into a group labelled ‘low plausibility’. Overall 78% of 
responses in the low plausibility group endorsed the given conditional inference. 
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To compare responses in the high and low plausibility groups, a 4x3x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA was completed with inference (MP, DA, AC and MT), antecedent 
polarity (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated) and plausibility (high 
plausibility and low plausibility) as factors. This found significant main effects of 
inference (F(3,54) = 6.456, p=.001) and plausibility (F(1,18) = 5.046, p=.037). The 
mean number of inferences endorsed was higher for the high plausibility group than for 
the low plausibility group for every inference and antecedent polarity condition except 
those with MT inferences that had affirmative antecedent terms in the conditional. 
 
The main aim of this experiment is to look at whether the use of different types of 
negation in conditional inferences affects inference rates. To consider whether there is a 
negation effect separate from any plausibility effects, separate analysis was conducted 
on the group of responses that used scenarios where there is no main effect of the 
antecedent polarity condition on plausibility ratings. As shown in table 3.2 scenarios 1, 
5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12 showed no significant main effect of antecedent negation on 
plausibility ratings. Using only responses to these scenarios, a 4x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA with inference type and type of antecedent polarity as factors was completed 
on the number of inferences endorsed. This found a significant main effect of inference 
type (F(3,54)=6.248, p=.001) but not antecedent polarity. For the AC inferences using 
only these scenarios, 46.5% of inferences with “not” negated antecedent terms (and 
conclusions) were endorsed compared to the lower level of 43.0% of inferences that 
used “un-” negated antecedents (and conclusions). However, this difference was not 
significant. 
3.3.4. Discussion 
Overall levels of inference endorsement were high compared to previous studies using 
conditional inference tasks with Evans’ (1977) negations paradigm (for example, 
compared to the average results found in Oaksford et al.’s, 2000, meta-analysis of 
previous conditional inference experiments). This overall high level of endorsement 
appears to arise from higher than usual levels of DA, AC and MT endorsement. MP 
endorsement approaches ceiling at a similar level to that found in prior studies. A 
potential explanation for the high levels of endorsement is that the language used in the 
instructions was open and informal, describing the conditionals as ‘relationships’ rather 
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than ‘rules’ for example, and did not make reference to logic. This may have led more 
people than usual to endorse inferences when in doubt. Another factor was the variable 
proportion of each inference type that was presented with a negative conclusion.  
 
The overall level of inferences in different antecedent polarity conditions for MP, DA 
and MT placed the level of inference endorsement where “un-” negation was used 
between the levels where affirmative propositions and “not” negation are used. While 
this difference was not observed when looking at the different levels of inferences for 
each inference, the ANOVAs conducted suggest that the key effect of antecedent 
polarity is a difference between affirmative and “not” negated conditions (and not a 
difference between affirmative and “un-” conditions or the two negation conditions). 
This is in line with the prediction that “un-” propositions would behave more like 
affirmative propositions in influencing inference levels. This pattern of results for MP 
and DA would not reflect any conclusion bias effects because all conclusions used in 
each of these inference tasks will have had the same polarity (all affirmative for MP and 
all “not” negated for DA). For MT inference, conclusions were “not” negated where the 
antecedent was affirmative and conclusions were affirmative where the antecedents had 
either negation condition. The pattern of results for MT (with higher endorsement of 
inferences with “not” negated conclusions than of inferences with affirmative 
conclusion) was therefore in line with the expected negative conclusion bias although 
this difference was not significant. 
 
The predicted pattern, described above, did not hold for AC inferences where the level 
of endorsement of inferences with “un-” negated antecedents in the conditional (73.7%) 
was lower than where the antecedent was both affirmative and “not” negated (both 
conditions had an overall endorsement rage of 78.5%). However, this may reflect the 
anticipated negative conclusion bias increasing endorsements of “not” negated 
conclusions (which coincide with “not” negated antecedents). This effect may have 
overridden the normal pattern we might expect to see when negative conclusion bias is 
not a factor. As anticipated, more AC inferences were made in the “not” negated 
condition than the “un-” negated condition. However, this difference was only 
significant for one of the twelve scenarios and only approached significance overall. A 
similar difference was observed when only the scenarios with less difference in 
plausibility ratings were considered but this also failed to reach significance. The 
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direction of difference observed, and that the difference approached significance 
overall, supports the hypothesis that negative conclusion bias would be greater when 
“not” negation was used in conclusions than when “un-” negation was used. However, 
the lack of significant result may indicate that any effect is very small and an 
experiment with a larger sample size or more sensitive materials is required to detect it. 
Another curious feature of the pattern of responses to the AC inferences is that 
inferences with affirmative conclusions were endorsed at the same level as those that 
used conclusions with “not” negated. This may be because of material effects.  
 
The results of this experiment are therefore indicative that antecedent polarity may be a 
factor affecting the level of inferences endorsed in its own right in the manner predicted 
(and therefore support a probabilistic interpretation, e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). 
However, the failure to reach significance on most of the key anticipated differences 
means this conclusion must be treated with caution. The experiment has also not clearly 
demonstrated whether different types of negation can lead to different levels of negative 
conclusion bias (where the key results were also non-significant). What it has done is 
highlighted the role of the plausibility of a conditional in people’s willingness to 
endorse inferences which use it. When high plausibility conditionals were used in 
inferences, they were significantly more likely to be endorsed than when equivalent low 
plausibility conditionals were used. When only scenarios with no plausibility 
differences over the antecedent polarity condition were considered, no significant 
effects of antecedent polarity on the level of inference endorsements were found. The 
importance of the plausibility of the conditional is in line with prior research on the 
plausibility of conditional statements (e.g. Quinn & Markovits, 1998, 2002; Ahn et al., 
1995). Given the scale of the plausibility effect, it may be difficult to detect any 
independent negation effects unless differences between the plausibility of scenarios is 
minimised.  
 
Looking at the effect on plausibility ratings of changing antecedent and consequent term 
polarities in conditionals, there are some significant interactions with the scenario used. 
This suggests that the different scenarios, with different subject matter, have their 
meaning changed in different ways by the inclusion of negation. This is not surprising 
given the nature of the naturalistic scenarios used but suggests that further reflection is 
needed when scenarios are selected for further studies.  
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3.4. Experiment 2 
This experiment fully implements the extended negations paradigm based on Evans’ 
(1977) negations paradigm for conditional inference evaluation tasks. The experiment is 
intended to look at whether the different negation conditions had different effects on 
reasoning. The extended paradigm, therefore, incorporates an additional, alternative, 
form of negation, as a condition to the antecedent polarity and consequent polarity 
factors. This means when the polarity conditions are systematically varied, there are 
nine forms of conditional to test rather than four (as in Evans, 1977). Testing each 
conditional statement in all nine polarity conditions with four forms of inference (MP, 
DA, AC and MT) therefore requires 36 trials. To keep the length of the experimental 
survey manageable for participants, only two different scenarios are used in the 
experimental trials (generating 72 experimental tasks). As with the previous experiment, 
affixal negation using “un-” was the alternative form of negation used in antecedent and 
consequent terms along with affirmative versions of the terms and “not” negated 
versions. 
 
This experiment also aims to look at whether negation effects independent of 
plausibility effects can be identified. This appears to require the use of conditional 
statements which have minimal variance in perceived plausibility over all polarity 
conditions. The previous experiment looked at the plausibility rating participants gave 
to the twelve scenarios used across the nine different forms required by the extended 
negations paradigm. Two scenarios showed no significant interaction effect on 
plausibility ratings by antecedent and consequent polarities (scenarios 6 and 12). 
Neither of these scenarios demonstrated a main effect of antecedent negation on 
plausibility ratings. They did show some main effect of consequent negation on the 
conditional’s plausibility ratings, but this is much smaller than the interaction effects 
seen on the other ten scenarios. This experiment will, therefore, use these two scenarios 
with the aim of minimising the influence of conditional plausibility on the number of 
endorsements in different polarity conditions.  
 
Only using two different scenarios in the experimental trials creates an issue that 
participants are likely to become very aware of terms of the scenario and potentially 
bored. They may pay less attention over time. Such order effects should not impact on 
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the results if the trials are randomised. However, to minimise the repetition and 
potential for boredom, this experiment also uses a set of non-experimental distraction 
tasks. These follow the same format as the experimental tasks and use scenarios from 
the prior experiment which were not used in the experimental tasks. These will double 
the number of inference task trials the participants have to complete to 144 with 
experimental and distraction tasks all presented in random order together. 
 
The previous experiment had a fairly low number of participants. This will have limited 
the power of the experiment to identify small effects. This experiment will, therefore, 
take the form of an online study and seek to recruit substantially more participants to 
complete it. 
3.4.1. Predictions 
This experiment intends to provide a further test of the predictions related to the 
potential effects of different types of negation that experiment 1 considered (see §3.3.1). 
In this experiment, both antecedent and consequent negation will be varied so a more 
complex pattern as the polarity of those terms interacts should be observed. As with the 
prior experiment, the use of “un-” negation in the antecedent term is expected to create 
an interpretation of that term which behaves more like the affirmative case than the case 
using “not” negation.  Therefore, an overall pattern of results is expected that places the 
level of inference where “un-” negated propositions are used between the levels of 
inference where affirmative and “not” negated propositions are used. As before this 
expectation is in line with expectations from probabilistic (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000) 
and CBN (e.g. Fernbach & Erb, 2013) accounts, but not mental models accounts (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
 
As before, this overall pattern may not be observed where we would expect to see 
negative conclusion bias (e.g. Evans et al., 1995) effects. In this experiment, DA and 
MT inferences with have conclusions that are affirmative in some tasks and “not” 
negated in others. For these inferences higher endorsement is anticipated where “not” 
negation is used than where conclusions are affirmative. All three polarity conditions 
will be used in conclusions of MP and AC tasks. As in the previous experiment, it is 
predicted that there will be a lower level of endorsement of inferences using “un-” in the 
conclusion than the equivalent inferences using “not” in the conclusion. Inferences with 
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both forms of negative conclusion are expected to be endorsed more often than their 
equivalents with affirmative conclusions.  
 
As before, it is likely that ceiling effects obscure any effects on MP inferences. This 
experiment is intended to be more sensitive to the potentially small effects predicted 
than the prior experiment. As this experiment seeks to control for the perceived 
plausibility of conditionals in different antecedent and consequent polarity conditions, 
the previously predicted (and observed) plausibility effects should be minimised.  
3.4.2. Method 
3.4.2.1. Design 
The experiment used a 4x3x3 within-participants design. The factors were inference 
type (MP, DA, AC and MT), antecedent polarity (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” 
negated) and consequent polarity (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated). The 
responses to each conditional inference task (whether the inference was accepted or not) 
were recorded as the dependent variable. 
3.4.2.2. Participants 
A total of 96 participants (51 female) took part in this study. The participants were aged 
between 15 and 82 (with a median age 35.5) and 79 had English as a first language. All 
completed the experiment online through www.surveygizmo.com.  
 
The participants were recruited in two ways. The first group (37 participants) was an 
opportunity sample of people known to the experimenter and asked to participate and 
those recruited through adverts and links on a number of websites and forums. These 
participants were motivated by an offer to donate money to charities. Participants were 
asked which of three charities they wished to support and a total £200 donation was 
divided among the charities in the proportion that participants had selected each of 
them.   
 
The second group (59 participants) were recruited using the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
service (see §2.4.1.1). Participants recruited in this manner were paid $3 each for their 
participation.  
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There were 26 complete responses to the survey that were excluded from the results and 
from the counts provided above because we could not be confident that the participants 
were unique. The excluded responses were those that used IP addresses which matched 
other responses (indicating that the participants are in the same location – although that 
location may be a university of business with many unique users) and did not provide a 
unique e-mail address or demographic information. Where two or more responses from 
the same IP address were found with no distinguishing information, all responses from 
that IP address were excluded. 
3.4.2.3. Materials 
Conditional inference tasks were prepared based on the two scenarios found in 
experiment 1 in which the rules had the fewest significant differences in plausibility 
ratings between the different polarity conditions (those referred to as scenarios 6 and 12 
in the previous experiment). These scenarios will be referred to as scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively in relation to this experiment and its analysis. As before, each scenario 
consisted of a person’s name, first proposition, statement of when and/or where, 
pronoun and second proposition. The propositions were words that could be used 
affirmatively, negated using ‘not’ and negated using ‘un’. For example, the following 
was used as an MT statement with affirmative antecedent and “un-” negated 
consequent: 
 
If Brenda is informed about the issue being discussed today then she will be 
unconcerned.  
Brenda will be concerned. 
Therefore Brenda isn’t informed about the issue being discussed today. 
 
Each scenario was made into 36 tasks: nine tasks for each of the four conditional 
inference types with the antecedent and consequent term polarities each varied three 
ways. This generated a total of 72 experimental tasks. A further 72 distraction tasks 
which were not part of the experiment were also generated based on several other 
scenarios used in experiment 1. These tasks were intended to create more variety in the 
scenarios presented to the participants and reduce the frequency that they were asked 
questions about the same two scenarios. All 144 tasks were displayed in a random order 
to each participant. The tasks provided three statements setting out a relationship, 
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second premise and conclusion. The statements took the following forms for each 
inference type. 
 
 MP 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will [n2][second proposition].  
o [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] will [n2][second proposition]. 
 
 DA 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will [n2][second proposition].  
o [person’s name] is[n3] [first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] [n4] be [second proposition]. 
 
 AC 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will [n2][second proposition].  
o [person’s name] will [n2][second proposition]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when 
and/or where]. 
 
 MT 
o If [person’s name] is [n1][first proposition] [statement of when and/or 
where] then [pronoun] will [n2][second proposition].  
o [person’s name] [n4] be [second proposition]. 
o Therefore [person’s name] is[n3] [first proposition] [statement of when 
and/or where]. 
 
The polarity of the antecedent and consequent negation were varied for each inference 
by replacing the placeholder items (labelled ‘n1’, ‘n2’, ‘n3’ and ‘n4’) as shown in table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.3 – Varying polarity conditions 
  Item 
Antecedent Polarity Consequent Polarity n1 n2 n3 n4 
Affirmative Affirmative  be_ n’t won’t 
Affirmative “not” negated  not be_ n’t Will 
Affirmative “un-” negated  be un- n’t Will 
“not” negated Affirmative not_  be_  won’t 
“not” negated “not” negated not_  not be_  Will 
“not” negated “un-” negated not_  be un-  Will 
“un-” negated Affirmative un- be_  won’t 
“un-” negated “not” negated un- not be_  Will 
“un-” negated “un-” negated un- be un-  Will 
 
After each set of three statements, each task asked the participant to indicate whether 
they thought the conclusion followed from the premises or not by clicking on the 
relevant radio button and then clicking a ‘Next’ button to move onto the next question. 
The order of the two radio buttons used to indicate whether the participant endorsed the 
inference or not was randomised for each trial. 
 
Further details about the materials used in this experiment are included in appendix 2 
(see §A2.2). 
3.4.2.4. Procedure 
Participants taking part in the study were directed to an initial webpage that provided an 
introduction to the study and ethics information. Participants were asked to click on a 
‘Next’ button to indicate that they consented to participate. The next page provided full 
instructions and was followed by three practise tasks in the same format as the 
experimental and distraction tasks. When the practise tasks were completed, participants 
were presented with the instructions again and asked to click ‘Next’ to continue. The 
144 experimental and distraction tasks were then presented in random order, one to a 
page. After they had completed the reasoning tasks, participants were asked to complete 
a demographic questionnaire. They were given the option of providing their e-mail 
address if they wanted to participate in future studies, asked to indicate which of three 
charities they wanted to support, given an opportunity to provide comments and 
feedback on the experiment and finally thanked for their participation.  
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3.4.3. Results 
Participants endorsed 62.3% of inferences overall in experimental tasks: 91.8% of MP 
inferences, 52.1% of DA, 55.7% of AC and 49.5% of MT. The proportion of inferences 
endorsed broken down by inference type and polarity of the inference conclusion is set 
out in table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 – Percentage of inferences endorsed in experiment 2 
Conclusion 
Polarity 
Inference type 
MP DA AC MT 
Affirmative 92.7% 52.0% 54.7% 49.3% 
“not” negated 90.5% 52.4% 55.2% 49.8% 
“un-” negated 92.2% - 57.1% - 
 
A 4x3x3 ANOVA was conducted on the level of endorsement with inference type, 
antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as the factors and the responses to both 
scenarios combined. This found an interaction between inference type and antecedent 
polarity (F(6, 570) = 2.511, p=.021) and a main effect of inference (F(3, 285) = 44.934, 
p<.001). Comparison t-tests (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of .008) found 
that the main effect of inference represented a significant differences between MP 
inferences and DA inferences (t(95) = 8.625, p<.001), between MP and AC (t(95) = 
8.228, p<.001) and between MP and MT (t(95) = 9.533, p<.001). No significant 
differences were found between the DA, AC and MT. The interaction between inference 
type and antecedent polarity is shown in figure 3.4. Three comparisons were completed 
for each the four inference types (twelve comparisons in total). The compared responses 
with each antecedent polarity with each other antecedent polarity for a given inference 
level and used a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.004. None of these 
comparisons met the required significant level. The only two comparisons that 
approached (but did not meet) the required significance level were between MP 
inferences with “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedents (t(95) = -2.674, p=.009) 
and between DA inferences with “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedents (t(95) = -
2.317, p=.023).  
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Figure 3.4 – Chart showing percentage of inferences by inference and antecedent polarity in 
experiment 2 (combined scenarios). 
 
MP inferences with “un-” negated conclusions were slightly more endorsed than those 
with “not” negated conclusions. However, a one-way ANOVA on the proportion of MP 
responses endorsed with conclusion polarity as the factor (three levels: affirmative; 
“not” negated and “un-” negated) did not show a significant effect. Against the 
prediction that a negative conclusion bias would be observed, the MP inferences with 
affirmative conclusions were more endorsed than those with either form of negation in 
the conclusion. 
 
AC inferences with “un-” negated conclusions were also more endorsed than those with 
“not” negated conclusions. However, no significant effect of conclusion polarity was 
found in one-way ANOVA on the proportion of AC responses endorsed with 
conclusion polarity as the factor (three levels: affirmative; “not” negated and “un-” 
negated). 
 
Both DA and MT inferences showed a slightly higher level of responses when the 
conclusion was “not” negated than when it was affirmative. However, t-tests found that 
these differences were not significant. 
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The data were also fitted with Oaksford et al.’s (2000) computational-level model of 
conditional inference (see §1.3.3 for a description of this model). This model predicts 
inference levels for conditionals of the form ‘if p then q’ based on the parameters P(p), 
P(q) and P(q│p) using the following formulae: 
 
MP = P(q│p) 
DA = (1- P(q) - P(p) * (1- P(q│p))) / (1- P(p)) 
AC = (P(q│p)* P(p)) / P(q) 
MT = (1- P(q) - P(p) * (1- P(q│p))) / (1- P(q)) 
 
Fits were created for the combined scenarios and each scenario by setting each of the 
three parameters at 0.5 and then calculating the best fitting values for the other two for 
each polarity condition using the coefficient of variation as a measure of best fit for DA, 
AC and MT inferences. The best fits had all parameters set at a value of around 0.5 (the 
mean parameter values of the best fits for combined scenarios were P(p) = .52, P(q) 
=.50 and P(q│p) =.52). The lowest coefficient of variation for these fits was R2 = 0.93 
and most (76.2%) of the fits were R2 > 0.99 suggesting that the model was highly 
predictive of endorsement levels (the R2 statistic is described later in §4.2.4.1).  
3.4.3.1. Results for Each Scenario 
To look at whether there were any scenario or context effects that could have obscured 
any potential findings, responses to each of the two scenarios will be considered 
separately.  
 
When the first scenario was used, participants endorsed 61.6% of experimental task 
inferences overall. This was made up of 91.1% of MP, 52.3% of DA, 53.8% of AC and 
49.1% of MT inferences. The proportions of scenario 1 inferences endorsed by 
inference type and conclusion polarity are shown in table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5 – Percentage of inferences endorsed using scenario 1 
Conclusion 
Polarity 
Inference type 
MP DA AC MT 
Affirmative 92.4% 52.4% 52.8% 49.0% 
“not” negated 89.9% 52.1% 53.8% 49.3% 
“un-” negated 91.0% - 54.9% - 
 
The level of endorsement when scenario 1 was used was tested using a 4x3x3 ANOVA 
with inference type, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors. This found 
interactions between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4, 380) = 4.291, 
p=.002) and between inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6,570) = 2.208, p=.041). 
A main effect of inference (F(3, 285) = 41.974, p<.001) was also found. Comparison t-
tests (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of p=.008) found that the main effect 
of inference represented a significant difference between MP inferences and DA 
inferences (t(95) = 8.234, p<.001), between MP and AC (t(95) = 7.954, p<.001) and 
between MP and MT (t(95) = 9.183, p<.001). No significant differences were found 
between the DA, AC and MT inferences.  
 
The interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity for scenario 1 is shown 
in figure 3.5. Twelve comparisons were completed, three for each the four inference 
types comparing responses with each antecedent polarity with each other antecedent 
polarity. No comparisons reached the Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.004. 
Two comparisons approach significance, which were between DA inferences with “not” 
negated and “un-” negated antecedents (t(95) = -2.400, p=.018) and between MT 
inferences with “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedents (t(95) = 2.222, p=.029).  
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Figure 3.5 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity 
(scenario 1). 
The interaction found for scenario 1 between inference type and consequent polarity is 
shown in figure 3.6. Twelve comparisons were made, three for each the four inference 
types between responses with each consequent polarity with each other consequent 
polarity. No comparisons reached the Bonferroni adjusted significance level of p=.004. 
Only one comparison approached significance, which was between MT inferences with 
“not” negated and un negated antecedents (t(95) = 2.339, p=.021).  
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Figure 3.6 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity 
(scenario 1). 
 
Participants endorsed a total of 62.96% of experimental task inferences when the second 
scenario was used. This was made up of 92.48% of MP, 51.97% of DA, 57.52% of AC 
and 49.88% of MT inferences. The proportions of inferences endorsed by inference type 
and conclusion polarity for scenario 2 are shown in table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6 – Percentage of inferences endorsed using scenario 2 
Conclusion 
Polarity 
Inference type 
MP DA AC MT 
Affirmative 93.1% 51.6% 56.6% 49.7% 
“not” negated 91.0% 52.8% 56.6% 50.4% 
“un-” negated 93.4% - 59.4% - 
 
Levels of endorsement for tasks using scenario 2 were compared with a 4x3x3 ANOVA 
with inference type, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors. This found 
no interactions and a main effect of inference (F(3, 285) = 42.848, p<.001) was also 
found. Comparison t-tests (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of p=.008) 
found that the main effect of inference represented a significant differences between MP 
inferences and DA inferences (t(95) = 8.677, p<.001), between MP and AC (t(95) = 
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8.129, p<.001) and between MP and MT (t(95) = 9.448, p<.001). No significant 
differences between the DA, AC and MT inferences were detected. 
 
The pattern of responses for MP inferences was the same for scenario 1 as it was 
overall: inferences with affirmative conclusions more endorsed than those with “un-” 
negated conclusions; and inferences with “un-” negated conclusions were more 
endorsed than those with “not” negated conclusions. The pattern differed for scenario 2 
with inferences that had “un-” negated conclusions more endorsed than those with 
affirmative conclusions (but both were still more endorsed than inferences with “not” 
negated conclusions). However, two one-way ANOVAs on the proportion of MP 
responses endorsed for each scenario with conclusion polarity as the factor (three levels: 
affirmative; “not” negated and “un-” negated) did not show any significant effects.  
 
As with the combined results, both scenarios individually showed that AC inferences 
with “un-” negated conclusions were also more endorsed than those with “not” negated 
conclusions. Scenario 1, like the combined results, showed inferences with “not” 
negated conclusions were more endorsed than those with affirmative conclusions. Trials 
using scenario 2 showed that inferences with “not” negated and affirmative conclusions 
were endorsed at the same level. In neither case did the two scenarios show any 
significant effect of conclusion polarity on responses to AC inferences (in two one-way 
ANOVAs). 
 
For MT inferences, both scenarios shared the overall pattern of results with inferences 
with conclusions using “not” negated slightly more endorsed than those with affirmative 
conclusions. However, for DA inferences, scenario 1 showed a higher level of 
endorsement where conclusions were affirmative than where they were “not” negated. 
For scenario 2, inferences with “not” negated conclusions were more endorsed then 
those with affirmative conclusions. A series of t-tests found that none of these small 
differences was significant. 
3.4.4. Discussion 
The results of this experiment did not support the hypothesis that using different types 
of negation in reasoning tasks would have different effects on people’s reasoning. No 
significant differences were found for inferences of each type when using different 
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polarity conditions (affirmative, “not” negation and “un-” negation) in their 
conclusions. When responses from both scenarios were combined, there was an 
interaction between antecedent polarity and inference type on the level of inferences 
endorsed. Looking just at scenario 1, there was also an interaction effect of antecedent 
polarity and inference type and an additional interaction effect of consequent polarity 
and inference type. However, it is hard to unpick these effects as none of the individual 
differences tested reached the required significance level and the pattern of results 
approaching significant was not consistent across both scenarios. It may be that other 
factors obscured any small effects. 
 
Surprisingly, the results of this experiment did not show the effects of inference type or 
negative conclusion bias that have previously been widely observed. Most conditional 
inference evaluation tasks see different levels of response between DA, AC and MT 
inferences as well as between MP and the other forms of inference (e.g. Schroyens et 
al., 2001, discussed in §1.2). This experiment only found differences between MP and 
the other forms of inference. The other unusual result was the failure to detect any 
significant negative conclusion bias for any inference type. This raises two questions: 
why was the often seen differences between DA, AC and MT not observed; and why 
were levels of MP endorsement significantly higher than the other inferences despite 
whatever suppressed the normal differences between them? 
 
As shown in the results, Oaksford et al.’s (2000) conditional probability model can 
provide a good fit for the data derived from this experiment. This model suggests that 
that endorsement of MP inferences using conditionals of the form ‘if p then q’ is closely 
related to P(q│p). Oaksford and Chater (2007, 2013) discuss the difference between MP 
inference levels and those of DA, AC and MT. They suggest that MP inferences are 
likely to be made without the same consideration of potential alternative causes and 
disabling propositions that we have seen incorporated into causal interpretations (e.g. 
Cummins et al., 1991) and which suppress inference levels. This provides a likely 
explanation for MP inference levels to remain high even when the plausibility of the 
conditional relationship is low (which would suppress other inference levels).  In this 
case, as before, it looks like MP endorsement levels approached the ceiling level, 
potentially obscuring any small effects that might otherwise have been observed. 
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The normal differences between DA, AC and MT may have been suppressed because of 
an unusual characteristic of the scenarios. The two scenarios used were selected because 
of the lack of difference in the plausibility of the conditionals they used between 
different antecedent and consequent polarity conditions. This makes them quite unusual 
for a naturalistic scenario (people’s normal expectation would reasonably be that ‘if p, 
then q’ is highly plausible then ‘if p, then not q’ would not be). To have this property, 
the conditions may have all been perceived as having ambiguous or uncertain 
plausibility in every polarity condition. Previous studies (e.g. Chan & Chau, 1994) have 
shown that the plausibility of premises given can affect people’s willingness to draw 
inferences from them. This ambiguity may, therefore, have led participants to suppress 
the level of inferences people are willing to make or endorse using them. This 
suppression of inferences may have reduced the differences normally observed between 
the different forms of inference (and also suppressed any other negation effects that 
might have been observed). 
 
The very good fit with Oaksford et al.’s (2000) computational-level model of 
conditional inference may provide further experimental support for the validity of that 
model and the probabilistic approach on which it was based. However, the overall lack 
of variability observed in the level of endorsement of DA, AC and MT means that the 
current data may be easily modelled. Therefore the current results do not provide a 
useful test for the model. 
 
Although this experiment had substantially more participants than the previous 
experiment, it may not have been much more powerful overall. In the previous 
experiment, each of the nineteen participants responded to twelve different versions 
(one for each scenario) of each type of inference in each antecedent polarity condition – 
a total of 228 responses per inference and antecedent polarity form. The current 
experiment does have a much larger number of participants but they each only 
completed two trials for each type of inference with each antecedent and consequent 
polarity combination. The 96 participants therefore only provided 192 responses per 
inference and polarity form – a similar order of responses to the prior experiment. This 
undermines the attempt in this experiment to increase the size of the sample to help 
detect subtle effects. 
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Although these results do not support the hypothesis that different types of negation will 
influence inference rates in different ways, it looks like the scenarios used in this 
experiment did not elicit the responses that are normally seen. Therefore, it may be that 
the anticipated negation effects could still be observed using scenarios that provoked 
more typical responses. The plausibility of the conditionals used in the current scenarios 
may have been a factor is suppressing other inference effects and this highlights the 
importance of plausibility as a factor in inference judgements. 
3.5. Experiment 3 
This experiment is intended to provide a further test of the differences that different 
types of negation would differently affect people’s conditional inference judgements. 
Like the previous experiment, it uses the full extended negations paradigm (based on 
Evans’, 1977, negations paradigm). As with the previous experiment, affirmative, “not” 
negated and “un-” negated antecedent and consequent terms are used in the conditional 
statements and MP, DA, AC and MT inferences are presented to participants.  
 
The previous experiment attempted to use scenarios which minimised the variation in 
plausibility between the conditional statements used. This is an odd characteristic for 
conditional statements to have. It may have led to the conditional statement being 
perceived as having more ambiguous plausibility that a typical naturalistic conditional 
in all the antecedent and consequent polarity conditions. This unusual property may 
have contributed to the suppression of the effects of inference type normally observed in 
conditional inference validation tasks. The current experiment will, therefore, use 
scenarios that are expected to have varied plausibility across negation conditions – 
based on the scenarios used in chapter 2, experiment 3 (see §2.5.2.3).  These 
conditionals have already been shown to have more natural plausibility characteristics, 
like being more plausible when both antecedent and consequent terms were affirmative 
or when both these terms were negative (either negation condition). The use of 
scenarios with more normal plausibility characteristics should facilitate more typical 
responses to the inference tasks than were observed in the previous experiment. 
Plausibility will, therefore, have to be considered as a covariant factor in the analysis of 
inference response.  
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In the prior experiment, all participants saw tasks based on the same scenario for 36 
trails for each of the two experimental scenarios. This will have been quite repetitive for 
participants (even with distraction tasks randomly inserted). While the randomisation of 
trials should have avoided order effects, there is a risk that repetition led to participants 
making assumptions about what they were seeing and responding differently – or 
without paying sufficient attention – to later trials. Overall, this may have reduced the 
sensitivity of the tasks to the small effects that it was aiming to reveal. The current 
experiment, therefore, employs a design in which each participant only sees each 
scenario once. In the current experiment, each participant will only provide a single 
response for each scenario and each inference type. To retain the power to detect small 
effects, substantially more participants will need to be recruited than for the previous 
experiment.  
3.5.1. Predictions 
As in the previous experiments, we expect to see a pattern of inference endorsement 
similar to that previously observed when affirmative and negated propositions are used 
(e.g. Oaskford et al., 2000). Where ‘un-’ negation is used, it is anticipated to behave 
more like affirmative than ‘not’ negated propositions with endorsement levels between 
those seen under those other two polarity conditions. This basic pattern may be 
obscured by any negative conclusion bias (e.g. Evans et al., 1995) which is anticipated 
to lead to higher levels of endorsement where conclusions are “not” negated than where 
they are “un-” negated or affirmative (“un-” negation is used only in some conclusions 
for MP and AC tasks). The plausibility of the conditional used will also be a significant 
factor (people will be more willing to endorse inferences where the conditional used has 
high plausibility in all inference conditions).  
 
As set out before the prior two experiments, these predictions align with probabilistic 
computational level models (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000) and CBN algorithmic models 
(e.g. Fernbach & Erb, 2013). They are not consistent with mental models accounts (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
 
Ceiling effects may obscure any impact of using different types of negation in MP 
inferences.  
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3.5.2. Method 
3.5.2.1. Design 
This experiment used inference type (four levels: MP, DA, AC and MT), antecedent 
polarity (three levels: affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated) and consequent 
polarity (the same three levels as antecedent polarity) as independent variables. The 
dependent variable is participants’ responses to the question of whether they agree with 
the given conclusion to the inference. This response was measured using an eight-point 
scale (from “Completely disagree” to “Completely agree”). Each participant would see 
a task for each inference type (each using a difference scenario) with polarity conditions 
randomised for each task. 
 
The second part of the experiment uses antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as 
independent variables (each with the same three levels as above). The dependent 
variable is the probability rating assigned to the conditional statement provided (a 
number between 0 and 100). Participants would see the same four conditional 
statements that they had seen in the first part (where the polarity conditions had been 
randomly assigned).  
3.5.2.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited and paid through the ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’ system 
(payment was US$0.10). Potential duplicate responses (those from the same IP address 
or a Mechanical Turk ID that had been used in a prior experiment reported here) were 
removed. One participant was removed because their responses to the experimental 
survey were incompletely recorded. This left 848 participants with median age 27 
(range 16 to 69). A total of 42% of participants were female and 50% had English as 
their first language. All completed the experiment online through 
www.surveygizmo.com. 
3.5.2.3. Materials 
Four scenarios were prepared to provide context for each conditional inference task. 
These each combined two of the scenarios used in chapter 2, experiment 3 (see 
§2.5.2.3). As before, these provided statements about the situation of 100 people and 
then further statements designed to qualitatively indicate that more people would share 
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each trait described than don’t while providing ambiguity about the status of each 
individual. For example: 
 
100 people are asked if they believe in a newspapers investigative report.  
 
- Many of those people will be convinced by the evidence.  
- A few of those people never trust reports. 
- Several of those people normally accept such reports without much 
consideration.  
- Some of those people will want to challenge the evidence. 
 
The same 100 people are also asked what they plan for Valentines Day.  
 
- Many of those people want to do something nice with their partners.  
- A few of those people will upset their partners on Valentines Day. 
- Several of those people spend a lot of time planning their evening.  
- Some of those people are cynical about Valentines Day. 
 
For each of the scenarios, nine statements including a conditional sentence were 
prepared. These took a form like “An observer looks at the 100 people and suggests the 
following rule: If a person is believing, then the person is not romantic”). Nine forms of 
conditional statement were prepared (three with each antecedent polarity condition for 
each of the three consequent polarity conditions).  
 
For the first part of the experiment, these scenarios were each presented with one of the 
conditional statements set out above as part of a conditional inference statement. Four 
conditional inference statements (one for each of the tested types of inference: MP, DA, 
AC and MT) were prepared for each of the nine conditional sentence forms prepared for 
each scenario (a total of 36 conditional inferences per scenario). As well as the scenario 
context and the statement including the conditional, each conditional inference 
statement included a premise related to the scenario and conditional sentence (e.g. 
“Given the rule, if a person from the 100 people was found meeting the following 
condition: The person is not romantic” for the MP case of the example given above) and 
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a conclusion (continuing the example: “Would you agree with the following 
conclusion? The person is believing”).  
 
For the second part of the experiment, the same set of 36 conditional inference 
statements for each scenario were used without the premise and conclusion. 
 
For more detail on the materials used, see appendix 2 (§A2.3). 
3.5.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were recruited through the Mechanical Turk system and directed to the 
experimental survey. The first screen sought their informed consent and they were then 
provided with instructions for the inference tasks.  
 
Each participant completed four inference tasks, one on each screen. The four tasks 
represented both one using each of the four scenarios and one using each of the 
inference types (MP, DA, AC and MT). The inference type combined with each 
scenario was randomly varied for each participant and the tasks were presented to each 
participant in random order. For each task, the antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity conditions were randomised. This means that an individual participant may see 
more than one trial with the same combination of antecedent polarity and consequent 
polarity conditions. With only four trials per participant and nine possible combinations 
of antecedent polarity and consequent polarity conditions, no participant will see all of 
these conditions. The inference task will present the conditional inference statement as 
described in §3.5.2.3 above (including context, a statement with conditional sentence, 
premise and conclusion). Participants are asked to indicate whether they would endorse 
the inference by selecting one of the following options (presented in order) and clicking 
the ‘next’ button: 
 Completely disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree 
 Disagree a little 
 Agree a little 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
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 Completely agree 
 
Once they had completed the four inference task questions, participants were given 
instructions for the second part of the experiment. In this part of the experiment, the 
participants were presented with the same conditional statements that they had seen in 
the first part of the experiment (with the context statements but without the premise and 
conclusion). They were then asked the following probability rating task question 
(Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999): “For how many of the 100 people do you think 
the rule will be true for (enter a number between 0 and 100)?” This was intended to 
provide a measure of the plausibility assigned to the conditional statement by showing 
for how many people the participant thought the rule might be correct – more plausible 
rules expected to be perceived as correct for more people. Participants had to respond 
by typing a number between 0 and 100 and clicking next. 
 
After the tasks were completed, participants were thanked for their time and invited to 
return to the Mechanical Turk system to enter a code for payment. 
3.5.3. Results 
Responses to inference questions were recorded as a number between 1 and 8 with 1 
corresponding to ‘Completely disagree’ with the inference and 8, ‘Completely agree’. 
The overall mean response score across all inference questions was 4.72 which would 
be placed between ‘Disagree a little’ and ‘Agree a little’ on the rating scale given – a 
little closer to ‘Agree a little’. For the different types of inference, the mean scores were 
4.74 for MP, 4.81 for DA, 4.58 for AC and 4.75 for MT.  
3.5.3.1. Pattern of Inference Scores 
The mean and standard deviation of inference responses by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity are shown in table 3.7.  
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Table 3.7 – Mean (standard deviation) inference scores by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity 
Inference 
Type 
 MP   DA  
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative 5.25 (1.68) 4.54 (1.71) 4.7 (1.68) 4.86 (1.64) 4.31 (2.00) 3.95 (1.99) 
“not” 
negated 
4.27 (1.96) 4.72 (1.81) 5.33 (1.85) 4.45 (1.94) 5.27 (1.49) 5.00 (1.81) 
“un-” 
negated 
4.35 (2.07) 4.95 (1.95) 4.7 (2.02) 4.33 (1.93) 5.36 (1.67) 5.49 (1.59) 
 
Inference 
Type 
 AC   MT  
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative 5.46 (1.67) 4.32 (2.06) 4.1 (2.01) 4.5 (1.78) 4.25 (2.00) 4.23 (1.83) 
“not” 
negated 
4.06 (1.96) 4.69 (1.60) 4.63 (1.89) 4.14 (1.82) 5.33 (1.59) 5.22 (1.79) 
“un-” 
negated 
4.44 (1.69) 4.48 (1.68) 4.97 (1.96) 3.84 (2.01) 5.49 (1.71) 5.31 (1.82) 
 
A 4x3x3 ANCOVA was used to compare inference response scores (each representing a 
participant’s level of agreement with a given inference) across inference types, 
antecedent polarities and consequent polarities. Plausibility of the relevant conditional 
used was treated as a covariate. With plausibility as a covariate removed, adjusted mean 
inference endorsement scores were 4.77 for MP, 4.78 for DA, 4.59 for AC and 4.70 for 
MT. This found an interactions between inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6, 
3355) = 5.852, p<.001, ηp2 = .010) shown in figure 3.7, between inference type and 
consequent polarity (F(6, 3355) = 4.569, p<.001, ηp2 = .008) shown in figure 3.8 and 
between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4, 3355) = 11.477, p<.001, ηp2 
= .013) shown in figure 3.9. It also found main effects of antecedent polarity (F(2, 3355) 
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= 10.043, p<.001, ηp2 = .006) and consequent polarity (F(2,3355) = 13.331, p=.001, ηp2 
= .008). The covariate, plausibility ratings of the relevant conditionals, also had a 
significant effect on inference scores (F(1, 3355) = 490.308, p<.001, ηp2 = .128).  
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity on 
inference responses in experiment 3. 
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Figure 3.8 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity on 
inference responses in experiment 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 – Chart showing interaction between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity on 
inference responses in experiment 3. 
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Given the significant interactions, post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons were used to compare each condition for each of 
the three independent variables. For the inference conditions, no significant differences 
were found. For antecedent polarity, significant differences were observed between 
affirmative and “not” negated (p<.001) and affirmative and “un-” negated (p<.001) 
conditions.  The mean response (adjusted for the covariate) was 4.52 when the 
antecedent was affirmative, 4.80 when it was “not” negated and 4.81 when it was “un-” 
negated. Similarly, for consequent polarity, significant differences were observed 
between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.001) and affirmative and “un-” negated 
(p<.001) conditions. The mean response (after adjustment) was 4.50 when the 
consequent was affirmative, 4.76 when it was “not” negated and 4.87 when it was “un-” 
negated. 
3.5.3.2. Negative Conclusion Bias 
The mean scores for each inference type and conclusion polarity is shown in table 3.8.  
 
 
 
Table 3.8 – Mean (standard deviation) responses to inference questions in chapter 3, 
experiment 3 
Conclusion 
Polarity 
Inference type 
MP DA AC MT 
Affirmative 4.84 (1.71) 5.01 (1.78) 4.66 (1.87) 5.02 (1.85) 
“not” negated 4.74 (1.93) 4.40 (1.90) 4.50 (1.78) 4.18 (1.88) 
“un-” negated 4.64 (2.03) - 4.58 (1.98) - 
 
Two one-way ANCOVAs (with plausibility ratings covaried out) were conducted 
comparing inference response scores for MP and AC inferences with conclusion 
polarity as the factor. Neither ANCOVA found significant effects.  
 
3.5.3.3. Role of Plausibility 
The mean response to the probability rating tasks using the conditionals was 48.4 
(standard deviation 27.7). The mean plausibility ratings given to each conditional with 
each antecedent and consequent polity are shown in table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9 – Mean plausibility ratings by antecedent polarity and consequent polarity 
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated 
Affirmative 60.9 45.8 43.1 
“not” negated 42.0 52.6 50.9 
“un-” negated 39.1 47.8 51.1 
 
Under probability theory, probabilities should meet the following constraint: 
 
P( ¬ q │p ) + P( q │p ) = 1   
 
We can consider whether people’s plausibility ratings are consistent with this constraint 
for the probability of ‘if p then q’ by looking at the sum of the plausibility ratings 
(divided by 100) for the affirmative consequent case and each of the cases with a 
negated consequent. On average these are 1.029 (for the “not” negated consequent case) 
and 1.000 (for the “un-” negated consequent case) where the antecedent is affirmative. 
Where antecedents are “not” negated, the equivalent values are .984 (for the “not” 
negated consequent case) and .936 (for the “un-” negated consequent case). Where 
antecedents are “un-” negated, the equivalent values are .940 (for the “not” negated 
consequent case) and .942 (for the “un-” negated consequent case). All of these results 
are close to 1, suggesting people’s average plausibility ratings provide perceived 
probabilities consistent with probability theory. 
 
A 3x3 between subjects ANOVA was completed on probability rating tasks responses 
with antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors (each with three factors: 
affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated). This found a significant interaction 
between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4, 3383) = 42.621, p<.001) and 
a significant main effect of consequent polarity (F(2, 3383) = 6.164, p=.002). The 
interaction between antecedent and consequent polarity conditions is shown in figure 
3.10. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were used to compare each condition within both 
factors and a significant difference was found between probability rating responses 
where affirmative and “un-” negated consequent terms were used (p<.001).  
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Figure 3.10 – Chart showing interaction effect between antecedent and consequent polarity on 
probability ratings of conditionals in experiment 3. 
 
There was a significant positive correlation (r = .375, p<.001) between the perceived 
plausibility of the conditional statement (measured using the probability rating task 
score) and the level of agreement with the inference using that statement (measured 
using the response to the inference task).   
 
Two groups of responses were identified from within the responses based on the 
plausibility attributed to the conditional. There was a high plausibility group (991 
responses where participants rated the plausibility of the conditionals as greater than or 
equal to 67 on the probability rating task) and a low plausibility group (1,108 responses 
with probability rating responses less than or equal to 33). The proportion of responses 
in each antecedent and consequent polarity condition allocated to each group is set out 
in table 3.10. The mean inference responses were 5.5 for the high plausibility group 
(standard deviation 1.69) and 3.91 for the low plausibility group (standard deviation 
2.02). This difference was significant (t(2097) = 19.485, p<.001).  
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Table 3.10 – Proportion of responses in each polarity condition allocated to each 
plausibility group 
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated 
Affirmative 45% / 15% (411) 29% / 36% (372) 23% / 39% (343) 
“not” negated 22% / 43% (372) 31% / 24% (403) 31% / 31% (357) 
“un-” negated 17% / 48% (368) 28% / 33% (374) 33% / 29% (392) 
Percentage of responses allocated to high plausibility group / Percentage of responses 
allocated to low plausibility group (Total number of responses) 
 
Looking just at the high plausibility group, a 4x3x3 between participants ANOVA with 
inference type, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors compared 
responses to the inference tasks. This showed an interaction effect between antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,955) = 3.877, p=.004, ηp2 = .016). Inference 
scores were higher where antecedent and consequent polarities are either both 
affirmative or both negative (i.e. using either negation condition) than when one 
polarity was affirmative and the other negative. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were used to 
compare each condition within these two factors, but no significant differences were 
found. 
 
Comparing only responses to inference tasks allocated to the low plausibility group, a 
4x3x3 between participants ANOVA was conducted with inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity as factors. This showed interactions between all three 
factors (F(12,1072) = 2.089, p=.015, ηp2 = .023). It also showed interactions between 
antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,1072) = 4.096, p=.003, ηp2 = .015) and 
between antecedent polarity and inference (F(6,1072) = 2.884, p=.009, ηp2 = .016). 
Where consequent polarity was negative, inference scores were higher when antecedent 
polarities were also negative than when they were affirmative but where consequent 
polarity was affirmative the opposite pattern was observed. Inference scores were higher 
when antecedent polarity was negative than when it was positive for MP, DA and MT 
inferences but this pattern was reversed for AC inferences. Main effects of antecedent 
polarity (F(2,1072) = 7.969, p<.001, ηp2 = .015) and consequent polarity (F(2,1072) = 
6.212, p=.002, ηp2 = .011) were observed. Both polarity factors typically led to higher 
inference scores where they were negative. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were used to 
compare each condition within these three factors involved in significant interactions. 
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For antecedent polarity, significant differences were observed between the affirmative 
condition and both “not” negation (p<.001) and “un-” negation conditions (p<.001). For 
consequent polarity, significant differences were observed between the affirmative 
condition and both “not” negation (p=.009) and “un-” negation conditions (p=.010). 
3.5.3.4. Other Possible Factors 
Several other factors may have influenced responses to the inference tasks in this 
experiment. The high level of participants with English as a second language, the 
potential for participant or scenario effects and the fact that responses to inference tasks 
in this experiment were based on a rating scale rather than categorical as in previous 
experiments should all be considered.  
 
A large proportion of participants did not have English as a first language. A 4x3x3 
between participants ANCOVA was used to compare inference scores across inference 
types, antecedent polarities and consequent polarities for only those participants that 
reported English as a first language. Plausibility ratings were used as covariates. As 
with the same test using all participants in §3.5.3.1, this found interactions between 
inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6,1675) = 4.043, p<.001, ηp2 = .014), between 
inference type and consequent polarity (F(6,1676) = 2.280, p=.034, ηp2 = .008) and 
between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,1676) = 5.145, p<.001, ηp2 
= .012). It also found and a main effects of antecedent polarity (F(2,1676) = 9.190, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .011) and consequent polarity (F(2,1676) = 8.008, p<.001, ηp2 = .009). 
Post hoc pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons) 
comparing each condition for each of the three independent variables only showed any 
significant results for consequent polarity. Here significant differences were observed 
between affirmative and “un-” negated conditions (p<.001). The mean response (after 
adjustment were) was 4.59 when the consequent was affirmative, 4.81 when it was 
“not” negated and 5.01 when it was “un-” negated. 
 
For analysis purposes, this has been treated as a between participants design as all 
participants responded to different conditions. However, each participant gave 
responses to four inference tasks which may not be independent. A 4x3x3 between 
participants ANCOVA with inference types, antecedent polarity and consequent 
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polarity as factors and plausibility rating and participant as covariates found no 
significant effect of the participant covariate (F(1,3354) = 0.025, p=.876).  
 
This experiment used four scenarios. A 4x4x3x3 ANCOVA compared inference scores 
with inference types, scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity as factors 
(with plausibility ratings as covariate). This found a significant interaction between 
scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(12,3247) = 8.871, p<.001, ηp2 
= .011). It also found a main effect of scenario (F(3,3247) = 3.610, p=.013, ηp2 = .003). 
Post hoc pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment) were used to compare each 
of the four scenario conditions with each other and significant differences were found 
between scenarios 3 and 4 (p=.007). This appears to be a reflection of lower levels of 
inference endorsement when scenario 4 was used with negative antecedent and 
consequent polarity conditions than when scenario 3 was used in the same polarity 
conditions. Effects similar to those observed when scenario was not included as a factor 
were found between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,3248) = 10.650, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .013), between inference and antecedent polarity (F(6,3248) = 5.816, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .011), between inference and consequent polarity (F(6,3248) = 4.623, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .008) and main effects of antecedent polarity (F(2,3248) = 8.439, p<.001, 
ηp2 = .005) and consequent polarity (F(2,3248) = 12.793, p<.001, ηp2 = .008). 
 
This experiment sought responses on an eight-point scale where the previous two 
experiments in this chapter had sought categorical responses. To look at whether this 
might have affected the findings, responses on the eight-point scale were converted to 
binary responses with scores of 1 to 4 treated as reflecting that the inference would not 
be endorsed and 5 to 8 as representing endorsement of the inference. Under this 
measure, endorsement levels were 59.7% for MP, 61.8% for DA, 56.5% for AC and 
59.6% for MT inferences. 4x3x3 between participants ANCOVA was used to compare 
binary inference scores across inference types, antecedent polarities and consequent 
polarities (with plausibility rating as a covariate). This found an interactions between 
inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6,3355) = 4.708, p<.001, ηp2 = .008), between 
inference type and consequent polarity (F(6,3355) = 6.057, p<.001, ηp2 = .011) and 
between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4,3355) = 9.614, p<.001, ηp2 
= .011). It also found and a main effects of antecedent polarity (F(2,3355) = 5.892, 
p=.003, ηp2 = .004) and consequent polarity (F(2,3355) = 11.110, p<.001, ηp2 = .007).  
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3.5.4. Discussion 
The pattern of results is this experiment showed some unexpected characteristics. 
Firstly, inference levels did not align with results from prior experiments where Evans’ 
(1977) negations paradigm has been used (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). Figure 3.11 
shows how the responses here look if the different types of negation are reduced to the 
standard negation paradigm. MP normally sees the highest inference levels but, in this 
experiment, overall MP inference levels were lower than DA and MT (as the figure 
shows MP was only highest where antecedents were negated and consequents 
affirmative). AC is also typically higher than DA, but this standard result was also 
reversed overall (an effect that appears to be driven where consequents are negated).  
 
 
Figure 3.11 – Chart showing mean inference responses in experiment 3 by inference type and 
standard negation paradigm conditional formats.  
 
The panels show (from left to right): (i) responses where conditional had affirmative antecedents 
and affirmative consequents; (ii) responses where conditionals had affirmative antecedents and 
negated consequents; (iii) responses where conditionals had negated antecedents and 
affirmative consequents; and (iv) responses where conditionals had negated antecedents and 
negated consequents. Different lines show inference responses with the results from 
conditionals using “un-” negated excluded and with responses to conditionals using the two 
different types of negation averaged. 
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In contrast to the anticipated effect, where differences between polarity conditions were 
observed, it generally showed that the effects of “un-” negated propositions was closer 
to the effects of “not” negated propositions than the effect of affirmative propositions. 
 
Also, no evidence of the typical negative conclusion bias (e.g. Evans et al., 1995) was 
seen – negated conclusions all saw lower levels of inference endorsement where 
conclusions used either type of negation than where conclusions were affirmative 
(although these differences were not significant). 
 
This suggests that the way participants treated these scenarios is different to respondents 
to typical inference tasks – as with the prior experiments. For example, it has previously 
been seen that, where naturalistic scenarios are used, different factors can have greater 
influence on the results than is normally observed (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992).  
 
These results are obviously not consistent with the expectations that responses would 
align with previous patterns of results with “un-” negation behaving more like 
affirmation than “not” negation. These predictions were based on probabilistic and CBN 
models. However, it is not clear that other approaches might provide an adequate 
explanation of these results. In particular, the mental models account (e.g. Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002) would not appear to be able to explain the lower levels of MP 
inference (which should normally be well facilitated by the initial mental model).  
 
What the results did show, which was consistent with probabilistic and CBN accounts, 
was a highly significant positive correlation between the plausibility of the conditional 
statement (as measured through probability ratings task responses) and level of 
inference endorsement (measured through responses to inference tasks).  This can be 
seen, particularly by looking at the suppression of inference levels where conditionals 
had incongruent antecedent and consequent polarities (which yielded lower plausibility 
ratings for the conditional). This may suggest that – for these scenarios – the use of 
‘un-’ negation does yield similar consideration of enablers and disablers as ‘not’ 
negation. This may be consistent with the relatively wide scope interpretations “un-” 
negated statements can take compared to other forms of affixal negation like “iN-” 
(Zimmer, 1964).   
 
  
 
 158
The impact of plausibility may also explain the main effect of scenario observed. 
Participants may have viewed scenario 4 statements like “If a person is not stylish, then 
the person is not wise” (mean plausibility score 46.31) as having less related antecedent 
and consequent terms than the equivalent statements in scenario 2 (“If a person is not 
friendly, then the person is not social”, mean plausibility score 58.70) and scenario 3 
(“If a person is not grateful, then the person is not happy” mean plausibility score 
51.79). Where there is perceived to be a limited connection between antecedent and 
consequent terms the conditional is often considered less plausible (e.g. Quinn & 
Markovits, 1998). Participants appear to have been more willing to draw inference when 
presented with the conditionals rated as more plausible. Such material effects may also 
explain why MP inferences, in particular, may trigger more consideration of disablers 
(alternatives to the antecedents that may cause the consequent). Under Fernbach and 
Erb’s CBN model for MP, this would reduce MP inferences. 
 
While the results did not reflect the detail of the predictions made, this strong 
relationship between plausibility and inference levels does provide strong support for 
probabilistic and CBN approaches. As discussed above, it is likely that particular 
material effects changed the way these have operated in other experiments leading to 
the results observed. 
 
Another possible cause of difference is that this experiment used a different measure to 
the previous experiments in this chapter. This measure – an eight-point scale – may be 
interpreted and treated differently by participants to a straightforward endorsement 
question requiring a binary response. When the inference responses on an eight-point 
scale were converted to a categorical measure, the pattern of results did not change. 
However, it remains possible that these results are not comparable to those in the prior 
experiments because of the measure used. It is possible that when faced with a wider 
range of optional responses, participants tend towards the middle of that range if they 
have any uncertainty. In the case of MP inferences, the option to say they ‘Disagree a 
little’ with the inference may be easier to select if the participant is uncertain than a 
binary response rejecting the inference completely.  
 
The pattern of results remained the same when looking exclusively at participants who 
had English as a first language. This suggested that the large number of respondents 
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with English as a second language was not a significant factor affecting responses to the 
inference tasks.  
 
This overall effect of plausibility, in an experiment which used naturalistic materials 
from which people can rate plausibility with reference to external knowledge, may have 
masked any other effects of inference. This effect may also have outweighed the small 
effects when the type of negation was varied that had been hypothesised. It had been 
hoped that a much larger sample in an experiment (where the conditional statements 
would have more natural plausibility functions than in experiment 2) might have helped 
the observation of small negation effects. There were substantially more respondents to 
this experiment than the previous two experiments in this chapter. However, the 
numbers were not as high as had been hoped. The design used meant that each 
participant only answered questions covering four of the 36 possible combinations of 
antecedent polarity, consequent polarity and inference type. This meant that, although 
there were 849 participants (almost nine times as many as in experiment 2 and almost 
45 time the number in experiment 1), there were only an average of 94 response for 
each combination of antecedent and consequent polarity and inference type (roughly 
half the number of responses per conditions seen in the prior two experiments). This 
substantially undermines the ability of this experiment to detect subtle effects compared 
to the prior experiments.  
 
The results of this experiment, therefore, have not allowed a more powerful test of 
predictions about the use of different types of negation in conditional inference tasks 
effectively. However, it has provided substantial further support for the hypothesis that 
plausibility is important to people’s responses to inference tasks. It showed that people 
were significantly more likely to endorse an inference where the conditional used was 
rated as more plausible. 
3.6. Experiment 4 
The previous experiment aimed to use more participants and a design in which each 
participant did not see each polarity condition to detect small effects caused by the use 
of different types of negation. However, fewer responses per combination of polarity 
and inference conditions were obtained than in the prior experiments. Also, the quasi-
between-participants nature of the previous experiment (each participate completed 
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tasks in a random subset of conditions) prevented a fully crossed analysis of responses. 
These factors will have made it less sensitive than the prior experiments to small effects.  
 
This experiment, therefore, aims to provide a more sensitive test of the effects of 
different types of negation on conditional reasoning. Like the previous two experiments 
in this section, this experiment will employ the full extended negations paradigm. 
Affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated antecedent and consequent terms will be 
used in the conditional statements for MP, DA, AC and MT inferences.  
 
The current experiment will use the same scenarios as the prior experiment in a fully 
within-participants design. This requires each participant to respond to 144 inference 
questions (and a large number of plausibility questions). Around 50 participants would 
produce about 200 responses for each of the 36 combinations of inference and polarity 
conditions – similar to the number in the first two experiments in this section (and about 
twice the number in the third. The current experiment will, therefore, seek responses 
from more than 50 participants to increase the number of responses per condition. There 
is a risk of participants losing engagement and abandoning the experimental survey 
which will be avoided by increasing the payment available for participation.  
 
As in the prior experiment, participants will be asked to rate the plausibility of the 
conditionals used after the experimental inference questions. In addition to considering 
the conditionals, participants will be asked to provide probability ratings for the 
antecedent propositions used in the conditions (in all three polarity conditions). This 
will enable easier comparison between participant responses and conditional probability 
models (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000).  
3.6.1. Predictions 
The predictions of this experiment are essentially the same as those set out for the 
previous experiment (see §3.5.1). As before, it is anticipated that the pattern of 
inference endorsement will be similar to that normally observed when affirmative and 
negated propositions are used (e.g. Oaskford, Chater & Larkin, 2000). Negative 
conclusion bias (in which conclusions using “not” negation are more likely to be 
endorsed, e.g. Evans et al., 1995) is also anticipated. Within both of these predicted 
effects, where ‘un-’ negation is used in propositions and conclusions, it is anticipated to 
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behave more like equivalent affirmative than ‘not’ negated propositions or conclusions. 
The plausibility of the conditional used is expected to be a significant factor and any 
differences in MP inference levels are likely to be obscured by ceiling effects. 
 
As before, these predictions are based on probabilistic (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000) and 
CBN (e.g. Fernbach & Erb, 2013) accounts but not mental models accounts (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
3.6.2. Method 
3.6.2.1. Design 
This experiment used a within-participants design with inference type (four levels: MP, 
DA, AC and MT), antecedent polarity (three levels: affirmative, “not” negated and 
“un-” negated) and consequent polarity (the same three levels as antecedent polarity) as 
independent variables. The dependent variable is participants’ responses to the question 
of whether they agree with the given conclusion to the inference. This response was 
measured using an eight-point scale (from “Completely disagree” to “Completely 
agree”). 
 
The second part of the experiment will also be a within-participants design. The 
dependent variable is the probability rating assigned to the statement provided (a 
number between 0 and 100). The independent variable will be the statement, with 48 
levels. The statements are made up of two forms. Firstly, the conditionals used (with 
antecedent and consequent negation systematically varied by the three polarity 
conditions – affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated – to provide nine conditionals 
for each of four scenarios). Secondly, statements of the antecedent term in each of the 
three polarity conditions (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated to provide a 
further three statements for each of the four scenarios).  
3.6.2.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited and paid through the ‘Prolific Academic’ system (payment 
was £6.00). The system is similar to the Mechanical Turk system used in other 
experiments. Potential duplicate responses (those from the same IP address as another 
response) and incomplete responses were removed. This left 89 participants with 
median age 34 (range 20 to 62). A total of 48% of participants were female and 99% 
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had English as their first language. All completed the experiment online through 
www.surveygizmo.com. 
3.6.2.3. Materials 
This experiment used the same four scenarios that were prepared for the previous 
experiment (see §3.5.2.3). As before, nine statements including a conditional sentence 
were used for each scenario (three with each antecedent polarity condition for each of 
the three consequent polarity conditions). For each conditional statement, four inference 
tasks were again used (MP, DA, AC, MT). In this experiment, all participants would do 
all 144 tasks prepared rather than a subset of them (as was the case in the previous 
experiment). 
 
As with the prior experiment, the scenarios and conditional statements (nine for each of 
the four scenarios) were used. Also, for this second part of the experiment people were 
asked to evaluate the plausibility of a further three statements for each scenario. These 
were statements that the antecedent term of the conditional was true in each polarity 
condition (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated).  This meant a total of twelve 
statements would be evaluated for each of the four scenarios (a total of 48).  
 
For more detail on the materials used, see appendix 2 (§A2.3). 
3.6.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were recruited through the ‘Prolific Academic’ system and directed to the 
experimental survey. The first screen sought their informed consent and they were then 
provided with instructions for the inference tasks.  
 
Each participant completed all 144 inference tasks, one on each screen, in random order. 
Each inference task presented the conditional inference statement as described above 
(including context, a statement with conditional sentence, premise and conclusion). 
Participants are asked to indicate whether they would endorse the inference by selecting 
one of the following options (presented in order) and clicking the ‘next’ button: 
 Completely disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree 
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 Disagree a little 
 Agree a little 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 Completely agree 
 
Once they had completed the inference task questions, participants were given 
instructions for the second part of the experiment. In this part of the experiment, the 
participants were presented with each conditional statement that they had seen in the 
first part of the experiment (with the context statements but without the premise and 
conclusion) and each antecedent proposition (in each polarity condition). These were 
provided one to a page in random order. They were then asked the probability ratings 
task question (Oaksford, Chater & Grainger, 1999): “For how many of the 100 people 
do you think the [rule or statement] will be true for (enter a number between 0 and 
100)?” This was intended to provide a measure of the plausibility assigned to the 
conditional statement by showing for how many people the participant thought the rule 
might be correct – more plausible rules expected to be perceived as correct for more 
people. Participants had to respond by typing a number between 0 and 100 and clicking 
next. 
 
After the tasks were completed, participants were thanked for their time and invited to 
return to the Prolific Academic system to enter a code for payment. 
3.6.3. Results 
As with the previous experiment, responses to inference questions were recorded as a 
number between 1 and 8 with 1 corresponding to ‘Completely disagree’ with the 
inference and 8, ‘Completely agree’. The overall mean response score across all 
inference questions was 4.89 which would be placed between ‘Disagree a little’ and 
‘Agree a little’ on the rating scale given – much closer to ‘Agree a little’. For the 
different types of inference, the mean scores were 5.25 for MP, 4.77 for DA, 4.84 for 
AC and 4.73 for MT.  
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3.6.3.1. Pattern of Inference Scores 
The mean and standard deviation of inference responses by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity are shown in table 3.11.  
 
Table 3.11 – Mean (standard deviation) inference scores by inference type, antecedent 
polarity and consequent polarity 
Inference 
Type 
 MP   DA  
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative 6.1 (1.21) 4.64 (1.85) 4.65 (1.88) 5.08 (1.42) 3.89 (1.63) 3.92 (1.6) 
“not” 
negated 
4.56 (1.92) 5.7 (1.37) 5.69 (1.33) 3.95 (1.56) 5.55 (1.39) 5.49 (1.42) 
“un-” 
negated 
4.58 (1.92) 5.69 (1.32) 5.64 (1.34) 3.95 (1.55) 5.53 (1.39) 5.54 (1.44) 
 
Inference 
Type 
 AC   MT  
Consequent 
Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative “not” 
negated 
“un-” 
negated 
Affirmative 5.75 (1.28) 4.15 (1.58) 4.19 (1.7) 5 (1.43) 4.01 (1.5) 4.03 (1.58) 
“not” 
negated 
4.24 (1.55) 5.28 (1.36) 5.22 (1.34) 3.84 (1.62) 5.47 (1.5) 5.43 (1.41) 
“un-” 
negated 
4.18 (1.62) 5.28 (1.43) 5.23 (1.39) 3.9 (1.63) 5.43 (1.46) 5.48 (1.47) 
 
For each participant, inference ratings and plausibility ratings for each experimental 
condition were averaged across the four scenarios. A 4x3x3 within participants 
Multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) was used to compare mean inference response 
scores and mean conditional plausibility scores as dependent variables from each 
participant across the factors inference type (MP, DA, AC, MT), antecedent polarity and 
consequent polarities (the latter two both have three levels: affirmative, “not” negated, 
“un-” negated). This found significant multivariate effects for the interactions between 
inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6, 528) = 18.034, p<.001, ηp2 = .170), between 
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inference type and consequent polarity (F(6, 528) = 19.001, p<.001, ηp2 = .178) and 
between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(8, 704) = 45.747, p<.001, ηp2 
= .342). Multivariate analysis also found main effects of inference type (F(3, 264) = 
9.190, p<.001, ηp2 = .095), antecedent polarity (F(4, 352) = 32.625, p<.001, ηp2 = .270) 
and consequent polarity (F(4, 352) = 29.703, p<.001, ηp2 = .252).  
 
Univariate analysis for the effects of the independent variables on inference ratings 
found interactions between inference type and antecedent polarity (F(6, 1056) = 18.034, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .170) shown in figure 3.12, between inference type and consequent 
polarity (F(6, 1056) = 19.001, p<.001, ηp2 = .178) shown in figure 3.13 and between 
antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4, 1056) = 101.377, p<.001, ηp2 = .535) 
shown in figure 3.14. It also found main effects of inference type (F(3, 1056) = 9.190, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .095), antecedent polarity (F(2, 1056) = 81.526, p<.001, ηp2 = .481) and 
consequent polarity (F(2, 1056) = 71.204, p<.001, ηp2 = .447). Note that the univariate 
effects related to inference are the same as those described in the multivariate effects 
above. This is because plausibility ratings were the same across inference types and so 
the effect of inference type is entirely on inference responses. Univariate analysis for the 
effects of the independent variables on plausibility ratings will be discussed below. 
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Figure 3.12 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and antecedent polarity on 
inference responses in experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.13 – Chart showing interaction between inference type and consequent polarity on 
inference responses in experiment 4. 
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Figure 3.14 – Chart showing interaction between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity 
on inference responses in experiment 4. 
 
Given the significant interactions, post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons were used to compare inference ratings for each 
condition for each of the three independent variables. For the inference conditions, MP 
was found to significantly vary from DA (p=.011), AC (p=.001) and MT (p=.005). For 
antecedent polarity, significant differences were observed between affirmative and 
“not” negated (p<.001) and affirmative and “un-” negated (p<.001) conditions.  
Similarly, for consequent polarity, significant differences were observed between 
affirmative and “not” negated (p<.001) and affirmative and “un-” negated (p<.001) 
conditions.  
3.6.3.2. Negative Conclusion Bias 
The mean inference scores by inference type and conclusion polarity are shown in table 
3.12.  
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Table 3.12 – Mean (standard deviation) responses to inference questions in chapter 3, 
experiment 4 
Conclusion 
Polarity 
Inference type 
MP DA AC MT 
Affirmative 5.13 (2.03) 5.00 (1.91) 4.72 (1.92) 4.97 (1.89) 
“not” negated 5.32 (1.96) 4.30 (1.91) 4.90 (1.90) 4.25 (1.90) 
“un-” negated 5.30 (1.94) - 4.88 (1.90) - 
 
Two one-way MANOVAs were conducted comparing inference response and 
plausibility rating scores for MP and AC inferences with conclusion polarity as the 
factor.  
 
For MP, this showed a significant multivariate effect of conclusion polarity on both 
dependent variables (F(2,85) = 5.972, p<.001, ηp2 = .219) and univariate effects of 
conclusion polarity on inference response (F(2,176) = 7.083, p=.001, ηp2 = .074) and 
plausibility rating (F(2,176) = 9.984, p<.001, ηp2 = .102). Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment) were used to compare inference ratings for 
each conclusion polarity condition for MP. These showed significant differences in 
inference ratings between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.018) and affirmative and 
“un-” negated conclusions (p=.017). They also showed significant differences in 
plausibility ratings between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.004) and affirmative and 
“un-” negated conclusions (p=.005). No differences were found between the two 
different negation conditions for either dependent variable. 
 
For AC, this showed a significant multivariate effect of conclusion polarity on both 
dependent variables (F(2,85) = 63.780, p<.001, ηp2 = .750) and univariate effects of 
conclusion polarity on inference response (F(2,176) = 5.667, p=.004, ηp2 = .061) and 
plausibility rating (F(2,176) = 132.702, p<.001, ηp2 = .601). Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment) were used to compare inference ratings for 
each conclusion polarity condition for MP. These showed significant differences in 
inference ratings between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.016) and affirmative and 
“un-” negated conclusions (p=.029). They also showed significant differences in 
plausibility ratings between affirmative and “not” negated (p<.001), between 
affirmative and “un-” negated conclusions (p<.001) and between “not” and “un-” 
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negated conclusions (p<.001). No differences were found between the two different 
negation conditions for either dependent variable. 
3.6.3.3. Role of Plausibility 
The mean response to the probability rating tasks using the conditionals was 31.9 
(standard deviation 26.3). The mean response to the probability rating tasks using the 
statements of antecedent propositions was 40.5 (standard deviation 25.5). The mean 
plausibility ratings given to each of the conditionals with each antecedent and 
consequent polarity are shown in table 3.13. The mean plausibility ratings given to each 
of the statements of antecedent propositions with each polarity are shown in table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.13 – Mean plausibility ratings of conditionals by antecedent polarity and 
consequent polarity 
Consequent Polarity 
Antecedent Polarity 
Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated 
Affirmative 61.5 21.4 21.8 
“not” negated 21.8 34.6 34.9 
“un-” negated 21.5 35.3 34.6 
 
Table 3.14 – Mean plausibility ratings of antecedent statements by polarity 
 Polarity 
Affirmative “not” negated “un-” negated 
Mean plausibility 
rating 
63.9 29.2 28.4 
 
As considered in the previous experiment, we can look at whether these ratings meet the 
following probability theory constraint: 
 
P( ¬ q │p ) + P( q │p ) = 1   
 
As before (§3.5.3.3) we can considering the sum of the plausibility ratings (divided by 
100) for the affirmative consequent case and each of the cases with a negated 
consequent. On average these are .833 (for the “not” negated consequent case) and .830 
(for the “un-” negated consequent case) where the antecedent is affirmative. Where 
antecedents are “not” negated, the equivalent values are .560 (for the “not” negated 
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consequent case) and .567 (for the “un-” negated consequent case). Where antecedents 
are “un-” negated, the equivalent values are .567 (for the “not” negated consequent 
case) and .564 (for the “un-” negated consequent case). All of these results are much 
less than 1, suggesting people’s average ratings provide perceived probabilities that are 
‘superadditive’ (Macchi, Oshero & Kranz, 1999). 
 
As set out above, a 4x3x3 within participants MANOVA was used to compare mean 
inference response scores and mean conditional plausibility scores as dependent 
variables from each participant across the factors inference type (MP, DA, AC, MT), 
antecedent polarity and consequent polarities (the latter two both have three levels: 
affirmative, “not” negated, “un-” negated). The significant multivariate effects are 
reported above along with the univariate effects on inference responses. 
 
Univariate analysis for the effects of the independent variables on plausibility ratings 
found interactions between antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(4, 1056) = 
170.085, p<.001, ηp2 = .659) shown in figure 3.15. It also found main effects of 
antecedent polarity (F(2, 1056) = 8.936, p<.001, ηp2 = .092) and consequent polarity 
(F(2, 1056) = 9.984, p<.001, ηp2 = .102).  
 
Given the significant interactions, post hoc pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni 
adjustment) were used to compare plausibility ratings between each level of the two 
polarity conditions. For antecedent polarity, significant differences were observed 
between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.007) and affirmative and “un-” negated 
(p=.010) conditions.  Similarly, for consequent polarity, significant differences were 
observed between affirmative and “not” negated (p=.004) and affirmative and “un-” 
negated (p=.005) conditions.  
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Figure 3.15 – Chart showing interaction effect between antecedent and consequent polarity on 
probability ratings of conditionals in experiment 4. 
 
There was a significant positive correlation (r=.233, p<.001) between the perceived 
plausibility of the conditional statement (measured using the probability rating task 
score) and the level of agreement with the inference using that statement (measured 
using the response to the inference task). There was also a smaller significant negative 
correlation (r=-.088, p<.001) between the perceived plausibility of the antecedent 
statement (measured using the probability rating task score) and the level of agreement 
with the inference using that statement (measured using the response to the inference 
task).   
3.6.3.4. Other Possible Factors 
The key additional factor that needs consideration for this experiment is the potential for 
scenario effects. There was only one participant who did not report having English as 
their first language so this the risk that this factor skewed results is very low compared 
to prior experiments. Participant factors are also addressed through using analyses 
appropriate to a fully within-participant design. The impact of moving from a 
categorical response to rating scale was considered as part of the previous experiment 
and found not to be a factor that substantially affected responses.  
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This experiment used four scenarios. A 4x4x3x3 MANOVA compared inference scores 
and plausibility ratings with the scenario, inference type, antecedent polarity and 
consequent polarity as factors. The same significant interactions and main effects (and 
no additional significant results) were found involving only the inference type, 
antecedent polarity and consequent polarity factors as the MANOVA described in 
§3.6.3.1 and §3.6.3.3 above (both the multivariate and univariate analyses). Additional 
multivariate effects on both dependent variables were found for interactions between 
scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(24,65) = 6.242, p<.001, ηp2 
= .697), scenario and antecedent polarity (F(12,77) = 6.458, p<.001, ηp2 = .502) and 
scenario and consequent polarity (F(12,77) = 7.094, p<.001, ηp2 = .525). An additional 
multivariate main effect was found for scenario (F(6,83) = 8.673, p<.001, ηp2 = .385). 
Univariate analysis of the effects on inference responses found additional significant 
interactions between scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(12,3168) 
= 28.437, p<.001, ηp2 = .244), scenario and consequent polarity (F(6,3168) = 14.818, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .144) and scenario and antecedent polarity (F(6,3168) = 19.948, p<.001, 
ηp2 = .185). In addition a significant univariate main effect of scenario on inference 
responses was found (F(3,3168) = 21.493, p<.001, ηp2 = .196). Univariate analysis of 
the effects on inference responses found additional significant interactions between 
scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity (F(12,3168) = 24.354, p<.001, ηp2 
= .217), scenario and consequent polarity (F(6,3168) = 9.863, p<.001, ηp2 = .101) and 
scenario and antecedent polarity (F(6,3168) = 19.948, p=.018, ηp2 = .028). In addition a 
significant univariate main effect of scenario on plausibility ratings was found 
(F(3,3168) = 11.938, p<.001, ηp2 = .119). Post hoc pairwise comparisons (with 
Bonferroni adjustment) comparing inference ratings for each scenario condition found 
significant differences between scenario 1 and scenarios 2 (p<.001) and 3 (p=.009), 
scenario 2 and scenario 4 (p<.001) and scenario 3 and scenario 4 (p<.001). This appears 
to reflect scenarios 1 and 4 being closely correlated across conditions and 2 and 3 being 
closely correlated across conditions. All scenarios had a similar effect pattern on 
inferences, with higher inferences where the polarities of the antecedent and consequent 
were congruent (both affirmative or both negated – either negated condition). The 
difference between congruent and “non-”congruent polarity conditions is larger for 
scenarios 2 and 3 than for 1 and 4. Similar pairwise comparisons comparing plausibility 
ratings found significant differences between scenario 1 and scenario 2 (p=.002), 
scenario 2 and scenario 4 (p<.001) and scenario 3 and scenario 4 (p=.006). The pattern 
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of the scenario effects is similar to that with inference responses (higher plausibility 
ratings where polarities are congruent). Again the difference looks larger with scenarios 
2 and 3 (which have lower plausibility ratings where polarities are incongruent and 
higher ratings where polarities are congruent than 1 and 4). However, this difference is 
not significant in all cases. 
3.6.4. Discussion 
Like the previous experiment (see discussion in §3.5.4), the pattern of results differed 
from expectations. Like that experiment, patterns of inference did not completely align 
with the data from prior experiments where Evans’ (1977) negations paradigm has been 
used (see figure 3.16). Like the previous experiment, inference levels are much lower 
where plausibility ratings are lowest (i.e. where the conditional has incongruent 
antecedent and consequent polarities). However, despite using the same scenarios, the 
pattern does not completely align with the previous experiment either. There does not 
appear to be the same suppression of MP which is now more endorsed than DA, AC and 
MT overall. Similarly, AC is now more endorsed overall than MT (although this normal 
pattern is still reversed where both antecedent and consequent use some form of 
negation). 
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Figure 3.16 – Chart showing mean inference responses in experiment 4 by inference type and 
standard negation paradigm conditional formats.  
The panels show (from left to right): (i) responses where conditional had affirmative antecedents 
and affirmative consequents; (ii) responses where conditionals had affirmative antecedents and 
negated consequents; (iii) responses where conditionals had negated antecedents and 
affirmative consequents; and (iv) responses where conditionals had negated antecedents and 
negated consequents. Different lines show inference responses with the results from 
conditionals using “un-” negated excluded and with responses to conditionals using the two 
different types of negation averaged. 
 
Like the prior experiment, where differences between polarity conditions were 
observed, it generally showed that the effects of “un-” negated propositions was closer 
to the effects of “not” negated propositions than the effect of affirmative propositions.  
 
Unlike the prior experiment, the analysis considering conclusion polarities did show 
higher levels of inference where conclusions were negated for MP and AC (though still 
not for DA and MT). MP and AC are the most interesting cases in this condition 
because they include conclusions in all three polarity conditions. For both of these 
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not found (although both negation conditions differed significantly from the affirmative 
condition). 
 
The key difference between this experiment and the previous one was the extent to 
which participants will have had the opportunity to get used to the scenarios – they will 
have been exposed to each scenario 36 times in responding to inference questions and 
another 12 times for the plausibility rating questions. While the random presentation of 
the tasks will mitigate order effects, most responses were made after participants had 
seen multiple versions of the relevant scenario (rather than seeing each scenario for the 
first time as was the case in the previous experiment). Evidence that this led to different 
judgements about the conditionals includes the superadditive nature of the judgements 
about the likelihood of each conditional relationship (compared to responses in the prior 
experiment consistent with probability theory). As with the finding by Macchi et al. 
(1999) that people make more superadditive judgements where they have less 
knowledge of the events in question, greater exposure to the scenarios may have 
affected people’s perceptions of them.  
 
Greater familiarity with the form of the tasks may also have led to participants 
considering the different negation conditions alongside each other as they went through 
the experiment rather than in isolation. This may have led to them developing a strategy 
of responses which aligned the interpretation of the two different negations used, 
minimising any differences that might otherwise have been observed. This exposure to 
each scenario may also have allowed them to overcome the MP and AC suppression 
effects implied by the results to the previous experiment – greater familiarity with the 
form may have allowed these to be processed with less direct reference to the scenario 
in each case reducing the context effects seen previously. While MP inferences may 
have triggered more disablers when a scenario was considered for the first time, people 
may have taken the inference more for granted when considering it as part of a series of 
inferences. This will have led to the observed higher level of inference under the 
Fernbach and Erb (2013) CBN model.  
 
Greater familiarity with the scenarios (and a lack of participant difference factors in a 
within-participants design) may also have allowed scenario effects to be observed more 
clearly. In this experiment, we saw that the two scenarios with, arguably, better related 
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propositions (scenarios 2 – which related ‘friendly’ and ‘social’ – and 3 – which related 
‘grateful’ and ‘happy’) showing a more extreme range of plausibility between congruent 
and incongruent polarity conditions. This greater difference in plausibility related to 
greater differences in inference response levels. 
 
As before, and as expected, plausibility ratings of the conditionals, does appear to be a 
key factor in people’s willingness to endorse inferences using them. While the pattern 
of results did not match predictions, the presence of this factor means that these results 
continue to provide strong support for theories based on probabilistic (e.g. Oaksford et 
al., 2000) and CBN (e.g. Fernbach & Erb, 2013) models. That differences in probability 
perceptions between this experiment and the previous one appeared to affect inference 
judgements is also consistent with these theories. These effects are harder to explain 
with reference to mental models (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) where the mental 
models considered should have been identical between the two experiments. 
 
This experiment did collect a large amount of data through a large within-participants 
design. While the results are not aligned with the predicted effects of different types of 
negation, the data – and the differences between that obtained in the prior experiment – 
continue to provide broad support for the role of probabilistic and CBN models in 
reasoning.  
3.7. General Discussion 
The four experiments discussed in this chapter aimed to explore how the use of different 
types of negation in conditional inference tasks might affect reasoning biases. The 
experiments did not identify any robust effects that emerge when different types of 
negation are used. They may not have been sufficiently sensitive to identify what are 
likely to be small effects. However, the experiments all provided substantial evidence 
for the role of plausibility in people’s inference judgements. 
 
Experiments 1, 3 and 4 showed higher rates of inference endorsement when 
conditionals rated more plausible were used. This is the same pattern as observed in 
previous studies which have considered the role of plausibility in conditional reasoning 
(e.g. Quinn & Markovits, 1998). In these experiments, the plausibility of the conditional 
was not actively manipulated (although the scenarios used in experiments 3 and 4 were 
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designed to create a natural profile of plausibility). There may be other factors that 
affect both the variance in plausibility between the conditionals and inference rates – 
such as the interaction effect of antecedent and consequent polarity factors on both 
plausibility ratings and inference responses. However, these associated factors may also 
suggest a mechanism by which the plausibility of conditionals (which is likely to be 
different for most conditional when the form ‘if x, then y’ is changed to ‘if x, then not 
y’) is partly responsible for negation effects seen elsewhere. So, people may consider ‘if 
x, then y’ a plausible relationship (either because of what they know about x and y, their 
salience to each other or because of the information provided in context). The 
relationship ‘if x, then not y’ will then be considered less plausible because it represents, 
in some respects, the opposite of a relationship they consider plausible. Based on the 
differences we have seen when plausibility is higher, inferences are more likely to be 
drawn when the more plausible ‘if x, then y’ is used than the less plausible ‘if x, then not 
y’. This may lead to the observation of effects apparently related to the insertion of 
negation which is actually caused by plausibility and the effect the insertion of negation 
has on the plausibility of the conditional. These experiments do not allow us to test this 
proposition, but their results would appear to be consistent with it. 
 
Another finding that emphasises the role of plausibility in inference tasks is the odd 
results in experiments 2. Here conditionals with low variation in plausibility ratings 
were used and these may have had ambiguous plausibility. These scenarios led to the 
odd result that no difference between DA, AC and MT inference levels were observed. 
This may be because the typical inference type effects were undermined by participants’ 
confusion at dealing with scenarios with ambiguous plausibility. This, again, potentially 
emphasises the importance of conditional plausibility as a factor in inference responses 
(even compared to well-established inference type effects). A similar suppression of 
inference effects was seen in experiment 3, but the fact that MP inference rates were 
also much lower than normal (and that this effect was not seen in experiment 4) 
suggests that another factor may have been responsible – possibly related to how people 
consider disablers when provided with these conditionals for the first time (rather than 
once they are used to the scenarios).  
 
The results of the experiments in this chapter did not demonstrate significant effects of 
different types of negation on reasoning with conditional inference tasks. However, the 
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experiments do not rule out the possibility that small effects exist. It appears that, in the 
tests conducted, other factors were more significant in influencing reasoning responses 
– a key factor appears to be the plausibility of conditionals. The impact of this factor 
provides substantial support for probabilistic and CBN models of reasoning (e.g. 
Oaksford et al., 2000; Fernbach & Erb, 2013).  
 
To continue consideration of the effects of different types of negation in reasoning 
tasks, it might be interesting to see whether a larger study in which people only saw 
each scenario once replicated the results of experiment 3 (and the differences with 
experiment 4). Different plausibility manipulations could be used (for example 
adjustments to the likelihood profiles suggested by scenarios) which might reduce 
plausibility effects and make negation effects easier to observe. However, it is clear 
from the experiments conducted that plausibility has a very substantial effect on results 
and it is not easy to mitigate this. Therefore, it seems sensible to move onto to consider 
another aspect of the role of negation in reasoning.  
 
 
  
  
 
 179
4. Contrast Classes in Conditional Inference 
Previous chapters have looked at whether different understandings of negation can help 
us understand and interpret the reasoning biases that occur when using negation. In the 
current chapter, I will consider a further understanding of negation based on the 
philosophical account of negation as implying ‘otherness’ (Horn, 1989). This 
philosophical account informs the psychological account of ‘contrast classes’ 
(Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). The contrast class account has been used 
to underpin the optimal data selection account of the effects of negation in Wason’s 
(1968) selection task (Oaksford, 2002; Oaksford & Stenning, 1992; Oaksford & Chater, 
1994, 2003a, 2007; Oaksford and Moussakowski, 2004; Singmann, Klauer & Beller, 
2016). In the present chapter, I consider the influence of contrast classes in people’s 
responses to conditional inference tasks and how that might help us understand how 
people reason with negations. 
4.1. The Contrast Class Account of Negation 
The philosophical depiction of negation as otherness – that a negated statement is seen 
as a positive reference to something other than the negated proposition – can be traced 
back to Plato (Horn, 1989). The otherness approach does not appear to be able to 
account for all uses of negation (for example, an instruction using negation like ‘do not 
kill’ has a different implication to any attempt to assign an entirely positive counterpart, 
e.g. ‘let all live’). However, the approach may provide another way to understand and 
process negations under certain circumstances – where positive alternatives to negated 
statements are readily available.     
 
As discussed earlier (§1.4.3), people form cognitive groupings, reference sets, into 
which they categorise items. People’s ability to form and use categories around 
concepts was demonstrated by Rosch (1973) in a pair of experiments which trained 
monolingual participants whose language did not describe differences in colour and 
geometric forms to identify sets of colours and geometric forms. She found that 
participants more quickly learned to identify sets with a ‘presumed natural prototype’. 
For example, for colours, sets with members that were closely related to a colour (in 
terms of hue and brightness) which had been identified as normally relating to a basic 
colour term in prior cross-language studies (e.g. ‘blue’ in English) were easier to learn 
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than categories centred around colours that did not match a normal basic colour term 
(e.g. ‘red and brown’ in English). Once learned, Rosch (1973) demonstrated that almost 
all participants could extend the set to apply to a previously unseen stimulus which was 
consistent with the set. 
 
Therefore, people normally have ready cognitive access to a set of items which might be 
appropriate and relevant to a given proposition. For example, when a proposition 
considers modes of travel between the UK and France, a group of items likely to 
include ‘aeroplane’, ‘ferry’ and ‘train’ will be considered more readily than a wider 
group of modes of travel (which could also include ‘walking’ or ‘bicycle’). This group 
of items provides a reference class that people can use when considering a proposition. 
So, when a person considers a journey between London and Paris, a group of options 
will be considered that may well include ‘train’ but is unlikely to include ‘bicycle’. 
Similarly, on consideration of such a journey, an individual will narrow the reference 
set considered to relevant modes of transport and exclude from consideration items that 
are not relevant (like ‘cat’ which may be considered within categories of ‘animals’ or 
‘pets’ but not a category which requires modes of travel).  
 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) conducted a series of experiments that investigated the 
structure of cognitively formed reference sets. They found that items considered most 
prototypical of a class were those that had the most attributes in common with other 
members of the class and the least attributes in common with members of other classes. 
As part of these experiments, they looked at how participants could generate contrast 
sets of items that are in the same category as an item (they share relevant attributes) but 
are not the item. This demonstrated that, when negating an item, people can use 
reference sets of cognitively related items to form relevant contrast sets. For example, if 
you asked your friend whether they were taking the train on their trip from London to 
Paris and they clarified that they were not, then you would probably consider options 
like aeroplane and ferry (which form part of a reference set of ways to get to France) as 
alternative possibilities. Note that such contrast sets are cognitive constructs, not logical 
ones as they exclude items not likely to be relevant to the proposition in hand. The 
logical contrast set of items which are not taking a train would include riding a cat and 
swimming. The former is excluded from most people’s cognitive contrast set as not 
feasible and the latter would normally be excluded as highly unlikely (except in certain 
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contexts – such as a fit friend planning a highly exhausting trip to France to raise money 
for charity!)  
 
Cognitive contrast sets that include items similar to (but which are not) a given item are 
called contrast classes of the given item (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). The probabilistic 
approach to reasoning has considered how people might use contrast classes in 
reasoning (Oaksford, 2002). 
4.1.1. Contrast Classes in Reasoning 
Oaksford and Stenning (1992) sought to explain matching bias in Evans’ (1972a) 
construction task and Wason’s (1968) selection task by considering how negated 
propositions are understood as identifying a contrast class rather than simple denial. 
They contrasted this ‘processing negations’ account with the heuristic-analytic account 
(e.g. Evans, 1984) which suggested that matching was caused by a rejection of 
irrelevant (non-matching) information at an initial heuristic stage before the problem 
was considered logically in a subsequent analytic stage. Their experiments predicted 
that matching bias would be suppressed in conditions which eased contrast class 
construction (by providing a context in which a contrast class can easily be derived 
rather than an abstract form where the nature of the contrast class is ambiguous). The 
heuristic-analytic approach would not anticipate any suppression of matching effect in 
such conditions. Oaksford and Stenning (1992) observed effects which supported their 
processing negation account and not the heuristic-analytic account, providing an initial 
indication that contrast classes may play a role in people’s reasoning.  
 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) set out a more developed probabilistic approach which 
predicts responses to Wason’s (1968) selection task. This approach proposed that 
people’s responses are based on seeing the task as one of optimal data selection 
(selecting the answer that would most likely provide the most information about 
whether the given rule was true or false) rather than the logic of falsification. They 
developed a model which predicted the cards chosen in different circumstances based 
on the likelihood that the card would provide useful information about whether the rule 
was true or false. The model assumed that people would interpret negated items with 
reference to the item’s contrast class. They anticipated that people would ascribe a 
higher probability to the contrast class of an item (that the item was not the case) than to 
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the single item itself because there is often more than one item in a contrast class. Also, 
they set the probability that an item is true or that a member of its contrast class is true 
at less than one. This is because the plausible contrast class is not the full complement 
of possibilities to the negated item. Therefore, there remains a small possibility that it is 
not the case that either the item is true or a member of the plausibly generated contrast 
class is true. 
 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) found that their model was a good match for data derived 
from prior experiments. They, therefore, concluded that responses to the selection task 
were likely a rational response based on an adaptive approach to hypothesis testing 
which would be more appropriate in everyday life rather than a systematic bias against 
classical logic. The good fits obtained for a model which assumed contrast class 
construction support the hypothesis that people interpret negation in reasoning with 
reference to appropriate contrast classes.  
 
Further indirect evidence for people’s use of contrast classes to interpret negation in 
reasoning problems was observed by Oaksford, Chater and Larkin (2000). They 
proposed a probabilistic model which predicted responses to conditional inference tasks. 
As with their model for Wason’s (1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994), 
Oaksford et al. (2000) suggested that people normally assume that a negated proposition 
would have higher probability than the same proposition without negation. This is 
because the contrast class associated with the proposition would contain more 
possibilities (and therefore be more likely) than the proposition itself. The model 
considered the conditional probabilities implied by conditional statements and predicted 
that inferences would be more highly endorsed where their likelihood was high (rather 
than necessarily where they are logically correct). This model provided a good fit for a 
meta-analysis of prior experimental data. The theory proposed that negation effects 
were due to the interpretation of the negated proposition as having a higher probability 
than the affirmative proposition (because of the greater number of possibilities in the 
contrast class) was also supported by three experiments. The experiments tested high 
probability affirmative statements in place of negated propositions. They found that 
these high probability propositions led to effects similar to those previously seen when 
using negations in abstract tasks (including one that used scenarios similar to many 
prior tasks) and a task with naturalistic scenarios. 
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Initial studies (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford et al., 
2000) proposing the relevance of contrast classes to reasoning had used the concept to 
inform probabilistic models. Meta-analyses, fitting the model to prior data and new 
experiments suggested that these models had some predictive power, supporting the 
case that contrast classes are relevant to people’s understanding of negation in reasoning 
tasks. However, these studies had not shown direct evidence for contrast class 
generation when people approached reasoning problems.  
 
The heuristic-analytic theory’s (e.g. Evans, 1984) explanation of bias in conditional 
reasoning continues to provide an alternative to probabilistic approaches which assume 
contrast classes are relevant to interpretations of negations. This approach suggests that 
people did consider tasks logically and responded accordingly following an analytical 
stage and that a prior heuristic stage which selected only information deemed relevant 
for consideration (to reduce the requirements of the more complex analytic phase) 
causes illogical biases. Negation is therefore not considered at the heuristic stage (which 
simply looks at whether a proposition appears relevant to the conditional being 
considered – e.g. the content of the proposition matches a term in the conditional. At the 
analytical stage, the problem is considered with negation representing simple denial 
(rather than representing something other than the subject of the negation as required by 
the contrast class interpretation). Evans (1998) highlighted a series of experiments by 
Evans, Clibbens and Rood (1996) that demonstrated that the use of explicit negations 
(rather than implicit negations) in Wason’s (1968) selection task appeared to remove 
matching bias. Evans (1998) suggested that the heuristic-analytic account with an initial 
step to narrow the information considered to that relevant (Evans, 1984) and processing 
negations account using contrast classes (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992) were both more 
likely to account for these findings than other theories. For example, Evans (1998) 
considered that mental models accounts (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1993) did not 
easily predict the observed matching of negated antecedent terms in the selection task – 
a matching of terms which would not be included in the initial mental model.  
 
Some experiments have compared the differing predictions that the dual process 
approach (e.g. Evans, 1984) and the contrast class approach (e.g. Oaksford and Chater, 
1994) make for responses to the selection task. Yama (2001) conducted a series of 
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experiments which provided participants with frequency data about alternative options 
and asked them to complete a version of the selection task using materials related to this 
information. Essentially, Yama (2001) predicted that if people took a probabilistic 
approach to the selection task, differences in the frequency data presented would have a 
greater impact on responses than the matching bias anticipated by the heuristic-analytic 
approach. These experiments suggested that matching bias was not suppressed by the 
provision of frequency information which would reduce the probabilistic motivation for 
matching bias under Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) optimal data selection approach. 
This potentially undermined the case that people interpreted negations in reasoning with 
reference to contrast classes. However, Oaksford (2002) argued that Yama’s (2001) 
results supported a larger number of the detailed predictions made by the contrast class 
account than of those made by the dual-process account. Oaksford and Moussakowski 
(2004) followed this with a series of three experiments that provided the frequency 
information in a manner more likely to engage participants. After first replicating 
Yama’s (2001) key experiment with a group of western participants, they conducted 
two experiments which provided frequency information in a more naturalistic way. 
People do not normally derive their beliefs about the likelihood of events from tables of 
information but through sequential sampling – observing a single case, one at a time, 
many times (Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003). Oaksford and Moussakowski (2004) 
therefore provided information about frequencies by presenting examples of 
occurrences one at a time. Unlike Yama (2001), they did find that the frequency 
information had the effect predicted by the optimal data selection approach. This 
suggests that where the presentation of information reflects the manner that they 
naturally absorb it, people’s reasoning judgements to reflect probabilistic consideration. 
 
Several studies have provided evidence which undermines the contrast class account, 
including Prado and Noveck (2006) and Stahl, Klauer and Erdfielder (2008). 
 
Prado and Noveck (2006) sought to compare the relevance of ‘narrow’ and ‘search for 
alternatives’ interpretations of negation to matching bias. They described the ‘narrow’ 
view of negation as logical denial and the ‘search for alternatives’ was described in line 
with the contrast class account (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). They used an evaluation 
task (in which participants consider whether a given stimuli are consistent with a 
conditional rule) and a falsification task (where participants consider whether a given 
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stimuli would falsify the given conditional). Focusing on conditionals with affirmative 
antecedents and negative consequents (the form if p then not-q), they found that 
participants were both more successful (significantly so) and quicker (although not 
significantly quicker) at correctly rejecting stimuli which matched the terms of the rule 
(i.e. consistent with p and q) than at confirming the validity of stimuli consistent with 
the rule (i.e. showing p and not-q). Similarly, in the falsification task, they found that 
participants were significantly quicker to recognise stimuli that falsified the rule 
(showing p and q) than to correctly reject stimuli that would not (showing p and not-q). 
There was no significant difference in accuracy of responses between these two 
conditions in the falsification task. Prado and Noveck (2006) argued that this was 
consistent with their ‘narrow’ view of negation and Evans (1998) proposed matching 
heuristic. They suggested that a ‘search for alternatives’ approach to negation would 
predict greater accuracy and quicker responses where the stimuli included an example 
of not-q rather than q itself. They found similar support for the hypothesis based on the 
‘narrow’ view by showing that people would more quickly and accurately respond 
where stimuli ‘matched’ the terms of the rule (i.e. showed p and q regardless of the 
negation in the conditional) when comparing trials with stimuli that falsified that 
affirmative antecedent and affirmative consequent rule (if p then q) to trials with stimuli 
that confirmed the affirmative antecedent and negative consequent version of the rule (if 
p then not-q).  
 
Stahl, Klauer and Erdfielder (2008) compared the function of implicit and explicit 
negations when used in Wason’s (1968) selection task with propositions involving 
numbers and letters. They found that the use of explicit negation reduced the matching 
bias observed but did not remove it as had been observed in prior studies (e.g. Evans, 
1996). This finding undermines basic heuristic accounts (e.g. Evans, 1984) which rely 
on a ‘relevance’ heuristic prioritising consideration of items named in the conditional 
given to account for matching bias (as, when using explicit negations, the inference 
does not state the item matched). The authors also tried and failed to model their data 
using Oaksford and Chater’s (2003) optimal data selection model which relies on 
contrast class understandings of negation. These results call into question these 
approaches. Stahl et al. (2008) were able to model their data using an updated version of 
Evans (2006) heuristic-analytic theory that allowed the use of negations in the task to 
affect the task’s resolution strategy.  
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Prado and Noveck (2006) and Stahl, Klauer and Erdfielder (2008) provide evidence 
which may suggest that contrast classes are less relevant to reasoning with negations. 
However, Prado and Noveck’s (2006) expectation that accessing contrast classes would 
create a quicker response when a participant looked at a member of the contrast class 
rather than the named item itself may not be correct. Reference to a contrast class may 
be used to support processing of reasoning and may lead to contrast class members 
being processed and considered more quickly than irrelevant items. However, that does 
not mean contrast class members can be processed more quickly than the item named 
which is also likely to be part of the individual’s processing. Therefore, it may not be 
reasonable to dismiss the contrast class account on the basis of the experiment 
conducted by Prado and Noveck (2006). Stahl et al. (2008) also do not rule out the 
relevance of an optimal data selection model using contrast classes to explain matching 
bias in the selection task. It may be that the model they used needs to be better adapted 
to address the requirements of their experiment. 
 
More recently, Gale and Ball (2012) investigated the role of contrast classes in Wason’s 
(1960) rule discovery task. This task gives participants a ‘triple’ consisting of three 
numbers (traditionally ‘2-4-6’) which participants are told is consistent with a rule that 
the experimenter is using. Participants are invited to suggest further triples which the 
experimenter tells them are either consistent or inconsistent with the rule. The 
participants’ task is to identify the rule and Wason (1960) suggested that the narrow 
rules many proposed (e.g. ‘numbers increasing by two’) were an example of 
‘confirmation bias’ as many of these participants had only suggested triples consistent 
with that hypothesis. Those participants that tried triples inconsistent with their 
hypothesised rule were more likely to uncover the true rule, ‘increasing numbers’. 
Subsequent researchers  (e.g. Sperber, Cara & Girotto, 1995) have argued that the 
exemplar leads participants to a narrower than necessary hypothesis, an example of 
‘relevance theory’. Success rates did increase where participants responded to a dual 
goal task (e.g. Gale & Ball, 2006). This told them that there are two rules and the 
example only represents one of them (all those that don’t meet the ‘increasing numbers’ 
rule are said to conform to the alternative rule). Gale and Ball (2012) conducted three 
experiments where participants completed dual goal tasks. In their first two experiments 
participants were given ‘2-4-6’ as the example of the ‘increasing numbers’ rule as usual 
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as well as an example of the other rule. In the first experiment, this example was from 
the contrast set of the initial rule and was either ‘useful’ (‘6-4-2’) or ‘nonuseful’ (‘4-4-
4’). In their second experiment a third condition was introduced in which a ‘multiple-
dimensions’ example for the other rule was provided (‘9-8-1’). They noted that the 
‘useful’ example was the most likely member of a contrast class for the other example 
given (as defined by Oaksford, 2002, as the likely alternatives rather than the set of all 
alternatives). They found that around three-quarters of participants given the ‘useful’ 
exemplar were able to provide the ‘increasing numbers’ rule in the given amount of 
time (compared to about a fifth when using the ‘nonuseful’ rule and about a third with 
the ‘multiple dimensions’ rule). This suggests that prompts involving likely contrast 
class members are particularly facilitative at helping people solve this task. In their third 
experiment, Gale and Ball (2012) gave all participants the standard exemplar for the 
‘increasing numbers’ rule and the ‘useful’ exemplar of the other rule. They asked 
participants what they thought the first rule was immediately after being provided with 
the task and again after they had suggested and had feedback on a set of alternative 
triples. Few participants guessed the rule initially, but most got it after the additional 
feedback on their triples. This suggests that the facilitation effect of providing a contrast 
class member was on the participants’ use of testing other triples to find the rules rather 
than on the initial guess. Overall Gale and Ball (2012) show how contrast class use can 
facilitate reasoning in the rule discovering task – demonstrating the wider application of 
contrast classes to reasoning problems. 
4.1.2. Implicit Negations Using Contrast Class Members 
I discussed the use of implicit negation earlier (see §2.2.2), which Tottie (1982) 
described as a statement that negated a proposition without explicitly referencing the 
negated proposition.  
 
Evans and Handley (1999) conducted three experiments using implicit negations in 
inference tasks. They used abstract materials referring to cards with numbers and letters 
on them (as are typically used in the selection task). In the first two experiments, they 
presented a conditional relationship and then a series of premises and conclusions 
(representing MP, DA, AC and MT) and asked whether the conclusion followed the 
premise in each case. In the third experiment, participants were just given the 
conditional and premise and asked to generate their own conclusion. The premises 
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given either used explicit negation (e.g. ‘A card which does not have a P’ where the 
conditional referred to cards with a ‘P’) or implicit negation (e.g. ‘A card which has a 
B’ given the same rule). This task showed that people were less likely to endorse (or 
generate a conclusion for) a conditional inference where the premises given where 
implicitly rather than explicitly negated.  
 
Schroyens, Verschueren, Schaeken and d’Ydewalle (2000) conducted an experiment 
similar to Evans and Handley (1999), but they provided information about the size of 
the contrast class of the propositions in the conditional (i.e. what alternative values it 
could take). They found that the presence of a larger contrast class decreased the 
implicit negation effect which had been observed by Evans and Handley (1999). 
Schroyens et al. (2000) pointed out that this was consistent with Oaksford and 
Stenning’s (1992) processing negations account which suggested that people will reason 
with reference to the contrast class. Under the processing negations account (Oaksford 
and Stenning, 1992), explicit negation should readily trigger reference to the relevant 
contrast class. This will normally lead to the negation of a low probability affirmative 
proposition creating a high probability proposition based on the large number of 
alternatives that could be the case. Implicit negation may not trigger contrast class 
construction and therefore a proposition using implicit negation is likely to be seen as 
low probability – inhibiting inferences using it when it is the premise. Therefore, when 
the contrast class was manipulated to be large, the effects disappeared. In their second 
experiment, Schroyens et al. (2000) tested this by using implicit denials that either 
facilitated or did not facilitate reference to contrast class members. They again observed 
that implicit negation effects reduced when facilitating contrast class consideration.  
 
Oaksford, Chater and Larkin (2000) introduced the conditional probability model for 
conditional inference (see §1.3.3 for a description of this model). The model is 
dependent on a contrast class approach to processing negations. While this model 
proved a good fit for most data, Oaksford et al. (2000) themselves found weaker support 
for the model in their second experiment which used implicit negations.  
 
Schroyens and Schaeken (2003) provided a critique of Oaksford et al.’s (2000) model. 
They suggested that the conditional probability model should predict equivalent levels 
of endorsement based on P(p│r) for the following AC inferences: 
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 If p, then not q; r ∴ p 
 If p, then r; r ∴ p 
 
Schroyens and Schaeken (2003) pointed out that this did not align with the results seen 
in Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (2000). These studies saw implicit 
negation bias suggesting that these two inferences were not treated equivalently (with 
the implicit negation used in the first inference suppressing endorsements compared to 
the second, affirmative, version).  
 
Oaksford and Chater (2003) point out that although these conditional inferences are 
superficially similar, these are not the conditionals that participants get to see in these 
experiments, which retain the same lexical content in antecedent and consequent 
positions. They point out that one of the examples of these inferences that Schroyens 
and Schaeken (2003) consider (‘If you are in Paris, then you are in France. You are in 
France. Therefore, you are in Paris’) has probability greater than zero. However, the 
corresponding statement that uses the same lexical content in antecedent and consequent 
(‘If you are in Paris, then you are not in France. You are in England. Therefore, you are 
in Paris’) does have a probability of zero. Therefore, the conditional probability is only 
the same where the lexical materials are allowed to vary between antecedent and 
consequent (‘If you are in Paris, then you are not in England. You are in France. 
Therefore, you are in Paris’) which is not the case in these experiments. 
 
Oaksford and Chater (2007) further considered how the effects of implicit negation 
using members of a contrast class might still reflect rational responses, dependent on 
conditional probabilities. Such considerations may not have been fully incorporated into 
the basic model of Oaksford et al. (2000) which generalised treatment of contrast 
classes. However, the basic theory that inference is dependent on conditional probability 
could incorporate these considerations. They considered how MP would be considered 
differently in two superficially similar cases. They proposed the contingencies in table 
4.1. Panel A (‘Explicit negations’) considers a dependency between propositions p and 
a. Panel B (‘Implicit negations’) represents the same dependency but splits out the not-p 
cases as a contrast class (consisting of q and r) and the not-a cases into a contrast class 
(consisting of b and c). Assuming those contrast classes are complete, then the 
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contingencies for b and c in panel B can be collapsed into the contingencies for not-a in 
panel A and, similarly, you can collapse q and r into not-p. 
 
Table 4.1 – Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) illustrative examples of contingency tables 
for a conditional rule where, e.g. ¬a = {b c} 
 Explicit negations  Implicit Negations  
 a ¬a   a b c 
p .3 .1  p .3 .05 .05 
¬p .1 .5  q .1 .025 .025 
    r 0 .225 .225 
Source: Oaksford and Chater (2007), Table 5.2 
 
We can assess the following inferences using explicit negations as set out in these 
contingency tables: 
 If ¬ p, then ¬ a; ¬ p ∴ a 
 If ¬ p, then ¬ a; ¬ p ∴ ¬ a 
According to the conditional probability model, endorsement of these inferences will be 
based on P(a│¬ p) and P(¬ a│¬ p) respectively. Based on either of the contingency 
tables in panel A or panel B, this provides probabilities of .167 and .833 respectively. 
The model would, therefore, suggest that the first inference (which is not logically 
correct) would see lower levels of endorsement than the second, MP, inference. Given a 
choice between these inferences, you would expect them to pick the latter, MP, 
inference in preference to the first.  
 
However, we may see different conditional probabilities if we use members of a 
contrast class to provide implicit negation, as in the following two inferences: 
 If ¬ p, then ¬ a; q ∴ a 
 If ¬ p, then ¬ a; q∴ ¬ a 
Although superficially similar to the inferences above, the use of a contrast class 
member (which is a member of the ¬ p set) invokes different conditional probabilities: 
P(a│q) and P(¬ a│q) respectively. These have to be evaluated using the contingencies 
in panel B and now the probability of the first (logically incorrect) inference is .667, 
higher than the probability of the MP inference which is .333. In this case, the 
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conditional probability model would predict the choice of the first inference over the 
latter, MP, inference. 
 
With this example, Oaksford and Chater (2007) provide an account of how the 
conditional probability model could account for implicit negation effects, such as those 
seen by Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (2000). This account would 
predict that you can create implicit negation effects by providing people with a 
reference contrast class and manipulating the frequencies involved. However, this 
prediction has not yet been directly tested.   
 
The purpose of the current chapter is therefore to test Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) 
intuitive understanding of reasoning with implicit negations using contrast class 
members. If manipulation of contrast classes in the manner proposed above does lead to 
suppression of MP inferences, then this will provide support for the notion (central to 
Oaksford & Chater’s, 2000, model) that inference levels depend on conditional 
probability.  
4.1.3. Implicit negation effects and other theories of reasoning 
As discussed above, a finding that manipulating frequency information related to 
contrast class members suppressed MP inferences would support the underlying theory 
of Oaksford and Chater’s (2000) conditional probability model for conditional 
inference.  
 
If the use of implicit negation can affect inferences when they imply a different 
conditional probability for the inference, then it is not clear how mental models theory 
(e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) can account for this result. Given the rule ‘If not p, 
then not q’ we would expect the generation of the following initial mental model: 
 
 [¬p] ¬q 
 … 
 
This would allow the MP inference to be drawn quickly when using explicit negation. 
Superficially, the need to convert an implicitly negated premise into the ‘not p’ term in 
the mental model may suppress inferences when using implicit negation. However, this 
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suppression effect would be the same regardless of the frequency data provided (so you 
should not expect different levels of suppression effect based on frequency data). 
 
The fully fleshed out mental model for ‘If not p, then not q’ is as follows: 
[¬p] ¬q 
p [q] 
p ¬q 
 
Based on this, a similar concern exists for the other forms of inference that we could test 
(DA, AC and MT).  
 
Khemlani, Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) provide a more recent account of negation 
based on mental models theory. They note that negation of a proposition often leads to a 
wider range of possibilities and that modelling all possibilities could place a burden on 
mental capacity. For example, they note that modelling the possibilities for the 
statement ‘The students are not male adults’ could represent three narrow scope 
possibilities, modelled as: 
 Not male Adults  (i.e. the students are women) 
 Male   Not adults  (i.e. the students are boys) 
 Not male Not adults  (i.e. the students are girls) 
 
Khemlani et al. (2012) therefore propose that a general effect of context on model 
generation will make it easier (i.e. quicker) to understand negation when people are 
already considering models of the corresponding affirmative assertion. They propose 
that people will generally take a narrow scope interpretation of negation (i.e. only the 
possibility set out in the model above that is best supported by context) to simplify 
model generation. Because the use of implicit negation does not refer to the 
corresponding affirmative assertion, they predict that it is, therefore, harder to 
understand (i.e. slower) than explicit negation using “not”. Khemlani et al. (2012) 
therefore propose a mechanism where consideration of the mental model is made more 
complicated by the requirement to translate an implicit negation into an explicit 
negation as used by the model. However, this effect would appear to be consistent, 
regardless of any frequency manipulations. Therefore, while Khemlani et al. (2012) find 
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supporting evidence for their predictions, their account cannot predict the effects 
anticipated by Oaksford and Chater (2007), set out above.  
 
A heuristic-analytic theory (e.g. Evans, 1984) suffers from a similar constraint. Evans 
(2006) provides an extended heuristic-analytic account which suggests that a heuristic 
system unconsciously generates plausible models and either refers them to an analytic 
system for full consideration or uses them to inform immediate responses. Systematic 
biases, like matching, are attributed to this system, which provides quick responses 
based on requirements like relevance where required. The relevance requirement in the 
heuristic system could suggest that inferences are more likely to be rejected because the 
presence of an implicitly negative term is not obviously relevant to the conditional 
under consideration. However, such an effect would be expected to be flat and apply to 
all uses of implicit negation – not just the uses where the underlying frequency 
information also supported suppression. Evans’ (2006) analytical system provides an 
explicit reasoning process for evaluating models and using them to either respond or 
refer back to the heuristic system for a new model. Evans (2006) argues that this 
analytical system can adopt a range of strategies depending on the nature of the problem 
under consideration. The ability of such a heuristic-analytic approach to account for the 
predicted effects, therefore, depends on the nature of the analytic system that you 
anticipate being employed (such as a probabilistic reasoning system like that proposed 
by Oakford & Chater, 2000, or one based on Johnson-Laird & Byrne’s, 2002, mental 
models). 
4.2. Experiment 1 
This first experiment is intended to provide a basic test of the predictions set out in 
Oaksford and Chater (2007). Specifically, participants see frequency information based 
on Oakford and Chater’s (2007) contingency table (table 4.1 above). This should create 
a situation where endorsement of MP inferences depends on whether explicit or implicit 
negation – referring to a contrast class member – is used.  
4.2.1. Approach to providing contextual information  
Previous experiments have sought to provide context information intended to inform 
participants’ conditional reasoning on a single page through narrative statements or data 
tables (e.g. Oberauer, Wilhelm & Rosas Diaz, 1999; Yama, 2001; Oaksford et al., 
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2000). However, these approaches do not reflect the way in which people normally 
learn about the relative frequencies of occurrences in the world. Typically, people will 
experience different instances that relate to a subject under consideration over time. By 
seeing one instance, then another and another, people slowly build up an impression of 
the proportion of instances of each type.  
 
Pollard and Evans (1983) conducted a selection task experiment which showed 
participants both sides of each card in a deck of 22, one at a time (participants were 
shown the front of each card and asked to guess if a given symbol would appear on the 
back before it was turned over). The experiment then picked four cards from the deck 
and participants were then presented with Wason’s (1968) selection task (see §1.1). The 
results provided some evidence for the influence of experience (the learning phase) on 
peopl’es judgements in the selection task.  
 
Oaksford and Wakefield (2003) used a similar method of sequential exposure to 
materials which provided participants with contextual data over time before they 
completed a selection task. This approach initially provided frequency information 
about the number of cards with given labels in a large pack directly. They then 
presented participants with example cards, one at a time, which had labels in proportion 
with those provided in the initial frequency information. Participants were asked about 
each card they were shown and then asked a key experimental selection task question. 
This approach was intended to emulate the natural sampling through which people 
normally acquire information about relative frequencies. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
(1995) had shown that people were better at Bayesian probability problems where they 
were given information about frequency (e.g. “8 of every 10 women with breast cancer 
will get a positive mammography”) rather than a probability (e.g. “If a woman has 
breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will get a positive mammography”). 
Oaksford and Wakefield (2003) showed that sequential exposure to materials (which 
allowed the development of an understanding of relative frequencies) led to responses to 
selection task questions that better reflected the probability model based on the 
frequencies provided to participants than had been found by Oberauer et al. (1999) 
which had provided only narrative information. Using a similar approach with 
sequential presentation, Oaksford and Moussakowski (2004) found that people 
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responded to a selection task in a way that better reflected the frequencies provided than 
Yama (2001) had observed (Yama, 2001, had also only provided narrative information). 
 
This experiment intends to manipulate the frequency with which participants will 
anticipate given events occurring. Based on these previous results showing that people’s 
responses appear better informed by frequency data when it is provided sequentially, the 
experiment will include a learning phase. This phase will provide information about 
individual instances relevant to the conditional to be considered one at a time. 
Participants will be asked questions about the information they are shown to support 
engagement with it. 
4.2.2. Predictions 
In this experiment, participants will be provided with information about the proportion 
of animals of each of three different types and colours. This information will be given 
both directly in the form of percentages and indirectly through a learning phase which 
will show 50 pictures of animals of the relevant types and colours. The information 
would suggest that an MP inference is much more likely be true when a “not” negated 
second premise is used than when a contrast class member is used in its place. The 
proportions given were based on those suggested by Oaksford and Chater (2007), 
modified to allow the context to be presented in 50 pictures. The proportion of animals 
of each type and colour shown to participants is detailed in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 – Contextual information provided about animals 
 Type of animal 
Total Cat Dog Rabbit 
Colour of 
animal 
Black 30% (15) 10% (5) 0% (0) 40% (20) 
White 6% (3) 2% (1) 22% (11) 30% (15) 
Brown 4% (2) 4% (2) 22% (11) 30% (15) 
Total 40% (20) 16% (8) 44% (22) 100% (50) 
Percentage of given type and colour shown to the participants (number of given type and colour 
presented in learning phase) 
 
Participants would be asked to use this information to test the rule “If it is not a cat, then 
it is not black”. They would be presented with the rule as a major premise and a suitable 
statement for the minor premise. For the MP inference, the minor premise would be 
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“not a cat” in the “not” negated condition and “a dog” in the contrast class condition. 
Participants would then be asked whether they would conclude either that “The animal 
is not black” (which is equivalent to endorsement of MP in this example) or that “The 
animal is black”.  
 
The scenarios presented would suggest that animals of the relevant types and colours 
exist in such a probability of a MP inference being correct when “not” negation is used 
in the second premise is 83.33%. However, when the contrast class member ‘dog’ is 
used in the second premise, this probability drops to 37.5%. Therefore, given this 
context, it is expected that participants make fewer MP inferences when the contrast 
class member ‘dog’ is used in the second premise in place of ‘not a cat’. Similarly, 
confidence ratings that the inference is correct are anticipated to be lower for MP 
inference when the contrast class is used than the explicit negation.  
 
Conversely, no significant differences are predicted with AC inference between the 
contrast class and explicitly negated condition for either confidence ratings or number 
of inferences made. This is because the scenarios presented only provide a small 
difference between the probabilities that AC inference is correct when “not” negation is 
used (83.33%) and when the contrast class is used (80%).   
4.2.3. Method 
4.2.3.1. Design 
This experiment used a within-participants design with inference type (MP, DA, AC 
and MT), conclusion polarity (“not” negated and contrast class for MP and AC 
inference conditions, affirmative for the other conditions) and order (before learning 
phase and after learning phase) as factors. The dependent variables were responses to 
the inference tasks (whether they made the inference or not) and their stated confidence 
in their response (provided using a slider on a visual analogue scale which was assigned 
a response between 1 and 100).  
4.2.3.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited through the ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’ system to complete 
the experimental survey. All people who completed the survey (including a small 
number of responses which were excluded from the data because they may have been 
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duplicates – either sharing a Mechanical Turk ID or IP address) received a small 
payment (between US$0.50 and US$1.00). After these exclusions, the sample consisted 
of 272 people, was 52% female and was aged between 18 and 75 (median age 31). A 
total of 97% of participants reported that English was their first language. 
4.2.3.3. Materials 
A scenario was prepared in which a vet was testing the following conditional rule in 
respect to the animals that she saw: 
 
If it is not a cat, then it is not black 
 
Six inference tasks were developed using this rule. These took the following form: 
 
The vet is considering the following rule about the animals that she sees: 
 
o If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 
 
The vet is told that the next animal she will see is: 
 
 [One of the following minor premises was provided for each question] 
o not a cat. [MP with “not” negation] 
o a dog. [MP with contrast class] 
o a cat. [DA] 
o not black. [AC with “not” negation] 
o white. [AC with contrast class] 
o black. [MT] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next animal.  
 
[One of the following pairs of options was provided with the options in random 
order for each question] 
 [For MP and DA questions:] 
That the animal is not black 
  
 
 198
That the animal is black 
 [For AC and MT questions:] 
  That the animal is not a cat 
  That the animal is a cat 
 
In addition, 50 questions were prepared to form the learning phase. These questions 
each consisted of a photograph of an animal of a given type and colour. Photographs of 
relevant animals against a white background were found which had no features apart 
from the animal. The photographs were cropped and reduced in size to ensure they 
would all display at the same size in an online survey and that the photo and questions 
on each learning phase page would fit on a single screen at typical resolution. These 
photos were each combined with multiple choice questions about the photo which 
participants had to answer to move on. This was intended to ensure that participants 
attended to the materials. The following questions were used: 
 
 What type of animal is this? [Answer options: Dog; Cat; Rabbit]  
 What colour best describes this animal? [Answer options: Black; White; Brown] 
 
Full details of the scenario used in this experiment and questions asked are included in 
appendix 3 (see §A3.1). 
4.2.3.4. Procedure 
Participants were directed to the web-based survey (using www.surveygizmo.com) from 
the Amazon Mechanical Turk System (www.mturk.com). They saw an information 
screen and had to confirm consent to proceed. They then provided basic demographic 
information before being provided with instructions for the first part of the experiment.  
 
The first part of the experiment provided participants details of the proportion of 
animals that the vet sees of different types (cats, dogs, rabbits) and colours (black, 
white, brown). These were provided as the percentages given in table 4.2 above. It then 
asked the six inference questions for the first time. These inference questions were 
presented one to a page in random order. Participants had to provide a response to the 
inference question and click on the slider bar to indicate their confidence in the response 
they had given before they were able to move onto the next page. The slider bar was 
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labelled with ‘Not at all confident’ at one end and ‘Completely confident’ at the other. 
Responses were recorded at a number between 1 and 100 based on how far down the 
slider bar the participant clicked. 
 
The participants were then given instructions for the learning phase. The learning phase 
consisted of fifty pages. Each page had a picture of an animal and asked two multiple 
choice questions about the animals type and colour. Participants had to answer both 
questions on each page before they could continue. Learning phase pages were 
presented in a random order. 
 
Participants were then given instructions for the second set of inference questions. This 
stage used the same six inference questions that participants had answered earlier in 
random order. However, the participants were not given any information about the 
proportion of animals on the instructions page.   
 
Finally, participants were presented with a page that contained the verification task. 
This presented nine response boxes in a three by three grid labelled animal type (cat, 
dog, rabbit) on one axis and colour (black, white, brown) on the other. Participants were 
instructed to enter how many of the next 100 animals that the vet would see would be in 
each category. If participants attempted to proceed without their responses summing to 
100, they were returned to this page with an instruction providing the total value they 
had entered and asking them to make sure their responses added up to 100. 
 
A final page provided participants with a code to enter on the Mechanical Turk system 
to confirm that they had completed the survey, thanked them for their time and provided 
contact information if they had any questions. 
4.2.4. Results 
Raw responses to confidence questions were numbers between 1 and 100 reflecting the 
extent to which the participant considered their response to the inference question were 
correct. These were converted into scores reflecting the participants’ confidence that 
inferences were correct based on whether they made the inference in responding to the 
inference question or not. Where a response to the inference question was consistent 
with the relevant inference, the relevant response to the confidence question was simply 
  
 
 200
divided by 100 to provide a proportion. Where a response to the inference question was 
inconsistent with the relevant inference, the relevant response to the confidence question 
was simply divided by 100 and subtracted from 1 to provide the proportion confidence 
that that inference was correct. 
 
The proportion of responses in line with the relevant inferences and average confidence 
scores are set out in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 1 
 
Trials before learning phase 
MP DA AC MT 
Not Contrast  Not Contrast  
Proportion making 
Inference 
85.66% 83.09% 83.82% 86.40% 81.62% 86.03% 
Confidence of Inference 
(standard deviation) 
.70 
(0.28) 
.68 
(0.28) 
.58  
(0.29) 
.66 
(0.28) 
.59 
(0.29) 
.66 
(0.28) 
       
 
Trials following learning phase 
MP DA AC MT 
Not Contrast  Not Contrast  
Proportion making 
Inference 
90.07% 83.46% 89.34% 93.01% 87.13% 90.81% 
Confidence of Inference 
(standard deviation) 
.69 
(0.27) 
.61 
(0.30) 
.61  
(0.29) 
.65 
(0.28) 
.62 
(0.28) 
.67 
(0.26) 
Proportion making inference as a percentage to 2 decimal places 
Mean Confidence (standard deviation) to 2 decimal places 
 
Planned comparisons using McNemar χ2 tests were used to compare the number of 
inference question responses consistent with the relevant inference in the “not” negated 
and contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences, before and after the 
learning phase. Neither inference showed a significant difference between “not” negated 
and contrast class conditions before the learning phase. After the learning phase, 
significant differences between the number of inferences made in “not” negated and 
contrast class conditions were observed for both MP (χ2(1) = 6.000, p=.021) and AC 
(χ2(1) = 5.818, p=.024) inferences.   
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Difference between confidence scores was analysed using a 2x2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with order (before and after the learning phase), inference (MP and AC) and 
negation used (“not” negation and contrast class) as factors. This found significant main 
effects of inference (F(1,271) = 9.600, p=.002, ηp2 = .034) and negation (F(1,271) = 
22.104, p<.001, ηp2 = .075), a significant two-way interaction between order and 
inference (F(1,271) = 7.205, p=.008, ηp2 = .026) and a significant three-way interaction 
between each of the factors (F(1,271) = 7.801, p=.006, ηp2 = .028). 
 
Four planned t-test comparisons (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013) were used to compare confidence scores in the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions. There were done for the MP inference before the learning phase which was 
not significant and the AC inference before the learning phase which was significant 
(t(271) = 3.048, p=.003). After the learning phase, t-tests were used to compare the 
responses in the MP inference which showed significant differences between the “not” 
negated and contrast class conditions (t(271) = 4.608, p<.001) and AC inference which 
did not reach the required Bonferroni level of significance (t(271) = 1.854, p=.065).   
4.2.4.1. Engagement with Learning Phase 
The experimental survey provided two ways of monitoring engagement with the 
learning phases. The first was the responses to the questions that people answered to 
describe the pictures they say in the learning phase which was intended to ensure they 
paid attention. The second was the final question which indicated the extent to which 
participants had integrated an understanding of the relative frequencies presented. 
 
Participants were asked two questions about each of the 50 pictures they see (about the 
type and colour of the animal): a total of 100 learning phase questions. Errors per 
participant ranged from 0 to 33 (with a median of 0, mean of 0.7 and standard deviation 
of 2.26). Only 96 participants (35%) made any errors and only three participants (about 
1%) made more than three errors. It would, therefore, appear that people responded with 
reasonable accuracy throughout the learning phase. However, that does not say anything 
about whether they attended sufficiently to learn anything about the relative frequencies 
presented.  
 
  
 
 202
The final question in the experimental survey asked participants to provide their own 
estimates of the number of animals of each type and colour. The coefficient of 
determination (the R2 statistic) was calculated for each participant based on how well 
their responses to this question matched the model implied by the information provided 
in the first set of instructions and by the learning stage. The R2 statistic represents the 
proportion of variation in a variable (in this case participants responses to the validation 
task) that is accounted for by another variable (in this case the responses predicted by 
the frequencies presented in the learning task). For each participant, it is calculated by 
dividing the residual sum of squares (the sum of the squared differences between each 
response and its prediction) by the total sum of squares (the sum of squared differences 
between each response and the participant’s mean response) and subtracting this 
number from 1. A result of between 0 and 1 represents the extent to which the model 
data (in this case the responses predicted by learning task frequencies) predicts the 
response data. A score of 0 represents response data that is not at all predicated by the 
response data. A score of less than 0 (which occurs where the residual sum of squares is 
higher than the total sum of squares) occurs where the predicted responses are less 
useful a prediction than predicting the same value for each response. This statistic is 
often used to confirm the extent to which a model fits response data (e.g. Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007). 
 
The R2 statistics for each participant ranged between -1,070 and 1, had a median of 
0.019, a mean of -17.85 and a standard deviation of 126.50. This suggests that, for a 
large number of participants, the information presented in the first set of instructions 
and the learning phase provides a very poor model for their understanding of the 
number of animals of each type and colour. 
 
To consider only participants who demonstrated some impact of the learning phase in 
response to the final question, all those with an R2 score of greater than zero were 
selected to form a sub-sample. This smaller sample consisted of 139 participants.  
 
The previous planned comparisons were repeated using this narrower sample whose 
estimates of the frequency of animal types and colours showed evidence of being 
informed by the learning phase. McNemar χ2 tests were again used to compare the 
number of inference question responses consistent with the relevant inference in the 
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“not” negated and contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences, before and 
after the learning phase. Neither inference showed a significant difference between 
“not” negated and contrast class conditions before the learning phase. After the learning 
phase, a significant difference between the number of inferences made in “not” negated 
and contrast class conditions was observed for MP (χ2(1) = 11.636, p=.001) inferences 
but not AC inferences. In this narrower sample, participants endorsed 95.0% of MP 
inferences when “not” was used and only 83.5% when the contrast class was used. AC 
inferences were endorsed 95.7% of the time when “not” negation was used and 92.8% 
of the time in the contrast class condition. 
 
A 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted on this smaller sample’s 
confidence scores with order (before and after the learning phase), inference (MP and 
AC) and negation used (“not” negation and contrast class) as factors. This found 
significant main effects of order (F(1,138) = 4.481, p=.036, ηp2 = .031) and negation 
(F(1,138) = 6.315, p=.013, ηp2 = .044), a significant two-way interaction between order 
and inference (F(1,138) = 7.472, p=.007, ηp2 = .051) and a significant three-way 
interaction between each of the factors (F(1,138) = 10.799, p=.001, ηp2 = .073).  
 
Planned comparisons using t-tests (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013) were used to compare confidence scores in the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions for the MP and AC inferences. Before the learning phase, a significant 
difference was found between confidence scores for AC inferences (t(138) = 2.586, 
p=.011) but not MP inferences. After the learning phase, significant differences were 
found for MP (t(138) = 3.104, p=.002) but not AC inferences. The mean confidence 
levels for these inferences are shown in figure 4.1 (error bars represent standard error). 
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Figure 4.1 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for MP and AC Inferences of Participants 
that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 1. 
 
4.2.4.2. Participants’ Probability Estimates 
The final question, in which participants provided their estimates of the number of 
animals of each type and colour, also allows us to estimate internal probabilities that 
each inference is correct given the premises provided. We can, therefore, look at 
whether people’s confidence that an inference is true is correlated with the probability 
that it is true based on their internal understanding of the frequency of different 
occurrences. 
 
Pearson correlation tests were used to compare confidence scores for each of the 
inference questions to the conditional probability that the inference is correct based on 
the participant’s self-report of animal frequencies. For the inference tests before the 
learning phase, a significant correlation was only found between the confidence in the 
inference and the probability based on self-reported animal frequencies for the MP 
inference using the contrast class (r=.171, p=.005). For the inference tests following the 
learning phase, significant correlations were found between participants confidence 
scores and the conditional probabilities based on their self-reported understanding of 
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animal frequencies across most conditions. This includes MP inferences using “not” 
negation (r=.153, p=.011) and the contrast class (r=.278, p<.001), DA inferences using 
“not” (r=.134, p=.027) and AC inferences using the contrast class (r=.179, p=.003). 
Post-learning, significant correlations were only not found for AC inferences using 
“not” and MT inferences. 
4.2.5. Discussion 
This experiment has shown that, where participants can demonstrate some learning of 
the frequency data, the use of implicit negation suppresses MP inference in the manner 
predicted. In contrast, AC inferences are not suppressed by the use of implicit negation 
based on this frequency data as would be expected if participants inferences are 
motivated based on the relevant conditional probabilities.  
 
This provides some initial support for Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) intuition about how 
the conditional probability model could be used to motivate inferences where implicit 
negations from the contrast class are used. While these results are consistent with their 
theory, other approaches cannot be ruled out based on this experiment. MP inferences 
were suppressed when the low probability contrast class member was used as an 
implicit negator, but we cannot be sure whether this was because of the frequency data 
provided or because of a more general implicit negation effect when considering MP 
inferences. For example, a mental models account (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) 
could argue that this effect was due to the use of implicit negation in MP making 
consideration of the task more complex (requiring an additional step to form the mental 
models required). The next experiment will address this by using MP inferences both 
where the frequency data would suggest that “not” negated and contrast class negated 
conclusions should be endorsed at a similar level and where frequency data is expected 
to motivate a difference. 
 
When data from all those that completed the experiment was taken into account 
(including those that showed no evidence of learning about the frequencies) a 
significant suppression effect was also seen when the contrast class member was used to 
provide implicit negation in the AC task as well as the MP task. This is not what was 
predicted and may suggest that there is an implicit negation effect independent of the 
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conditional probabilities (but a smaller effect that disappears when the frequency data 
has been understood).  
 
While MP inferences were suppressed in the contrast class condition, they were still 
relatively high. It should be noted that while the relevant conditional probability 
was .37, it was never predicted that inference levels would fall this far. The conditional 
probability model proposed that the relevant conditional probabilities inform the likely 
level of inferences, but the levels are not likely to be identical. This is particularly the 
case with MP which people are normally ready to endorse. 
 
Further support for the conditional probability model comes from the strong correlations 
between participants internalised understanding of frequencies (as reported in the final 
task) and their confidence scores in relation to most inferences. This is what would be 
expected if people had developed their own understanding of the conditional 
probabilities based on the learning phase and this information informed their inference 
responses. 
4.3. Experiment 2 
The previous experiment showed that MP would show an implicit negation effect – 
suppressing inference levels – as Oaksford and Chater (2007) predicted when a contrast 
class member was used in the premises. However, this result is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that it is the conditional probabilities that have led to this effect and rule 
out other theories. 
 
This experiment will, therefore, seek to expand the result. Firstly, it will look at whether 
frequencies can be modified to both create an implicit negation effect for MP and 
remove that effect in different conditions. Secondly, it will see if a similar effect can be 
induced in a different type of inference, AC. The third key change will be to use more 
extreme differences in frequency levels to see if this increases the suppression effect 
compared to that seen in the prior experiment. If an effect for MP and AC can be 
created and removed in different frequency conditions, with the effect increased through 
the use of more extreme frequency differences, this will provide substantial support for 
the conditional probability model. As discussed above (§4.1.3) it is not clear how 
mental models or heuristic-analytic approaches could explain such effects. 
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This experiment will use a second scenario alongside the one used in the previous 
experiment to test whether the effects can be replicated with different scenarios. The 
learning test will be shortened to allow participants to complete the tasks using both 
scenarios in a reasonable amount of time. 
 
One potential criticism of the presentation of the previous experiment is that the 
presentation of direct frequency data at the beginning may have primed participants to 
take a probabilistic approach. It is not clear based on responses to the inference 
questions before the learning phase that they were taking this in, but it will be removed 
in this experiment to prevent any risk of priming. Because this has been removed – and 
also to avoid priming people by considering the inference questions before the learning 
phase – there is no initial set of inference tests. 
4.3.1. Predictions 
In this experiment, participants will complete two learning tasks, each showing 30 
pictures and each followed by a set of inference questions. One learning task and set of 
inference questions will use the same scenario presented in experiment 1. The other 
learning task and set of inference task will use a new scenario based on vehicles of 
different types and colours. In this latter scenario, participants will be asked to test the 
rule “If it is not white, then it is not a van”. They would be presented with the rule as a 
major premise and a suitable statement for the minor premise. For the AC inference, the 
minor premise would be “not a van” in the “not” negated condition and “a motorbike” 
in the contrast class condition. Participants would then be asked whether they would 
conclude whether “the vehicle is not white” (equivalent to endorsing the AC inference) 
or “The vehicle is white”. 
 
The proportions of vehicles or animals of different types and colours shown in each 
learning phases have been manipulated to suggest that, for one inference type, the 
inference is much more likely be true when a “not” negated second premise is used than 
when a contrast class member is used in its place. This is, again, based on the approach 
proposed by Oaksford and Chater (2007). Each participant will see one scenario 
intended to suggest that MP inferences are more likely when “not” negation is used in 
place of the contrast class and no difference in AC inferences between these conditions. 
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The other scenario will keep the likelihood of MP inferences constant between “not” 
negated and contrast class conditions while suggesting that AC is more likely where 
“not” negation is used than the contrast class. Participants will be randomly assigned to 
an animal scenario that varies the probabilities associated with either MP or AC and the 
vehicle scenario will then vary the probabilities associated with the other. 
 
Table 4.4 – Contextual information provided – MP manipulation 
 Colour of vehicle / type of animal 
Total White / Cat Blue / Dog Red / Rabbit 
Type of 
vehicle / 
colour of 
animal 
Van / Black 8 2 0 10 
Motorbike / 
White 
0 0 10 10 
Car / Brown 0 0 10 10 
Total 8 2 20 30 
Number of given type and colour presented in learning phase 
 
For the scenario where MP is varied the number of vehicles or animals of different 
types and colours presented in the learning phase (see table 4.4) suggests that the 
probability of a MP inference being correct when “not” negation is used in the minor 
premise is 91%. However, when a contrast class member (‘blue’ or ‘dog’) is used in the 
minor premise, this probability drops to 0%. Therefore, given this context, it is expected 
that participants make fewer MP inferences when the contrast class member is used in 
the minor premise instead of the “not” negated premise. For the same reason, 
confidence ratings are expected to be lower when drawing the MP inference using the 
contrast class member in the minor premise than when explicit negation is used.  
 
Where AC inferences are tested in this scenario, no significant differences are 
anticipated in the level of inferences made or confidence ratings in those inferences 
between the contrast class and explicitly negated condition. The scenarios presented 
provide no difference between the probabilities that AC inference is correct when “not” 
negation is used (100%) and when the contrast class is used (100%).  
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Table 4.5– Contextual information provided – AC manipulation 
 Colour of vehicle / type of animal 
Total White / Cat Blue / Dog Red / Rabbit 
Type of 
vehicle / 
colour of 
animal 
Van / Black 8 0 0 8 
Motorbike / 
White 
2 0 0 2 
Car / Brown 0 10 10 20 
Total 10 10 10 30 
Number of given type and colour presented in learning phase 
 
For the scenario where AC is varied, the number of vehicles or animals of different 
types and colours presented in the learning phase (see table 4.5) suggests that the 
probability of an AC inference being correct when “not” negation is used in the minor 
premise is 91%. However, when a contrast class member (‘white’ in reference to 
animals or ‘motorbike’ for vehicles) is used in the minor premise, this probability drops 
to 0%. Therefore, given this context, it is expected that participants make fewer AC 
inferences when the contrast class member is used in the minor premise instead of the 
“not” negated premise. For the same reason, confidence ratings are expected to be lower 
when drawing the AC inference using the contrast class member in the minor premise 
than when explicit negation is used.  
 
Where MP inferences are tested in this scenario, no significant differences are 
anticipated in the level of inferences made or confidence ratings in those inferences 
between the contrast class and explicitly negated condition. The scenarios presented 
provide no difference between the probabilities that MP inference is correct when “not” 
negation is used (100%) and when the contrast class is used (100%).  
4.3.2. Method 
4.3.2.1. Design 
A mixed design was used for this experiment.  Inference type (MP, DA, AC and MT), 
conclusion polarity (“not” negated and contrast class for MP and AC inference types 
and only affirmative for DA and MT types) and manipulation (MP manipulation or AC 
manipulation) were within participants factors. Scenario was a between participants 
factor with each participant being randomly assigned to one scenario for the MP 
manipulation condition and the other for the AC manipulation condition. All 
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participants, therefore, responded to all inference types and conclusion polarities in both 
manipulation conditions. They also saw both scenarios. However, roughly half the 
participants saw the animal scenario in the MP manipulation condition and the vehicle 
scenario in the AC manipulation condition. For the other participants, the scenarios 
were reversed. 
 
Responses to the inference tasks (whether they made the inference or not) and 
confidence in that response (based on a visual analogue scale using a slider providing a 
response between 1 and 100) were dependent variables.  
4.3.2.2. Participants 
A total of 334 unique participants completed the experimental survey after being 
recruited through the ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’ system. This total is the number left 
after a small number of exclusions to ensure each participant was unique (responses that 
either shared a Mechanical Turk ID or IP address). All people completing the survey 
received a small payment (US$0.50). Participants were aged between 18 and 83 
(median age 36), 53.6% were female and 96.4% reported English as their first language. 
4.3.2.3. Materials 
The scenario developed for the previous experiment involving animals was reused. Two 
sets of 30 learning phase tasks were used for this experiment with images of animals of 
different types and colours to match the frequencies for the MP variation and AC 
variation conditions as set out above. The form of the learning and inference tasks were 
otherwise the same as the previous experiment. 
 
In addition, a new scenario was developed in which a police traffic officer was testing 
the following conditional rule concerning the vehicles that she saw: 
If it is not white, then it is not a van 
 
As with the previous experiment, six inference tasks were generated which used this 
rule as follows: 
 
The police traffic officer is considering the following rule about the vehicles that 
she sees: 
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o If it is not white, then it is not a van 
 
A colleague up the road radios the officer to tell her that the next vehicle is: 
 
 [One of the following minor premises was provided for each question] 
o not white. [MP with “not” negation] 
o blue. [MP with contrast class] 
o white. [DA] 
o not a van. [AC with “not” negation] 
o a motorbike. [AC with contrast class] 
o a van. [MT] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next vehicle.  
 
[One of the following pairs of options was provided with the options in random 
order for each question] 
 [For MP and DA questions:] 
That the vehicle is not a van 
That the vehicle is a van 
 [For AC and MT questions:] 
  That the vehicle is not white 
  That the vehicle is white 
 
As with the animal scenario, two sets of 30 learning phase tasks were generated using 
this scenario for this experiment. These had images of vehicles of different types and 
colours to match the frequencies for the MP variation and AC variation conditions as set 
out above. Appropriate photographs showing vehicles of the required types and colours 
against a white background with no other features were identified. The photographs 
were cropped and resized to appear the same size in the online survey and ensure the 
picture and questions would appear on a single page at typical resolutions. These 
questions used beneath each picture for each learning phase task were: 
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 What type of vehicle is this? [Answer options: Van; Motorbike; Car]  
 What colour is this vehicle? [Answer options: White; Blue; Red] 
 
Full details of both scenarios used in this experiment and questions asked are included 
in appendix 3 (see §A3.1 for the ‘animals’ scenario and §A3.2 for the ‘vehicles’ 
scenario). 
4.3.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk System and 
completed the experiment using a web-based survey (using www.surveygizmo.com). 
An information screen requested that they confirm consent before they were able to 
proceed. As this stage, the survey randomly assigned each participant to randomly see 
the animal scenario in either the form that varied the likelihood of MP inferences or the 
form that varied the likelihood of AC inferences. They were then allocated to the form 
of vehicle scenario that varied the likelihood of the other inference type. The survey 
also randomly allocated the participant to see one of the two scenarios first and the other 
second. The following screen sought basic demographic information before instructions 
for the first learning phase were provided.  
 
Each learning phase consisted of thirty pages presented in random order. Each page had 
a picture of a vehicle or animal and asked participants what type of vehicle or animal 
was shown (with multiple choice answers car, van and motorbike presented in random 
order for the vehicle scenario and cat, dog and rabbit presented in random order for the 
animal scenario) and what colour the vehicle or animal was (with possible responses 
white, blue and red for vehicles and black, white and brown for animals also presented 
in random order). Participants had to answer both questions before continuing to the 
next page. 
 
After each learning phase, participants were then given instructions for the inference 
questions. The six inference questions for each scenario (as described in §4.2.3.3 and 
§4.3.2.3) were then presented in random order with one inference on each page. 
Participants had to provide a response to the inference question and click on a slider bar 
to indicate their confidence in the response they have given before they were able to 
move onto the next page. The slider bar was labelled with ‘Not at all confident’ at one 
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end and ‘Completely confident’ at the other. Responses were recorded as a number 
between 1 and 100 based on how far down the slider bar the participant clicked. 
  
After each learning phase and set of inference questions, participants were asked to 
complete a verification task. This task was presented on a single page with a three by 
three grid of response boxes. The columns were labelled with the possible colours used 
in the scenario (white, blue, red for vehicles and black, white, brown for animals) and 
the rows with types (car, van, motorbike for vehicles and cat, dog, rabbit for animals). 
The order of the columns and rows was randomised for each participant. Participants 
were asked to enter how many of the next 100 vehicles that the police traffic officer sees 
would be in each category or how many of the next 100 animals that the vet sees would 
be in each category. If participants attempted to proceed without their responses 
summing to 100, they were returned to this page with an instruction providing the total 
value they had entered and asking them to make sure their responses added up to 100. 
 
After completing one set of learning, inference and verification tasks, participants 
started the tasks for the other scenario. 
 
A final page provided participants with a code to enter on the Mechanical Turk system 
to confirm that they had completed the survey, thanked them for their time and provided 
contact information if they had any questions. 
4.3.3. Results 
As with the prior experiment, responses to confidence questions were converted into 
scores reflecting the confidence the inference tested was correct. Table 4.6 sets out the 
proportion of responses in line with the relevant inferences and average confidence 
scores. 
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Table 4.6 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 2 
 
Trials in MP manipulation condition 
MP DA AC MT 
Not Contrast  Not Contrast  
Proportion making 
Inference 
97.3% 68.6% 93.1% 94.0% 95.8% 90.7% 
Confidence of 
Inference (standard 
deviation) 
.75  
(0.26) 
.53 
(0.35) 
.78  
(0.26) 
.76 
(0.27) 
.79 
(0.25) 
.71  
(0.28) 
       
 
Trials in AC manipulation condition 
MP DA AC MT 
Not Contrast  Not Contrast  
Proportion making 
Inference 
93.7% 94.3% 91.9% 93.4% 55.1% 92.8% 
Confidence of 
Inference (standard 
deviation) 
.81  
(0.25) 
.83 
(0.22) 
.68  
(0.28) 
.70 
(0.29) 
.48 
(0.34) 
.81  
(0.26) 
Proportion making inference as a percentage to 2 decimal places 
Mean Confidence (standard deviation) to 2 decimal places 
 
For the MP manipulation trials, McNemar χ2 tests were used for a planned comparison 
of the number of inference question responses consistent with the relevant inference in 
the “not” negated and contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences. These 
found a significant difference between the number of inferences made in “not” negated 
and contrast class conditions for MP inferences (χ2(1) = 85.333, p<.001) but not AC 
inferences. The same tests were done for the AC manipulation trials and found 
significant differences between the responses to the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions for AC inferences (χ2(1) = 110.703, p<.001) but not MP inferences. 
 
Difference between confidence scores was analysed using a 2x2x2x2 mixed measures 
ANOVA. The repeated measures factors were manipulation (MP manipulated and AC 
manipulated), inference (MP and AC) and negation used (“not” negation and contrast 
class). The independent measure factor was scenario (animal scenario in MP 
manipulation and animal scenario in AC manipulation). This found a significant three 
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way interaction between manipulation, inference and negation type (F(1,332) = 
147.898, p<.001, ηp2 = .308). It also found a significant two way interactions between 
manipulation and inference (F(1,332) = 93.429, p<.001, ηp2 = .402), between 
manipulation and scenario (F(1, 332) = 12.934, p<.001, ηp2 = .037) and between 
negation and scenario (F(1,332) = 6.058, p=.014, ηp2 = .018). Significant main effects 
were found for inference (F(1,332) = 23.180, p<.001, ηp2 = .065), negation type (F(1, 
332) = 93.429, p<.001, ηp2 = .220) and scenarios (F(1,332) = 9.482, p=.002, ηp2 = .028). 
 
Four planned t-test comparisons (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013) were used to compare confidence scores between the “not” negated and 
contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences in each of the MP manipulation 
and the AC manipulation conditions. In the MP manipulation condition, the MP 
inference showed a significant difference between the negation type conditions (t(333) 
= 10.325, p<.001) but the AC inference failed to reach the necessary level of 
significance (t(333) = -1.971, p=.050). In the AC manipulation condition, the difference 
between the negation type conditions failed to reach the required significance level for 
MP inference (t(333) = -2.050, p=.041) but a significant difference was observed in the 
AC inferences (t(333) = 10.115, p<.001).   
4.3.3.1. Engagement with Learning Phase 
As with the previous experiment, only about 35% of participants made any mistakes at 
all on any learning task questions (118 participants) across either learning phase. Each 
participant answered 120 questions across both learning phases. The total number of 
mistakes made by each participant across both phases ranged from 0 to 74, with a 
median of 0, a mean of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 4.14. 
 
As before, the final question relating to each scenario asked participants to provide their 
estimates of the number of animals or vehicles of each type and colour. Two R2 
statistics could be calculated for each participant – one for each scenario – reflecting 
how well their responses to this question matched the model implied by the information 
provided in the learning stage (the R2 statistic is described in §4.2.4.1). These R2 
statistics ranged from -2,125 to 0.999 with a mean of -48.65 and standard deviation of 
310.32 (median R2 was 0.669). As with the prior experiment, this suggests that many 
participants may not have internalised much of the information provided in the learning 
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phase. Removing participants’ responses to a given scenario where their R2 score was 
less than zero provided a sub-sample of responses where there was some evidence that 
the participant based there estimates of the likelihood of different options within the 
scenario on the information in the learning phased. This smaller sample consisted of 
237 sets of responses to scenarios in the MP manipulation condition and 247 sets of 
responses to scenarios in the AC manipulation condition. Before this exclusion, each 
participant (334) had provided a set of responses for each of the two manipulation 
conditions.  
 
The same overall analysis was completed again with this smaller sample. Because not 
every participant had provided a response which was still included in both manipulation 
conditions, manipulation was treated as a between participants variable.  
 
McNemar χ2 tests were again used to compare the number of inference question 
responses consistent with the relevant inference in the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions for the MP and AC inferences within each of the MP manipulation and AC 
manipulation conditions. Within the MP manipulation condition, a significant difference 
was again found between the number of inferences made in “not” negated and contrast 
class conditions for MP inferences (χ2(1) = 72.737, p<.001) but not AC inferences. With 
MP manipulated, MP inference levels were 98.3% and 64.6% and AC inference levels 
were 94.9% and 98.3% for the “not” and contrast class conditions respectively. Within 
the AC manipulation condition, a significant difference was found between the 
responses to the “not” negated and contrast class conditions for AC inferences (χ2(1) = 
108.138, p<.001) but not MP inferences. With AC manipulated, MP inference levels 
were 97.6% and 98.0% and AC inference levels were 96.8% and 51.4% for the “not” 
and contrast class conditions respectively. This mirrors the results found for the overall 
sample above.  
 
Difference between confidence scores was analysed using 2x2x2x2 mixed measures 
ANOVA using this smaller sample. For this test, the repeated measures factors were 
inference (MP and AC) and negation used (“not” negation and contrast class). The 
independent measures factors were manipulation (MP manipulated and AC 
manipulated) and scenario (animal scenario in MP manipulation and animal scenario in 
AC manipulation). This found significant three-way interactions between manipulation, 
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inference and negation type (F(1, 480) = 236.801, p<.001, ηp2 = .330) and between 
manipulation, inference and group (F(1, 480) = 5.588, p=.018, ηp2 = .012). It also found 
a significant two way interactions between and manipulation and inference (F(1, 480) = 
336.346, p<.001, ηp2 = .412) and between inference and group (F(1, 480) = 3.876, 
p=.050, ηp2 = .008). Significant main effects were found for inference (F(1, 480) = 
14.225, p<.001, ηp2 = .029), negation type (F(1, 480) = 121.214, p<.001, ηp2 = .202) and 
group (F(1, 408) = 15.628, p<.001, ηp2 = .032). This varied from the results when a 
similar ANOVA was conducted using the overall sample in that the interactions 
between manipulation and group and between inference and negation were not 
significant. The three-way interaction between manipulation, inference and group and 
the two-way interaction between group and inference were also not observed in the full 
sample. 
 
Again, four planned t-test comparisons (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013) were used to compare confidence scores between the “not” negated and 
contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences in each of the MP manipulation 
and the AC manipulation conditions. In the MP manipulation condition, significant 
differences between the negation conditions were observed for both the MP inference 
(t(236) = 10.201, p<.001) and the AC inference (t(236) = -3.133, p=.002). In the AC 
manipulation condition, significant differences were also observed for both the MP 
inference (t(246) = -3.184, p=.002) and the AC inferences (t(246) = 11.727, p<.001). 
The mean confidence levels for these inferences is shown in figure 4.2 (error bars 
represent standard error). 
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Figure 4.2 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for MP and AC Inferences of Participants 
that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 2. 
 
4.3.3.2. Materials Effects 
Although a main effect of scenario was found and interactions between scenario and 
manipulation and between scenario and inference type, the size of these effects was 
small. Similarly, in the subsample including only responses to inference questions 
where the R2 based on the information in the relevant learning phase and participants’ 
anticipated occurrence rates were greater than zero, the effects involving the group 
factor had low partial-eta-squared scores. 
 
When the whole sample is considered, mean confidence scores were .70 for responses 
involving the animal scenario and .74 for responses involving the vehicle scenario. This 
reflects a pattern of results in which responses to the questions involving vehicles led to 
slightly higher confidence scores than the equivalent questions involving each 
inference, negation and manipulation condition except in one case. Confidence scores 
for questions involving AC inferences with contrast class negation in the AC 
manipulation condition had a slightly higher mean when animals were used (.84) than 
when vehicles were used (.82).   
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For each scenario in isolation, McNemar χ2 tests were used to compare the number of 
inference question responses consistent with the relevant inference in the “not” negated 
and contrast class conditions for the MP and AC inferences within each of the MP 
manipulation and AC manipulation conditions. Within the MP manipulation condition, 
a significant difference was found between the number of inferences made in “not” 
negated and contrast class conditions for MP inferences for both the animal scenario 
(χ2(1) = 38.754, p<.001) and the vehicle scenario (χ2(1) = 47.078, p<.001)  but not AC 
inferences for either scenario. Within the AC manipulation condition significant 
differences were found between the responses to the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions for AC inferences for both the animal scenario (χ2(1) = 59.282, p<.001) and 
the vehicle scenario (χ2(1) = 51.429, p<.001) but not MP inferences for either scenario. 
This mirrors the results found for the overall sample above. 
 
Confidence scores were compared for each scenario using two 2x2x2 mixed measures 
ANOVAs (one for the animal scenario and the other for the vehicles). These 
comparisons had inference (MP and AC) and negation used (“not” negation and 
contrast class) as repeated measures factors and manipulation (MP manipulated or AC 
manipulated) as an independent measures factor. Both found significant three-way 
interactions between manipulation, inference and negation type (F(1, 332) = 84.002, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .225 for animals and F(1, 332) = 96.520, p<.001, ηp2 = .202 for vehicles) 
and a significant two way interactions between inference and manipulation (F(1, 332) = 
127.896, p<.001, ηp2 = .278 for animals and F(1, 332) = 156.878, p<.001, ηp2 = .321 for 
vehicles) . They also both found significant main effects for negation (F(1, 332) = 
48.047, p<.001, ηp2 = .126 for animals and F(1, 332) = 71.840, p<.001, ηp2 = .178 for 
vehicles) and manipulation (F(1, 332) = 6.796, p=.010, ηp2 = .020 for animals and F(1, 
332) = 8.099, p<.001, ηp2 = .024 for vehicles). A significant main effect of inference 
type was only found when the vehicle scenario was used (F(1, 332) = 26.322, p<.001, 
ηp2 = .073). A marginally significant interaction between negation and manipulation was 
only found where the animal scenario was used (F(1, 332) = 4.331, p=.038, ηp2 = .013). 
As set out above, the overall results with both scenarios combined saw similar effects 
(including the main effect of inference not seen in responses to the animal scenario on 
their own). However, when both scenarios were looked at together, above, no main 
effect of manipulation was seen and nor was the interaction between negation and 
manipulation observed in the animal scenario alone identified. 
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As with the overall results, four planned t-test comparisons (with Bonferroni adjusted 
significance levels of .013) were used for each of the two scenarios. These compared 
confidence scores between the “not” negated and contrast class conditions for the MP 
and AC inferences in each of the MP manipulation and the AC manipulation conditions. 
In the MP manipulation condition, significant differences between the negation 
conditions were observed for the MP inferences in both using both the animal (t(163) = 
6.461, p<.001) and vehicle (t(169) = 8.103, p<.001) scenarios but differences were not 
seen for AC inferences where either scenario was used. In the AC manipulation 
condition, significant differences were found for the AC inferences with both animal 
(t(169) = 7.770, p<.001) and vehicle (t(163) = 6.500, p<.001) scenario but not when MP 
inferences were used with either scenario.  
4.3.4. Discussion 
This experiment has shown that different frequency information can create and remove 
an implicit negation effect in MP and AC inferences based on the conditional 
probabilities implied. This effect appears larger than in the previous experiment, 
suggesting that more extreme differences in conditional probabilities can lead to greater 
differences in inference levels. This provides strong support for the conditional 
probability model of inference. It is also a result that is hard for other approaches to 
explain. 
 
When the reduced sample that demonstrated learning from the learning phase was 
considered, the results were generally consistent with the overall result. One difference 
was that small significant differences in confidence scores were observed where they 
were not expected and where they had not been observed in the overall sample. There 
were small significant differences in confidence scores between MP inferences using 
“not” and the contrast class in the AC manipulation condition and also differences in 
confidence scores between AC inferences using “not” and the contrast class in the MP 
manipulation condition. These results could undermine the overall conclusion. 
However, these unexpected effects were much smaller than the predicted differences 
and in the opposite direction (see figure 4.2). They also only occurred when the 
confidence information was considered, they did not show up in tests related to the 
overall level of inferences. These confidence effects do not, therefore, appear to affect 
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the inferences that people are willing to draw. It may be that this is a separate small 
negation effect that is observed when materials of this type are used (people being 
slightly less confident in inferences that use “not” negated conclusions than ones using 
the contrast class). Any such small effect would appear to be minor compared to the 
effects when frequency information is manipulated which drives the main result of this 
experiment. 
 
The fact that the overall results have better matched the predictions compared to those 
seen in the first experiment may reflect greater apparent engagement with the learning 
phase (70.5% of cases had R2>0 in this experiment compared to 51.1% in the previous 
experiment). It may be that the lack of direct frequency information up front and initial 
inference tasks led greater attention to that phase.  
4.4. Experiment 3 
This experiment will seek to show that the findings of the prior two experiments can be 
extended to DA and MT inferences. Demonstrating results consistent with the 
conditional probability model on a wider range of inferences will provide more support 
for the relevance of that model. 
  
It is also possible that some accounts of reasoning are more appropriate to abstract tasks 
and materials while others are more appropriate to naturalistic tasks. The previous two 
experiments in this sequence have used naturalistic materials to generate and provide 
reasoning problems which leaves open the question of whether the anticipated effects 
based on the conditional probability model would also be seen when abstract materials 
are used. The current experiment will, therefore, test whether the use of naturalistic 
materials may be partly or wholly responsible for the effects observed on reasoning task 
responses in the prior experiments when the likelihood of contrast class members is 
manipulated. It will do this by using a set of abstract materials (asking people to reason 
over shapes of different colours) alongside the more natural vehicle scenario from 
experiment 2. If the approach to reasoning tasks differed when materials were abstract 
(and contrast class construction may be harder), then we would not expect to see the 
predicted effects where these materials are used. 
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4.4.1. Predictions 
Like the previous experiment, participants will complete a series of tasks using two 
scenarios. As before, each scenario will consist of 30 learning tasks, six inference tasks 
and a verification task. One scenario will use the vehicle learning stage scenario from 
the previous experiment. The other scenario will use a new set of abstract learning stage 
scenario with shapes of different colours on them. The inference questions will use the 
rules, ‘If it is white, then it is a van’ following the vehicle learning phase and ‘If it is 
red, then it is a circle’ following the abstract scenario learning phase. DA and MT 
inferences would have both “not” negation (using “not white” and “not a van” for 
vehicles and “not red” and “not a circle” for the abstract task for DA and MT inferences 
respectively) and contrast class (using “blue” for vehicles and “yellow” for the abstract 
tasks in DA inferences and “a motorbike” for vehicles and “a square” for the abstract 
task for MT inferences) conditions.  
 
While the previous two experiments provided learning phases which were intended to 
affect responses to MP and AC inferences, the current experiment will have two 
learning phase conditions for each scenario intended to affect either DA or MT 
inferences. This is based on the further development of the approach proposed by 
Oaksford and Chater (2007). Each participant will see one scenario intended to suggest 
that DA inferences are more likely when “not” negation is used in place of the contrast 
class and no difference in MT inferences between these conditions. The other scenario 
will keep the likelihood of DA inferences constant between “not” negated and contrast 
class conditions while suggesting that MT is more likely where “not” negation is used 
than the contrast class.  
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Table 4.7 – Contextual information provided – DA manipulation 
 Colour of vehicle / Colour of shape 
Total 
White vehicle 
/ Red shape 
Blue vehicle / 
Yellow shape 
Red vehicle / 
Blue shape 
Type of 
vehicle / 
Type of 
shape 
Van / Circle 8 2 0 10 
Motorbike / 
Square 
0 0 10 10 
Car / 
Triangle 
0 0 10 10 
Total 8 2 20 30 
Number of given type and colour presented in learning phase 
 
In the condition where DA is varied, the number of vehicles or shapes of different types 
and colours presented in the learning phase (see table 4.7) suggests that the probability 
of a DA inference being correct when “not” negation is used in the minor premise is 
91%. However, when a contrast class member is used in the minor premise, this 
probability drops to 0%. Given this context, it is expected that participants make fewer 
DA inferences when the contrast class member is used in the minor premise instead of 
the “not” negated premise. For the same reason, confidence ratings are expected to be 
lower when drawing the DA inference using the contrast class member in the minor 
premise than when explicit negation is used.  
 
Where MT inferences are tested in this scenario, no significant differences are 
anticipated between “not” negated and contrast class conditions in responses to the 
inference task questions. Based on the learning phase materials in the condition, the 
probability that MT is correct is the same whether “not” negation is used (100%) or 
whether the contrast class is used (100%).  
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Table 4.8 – Contextual information provided – MT manipulation 
 Colour of vehicle / Colour of shape 
Total 
White vehicle 
/ Red shape 
Blue vehicle / 
Yellow shape 
Red vehicle / 
Blue shape 
Type of 
vehicle / 
Type of 
shape 
Van / Circle 8 0 0 8 
Motorbike / 
Square 
2 0 0 2 
Car / 
Triangle 
0 10 10 20 
Total 10 10 10 30 
Number of given type and colour presented in learning phase 
 
In the MT manipulation condition, given the conditional ‘if it is white, then it is a van’, 
the number of vehicles or shapes of different types and colours presented in the learning 
phase (see table 4.8) suggests that the probability of a MT inference being correct when 
‘it is not a van’ is used in the minor premise is 91%. However, when the ‘motorbike’ 
contrast class member is used as the minor premise, this probability drops to 0%. 
Therefore, it is expected that participants make fewer MT inferences when the contrast 
class member is used in the minor premise instead of the “not” negated premise in this 
condition. Confidence ratings are expected to be lower when drawing the MT inference 
using the contrast class member in the minor premise than when explicit negation is 
used in this condition.  
 
No significant differences are anticipated in responses to DA inferences in this 
condition. The learning phases in this condition do not suggest any difference in the 
probability that the DA inference is correct if “not” negation is used (100%) or if the 
contrast class is used (100%).  
4.4.2. Method 
4.4.2.1. Design 
Like the previous experiment, a mixed design was used with inference type (MP, DA, 
AC and MT), conclusion polarity (“not” negated and contrast class for DA and MT 
inference types and affirmative for MP and AC types) and manipulation (DA 
manipulation and MT manipulation) as within-participant factors. As with the prior 
experiment, scenario was a between participants factor. All participants saw both 
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scenarios, but half saw the vehicle scenario in relation to the MP manipulation condition 
questions and the other half seeing it in relation to the AC manipulation conditions 
(with the other scenario used for the alternative manipulation condition).  
 
Dependent variables were, again, responses to the inference tasks (whether the inference 
was made or not) and confidence in that response (based on a visual analogue scale 
using a slider providing a response between 1 and 100).  
4.4.2.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited through the ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’ system and received 
a small payment (US$0.50) after completion. A small number of respondents were 
excluded because their uniqueness could not be confirmed (matching either Mechanical 
Turk ID or IP address) leaving a total of 168 unique participants. The participants had 
median age 34 (range 19 to 75), were 56% female and 96% had English as their first 
language.  
4.4.2.3. Materials 
The scenario involving vehicles used in the previous experiment was used again in the 
present experiment (see §4.3.2.3). Again, two sets of 30 learning phase tasks were 
prepared with images of vehicles of different types and colours. However, this time the 
number of learning tasks of each type and colour matched those required for the DA 
variation and MT variation conditions which are set out above. The inference tasks with 
the vehicle scenario used a different inference rule: ‘If it is white, then it is a van’. The 
minor premises used in each inference task were also changed to the following: 
o white. [MP] 
o not white. [DA with “not” negation] 
o blue. [DA with contrast class] 
o a van. [AC] 
o not a van. [MT with “not” negation] 
o a motorbike. [MT with contrast class] 
The options available for responses to the vehicle inference questions were the same as 
the previous experiment. 
 
  
 
 226
A new scenario using more abstract materials was also developed which involved a 
quality control manager checking cards with shapes of different types and colours that a 
machine produced. Two sets of 30 learning phase tasks showing photos of cards with 
shapes of different types and colours in line with the frequencies required for the DA 
variation and MT variation conditions were prepared. Photos showed cards on a white 
background and were cropped and re-sized to ensure each learning task had the same 
sized picture. Each learning phase task in this scenario asked the following questions: 
 
 What type of shape is this? [Answer options: Circle; Square; Triangle]  
 What colour is this shape? [Answer options: Red; Yellow; Blue] 
 
Six inference tasks were generated for this scenario as follows: 
 
The quality control manager is considering the following rule about the cards 
that she sees: 
 
o If it is red, then it is a circle. 
 
A system on the machine indicates that the shape on the next card is: 
 
[One of the following minor premises was provided for each question] 
o red. [MP] 
o not red. [DA with “not” negation] 
o yellow. [DA with contrast class] 
o a circle. [AC] 
o not a circle. [MT with “not” negation] 
o a square. [MT with contrast class] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next shape.: 
 
[One of the following pairs of options was provided with the options in random 
order for each question] 
 [For MP and DA questions:] 
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That the shape is a circle 
That the shape is not a circle 
 [For AC and MT questions:] 
  That the shape is red 
  That the shape is not red 
 
Full details of the scenarios used in this experiment and questions asked are included in 
appendix 3 (see §A3.2 for the ‘vehicles’ scenario and §A3.3 for the ‘shapes’ scenario). 
4.4.2.4. Procedure 
After being recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk System (www.mturk.com), 
participants were directed to a web-based survey (using www.surveygizmo.com) to 
complete the experiment. The survey started with an information screen requiring 
participants to confirm consent to progress. Participants were randomly allocated to see 
the DA variation condition using the vehicle scenario and MT variation condition using 
the abstract (shapes) scenarios or vice versa. They were also randomly allocated to 
seeing the vehicle scenario first or second. Participants were asked to provide basic 
demographic information and then overall instructions and instructions for the first 
learning phase were provided.  
 
The learning phases each had thirty randomly ordered pages. A learning phase page 
consisted of a picture of either a vehicle or a card with a shape on it depending on the 
scenario and two questions. The first question asked what type of vehicle or shape was 
shown (with answer options car, van and motorbike for the vehicle scenario and circle, 
square and triangle for the abstract scenario presented in random order). The second 
question asked what colour the vehicle or shape was (with available responses white, 
blue and red provided in random order for vehicles and blue, yellow and red provided in 
random order for the shapes scenario). Participants had to answer both questions on 
each page before they could proceed. 
 
Instructions for the inference questions followed each learning phase. The six inference 
questions for each scenario (as described in §4.4.2.3) were each presented on a single 
page in random order. On each page, participants were asked to pick an option to 
respond to the inference question and click on a slider bar to indicate their confidence 
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that their response was correct. Responses to the confidence question were recorded at a 
number from 1 to 100 based on where they clicked on the bar (with 1 representing the 
end labelled ‘Not at all confident’ and 100 the end labelled ‘Completely confident’.)  
  
A verification task on a single phase followed each scenario’s inference question. This 
task asked participants to indicate what number of the next 100 vehicles or shapes they 
would expect to fall into each type and colour category. They were required to respond 
in a three by three grid. The columns were labelled in random order with the possible 
colours used in the scenario (white, blue, red for vehicles and red, yellow, blue for the 
abstract task). The rows were labelled in random order with types (car, van, motorbike 
for vehicles and circle, square, triangle for the abstract tasks). Participants’ responses 
were required to sum to 100 before they could proceed.  
 
Participants completed the learning, inference and verification tasks of the second 
scenario after they had completed the first.  
 
Finally, participants were thanked for their time and provided with a code to use on the 
Mechanical Turk system which would confirm that they had completed the survey. 
They were also provided with contact information if they had any questions. 
4.4.3. Results 
Scores reflecting participants’ confidence in each inference considered were derived 
from responses to the inference and confidence questions, as with the prior two 
experiments. The proportion of responses supporting the relevant inference and average 
confidence scores are set out in table 4.9. 
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 Table 4.9 – Summary of responses to chapter 4, experiment 3 
 
Trials in DA manipulation condition 
MP DA AC MT 
 Not Contrast  Not Contrast 
Proportion making 
Inference 
94.0% 94.0% 55.4% 95.2% 95.8% 94.6% 
Confidence of 
Inference (standard 
deviation) 
.84  
(0.23) 
.72 
(0.27) 
.48  
(0.35) 
.76 
(0.24) 
.78 
(0.27) 
.80  
(0.26) 
       
 
Trials in MT manipulation condition 
MP DA AC MT 
 Not Contrast  Not Contrast 
Proportion making 
Inference 
95.2% 92.3% 95.8% 95.2% 94.6% 61.9% 
Confidence of 
Inference (standard 
deviation) 
.78  
(0.23) 
.77 
(0.28) 
.79  
(0.28) 
.82 
(0.23) 
.68 
(0.27) 
.47  
(0.35) 
Proportion making inference as a percentage to 2 decimal places 
Mean Confidence (standard deviation) to 2 decimal places 
 
Planned comparisons using McNemar χ2 tests were used to compare the number of 
responses supporting the inference in the “not” negated and contrast class conditions for 
the DA and MT inferences in each manipulation condition. In the DA manipulation 
condition, these found a significant difference between the number of inferences 
supported in “not” negated and contrast class conditions for DA inferences (χ2 (1) = 
63.060, p<.001) but not MT inferences. In the MT manipulation, no difference was 
found in the number of DA inferences endorsed between the “not” negated and contrast 
class conditions, but a significant difference was found in the number of MT inferences 
endorsed between the two negation conditions (χ2(1) = 49.590, p<.001). 
 
Confidence scores were compared using a 2x2x2x2 mixed measures ANOVA. 
Manipulation (DA manipulated and MT manipulated), inference (DA and MT) and 
negation used (“not” negation and contrast class) were the repeated measures factors. 
Scenario (the vehicles scenario in the DA manipulation and shapes scenario in the MT 
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manipulation and vice versa) was the independent measures factor. A significant three-
way interaction between manipulation, inference and negation type (F(1,166) = 
129.132, p<.001, ηp2 = .438), a significant two way interaction between manipulation 
and inference (F(1,166) = 97.411, p<.001, ηp2 = .370) and a significant main effect of 
negation (F(1,166 = 101.426, p<.001, ηp2 = .379) were found. No main effect of 
scenario was found not any interactions with this factor. For this reason, material effects 
are not examined further in this experiment. 
 
To understand the interaction between negation and inference types, four planned 
comparison t-tests were performed (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013). In the DA manipulation condition, there was a significant difference in 
confidence scores depending on which negation type was used for DA inferences 
(t(167) = 7.782, p<.001) but not MT inferences. In the MT manipulation condition there 
was a significant difference in confidence scores depending on which negation type was 
used for MT inferences (t(167) = 7.151, p<.001) but not DA inferences. 
4.4.3.1. Engagement with Learning Phase 
Across both learning phases, each participant was asked 120 questions about the 
pictures that they saw. About 42% of respondents made any mistakes at all on the 
learning task questions (71 participants). The number of mistakes made by each 
participant across both learning tasks ranged between 0 and 40, with a median of 0, a 
mean of 1.1 and a standard deviation of 3.67. 
 
At the end of each scenario, participants were asked for their own estimates indicating 
the proportion of vehicles or shapes of each type and colour. R2 statistics were then 
calculated for each participant in each scenario which indicated how well their estimates 
approximated information provided in the learning stage (the R2 statistic is described in 
§4.2.4.1). A range from R2 = -2,125 to R2 = 1.000 was observed (median R2 was 0.656, 
mean R2 was -35.794 and the standard deviation of R2 scores was 255.90). To look only 
at responses from those participants whose internal model of the scenario appeared to 
reflect, to at least some extent, the information presented in the learning phase, 
responses to scenarios where the R2 score was less than zero were removed from the 
data. This left 122 responses to each inference and confidence question in the DA 
manipulation condition and 116 responses to each question in the MT manipulation 
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condition (both reduced from 168 sets of responses in each condition). The analysis 
above was repeated with this sub-sample with manipulation condition treated as a 
between participants variable (because some participants responses in one condition 
were now excluded).  
 
As with the full sample, McNemar χ2 tests found differences between the number of 
inferences endorsed by the sub-sample depending on the negation type used for DA 
inferences in the DA manipulation condition (χ2 (1) = 58.065, p<.001) and MT 
inferences in the MT manipulation condition (χ2 (1) = 49.076, p<.001). No differences 
were found between responses where different negation types were used for MT 
inferences in the DA manipulation condition or DA inferences in the MT manipulation 
condition. With this smaller sample, inference levels for DA were 95.9% and 46.7% 
respectively when “not” negation and contrast classes were used in the DA 
manipulation condition and 96.6% and 97.4% respectively in the MT manipulation 
condition. Inference levels for MT were 98.4% when both “not” negation and contrast 
classes were used in the DA manipulation condition and 97.4% and 53.4% respectively 
in the MT manipulation condition. 
 
A 2x2x2x2 mixed measures ANOVA was completed using this smaller sample with 
inference (DA and MT) and negation (“not” negated and contrast classes) types as 
within participants factors and inference manipulated (DA and MT) and scenario 
(vehicle scenario in DA manipulation and shapes scenario in MT manipulation and vice 
versa) as between participants factors. As with the similar ANOVA for the full sample, 
this found a significant three way interaction between manipulation, inference and 
negation type (F(1,234) = 160.857, p<.001, ηp2 = .407), a significant two way 
interaction between manipulation and inference (F(1,234) = 257.708, p<.001, ηp2 
= .524) and a significant main effect of negation (F(1,234 = 95.437, p<.001, ηp2 = .290). 
In addition, interactions between inference type and scenario (F(1,234 = 4.320, p=.039, 
ηp2 = .018), between negation type and scenario (F(1,234 = 10.103, p=.002, ηp2 = .041), 
between inference, scenario and manipulation (F(1,234 = 6.559, p=.011, ηp2 = .027) and 
between inference, negation, scenario and manipulation (F(1,234 = 9.382, p=.002, ηp2 
= .039) were found. All of these interactions involving scenario are small compared to 
those effects that were also observed in the full sample (and most are at the margins of 
significance). 
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The four planned comparison t-tests (with Bonferroni adjusted significance levels of 
p=.013) compared confidence scores between the “not” negated and contrast class 
conditions for the DA and MT inferences in each of the DA manipulation and the MT 
manipulation conditions for this sub-sample. As with the full sample, confidence scores 
differed significantly based on the type of negation used for DA inferences in the DA 
manipulation condition (t(121) = 8.182, p<.001) and MT inferences in the MT 
manipulation condition (t(115) = 8.997, p<.001). Neither the comparison for MT 
inferences in the DA manipulation condition (t(121) = -0.086, p=.932) nor for DA 
inferences in the MT manipulation condition (t(115) = -2.245, p=.027) reached the 
required level of significance. The mean confidence levels for these inferences is shown 
in figure 4.3 (error bars represent standard error). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Chart Showing Mean Confidence Scores for DA and MT Inferences of Participants 
that Demonstrated Learning in Experiment 3.  
 
4.4.4. Discussion 
This experiment has extended the results seen with MP and AC in the previous 
experiment to DA and MT inferences. It has shown that frequency information can 
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create and remove an implicit negation effect in DA and MT inferences based on the 
conditional probabilities implied. There were no unexpected effects when only the 
subsample that showed evidence of learning frequency information were included. 
 
Like the previous experiment, these results provide some substantial support for the 
fundamental insight of Oaksford et al.’s (2000) conditional probability model. An effect 
was created when the conditional probabilities implied that it should be and was absent 
where they implied that it should not be. This and the prior experiment have shown that 
this effect can be generated in MP, DA, AC and MT. The size of the effect in 
experiments 2 and 3 was much larger than in experiment 1 (where the difference in 
conditional probabilities motivating the effect was smaller).  
 
These effects are also hard for other theories to explain. The fact that the effect can be 
induced and removed based on conditional probabilities, in particular, makes it hard to 
see how mental models theory (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) or heuristic-analytic 
theory without a probabilistic analytic stage (e.g. Evans, 1984) could account for the 
data. 
 
Evidence of learning frequency information was similar to the previous experiment 
(70.8% of cases had R2>0 in this experiment which is close to the 70.5% seen 
previously). This experiment, like the last one, presented the learning task before any 
other frequency information is given or inference tasks completed. The high level of 
apparent learning supports the idea that participants engaged better where the learning 
phase is early in the experimental procedure.  
 
This experiment also set out to test whether contrast class manipulation effects would 
remain where abstract rather than naturalistic stimuli were used. In the ANOVAs 
conducted, no main effect of group was observed which would have been anticipated if 
one scenario suppressed the anticipated effects. When a sub-group of those that 
demonstrated engagement with the learning task was considered, some interactions 
involving the group factor were observed. However, the size of these effects was tiny 
compared to the effect of the interactions between inference, negation and manipulation 
and between inference and manipulation interaction as well as the main effect of 
negation. For this reason, it appears that the abstract scenario behaved in the same 
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manner as the previously used naturalistic scenarios. This suggests that the conditional 
probability approach which formed the basis of the predictions for this experiment can 
be used to predict effects with abstract scenarios like those used by Evans and Handley 
(1999) when they first identified an implicit negation bias.   
4.5. General Discussion 
This chapter set out to investigate Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) intuitions about how 
implicit negation effects were created when contrast class members were used which 
were based on their conditional probability model. The results of all three experiments 
have been consistent with those intuitions, and the extension of those intuitions from 
MP to DA, AC and MT inferences. 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated the basic effect, that MP inferences could be suppressed 
where appropriate contrast class members were used to provide implicit negation of the 
premise. This creates an effect like that observed by Evans and Handley (1999) under 
the circumstances predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2007). However, it does not allow 
us to confirm that this effect is generated by the conditional probabilities implied by the 
frequency data provided.  
 
Experiments 2 and 3 extended this result and demonstrated that the implicit conclusion 
suppression effect could be both created and removed just through the manipulation of 
conditional probabilities. Comparing the results of experiment 2 with experiment 1 
show that the size of this effect can be increased by using more extreme differences in 
the conditional probabilities implied by the frequency information.  
 
Experiment 3 also showed that this effect could be seen and manipulated with abstract 
as well as naturalistic materials. 
 
Altogether, these experiments show firstly that the conditional probability approach to 
reasoning can provide an effective account of the implicit negation effect as seen by 
Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (2000). For the reasons discussed in 
§4.1.3, these experiments also create effects that are hard for mental models theory (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Khemlani et al., 2012) or heuristic-analytic theory 
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without a probabilistic analytic stage (e.g. Evans, 1984) to account for (e.g. the creation 
and removal of the effect through manipulation of frequency data alone).  
 
They have also shown that the same inferences can take different conditional 
probabilities in different circumstances, addressing Schroyens and Schaeken’s (2003) 
criticism of the conditional probability approach proposed by Oaksford et al. (2000).  
 
A final result of potential interest is that engagement with the learning phase appears to 
have been much stronger in experiments 2 and 3 than experiment 1. This may indicate 
that providing probability data up front or asking conditional inference questions before 
the learning phases (which was done in experiment 1 but not experiments 2 and 3) 
suppressed engagement in the learning phase. It is possible that people assumed they 
already had the information they needed from the initial information provided and 
therefore made less attempt to consider what they were seeing. 
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5. Negation in Reasoning – Conclusions and Next Steps 
This thesis has explored how the use of alternative negation – negation without “not” – 
can affect people’s responses to conditional reasoning problems that use negation. Two 
sets of experiments have considered how the use of alternative forms of negation 
(particularly affixal negation) affect people’s probability judgements of propositions 
with negation and how this impacts their reasoning performance. The third set of 
experiments has used implicit negation based on contrast classes to explore how 
frequency information about a negated concept can suppress conditional inferences. 
 
In this chapter, I provide a summary of the experiments in this thesis and the key 
findings. I look again at how these findings might help us evaluate proposed accounts of 
reasoning. Finally, I consider some potential next steps to further evaluate the role of 
negation in human reasoning.    
5.1. Key Findings 
This thesis presents three sets of experiments which aim to look at how considering 
different types of negation can inform our understanding of how people complete 
reasoning tasks. The first two sets of experiments in this study explored how using 
different forms of negation might affect deductive reasoning with conditionals. The first 
set looked at how different types of negation affected probability judgements. The 
second set looked directly at how different types of negation affected conditional 
inference judgements. The final set of experiments moved on to test predictions which 
depend on a contrast class account of negations comparing inference levels depending 
on whether “not” negation or implicit negation using a contrast class member was used. 
5.1.1. Different Types of Negation and Probability 
The first set of experiments looked at how the use of different expressions of negation 
in propositions affected probability judgements in relation to those propositions. 
Different types of negation can lead to different understandings with more contrary or 
contradictory interpretations (e.g. Horn, 1989; Zimmer, 1964). A proposition that uses 
negation with a more contrary interpretation allows a narrower interpretation than the 
same proposition with a more contradictory form of negation (Horn, 1989). Bianchi, 
Savardi & Kubovy (2011) found that people can and do distinguish between the broader 
range of possibilities provided by the (contradictory) negation of concepts and the 
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contrary implication of the concept (the opposite). It was, therefore, anticipated that 
participants would rate the probability of a proposition using more contrary forms of 
negation lower than where more contradictory forms are used.  
 
Prior research on conditional reasoning has typically treated negation as a simple 
operator. Most key experiments looking at negation effects have used either “not” 
negation with Evans’ (1977) conditional inference paradigm or implicit negation in 
Wason’s (1968) selection task. Consideration of the nature of negation has been rare. 
Experiments have shown that the probability of propositions used in conditionals can 
affect biases in conditional reasoning (e.g. Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 2000). 
Therefore, if different types of negation gave rise to different probabilistic implications, 
then this might help us understand how negation effects lead to reasoning biases. 
 
The first experiment looked at several different types of affixal negation (using affixes 
“iN-”, “un-” and “non-”), negation using “not” and implicit negation (based on 
opposites used in Bianchi et al.’s, 2011, materials). This found a clear difference 
between the understanding created by propositions using very highly contrary implicit 
negation and the other (less contrary) forms of negation tested. However, it did not find 
the anticipated differences between the other forms of negation which varied in their 
levels of contrary and contradictory interpretation.  
 
The second experiment sought to look at whether more sensitive materials could find a 
difference between affixal and “not” negation. It, therefore, used materials allowing all 
forms of negation to be used with each proposition and just compared negation using 
affixes (“iN-”, “un-” and “non-”) and “not”. However, the design meant that an 
individual’s ratings of each type of negation could not be directly compared.The results 
again showed a difference between the form of negation that was expected to be most 
contrary (“iN-”) and the other forms of negation but none of the differences expected 
between those other forms of negation.  
 
The final experiment in this first set used materials that better reflected how affixal 
negation is used in natural language. It aimed to see whether there was a difference 
between the probability ratings of propositions depending on whether “not” or “un-” 
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negation was used. The results only showed a significant effect when materials that may 
have been ambiguous were removed so should be treated cautiously.  
 
This series of experiments has therefore shown that different types of negation can lead 
to different probability ratings when they are used in propositions. This suggests that 
using different types of negation in reasoning problems is likely to have an effect of the 
biases observed. Each experiment, in turn, was able to use more sensitive materials to 
show that differences between more similar forms of negation could be found. The size 
of effects observed was small and further experiments could potentially allow the nature 
of these effects to be better explored. However, this first set of experiments 
demonstrated that the use of different types of negation had the potential to effect 
reasoning biases so the next chapter would look directly at their use in conditional 
inference tasks.  
5.1.2. Different Types of Negation in Conditional Inference 
The second set of experiments looked directly at how different types of negation might 
affect conditional inferences. As the first set of experiments had shown, the use of 
different types of negation in propositions could alter the perceived probability of those 
propositions. Prior experiments often looked at the use of negations in conditional 
inference tasks using Evans’ (1977) paradigm which looked at negation effects by 
considering negation as a single, simple operator. This set of experiments used a novel 
extension of this paradigm which allowed consideration of two forms of negation. 
These experiments aimed to help evaluate different models of reasoning. In particular, 
differential effects of different types of negation would suggest support for models that 
allowed support for models based on causality and probability (e.g. Fernback & Erb, 
2013; Oaksford et al., 2000). Other models, such as those based on mental logic (e.g. 
Braine & O’Brien, 1991) or mental models (e.g. Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 
1992) suggest reasoning depends on algorithms which only allow for negation to exist 
as a simple contradictory operator. Such models are unable to account for the 
differences anticipated in these experiments.  
 
The first experiment in this set varied antecedent polarity in conditionals between three 
conditions (affirmative, “not” negated and “un-” negated). It was intended as an initial 
test of whether different forms of negation would lead to different biases in conditional 
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inference tasks. The results showed that inference levels for MP, DA and MT varied 
between polarity conditions in the directions predicted. However, responses using the 
alternative negation condition (“un-”) did not significantly differ from either the 
affirmative or “not” negated conditions. The different order seen in AC negation may be 
explainable as an artefact of the oft-observed negative conclusion bias (e.g. Evans, 
Clibbens & Rood, 1995). Overall these results are ambiguous about the predicted effect 
of alternative negation. However, a very significant effect was observed when high 
plausibility conditionals were used compared to lower plausibility conditionals. The 
next experiment would seek to control for this effect with the aim of focusing on any 
independent effect of an alternative form of negation. 
 
The second experiment attempted to control for the plausibility effects observed in the 
first experiment. It did this while testing three polarity conditions (affirmative, “not” 
and “un-”) across both antecedent and consequent terms in conditionals. The results 
showed that MP inferences approached ceiling but, unusually, there were minimal 
differences in the levels of DA, AC and MT inferences endorsed. This may be the result 
of using low plausibility conditionals used in this experiment (to control for plausibility 
effects). Therefore, while the results of this experiment do not help us understand how 
different types of negation may have differential effects, they do provide substantial 
support for models (including causal and probabilistic models) which would suggest 
that inference levels are influenced by conditional plausibility. 
 
The third and fourth experiments in this set used the same sets of materials. These 
materials were intended to test three polarity conditions (affirmative, “not” and “un-”) 
in both the antecedent and consequent terms of conditionals. The materials were 
intended to have normal plausibility characteristics (and therefore the plausibility of 
conditionals was also expected to affect responses). The third experiment used a design 
in which each respondent answered one question for each inference type (with 
randomised polarity conditions). The fourth experiment used a within-participants 
design with all participants answering questions using all inferences in all polarity 
conditions. Neither experiment showed different responses depending on the different 
types of negation used as had been anticipated. However, both provided results that 
supported probabilistic and causal models of reasoning. For example, there was 
variation in results between the fully within participants design in experiment 4 and the 
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experiment 3 design in which participants saw each inference once in random polarity 
conditions. The suppression of MP inferences in the experiment 3 design but not the 
within participants design of experiment 4 is consistent with participants generating 
more disablers when a scenario is considered for the first time under Fernbach and Erb’s 
(2013) Causal Bayesian Networks model. 
 
Overall these experiments did not find the robust effects of different types of negation 
which had been sought. However, they did provide additional evidence to support 
models of reasoning based on Causal Bayesian Networks (e.g. Fernback & Erb, 2013) 
and probabilistic computational aims (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). There are some 
indications that there is an effect of different types of negation but any such effect is 
much smaller than the effect of the plausibility of conditionals. A further experiment 
could attempt to provide a more sensitive analysis of different types of negation in 
conditional reasoning. However, given the evidence that any such effects are easily 
overwhelmed by other factors, it seemed appropriate to look at a different form of 
alternative negation for the final set of experiments. 
5.1.3. Contrast Classes in Conditional Inference 
The final set of experiments returned to considering the differences between “not” 
negation and implicit negation which had previously been considered in the first of the 
initial set of experiments. In particular, these experiments looked at how members of the 
contrast class (the set of concepts that could replace a negated concept; Oaksford & 
Stenning, 1992) could be used to provide implicit negation in a context in which 
probabilities were manipulated. These experiments specifically aimed to test and extend 
a hypothesis proposed by Oaksford and Chater (2007) that inference levels could be 
reduced in logically equivalent questions where the probabilities of propositions 
involving contrast classes are varied.  
 
These experiments used a learning phase to provide probability information to 
participants. Similar learning phases have been used in relation to Wason’s (1968) 
selection task (e.g. Pollard & Evans, 1982; Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003). However, 
such a learning phase has not previously been employed in conditional inference tasks 
and nor have they previously only involved simple questions about what is seen (rather 
than relating to the conditional being considered). In these experiments, the frequency 
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information about the occurrence of contrast class members was varied, so given 
contrast class members were either high probability or low probability. Oaksford and 
Chater (2007) predicted that when the contrast class members were used to provide 
implicit negation in a conditional inference task, the level of MP inferences could be 
varied depending on whether the contrast class member was high or low probability. 
Such a finding would support a probabilistic account of conditional reasoning (e.g. 
Oaksford et al., 2000).  
 
The first experiment in this set directly tested Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) hypothesis 
that given appropriate frequency information, the level of MP inferences will vary 
depending on whether “not” negation or implicit negation using a contrast class member 
was used in the inference task. The results showed substantial suppression of MP 
inferences when implicit negation was used. This provided some initial support for the 
hypothesis. However, this was not sufficient to confirm that the probability information 
was responsible for the suppression. The next experiment would, therefore, provide 
conditions that would show that inferences in the contrast class condition could be 
suppressed or not based on the probability information provided. 
 
The second experiment provided two conditions in which different frequency 
information was provided. It also extended Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) hypothesis to 
apply to AC inferences. One condition was intended to leave MP inferences at similar 
levels when “not” negation and an implicitly negating contrast class member were used 
but suppress AC inferences when implicit negation was used compared to “not” 
negation. The other condition reversed this, with MP inferences expected to vary but 
AC inferences expected to be stable across “not” negated and contrast class conditions. 
The results were in line with these predictions. 
 
The final experiment sought to manipulate DA and MT inferences in the same manner 
as the prior experiment had manipulated MP and AC (extending Oaksford & Chater’s, 
2007, hypothesis to these inferences). It also included a condition which used abstract 
rather than naturalistic materials in the learning phase and experimental tasks. The 
results showed that DA and MT inference levels could also be manipulated by varying 
the probability of contrast class members. It also showed that these effects are 
consistent when abstract and naturalistic materials were used. 
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These results provide considerable support for probabilistic models of reasoning (e.g. 
Oaksford et al., 2000) and to the relevance of the contrast class account of the 
understanding of negation in reasoning (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). The ability to 
manipulate inference levels using frequency information implying probability levels 
cannot be accounted for in current mental logic (e.g. Braine & O’Brien, 1991) or mental 
models (e.g. Johnson-Laird et al., 1992) approaches. 
5.2. Accounts of Reasoning  
As set out in §1.3, a number of models have been developed to provide an account of 
reasoning biases. The experiments discussed above sought to look at whether the use of 
different types of negation in reasoning problems can help us evaluate these competing 
accounts. I therefore, briefly, revisit these accounts in this section to discuss how our 
understanding might have been developed in this thesis. 
5.2.1. Mental Logics 
Approaches based on mental logics (e.g. Braine & O’Brian, 1991; Rips, 1994) 
essentially suggest that models of reasoning should aim to replicate classical logic. They 
propose models with algorithms that seek to imitate classical logic but with limitations 
in memory and processing capacity which lead to reasoning biases.  
 
As discussed in §1.3.1, these approaches suggest that people use internal rules for 
solving inference tasks. These rules are intended to emulate those of classical logic. 
However, sometimes an inference task will require a rule that people do not have in 
their mental logic and it is only through more complex reasoning that the task can be 
solved. Proponents of the mental logics approach suggest that reasoning biases occur 
where people’s internal logic is incomplete. For example, Braine and O’Brian’s (1991) 
mental logic approach suggests people have straightforward access to a rule of MP but 
not MT which requires more complicated processing. In their most basic form, mental 
logic approaches can explain basic reasoning biases (such as the easier acceptance of 
MP over MT). But, they do not appear to be able to take account of content, context and 
negation effects. They have therefore been extended. For example, Noveck and O’Brien 
(1996) have sought to use Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) pragmatic reasoning schemas to 
explain biases involving negation and Rips (1994) suggests that additional rules account 
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for negation effects. These extensions essentially allow context to provide an additional 
set of rules and/or constraints in which the basic mental logic operates.   
 
No firm conclusions about mental logic approaches can be drawn from the first set of 
experiments in this thesis. These experiments did not directly look at conditional 
reasoning (only at factors previously shown to be related to conditional reasoning).  
 
The second set of experiments did look directly at conditional reasoning. As discussed 
above, there were suggestions in these results that different forms of negation may 
affect reasoning. Basic mental logics treat negation as a simple logical operator and are 
therefore unable to account for differences motivated by different forms of negation. 
Approaches such as Rips’ (1994) PSYCOP model do not appear to allow for a 
differential treatment of different types of negation within the rules based approach. 
Similarly, Noveck and O’Brien’s (1996) application of pragmatic reasoning schemas, 
would appear to provide additional constraints which may lead to different biases 
depending on the presentation of the problem. However, they do not account for 
different biases where the problems are essentially the same except for the negative 
forms used. It may be possible to further augment mental logic approaches with 
additional rules (for example, an ‘un-x’ to ‘not-x’ conversion that complicates – and 
therefore makes less likely – drawing inferences) but no current model predicts such a 
process. The results suggested by this sets of experiments therefore have the potential to 
undermine mental logic approaches. However, as these results were not seen 
consistently or robustly across the four experiments, any conclusions undermining 
mental logic approaches should be treated provisionally. 
 
The final set of experiments again looked directly at conditional reasoning and how it 
was affected by probability manipulations. In the second and third experiment of this 
set, the same inference questions were answered differently depending on the context 
provided by frequency data. It is not clear how the algorithms proposed in mental logic 
approaches could explain the strong observation that probability manipulation can 
suppress inferences. The frequency information would not be sufficient to suggest an 
alternative pragmatic reasoning schema. Nor would any rules affecting the different 
treatment of ‘not’ and implicit negation explain the effect (as questions using both types 
of negation were answered in different ways depending on the frequency information 
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provided. This set of experiments, therefore, provides evidence which appears 
inconsistent with the role of mental logic in conditional reasoning. 
5.2.2. Mental Models 
The mental models approach (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992) proposes that 
people consider models when reasoning and each model representing a possibility or set 
of possibilities (see §1.3.2). Reasoning biases are said to occur because generating 
models requires time and mental capacity so people often reason over an incomplete set 
of models. Khemlani, Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) seek to provide an account of 
negation in mental models theory which does consider the complex forms that negation 
can take and range of implications that it can create (see §4.1.3). However, this account 
is still limited to negation creating context effects that make reasoning tasks more or 
less complicated under certain circumstances. 
 
Because the first set of experiments does not directly consider the function of 
conditional reasoning, firm conclusions about the mental models’ approach cannot be 
drawn. Where the second set of experiments provide limited evidence that different 
forms of negation may affect reasoning, this may help us to evaluate the mental models 
approach. The basic approach (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) would not appear to 
allow a mechanism that provides for different levels of inference to be drawn when 
different types of negation are used (the models considered are essentially equivalent for 
each type of negation so would not predict different biases). However, Khemlani et al.’s 
(2012) proposals may provide an approach that allows for such results. They suggest 
that a general context effect applies in which more processing time is required where 
some different types of negation are used. This may help account for the data from these 
experiments. But, as before, any conclusions are limited at this stage as the results of the 
experiments in this set were inconsistent. 
 
The final set of experiments did provide clear evidence that frequency manipulation can 
suppress inferences even where lexical information is constant. The inference tasks used 
between the inference manipulation conditions are identical (i.e. between the two MP 
manipulation conditions and the two AC manipulation conditions in experiment 2 and 
between the two DA manipulation conditions and the two MT manipulation conditions 
in experiment 3). Therefore, the same mental models should be generated in each 
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condition. The issue here cannot be additional complexity in processing the different 
type of negation alone (as Khemlani et al., 2012, suggests). Given the same mental 
models should be generated, and the lexical information in the inferences tasks does not 
vary (which might permit a difference in the effect proposed by Khemlani, 2012), it is 
not clear how the mental models approach can account for these results. Therefore, the 
results of these experiments would not appear to be consistent with the theory that 
people reason over mental models.  
5.2.3. Probabilistic Approach 
Probabilistic accounts of reasoning propose that the computational aim of reasoning is 
to reflect probability theory rather than classical logic, as this is more relevant to 
everyday life (Oaksford & Chater, 2001). Models based on this approach have provided 
a good account of the biases seen in conditional reasoning (e.g. Oaksford et al., 2000). 
More recently, algorithmic models have been developed based on Causal Bayesian 
Networks which are consistent with probabilistic approaches (e.g. Fernbach and Erb, 
2013).  
 
The first set of experiments in this thesis considered people’s probability ratings of 
propositions. Such differences in the perception of propositions are relevant to 
probabilistic approaches but not to other approaches. Therefore, the results showing that 
people do rate the probability of propositions differently depending on the type of 
negation used provides some support for the role of probabilistic approaches. In 
particular, it seems sensible that the computational aim of a model should be able to 
incorporate the different information that people consider – including probability 
information.  
 
The second set of experiments also provided support for the probabilistic approach. This 
set of experiments suggested that different forms of negation may affect reasoning. 
Such results are easier to account for with probabilistic models than models that do not 
allow for different probabilistic interpretations of negation. However, these results are 
tentative as the expected differences were not seen consistently across the four 
experiments. 
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The final set of experiments showed that conditional reasoning could be affected by 
probability manipulations. The predictions confirmed in this experiment were based on 
the probabilistic approach (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). These findings, therefore, 
provide substantial support for the relevance of that approach in accounting for human 
reasoning. 
5.2.4. Multiple Processes 
Multiple process theories typically involve two or more systems which interact to 
process reasoning tasks. Typically, these theories combine an associative, automatic and 
quick system and an analytic, controlled and slow system (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
The former system places little burden on cognitive resources while the latter requires a 
high level of cognitive resources. Evans’ (1984, 2006) Heuristic-Analytic Theory is a 
prominent multiple process model explored in some reasoning studies.  
 
The current set of experiments neither support nor rule-out the involvement of multiple 
processes in principle. However, they do undermine specific approaches. For example, 
it is not clear how Evans’ (1984) original theory could account for the impact of 
probability data in reasoning responses in the third set of experiments when the lexical 
materials in the tasks remained constant. Such results would suggest that any valid 
multiple process theory should have a substantial probabilistic element as part of one or 
more of its processes. 
5.2.5. Alternative Models 
In §1.3.5 a couple of other models were discussed: Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) 
account based on the use of pragmatic reasoning schemas and Politzer and Bonnefon’s 
(2010) proposal of a calculus of possibilities. 
 
As discussed, Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) approach ultimately seeks to distil the 
processing of reasoning problems into the implementation of logical rules. This aligns it 
with other approaches based on internal mental logics and it has been integrated with 
Braine and O’Brien’s (1991) approach (e.g. Noveck & O’Brien, 1996). As discussed 
above, the general theme of the present experiments (that negation is a complex 
operator can act through probability manipulation) undermines support for such 
approaches. 
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Politzer and Bonnefon (2010) proposed that a calculus of possibilities may better 
account for observed reasoning biases than approaches based on standard propositional 
logic or probability. The current study does provide some support for this approach. In 
particular, the experiments in chapter 3 show that the plausibility of a conditional is 
strongly correlated with people’s willingness to draw inferences using it. However, 
further consideration is required to establish the predictions that such an approach 
would make and how it could be distinguished from a probabilistic approach. This may 
be the subject of future research. 
5.3. Next Steps 
While the current thesis has helped develop our understanding of the role of negation in 
reasoning, some of the findings – particularly based on the second set of experiments – 
are tentative. This final section, therefore, considers how these results could be built on 
and developed further in future studies.  
 
The first set of experiments did show that people rate the probability of propositions 
using different types of negation differently. However, the effects found were small and 
easily influenced by other material effects. A further study seeking to demonstrate more 
robust and consistent results might want to use a within-participants design to look at 
people’s responses where materials are directly comparable across all negation 
conditions (which was not the case in the first experiment in this set which did use a 
within-participants design).  
 
The results in the second set of experiments were less conclusive. There were 
indications that different types of negation did affect people’s response to reasoning 
problems. However, these effects appear to be obscured by larger scenario effects 
(particularly related to the plausibility of conditionals). A future experiment to develop 
these results should, therefore, consider using materials which controlled for plausibility 
effects (but did not have the artificial characteristics observed in experiment 2).  It 
should use sufficient sets of materials to secure a large number of responses in a 
between-participants design (given the tendency seen in experiment 4 for people to 
make superadditive judgements when they have sight of all conditions). 
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The final set of experiments provided evidence for the role of the contrast class 
interpretation of negation in conditional reasoning. Further evidence for the use of 
contrast classes in reasoning could be done through direct checking for contrast class 
member priming when a given proposition is negated in a reasoning task. This could use 
lexical decision tasks (Meyer & Schveneveldt, 1971) to explore priming effects in 
reasoning tasks.  
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Appendix 1. Materials Used in Chapter 2 Experiments 
This appendix contains the experimental materials used in each of the three experiments 
reported in chapter 2. These considered how using different types of negation in 
propositions affected people’s probability ratings of those propositions.  
A1.1. Experiment 1 
The first experiment in chapter 2 looked at whether negation using affixes “non-”, “un-” 
and “iN-” and implicit negation led to different probability ratings than negation using 
“not”. This experiment is reported in §2.3. The method is set out in §2.3.2 and the 
development of the materials is discussed in §2.3.2.3. 
A1.1.1. Task Instructions 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the task: 
 
On each of the following pages, you will be given a scenario and asked to 
answer three questions about what you might expect given the scenario. Your 
response to each question will be an answer between 0 and 100.  
 
This is asking for your view, there are no right or wrong answers and no 
questions are trying to catch you out.  
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction.  
 
Once you’ve completed each question don’t go back to it.  
A1.1.2. Task Questions 
The following table sets out the 32 tasks presented to each participant. Each task 
provided a scenario and then three questions for the participants to answer. The tasks 
were presented in a booklet with the instructions (see above) on the front) and a task on 
each subsequent page. The order of the 32 tasks was randomised for each participants, 
as was the order of the three questions within each task. 
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The tasks labels in the table below were not seen by participants and refer to the type of 
alternative negation using in the tasks. Tasks UN1 to UN8 included a question using 
“un-” negation. Tasks IN1 to IN8 included a question using “iN-” negation. Tasks NO1 
to NO8 included a question using “non-” negation. Tasks IM1 to IM8 included a 
question using implicit negation (based on an opposite term). 
 
Approximately half the participants saw each question using “not” negation in the form 
‘Out of the 100 people, how many would you not expect to be ###’ (as shown below). 
The rest of the participants saw these questions in the format ‘Out of the 100 people, 
how many would you expect to be not ###’.  
 
Table A1.1 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 1 
Task Scenario Questions 
UN1 100 people joined a gym. 
 
When inducting people into the gym, 
the instructors expect people to have 
different levels of fitness. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
fit? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be fit? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unfit? 
UN2 100 people applied for a job. 
 
The person sifting the applications 
expects applicants to have different 
levels of qualifications relating to the 
job. 
 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
qualified? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be qualified? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unqualified? 
UN3 100 people put their photos on a 
dating website. 
 
A person browsing the site expects 
people to have different levels of 
attractiveness. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
attractive? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be attractive? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unattractive? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
UN4 100 people lie on a new type of 
mattress in a shop. 
 
The sales assistant knows that 
different people will experience 
different levels of comfort on the 
mattress. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
comfortable? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be comfortable? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
uncomfortable? 
UN5 100 people are selected to become 
part of juries for a series of trials. 
 
The judge knows that members of a 
jury will have different levels of biases 
based on their expectations. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
biased? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be not biased? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unbiased? 
UN6 100 people start on a series of 
creative writing courses. 
 
The tutors expect people on the 
course to demonstrate different levels 
of imagination as the course 
progresses. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
imaginative? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be imaginative? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unimaginative? 
UN7 100 people volunteer to take part in a 
medical trial. 
 
Doctors running the trial know that the 
volunteers will have different levels of 
suitability. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
suitable? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be suitable? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unsuitable? 
UN8 100 people are asked if they can 
attend a party. 
 
The organisers know that the people 
they invite will have different levels of 
availability. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
available? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be available? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unavailable? 
IN1 100 people are asked to change their 
shift patterns at work. 
 
The boss knows that their workers will 
have different levels of flexibility in 
being able to change shifts. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
flexible? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be flexible? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
inflexible? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
IN2 100 people are asked for their views 
on an emotional issue. 
 
The questioners know that different 
people have different levels of 
rationality when considering 
emotional issues. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
rational? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be rational? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
irrational? 
IN3 100 people have to give bad news to 
their staff. 
 
The staff know that they can expect 
different levels of directness 
depending on who their boss is. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
direct? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be direct? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
indirect? 
IN4 100 people apply for a Government 
benefit. 
 
An assessor knows that applicants’ 
levels of eligibility for the benefits will 
vary. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
eligible? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be eligible? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
ineligible? 
IN5 100 people like to drink in a bar. 
 
The bartender knows that different 
customers will come to the bar with 
different levels of regularity. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
regular? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be regular? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
irregular? 
IN6 100 people are voting in a national 
election. 
 
Returning officers understand that 
voters have different levels of 
significance in deciding the result 
depending on how and where they 
vote. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
significant? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be significant? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
insignificant? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
IN7 100 people each make a post on an 
internet forum. 
 
The forum moderators know that 
different people will make posts with 
different levels of relevance to the 
subject at hand. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
relevant? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be relevant? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
irrelevant? 
IN8 100 people are being considered by 
managers who plan a couple of 
redundancies. 
 
The managers know that their 
employees will feel different levels of 
job security under these conditions. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
secure? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be secure? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
insecure? 
NO1 100 people attend a political debate. 
 
The debate chairperson knows that 
different members of the audience will 
have different levels of political 
partisanship. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
partisan? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be partisan? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonpartisan? 
NO2 100 people watch a music video on 
television. 
 
The music channel schedulers know 
that viewers will have different levels 
of admiration for the star of the video. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
admirers? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be admirers? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonadmirers? 
NO3 100 people try some DIY over a bank 
holiday weekend. 
 
A hardware store manager knows that 
people trying DIY have different levels 
of practicality. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
practical? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be practical? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
non practical? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
NO4 100 people start a part time course 
lasting four years. 
 
Those running the course need to 
estimate how many people will drop 
out and know that people will have 
different levels of commitment to it. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
committed? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be committed? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
noncommitted? 
NO5 100 people attend a protest. 
 
The police know that protesters will 
have different levels of 
aggressiveness. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
aggressive? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be aggressive? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonaggressive? 
NO6 100 people are in a park in the 
summer. 
 
A doctor knows that different people 
will have different levels of allergy for 
the plants and flowers in the park. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
allergic? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be allergic? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonallergic? 
NO7 100 people are planning weddings. 
 
A stallholder at a wedding show 
knows that people have like different 
levels of tradition at their wedding. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
traditional? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be traditional? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nontraditional? 
NO8 100 people take part in a casual 
tournament for a game. 
 
The judges know that people have 
different levels of expertise at the 
game and the tournament is open to 
beginners and veterans alike. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
expert? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be expert? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonexpert? 
IM1 100 people are spending time in a 
park. 
 
A park manager knows that different 
people will have different levels of 
movement when they are in the park. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
moving? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be moving? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
still? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
IM2 100 people are trying to climb a 
mountain with a small forest half way 
up. 
An expert knows that at a given point, 
different climbers will be at different 
levels relative to the forest. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
above? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be above? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
below? 
IM3 100 people are going to visit the 
Doctor. 
 
The Doctor knows that different 
people will have different weights. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
fat? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be fat? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
slender? 
IM4 100 people are asked about 
something they like to be secret from 
most people by close friends. 
 
Friends know that they can expect 
different levels of openness from 
different people. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
open? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be open? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
closed? 
IM5 100 people are going to travel on an 
aeroplane. 
 
The designer of the plane’s seats will 
know that different people traveling by 
air will be different sizes. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
large? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be large? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
small? 
IM6 100 people are listed in order of their 
scores on an exam pass-list. 
 
The examiner knows that different 
people will be at different levels on 
the list. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
top? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be top? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
bottom? 
IM7 100 people are running in a race. 
 
The race organiser knows that at a 
given point, different people will at 
different positions in the race. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
in front? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be in front? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
behind? 
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Task Scenario Questions 
IM8 100 people are down in a cave. 
 
An experienced caver knows that 
different people will spend time at 
different depths in the cave. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
deep? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be deep? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
shallow? 
A1.2. Experiment 2 
The second experiment in chapter 2 looked at whether negation using affixes “non-”, 
“un-” and “iN-” led to different probability ratings than negation using “not”. This 
experiment is reported in §2.4. The method is set out in §2.4.3 and the development of 
the materials is discussed in §2.4.3.3. 
A1.2.1. Task Instructions 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the task: 
 
On each of the following pages, you will be given a scenario and asked to 
answer a question about what you might expect given the scenario. Your 
response to each question will be an answer between 0 and 100.  
 
This is asking for your view, there are no right or wrong answers and no 
questions are trying to catch you out.  
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question.  
A1.2.2. Task Questions 
The following table sets out the five scenarios presented in this experiment. Each 
participant saw each of the scenarios in random order with one of the questions attached 
to each scenario (they saw one question in each of the five polarity conditions across the 
five scenarios). The tasks were presented in an online form with a scenario and the 
assigned question for that scenario on a single page. 
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The scenario labels are provided for convenient reference and were not provided to 
participants. 
  
Table A1.2 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 2 
Label Scenario Questions 
A 100 people live in their parents' 
house.  
 
- Some of those people pay a 
commercial rate of rent.  
- Some of those people also use a 
parent's car.  
- Some of those people have parents 
who are away for most of the year.  
- Some of those people also go on 
holiday with their parents. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
dependent? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be dependent? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nondependent? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
undependent? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
independent? 
B 100 people work for local 
government.  
 
- Some of those people like to read in 
their spare time.  
- Some of those people will often be 
out of the office, meeting contractors.  
- Some of those people will spend 
most of their working time using the 
computer and phone.  
- Some of those people will be 
regarded as fit by their co-workers. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
active?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be active?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonactive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unactive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
inactive? 
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Label Scenario Questions 
C 100 people get up early on a Sunday.  
 
- Some of those people will be 
scientists.  
- Some of those people will have 
been taken to church every week 
when they were young.  
- Some of those people will not be 
superstitious.  
- Some of those people will be filled 
with awe when visiting large 
cathedrals. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
religious?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be religious?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonreligious?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unreligious?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
irreligious? 
D 100 people had to complain about 
appalling service in a shop.  
 
- Some of those people were in a 
hurry.  
- Some of those people don't like to 
be aggressive.  
- Some of those people had been 
made very angry by the service.  
- Some of those people will try to stay 
calm. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
polite?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be polite?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonpolite?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unpolite? 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
impolite? 
E 100 people speak to a police officer.  
 
- Some of those people will have 
been violent.  
- Some of those people will feel 
deferential.  
- Some of those people will remain 
calm.  
- Some of those people will dislike the 
police. 
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
offensive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you not expect to 
be offensive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
nonoffensive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
unoffensive?  
 Out of the 100 people, how 
many would you expect to be 
inoffensive? 
 
A1.3. Experiment 3 
The third and final experiment in chapter 3 first looked at whether negation using affix 
“un-” led to different probability ratings than negation using “not”. A second part 
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sought plausibility ratings for conditionals using antecedent and consequent terms 
which were systematically varied between affirmative, “not” negation and “un-” 
negated conditions. This experiment is reported in §2.5. The method is set out in §2.5.2 
and the development of the materials is discussed in §2.5.2.3. 
A1.3.1. Task Instructions for Part 1 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the first set of tasks: 
 
In the first part of this survey, you will be given a scenario and asked to answer 
a question about what you might expect given the scenario. Your response to 
each question will be an answer between 0 and 100.  
 
This is asking for your view, there are no right or wrong answers and no 
questions are trying to catch you out.  
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question.  
A1.3.2. Task Questions for Part 1 
The following table sets out the nine scenarios presented in part 1 of this experiment. 
Each participant saw each of the scenarios in random order with one of the questions 
attached to the scenario (randomly determined). The tasks were presented in an online 
form with a scenario and its question on a single page. 
 
The scenario labels are provided for convenient reference and were not provided to 
participants. 
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Table A1.3 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3, part 1 
Label Scenario Questions 
1 100 people are asked if they believe in a 
newspapers investigative report.  
 
- Many of those people will be convinced by the 
evidence.  
- A few of those people never trust reports. 
- Several of those people normally accept such 
reports without much consideration.  
- Some of those people will want to challenge the 
evidence. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be believing? 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not 
believing?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unbelieving? 
2 100 people were asked how they felt about their 
neighbours.  
 
- Many of those people often spoke with their 
neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked their 
neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes socialised 
with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see their 
neighbours. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to say their 
neighbours were 
friendly?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to say their 
neighbours were 
not friendly?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to say their 
neighbours were 
unfriendly? 
3 100 people where asked how they felt about a 
promotional gift when purchasing another item.  
 
- Many of those people liked the promotional gift.  
- A few of those people were annoyed by the 
promotional gift. 
- Several of those people had wanted the 
promotional gift.  
- Some of those people would have preferred not 
to have received the promotional gift. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be grateful? 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not grateful? 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be ungrateful? 
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Label Scenario Questions 
4 100 people are asked about their mood.  
 
- Many of those people had been doing something 
they enjoyed.  
- A few of those people were upset about 
something earlier that day. 
- Several of those people had recently received 
good news.  
- Some of those people found what they were 
doing a bit tedious. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be happy?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not happy?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unhappy? 
5 100 people are asked what they plan for 
Valentines Day.  
 
- Many of those people want to do something nice 
with their partners.  
- A few of those people will upset their partners on 
Valentines Day. 
- Several of those people spend a lot of time 
planning their evening.  
- Some of those people are cynical about 
Valentines Day. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be romantic?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not 
romantic? 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unromantic? 
6 100 people have their dress-sense assessed.  
 
- Many of those people will take care in choosing 
their clothes.  
- A few of those people will dress in a way that 
others consider appalling. 
- Several of those people will have taste others 
admire.  
- Some of those people will be thought to look 
okay but not particularly good or bad. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be stylish?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not stylish?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unstylish? 
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Label Scenario Questions 
7 100 people are asked how they would make a 
difficult decision affecting other people.  
 
- Many of those people would make a sound 
decision.  
- A few of those people would make a reckless 
decision. 
- Several of those people would base their 
decision on extensive experience.  
- Some of those people would only have limited 
knowledge on which to base their decision. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be wise?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not wise?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unwise? 
8 100 people are asked how they would consider the 
guilt of a suspect given conflicting evidence.  
 
- Many of those people are willing to give the 
benefit of the doubt to the suspect.  
- A few of those people assume the suspect was 
guilty and look at how the evidence in their favour 
could be mitigated. 
- Several of those people would consider the 
suspect innocent until proven guilty.  
- Some of those people admit their reaction would 
depend on the nature of the crime and a critical 
view of all the evidence. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be charitable?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not 
charitable?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be 
uncharitable? 
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Label Scenario Questions 
9 100 people are asked how they behave in a room 
full of new people.  
 
- Many of those people would try to make 
conversation.  
- A few of those people would find the situation so 
difficult they would want to leave the room. 
- Several of those people would want to use the 
opportunity to make new friends.  
- Some of those people would stay quiet.00 people 
had to complain about appalling service in a shop.  
 
- Some of those people were in a hurry.  
- Some of those people don't like to be aggressive.  
- Some of those people had been made very angry 
by the service.  
- Some of those people will try to stay calm. 
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be social?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be not social?  
 Out of the 100 
people, how many 
would you expect 
to be unsocial? 
A1.3.3. Task Instructions for Part 2 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the second part of this 
experiment: 
 
In each question in the final part of this survey, you will be given a scenario and 
a rule. You will be asked indicate how plausible you think the rule is given the 
scenario. You should select your response from the available options.  
 
This is asking for your view, there are no right or wrong answers and no 
questions are trying to catch you out.  
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question.  
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A1.3.4. Task Questions for Part 2 
The following table sets out the four scenarios presented in part 2 of this experiment. 
Each participant saw each of the scenarios in random order. Each scenario was 
presented with one of the nine related conditionals (randomly determined for each 
participant) on a single page of an online form with the experimental question. Each 
scenario page had the following format: 
 
 [scenario] 
 An observer looks at the 100 people and suggests the following rule: 
 [conditional] 
 Given the information provided, how plausible do you think this rule is?  
[Options provided: Completely implausible/Very implausible/Implausible/A 
little implausible/A little Plausible/Plausible/Very plausible/Completely 
plausible] 
 
The scenario labels are provided for convenient reference and were not provided to 
participants. 
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Table A1.4 – Tasks in chapter 2, experiment 3, part 2 
Label Scenario Conditional 
1 100 people were asked how they felt 
about their neighbours.  
 
- Many of those people often spoke with 
their neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked 
their neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes 
socialised with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see 
their neighbours. 
The same 100 people are asked how they 
behave in a room full of new people.  
 
- Many of those people would try to make 
conversation.  
- A few of those people would find the 
situation so difficult they would want to 
leave the room. 
- Several of those people would want to 
use the opportunity to make new friends.  
- Some of those people would stay quiet. 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is social 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is not social 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is unsocial 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is social 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is not 
social 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is unsocial 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is social 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is not 
social 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is unsocial 
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Label Scenario Conditional 
2 100 people were asked how they felt 
about their neighbours.  
 
- Many of those people often spoke with 
their neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked 
their neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes 
socialised with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see 
their neighbours. 
The same 100 people are asked how they 
behave in a room full of new people.  
 
- Many of those people would try to make 
conversation.  
- A few of those people would find the 
situation so difficult they would want to 
leave the room. 
- Several of those people would want to 
use the opportunity to make new friends.  
- Some of those people would stay quiet. 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is social 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is not social 
 If a person is friendly, then 
the person is unsocial 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is social 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is not 
social 
 If a person is not friendly, 
then the person is unsocial 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is social 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is not 
social 
 If a person is unfriendly, 
then the person is unsocial 
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Label Scenario Conditional 
3 100 people where asked how they felt 
about a promotional gift when purchasing 
another item.  
 
- Many of those people liked the 
promotional gift.  
- A few of those people were annoyed by 
the promotional gift. 
- Several of those people had wanted the 
promotional gift.  
- Some of those people would have 
preferred not to have received the 
promotional gift. 
The same 100 people are asked about 
their mood.  
 
- Many of those people had been doing 
something they enjoyed.  
- A few of those people were upset about 
something earlier that day. 
- Several of those people had recently 
received good news.  
- Some of those people found what they 
were doing a bit tedious. 
 If a person is grateful, then 
the person is happy 
 If a person is grateful, then 
the person is not happy 
 If a person is grateful, then 
the person is unhappy 
 If a person is not grateful, 
then the person is happy 
 If a person is not grateful, 
then the person is not 
happy 
 If a person is not grateful, 
then the person is 
unhappy 
 If a person is ungrateful, 
then the person is happy 
 If a person is ungrateful, 
then the person is not 
happy 
 If a person is ungrateful, 
then the person is 
unhappy 
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Label Scenario Conditional 
4 100 people are asked what they plan for 
Valentines Day.  
 
- Many of those people want to do 
something nice with their partners.  
- A few of those people will upset their 
partners on Valentines Day. 
- Several of those people spend a lot of 
time planning their evening.  
- Some of those people are cynical about 
Valentines Day. 
The same 100 people have their dress-
sense assessed.  
 
- Many of those people will take care in 
choosing their clothes.  
- A few of those people will dress in a way 
that others consider appalling. 
- Several of those people will have taste 
others admire.  
- Some of those people will be thought to 
look okay but not particularly good or bad. 
 If a person is romantic, 
then the person is stylish 
 If a person is romantic, 
then the person is not 
stylish 
 If a person is romantic, 
then the person is 
unstylish 
 If a person is not romantic, 
then the person is stylish 
 If a person is not romantic, 
then the person is not 
stylish 
 If a person is not romantic, 
then the person is 
unstylish 
 If a person is unromantic, 
then the person is stylish 
 If a person is unromantic, 
then the person is not 
stylish 
 If a person is unromantic, 
then the person is 
unstylish 
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Appendix 2. Materials Used in Chapter 3 Experiments 
This appendix contains the experimental materials used in each of the four experiments 
reported in chapter 3. These used an extension of Evans’ (1977) conditional inference 
paradigm to compare two types of negation (using “not” and affix “un-”). The 
experiments looked at whether responses reflected the different probabilistic 
implications of those negative forms.  
A2.1. Experiment 1 
The first experiment in chapter 3 first looked at how people endorsed inferences using 
conditionals when the antecedent term was affirmative, used “not” negation and used 
“un-” negation. A second part sought plausibility ratings for conditionals using 
antecedent and consequent terms which were systematically varied between affirmative, 
“not” negation and “un-” negated conditions. This experiment is reported in §3.3. The 
method is set out in §3.3.2 and the development of the materials is discussed in §3.3.2.3. 
A2.1.1. Task Instructions for Part 1 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the first set of tasks: 
 
The first part of this study consists of a series of pages which each have a 
conditional inference task. 
 
For each task you will be given two premises (a relationship such as "If Adrian 
has a hangover tomorrow then he was drinking" and statement like "Adrian has 
a hangover tomorrow") and a conclusion (like "Therefore Adrian was 
drinking").  
 
You should press "A" if you believe the conclusion follows from the two premises 
and "L" if you do not believe the conclusion follows from the two premises. 
You should try to be accurate as you respond to each task as quickly as possible. 
 
Press any key when you are ready to start.  
  
 
 282
A2.1.2. Task Questions for Part 1 
Participants were presented with 144 inferences, one to a screen, in random order. The 
144 inferences were made up of twelve scenarios each presented in four difference 
inference forms tested (MP, DA, AC, MT) each using three different antecedent polarity 
conditions (affirmative, “not” negated, “un-” negated). The basic forms presented for 
each task of each inference type were as follows:  
 
 MP 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will be [s5].  
o [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3]. 
o Therefore [s1] will be [s5]. 
 DA 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will be [s5].  
o [s1] is[n2] [s2] [s3]. 
o Therefore [s1] won’t be [s5]. 
 AC 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will be [s5].  
o [s1] will be [s5]. 
o Therefore [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3]. 
 MT 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will be [s5].  
o [s1] won’t be [s5]. 
o Therefore [s1] is[n2] [s2] [s3]. 
 
The placeholders [s1] to [s5] were varied to create the twelve different scenario 
conditions. The following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each 
of the twelve scenarios. 
 
Table A2.1 – Scenarios in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 1 
Scenario [s1] [s2] [s3] [s4] [s5] 
1 Andrew predictable  in the kitchen tomorrow he clean 
2 Melanie stable at home on Sunday she tidy 
3 Peter enthusiastic about visiting his brother 
next month  
he helpful 
4 Susan happy watching the programme 
on Wednesday 
she interested 
5 Paul believable at the trial next week he just 
6 Brenda informed about the issue being 
discussed today 
she concerned 
7 Stephen responsive to Karen on her birthday he settled 
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Scenario [s1] [s2] [s3] [s4] [s5] 
8 Joanna kind to her friends at the party 
this evening 
she forgiving 
9 Alan popular after school on Tuesday he friendly 
10 Sarah reliable on Friday morning at work she sympathetic 
11 Mark successful in the gym on Saturday he critical 
12 Liz conventional in planning her holiday for 
this summer 
she enthusiastic 
 
The placeholders [n1] and [n2] were varied to create the three antecedent polarity 
conditions. The following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each 
of the three conditions. 
 
Table A2.2 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 1 
Polarity [n1] [n2] 
Affirmative  n’t  
“not” negated not  
“un-” negated un-  
 
A2.1.3. Task Instructions for Part 2 
The following text was provided to participants to explain the second set of tasks: 
 
The final part of this study consists of a series of pages which ask you to assess 
the plausibility of a relationship. 
 
On each page you will be given a relationship (for example "If there is a fly in 
the soup then the waiter takes it away"). There is also a line which represents 
'entirely plausible' on the left and 'entirely implausible' on the right.  
 
You should click on the line at the point that best represents how plausible you 
think the relationship is. 
 
You should try and respond to each task as quickly as possible. 
Please click the mouse when you are ready to start.  
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A2.1.4. Task Questions for Part 2 
Participants were presented with 108 conditionals, one to a screen, in random order. The 
108 inferences were made up of twelve scenarios each presented in nine polarity 
conditions. The nine polarity conditions were made up by systematically varying both 
antecedent and consequent polarity across three conditions (affirmative, “not” negated, 
“un-” negated). The basic conditional form presented for each task was as follows:  
 
 If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will [n2][s5] 
 
The placeholders [s1] to [s5] were varied to create the twelve different scenario 
conditions. The scenarios were the same as for part 1 and so the content was as set out 
in table A2.1 (above). 
 
The placeholders [n1] and [n2] were varied to create the none antecedent polarity 
conditions. The following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each 
of the three conditions. 
 
Table A2.3 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 1, part 2 
 
A2.2. Experiment 2 
The second experiment in chapter 3 first looked at how people endorsed inferences 
using conditionals with the antecedent and consequent terms being systematically 
varied between affirmative “not” negated and used “un-” negated conditions. This 
Antecedent Polarity Consequent Polarity [n1] [n2] 
Affirmative Affirmative  be_ 
Affirmative “not” negated  not be_ 
Affirmative “un-” negated  be un- 
“not” negated Affirmative not_  be_ 
“not” negated “not” negated not_  not be_ 
“not” negated “un-” negated not_  be un- 
“un-” negated Affirmative un- be_ 
“un-” negated “not” negated un- not be_ 
“un-” negated “un-” negated un- be un- 
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experiment is reported in §3.4. The method is set out in §3.4.2 and the development of 
the materials is discussed in §3.4.2.3. 
A2.2.1. Task Instructions  
The following text was provided to participants to explain tasks: 
 
The study consists of a series of pages, with one task on each page.  
 
For each task you will be given two premises (a relationship such as "If Adrian 
has a hangover tomorrow then he was drinking" and statement like "Adrian has 
a hangover tomorrow") and a conclusion (like "Therefore Adrian was 
drinking").  
 
You should indicate whether or not you think the conclusion follows from the 
two premises.  
 
You should try to answer each question as quickly as possible - go with your 
first reaction.  
 
This study is looking at your perception. There are no right or wrong answers 
and no question is trying to catch you out.  
 
Over the next pages there are three practice questions for you to complete 
before moving onto the study questions.  
 
Click 'Next' when you are ready to start the practice questions.  
 
After the practice questions the following instructions were presented and before the 
experimental tasks, the instructions were repeated as follows: 
 
 You have now completed the practice questions. Before you move onto the study 
questions, here is a reminder of the instructions. 
 
The study consists of a series of pages, with one task on each page.  
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For each task you will be given two premises (a relationship such as "If Adrian 
has a hangover tomorrow then he was drinking" and statement like "Adrian has 
a hangover tomorrow") and a conclusion (like "Therefore Adrian was 
drinking").  
 
You should indicate whether or not you think the conclusion follows from the 
two premises.  
 
You should try to answer each question as quickly as possible - go with your 
first reaction.  
 
This study is looking at your perception. There are no right or wrong answers 
and no question is trying to catch you out.  
 
Click 'Next' when you are ready to start the study questions. 
A2.2.2. Practice Questions 
After the initial instructions, the following three practice inference tasks were presented, 
each on a single screen: 
 
 Practice 1 
o If Peter is not enthusiatic about his visit then he is helpful.  
o Peter is not enthusiatic about his visit. 
o Therefore Peter is helpful. 
 Practice 2 
o If Susan is not happy on Wednesday then she is uninterested.  
o Susan is interested. 
o Therefore Susan is happy on Wednesday. 
 Practice 3 
o If Paul is unbelievable in court then he is unjust.  
o Paul is believable in court. 
o Therefore Paul is just. 
 
  
 
 287
 
Below each inference, participants were given the following two options (in random 
order). Participants were required to select one and click a ‘Next’ button to move on. 
 
 The conclusion follows from the premises. 
 The conclusion does not follow from the premises. 
A2.2.3. Task Questions  
Participants were presented with 108 inferences, one to a screen, in random order. The 
108 inferences were made up of three scenarios each presented in four difference 
inference forms tested (MP, DA, AC, MT) each presented in nine polarity conditions. 
The nine polarity conditions were made up by systematically varying both antecedent 
and consequent polarity across three conditions (affirmative, “not” negated, “un-” 
negated). The basic forms presented for each task of each inference type were as 
follows:  
 
 MP 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will [n2][s5].  
o [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3]. 
o Therefore [s1] will [n2][s5]. 
 DA 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will [n2][s5].  
o [s1] is[n3] [s2] [s3]. 
o Therefore [s1] [n4] be [s5]. 
 AC 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will [n2][s5].  
o [s1] will [n2][s5]. 
o Therefore [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3]. 
 MT 
o If [s1] is [n1][s2] [s3] then [s4] will [n2][s5].  
o [s1] [n4] be [s5]. 
o Therefore [s1] is[n3] [s2] [s3]. 
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Like the practice questions, the following two options were presented below each 
inference (in random order) and participants were required to select one and click a 
‘Next’ button to move on: 
 
 The conclusion follows from the premises. 
 The conclusion does not follow from the premises. 
 
The placeholders [s1] to [s5] were varied to create the different scenario conditions. The 
following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each of the scenarios. 
 
Table A2.4 – Scenarios in chapter 3, experiment 2 
Scenario [s1] [s2] [s3] [s4] [s5] 
Experimental 1 Liz conventional in planning her holiday 
for this summer 
she enthusiastic 
Experimental 2 Brenda informed about the issue being 
discussed today 
she concerned 
 
A further 72 non-experimental distraction tasks were generated using additional 
scenario information in the placeholders from experiment 1 (see §A2.1.2). 
 
The placeholders [n1] to [n4] were varied to create the three antecedent polarity 
conditions. The following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each 
of the three conditions. 
 
Table A2.5 – Polarity conditions in chapter 3, experiment 2 
 
Antecedent Polarity Consequent Polarity [n1] [n2] [n3] [n4] 
Affirmative Affirmative  be_ n’t won’t 
Affirmative “not” negated    not be_ 
Affirmative “un-” negated  be un- n’t will 
“not” negated Affirmative not_  be_  won’t 
“not” negated “not” negated not_ not_  not be_  
“not” negated “un-” negated not_  be un-  will 
“un-” negated Affirmative un- be_  won’t 
“un-” negated “not” negated un- not be_  will 
“un-” negated “un-” negated un- be un-  will 
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A2.3. Experiments 3 and 4 
The final two experiments in chapter 3 looked at how people endorsed inferences using 
conditionals when the antecedent term was affirmative, used “not” negation and used 
“un-” negation. Information about participants perception of the plausibility of the 
conditionals and some propositions seen was also collected. The materials are presented 
together here because both experiments used the same set of inference tasks in different 
experimental designs. 
 
Experiment 3 is reported in §3.5. The method is set out in §3.5.2 and the development 
of the materials is discussed in §3.5.2.3. 
 
Experiment 4 is reported in §3.6. The method is set out in §3.6.2 and the development 
of the materials is discussed in §3.6.2.3. 
A2.3.1. Task Instructions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 1 
The following text was provided to participants in experiment 3 to explain the inference 
tasks: 
 
For each of the four questions that follows, you will be given a scenario, a rule, 
a statement related to the scenario and a conclusion. You will be asked indicate 
whether you agree with the conclusion given the rule and statement. You should 
select your response from the available options.  
 
After these four questions, four further questions will provide a scenario and a 
rule and ask you a question about how plausible you think the rule is given the 
scenario. You enter your response as a numerical answer between 0 and 100. 
 
All of the questions are asking for your view, there are no right or wrong 
answers and no questions are trying to catch you out.  
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question. 
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The following text was provided to participants in experiment 4 to explain the inference 
tasks: 
 
The first part of the survey will start on the next page. 
 
On each page in this first part, you will be given a scenario, a rule, a statement 
related to the scenario and a conclusion. You will be asked indicate whether you 
agree with the conclusion given the rule and statement. You should select your 
response from the available options and click next to move onto the next 
question. 
 
The scenarios given are each used in multiple questions. However, the rule, 
statement and conclusion change in each question so you should pay attention to 
this. 
 
After this part of the survey is complete, the second part will consist of further 
questions which provide a scenario and a rule or statement and ask you a 
question about how plausible you think the rule or statement is given the 
scenario. You enter your response as a numerical answer between 0 and 100. 
All of the questions are asking for your view, there are no right or wrong 
answers and no questions are trying to catch you out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question. 
A2.3.2. Task Questions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 1 
144 inferences were prepared for experiments 3 and 4. The 144 inferences were made 
up of four scenarios each presented in four difference inference forms tested (MP, DA, 
AC, MT) each presented in nine polarity conditions. The nine polarity conditions were 
made up by systematically varying both antecedent and consequent polarity across three 
conditions (affirmative, “not” negated, “un-” negated).   
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In experiment 3, participants saw only four of the 144 inference tasks each. The four 
tasks they saw included one of each scenario and one of each inference type (antecedent 
and consequent polarity conditions were random for each inference seen). The four 
questions seen were presented in random order. 
 
In experiment 4, participants saw all 144 inference tasks in random order. 
 
Each task was presented one to a screen in the following form: 
 
[scenario introduction] 
 
An observer looks at the 100 people and suggests the following rule: 
 
[conditional] 
 
Given the rule, if a person from the 100 people was found meeting the following 
condition: 
 
[second premise] 
 
Would you agree with the following conclusion? 
 
[conclusion] 
 
The following eight options were presented below each inference (in order) and 
participants were required to select one and click a ‘Next’ button to move on: 
 
 Completely disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Disagree a little  
 Agree a little Agree  
 Strongly agree  
 Completely agree 
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The placeholder [scenario introduction] were varied for each of the four scenario 
conditions. The following table sets out the content used in this placeholder for each of 
the four scenarios. 
 
Table A2.6 – Scenario introductions in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4 
Scenario [scenario introduction] 
1 100 people are asked if they believe in a newspapers investigative report.  
 
- Many of those people will be convinced by the evidence.  
- A few of those people never trust reports. 
- Several of those people normally accept such reports without much consideration.  
- Some of those people will want to challenge the evidence. 
 
The same 100 people are also asked what they plan for Valentines Day.  
 
- Many of those people want to do something nice with their partners.  
- A few of those people will upset their partners on Valentines Day. 
- Several of those people spend a lot of time planning their evening.  
- Some of those people are cynical about Valentines Day. 
2 100 people were asked how they felt about their neighbours.  
 
- Many of those people often spoke with their neighbours.  
- A few of those people actively disliked their neighbours. 
- Several of those people sometimes socialised with their neighbours.  
- Some of those people didn’t often see their neighbours. 
 
The same 100 people are asked how they behave in a room full of new people.  
 
- Many of those people would try to make conversation.  
- A few of those people would find the situation so difficult they would want to leave the 
room. 
- Several of those people would want to use the opportunity to make new friends.  
- Some of those people would stay quiet. 
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Scenario [scenario introduction] 
3 100 people where asked how they felt about a promotional gift when purchasing 
another item.  
 
- Many of those people liked the promotional gift.  
- A few of those people were annoyed by the promotional gift. 
- Several of those people had wanted the promotional gift.  
- Some of those people would have preferred not to have received the promotional gift. 
 
The same 100 people are asked about their mood.  
 
- Many of those people had been doing something they enjoyed.  
- A few of those people were upset about something earlier that day. 
- Several of those people had recently received good news.  
- Some of those people found what they were doing a bit tedious. 
4 100 people have their dress-sense assessed.  
 
- Many of those people will take care in choosing their clothes.  
- A few of those people will dress in a way that others consider appalling. 
- Several of those people will have taste others admire.  
- Some of those people will be thought to look okay but not particularly good or bad. 
 
The same 100 people are asked how they would make a difficult decision affecting 
other people.  
 
- Many of those people would make a sound decision.  
- A few of those people would make a reckless decision. 
- Several of those people would base their decision on extensive experience.  
- Some of those people would only have limited knowledge on which to base their 
decision. 
 
The placeholders [conditional], [second premise] and [conclusion] were varied between 
scenario, inference type, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity conditions. The 
following table sets out the content used in these placeholders for each condition. 
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Table A2.7 – Inference tasks in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4, part 1 
Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
1 / MP / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / MP / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is not 
romantic 
1 / MP / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
unromantic 
1 / MP / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / MP / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
The person is not 
romantic 
1 / MP / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is not 
believing 
The person is 
unromantic 
1 / MP / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
The person is not 
romantic 
1 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
The person is 
unromantic 
1 / DA / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
The person is not 
romantic 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
1 / DA / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / DA / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / DA / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is not 
romantic 
1 / DA / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / DA / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / DA / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
unromantic 
1 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
believing 
The person is 
romantic 
1 / AC / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / AC / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
1 / AC / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
unromantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / AC / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
1 / AC / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
1 / AC / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
unromantic 
The person is not 
believing 
1 / AC / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
1 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
1 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
unromantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
1 / MT / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is not 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
1 / MT / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is not 
believing 
1 / MT / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
unbelieving 
1 / MT / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
1 / MT / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / MT / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / MT / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is romantic 
The person is 
unromantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is not 
romantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
1 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unbelieving, then the 
person is unromantic 
The person is 
romantic 
The person is 
believing 
2 / MP / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / MP / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
not social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is not 
social 
2 / MP / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is 
unsocial 
2 / MP / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is not 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / MP / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is not 
friendly 
The person is not 
social 
2 / MP / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is not 
friendly 
The person is 
unsocial 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
2 / MP / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is 
unfriendly 
The person is social 
2 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is 
unfriendly 
The person is not 
social 
2 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is 
unfriendly 
The person is 
unsocial 
2 / DA / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
social 
The person is not 
friendly 
The person is not 
social 
2 / DA / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
not social 
The person is not 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / DA / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
unfriendly 
The person is social 
2 / DA / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is not 
social 
2 / DA / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / DA / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / DA / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is 
unsocial 
2 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is social 
2 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is 
friendly 
The person is social 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
2 / AC / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
social 
The person is social The person is 
friendly 
2 / AC / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
not social 
The person is not 
social 
The person is 
friendly 
2 / AC / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
friendly 
2 / AC / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is social The person is not 
friendly 
2 / AC / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is not 
social 
The person is not 
friendly 
2 / AC / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is 
unsocial 
The person is not 
friendly 
2 / AC / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is social The person is 
unfriendly 
2 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is not 
social 
The person is 
unfriendly 
2 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
unfriendly 
2 / MT / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
social 
The person is not 
social 
The person is not 
friendly 
2 / MT / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
not social 
The person is social The person is not 
friendly 
2 / MT / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is friendly, 
then the person is 
unsocial 
The person is social The person is 
unfriendly 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
2 / MT / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is not 
social 
The person is 
friendly 
2 / MT / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is social The person is 
friendly 
2 / MT / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is social The person is 
friendly 
2 / MT / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is social 
The person is 
unsocial 
The person is 
friendly 
2 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is not social 
The person is social The person is 
friendly 
2 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unfriendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
The person is social The person is 
friendly 
3 / MP / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / MP / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is not 
happy 
3 / MP / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is 
unhappy 
3 / MP / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / MP / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
The person is not 
happy 
3 / MP / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is not 
grateful 
The person is 
unhappy 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
3 / MP / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
The person is happy 
3 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
The person is not 
happy 
3 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
The person is 
unhappy 
3 / DA / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
The person is not 
happy 
3 / DA / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / DA / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
The person is happy 
3 / DA / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is not 
happy 
3 / DA / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / DA / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / DA / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is 
unhappy 
3 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is happy 
3 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
grateful 
The person is happy 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
3 / AC / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is happy The person is 
grateful 
3 / AC / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is not 
happy 
The person is 
grateful 
3 / AC / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
unhappy 
The person is 
grateful 
3 / AC / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is happy The person is not 
grateful 
3 / AC / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is not 
happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
3 / AC / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
unhappy 
The person is not 
grateful 
3 / AC / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is happy The person is 
ungrateful 
3 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is not 
happy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
3 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is 
unhappy 
The person is 
ungrateful 
3 / MT / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is not 
happy 
The person is not 
grateful 
3 / MT / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is happy The person is not 
grateful 
3 / MT / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is happy The person is 
ungrateful 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
3 / MT / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is not 
happy 
The person is 
grateful 
3 / MT / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is happy The person is 
grateful 
3 / MT / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is happy The person is 
grateful 
3 / MT / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is happy 
The person is 
unhappy 
The person is 
grateful 
3 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is not happy 
The person is happy The person is 
grateful 
3 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
ungrateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
The person is happy The person is 
grateful 
4 / MP / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
wise 
The person is stylish The person is wise 
4 / MP / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
not wise 
The person is stylish The person is not 
wise 
4 / MP / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
unwise 
The person is stylish The person is unwise 
4 / MP / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
The person is wise 
4 / MP / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
The person is not 
wise 
4 / MP / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is not 
stylish 
The person is unwise 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
4 / MP / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is 
unstylish 
The person is wise 
4 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is 
unstylish 
The person is not 
wise 
4 / MP / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is 
unstylish 
The person is unwise 
4 / DA / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
The person is not 
wise 
4 / DA / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
not wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
The person is wise 
4 / DA / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
unwise 
The person is 
unstylish 
The person is wise 
4 / DA / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is stylish The person is not 
wise 
4 / DA / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is stylish The person is wise 
4 / DA / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is stylish The person is wise 
4 / DA / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is stylish The person is unwise 
4 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is stylish The person is wise 
4 / DA / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is stylish The person is wise 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
4 / AC / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
wise 
The person is wise The person is stylish 
4 / AC / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
not wise 
The person is not 
wise 
The person is stylish 
4 / AC / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
unwise 
The person is unwise The person is stylish 
4 / AC / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is wise The person is not 
stylish 
4 / AC / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is not 
wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
4 / AC / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is unwise The person is not 
stylish 
4 / AC / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is wise The person is 
unstylish 
4 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is not 
wise 
The person is 
unstylish 
4 / AC / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is unwise The person is 
unstylish 
4 / MT / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
wise 
The person is not 
wise 
The person is not 
stylish 
4 / MT / Affirmative / 
“not” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
not wise 
The person is wise The person is not 
stylish 
4 / MT / Affirmative / 
“un-” negated 
If a person is stylish, 
then the person is 
unwise 
The person is wise The person is 
unstylish 
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Scenario / Inference 
Type / Antecedent 
Polarity / 
Consequent Polarity 
[conditional] [second premise] [conclusion] 
4 / MT / “not” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is not 
wise 
The person is stylish 
4 / MT / “not” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is wise The person is stylish 
4 / MT / “not” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not 
stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is wise The person is stylish 
4 / MT / “un-” 
negated / Affirmative 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is wise 
The person is unwise The person is stylish 
4 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is not wise 
The person is wise The person is stylish 
4 / MT / “un-” 
negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is 
unstylish, then the 
person is unwise 
The person is wise The person is stylish 
A2.3.3. Task Instructions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 2 
No further instructions were provided before the start of the plausibility tasks in 
experiment 3.  
 
The following text was provided to participants in experiment 4 to explain the 
plausibility tasks: 
 
You have completed the first part of the survey. 
 
The second part will consist of further questions which provide a scenario and a 
rule or statement and ask you a question about how plausible you think the rule 
or statement is given the scenario. You enter your response as a numerical 
answer between 0 and 100. 
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The scenarios given are each used in multiple questions. However, the rule and 
statement change in each question so you should pay attention to this. 
 
All of the questions are asking for your view, there are no right or wrong 
answers and no questions are trying to catch you out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question of the second 
(and final) part. 
A2.3.4. Task Questions for Experiments 3 and 4, Part 2 
The plausibility questions in experiments 3 and 4 used the same 36 conditionals that 
were used for the inference tasks.   
 
In experiment 3, participants saw the only the four conditionals which corresponded 
with those the participants saw in the inference tasks. The four questions seen were 
presented in random order. 
 
In experiment 4, participants saw all 36 conditionals in random order. Intermixed with 
these were 12 further tasks based on statements of the antecedent propositions used in 
the conditionals in each of the . 
 
Each task was presented one to a screen in the following form: 
 
[scenario introduction] 
 
An observer looks at the 100 people and suggests the following rule: 
 
[conditional/proposition] 
 
For how many of the 100 people do you think the [rule/statement] will be true 
for (enter a number between 0 and 100)? 
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Participants had to type a number between 0 and 100 and click on a ‘Next’ button to 
continue. 
 
The placeholder [scenario introduction] were varied for each of the four scenario 
conditions. The same four sets of scenarios were used as in part 1 and so the text used to 
replace this placeholder is the same as given in table A2.6. 
 
The placeholders [conditional/proposition] and [rule/statement] were varied between 
scenario, antecedent polarity and consequent polarity conditions for the conditionals and 
scenario and polarity conditions for the additional propositions used in experiment 4. 
The following table sets out the content used for this placeholder for each condition. 
 
Table A2.8 – Inference tasks in chapter 3, experiments 3 and 4, part 2 
Scenario / Antecedent 
Polarity / Consequent 
Polarity 
Or 
Scenario / Proposition 
Polarity 
[conditional/proposition] [rule/statement]  
1 / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is believing, then the 
person is romantic 
rule  
1 / Affirmative / “not” 
negated 
If a person is believing, then the 
person is not romantic 
rule  
1 / Affirmative / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is believing, then the 
person is unromantic 
rule  
1 / “not” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is not believing, then 
the person is romantic 
rule  
1 / “not” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not believing, then 
the person is not romantic 
rule  
1 / “not” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not believing, then 
the person is unromantic 
rule  
1 / “un-” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is unbelieving, then the 
person is romantic 
rule  
1 / “un-” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is unbelieving, then the 
person is not romantic 
rule  
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Scenario / Antecedent 
Polarity / Consequent 
Polarity 
Or 
Scenario / Proposition 
Polarity 
[conditional/proposition] [rule/statement]  
1 / “un-” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is unbelieving, then the 
person is unromantic 
rule  
1 / Affirmative a person is believing statement Expt. 4 
only 
1 / “not” negated a person is not believing statement Expt. 4 
only 
1 / “un-” negated a person is unbelieving statement Expt. 4 
only 
2 / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is friendly, then the 
person is social 
rule  
2 / Affirmative / “not” 
negated 
If a person is friendly, then the 
person is not social 
rule  
2 / Affirmative / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
rule  
2 / “not” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is not friendly, then the 
person is social 
rule  
2 / “not” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not friendly, then the 
person is not social 
rule  
2 / “not” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not friendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
rule  
2 / “un-” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is unfriendly, then the 
person is social 
rule  
2 / “un-” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is unfriendly, then the 
person is not social 
rule  
2 / “un-” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is unfriendly, then the 
person is unsocial 
rule  
2 / Affirmative A person is friendly statement Expt. 4 
only 
2 / “not” negated A person is not friendly statement Expt. 4 
only 
2 / “un-” negated A person is unfriendly statement Expt. 4 
only 
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Scenario / Antecedent 
Polarity / Consequent 
Polarity 
Or 
Scenario / Proposition 
Polarity 
[conditional/proposition] [rule/statement]  
3 / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is grateful, then the 
person is happy 
rule  
3 / Affirmative / “not” 
negated 
If a person is grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
rule  
3 / Affirmative / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
rule  
3 / “not” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is not grateful, then the 
person is happy 
rule  
3 / “not” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not grateful, then the 
person is not happy 
rule  
3 / “not” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not grateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
rule  
3 / “un-” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is ungrateful, then the 
person is happy 
rule  
3 / “un-” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is ungrateful, then the 
person is not happy 
rule  
3 / “un-” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is ungrateful, then the 
person is unhappy 
rule  
3 / Affirmative A person is grateful statement Expt. 4 
only 
3 / “not” negated A person is not grateful statement Expt. 4 
only 
3 / “un-” negated A person is ungrateful statement Expt. 4 
only 
4 / Affirmative / 
Affirmative 
If a person is stylish, then the 
person is wise 
rule  
4 / Affirmative / “not” 
negated 
If a person is stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
rule  
4 / Affirmative / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
rule  
4 / “not” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is not stylish, then the 
person is wise 
rule  
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Scenario / Antecedent 
Polarity / Consequent 
Polarity 
Or 
Scenario / Proposition 
Polarity 
[conditional/proposition] [rule/statement]  
4 / “not” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is not stylish, then the 
person is not wise 
rule  
4 / “not” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is not stylish, then the 
person is unwise 
rule  
4 / “un-” negated / 
Affirmative 
If a person is unstylish, then the 
person is wise 
rule  
4 / “un-” negated / “not” 
negated 
If a person is unstylish, then the 
person is not wise 
rule  
4 / “un-” negated / “un-” 
negated 
If a person is unstylish, then the 
person is unwise 
rule  
4 / Affirmative A person is stylish statement Expt. 4 
only 
4 / “not” negated A person is not stylish statement Expt. 4 
only 
4 / “un-” negated A person is unstylish statement Expt. 4 
only 
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Appendix 3. Materials Used in Chapter 4 Experiments 
This appendix contains the experimental materials used in each of the three experiments 
reported in chapter 4. These experiments tested Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) prediction 
of MP inference suppression when implicit negation is used instead of “not” negation 
and participants are provided with appropriate frequency information. They then 
expanded this prediction to use implicit negation to vary responses to DA, AC and MT 
inferences. 
 
Each experiment in this chapter presented a learning phase, where participants were 
expected to attend to a sequent of picture providing frequency information in relation to 
a scenario, a set of inference tasks based on the scenario and a verification task which 
asked participants about the frequencies observed at the learning stage.  
 
Experiment 1 (reported in §4.2 with method in §4.2.3 and materials discussed in 
§4.2.3.3) presented tasks based on an ‘animals’ scenario. This ‘animals’ scenario was 
used again in experiment 2 (reported in §4.3 with method in §4.3.2 and materials 
discussed in §4.3.2.3) along with a ‘vehicles’ scenario. This ‘vehicles’ scenario was 
used again in experiment 3 (reported in §4.4 with method in §4.4.2 and materials 
discussed in §4.4.2.3) along with an abstract ‘shapes’ scenario. Because two of the 
scenarios were used in a very similar forms across two experiments each, this appendix 
presents materials by scenario rather than by experiment. 
A3.1. ‘Animals’ Scenario 
The ‘animals’ scenario presented a set of different animals (cats, dogs and rabbits) in 
different colours (black, white and brown).  
A3.1.1. Task Instructions for Experiment 1 
The following text was provided to participants to participants at the beginning of 
experiment 1 on a single screen: 
This study will ask several sets of questions based on the following scenario: 
 
A vet sees a range of animals, mostly dogs, cats and rabbits. She notices 
that people in her village favour animals of certain colours. She wants to 
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come up with a rule linking the type of animal to its colour. She wants 
this to correctly link animal type and colour as often as possible. 
 
There are four sets of questions:  
 
1. Here you will be provided with some information about the percentages 
of different animals of different colours that the vet sees. You will then be 
provided with a rule which the vet could propose. You will then be given a 
partial description of an animal, e.g. its colour (like grey) or species (like 
horse). Finally, you will be asked to indicate what you could conclude about this 
animal. For example, you may be told that the animal is a horse and asked 
whether you believe it is grey or not. You will also be asked how confident you 
are in that belief. 
 
2. Here you will be presented with pictures of a set of animals that the vet 
has seen. You will then be asked you to identify their colour and species. 
 
3. Here you will be see a set of questions that are very similar to the first 
set. Each question provides a rule which the vet could propose and a partial 
description of the next animal that the vet will see. You will be asked what you 
would conclude about this animal and your confidence in that conclusion. 
 
4. Here you will be asked to indicate the proportion of different coloured 
animals that you have seen. 
Each question is asking for your view and no questions are trying to catch you 
out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to continue to the first set of questions, click on 'Next'. 
 
After these initial instructions, the following instructions were provided on screen 
before the first set of inference questions: 
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This first set of questions are all based on the following information: 
 
The vet's receptionist tallies the animals that the vet sees over a week and tells 
the vet that the animals she saw were made up of the following types:  
 
• Brown cats - 4% 
• White dogs - 2% 
• Black cats - 30% 
• Brown rabbits - 22% 
• White cats - 6% 
• Black dogs - 10% 
• White rabbits - 22% 
• Brown dogs - 4% 
 
Based on this information, the vet proposes the following rule: 
 
• If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 
 
The following questions provide information about animals that the vet is due to 
see as she is considering this rule. You should indicate what you think the vet 
should conclude in each case and how confident you would be that the 
conclusion selected is correct 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question. 
 
After the participant had completed the inference questions for the first time, they saw 
the following instructions before the learning phase: 
 
Thank you for completing the first set of questions.  
 
For the next set of questions:  
 
The vet observes the colour and type of the next 50 animals that she sees.  
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The following questions each provide a picture of one of the fifty animals that 
the vet observes and asks you to identify the animal and colour. Please select the 
options that you think best describes the animal even if you don't think the 
description is perfect.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question in this set. 
 
After the learning phase, participants saw a screen with the following instructions 
before seeing the inference questions for the second time: 
 
Thank you for completing the second set of questions. 
 
Having seen these animals, the vet again considers the following rule: 
• If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 
The following questions provide information about animals that the vet is due to 
see as she is considering this rule. You should indicate what you think the vet 
should conclude in each case and how confident you would be that the 
conclusion selected is correct 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the next set of questions. 
 
After the second presentation of the inference questions, participants were presented 
with the verification task on a final page. 
A3.1.2. Task Instructions for Experiment 2 
The following text was provided to participants to participants at the beginning of 
experiment 2 on a single screen: 
 
This study will ask several sets of questions based two scenarios. One scenario 
is based around a vet considering the animals she sees and the other scenario is 
based around a police traffic officer considering the vehicles she sees. 
 
For each scenario, there are three sets of questions:  
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1. First you will be presented with pictures of a set of animals that the vet 
has seen or vehicles that the police traffic officer has seen. You will then 
be asked you to identify their colour and type. 
 
2. Then you will be see a set of questions which provide a rule linking the 
colour and type of the animals or vehicles observed and a partial 
description of the next animal or vehicle seen. You will be asked what 
you would conclude about this animal or vehicle and your confidence in 
that conclusion. 
 
3. Here you will be asked to indicate the proportion of different coloured 
animals or vehicles of different types that you have seen. 
 
Once you have completed each set of questions for one scenario, you will be 
asked to complete similar sets of questions for the other scenario. 
 
Each question is asking for your view and no questions are trying to catch you 
out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to continue to the first set of questions, click on 'Next'. 
 
After this, the participant completed questions for either the ‘animal’ or ‘vehicle’ 
scenario. The scenarios were randomly ordered. Once they had completed one scenario 
they completed the other. At the start of the ‘animal’ scenario, the following instructions 
were provided: 
 
For this set of questions, please consider the following scenario: 
 
A vet sees a range of animals, mostly dogs, cats and rabbits. She notices that 
people in her village favour animals of certain colours. She wants to come up 
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with a rule linking the type of animal to its colour. She wants this rule to 
correctly link animal type and colour as often as possible. 
 
The vet observes the colour and type of the next 30 animals that she sees. 
 
The following questions each provide a picture of one of the thirty animals that 
the vet observes and asks you to identify the animal and colour. Please select the 
options that you think best describes the animal even if you don't think the 
description is perfect. 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question in this set. 
 
After the learning phase, participants were provided with the following instructions 
before the inference questions: 
 
Thank you for completing the first set of questions with this scenario. 
 
Having seen these animals, the vet considers the following rule: 
   
• If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 
 
The following questions provide information about animals that the vet is due to 
see as she is considering this rule. You should indicate what you think the vet 
should conclude in each case and how confident you would be that the 
conclusion selected is correct 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the next set of questions. 
 
After this, participants completed the verification task before moving onto the other 
scenario or completing the experiment. 
A3.1.3. Learning Phase 
The learning phase consisted of pages presented in random order. Each page had a 
picture of an animal with two questions below it. Participants had to pick an option to 
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respond to each question and click ‘Next’ to move on. The questions (with available 
response options in bullet points – which were presented in random order on each page) 
were: 
 
 What type of animal is this? 
 Cat 
 Dog 
 Rabbit 
 
Which colour best describes this animal? 
 Black 
 White 
 Brown 
 
The following table shows the pictures of animals used in this phase. All pictures were 
used in the experiment 1 learning phase. The table indicates whether each picture used 
in the MP manipulation condition, the AC manipulation condition, both or neither in 
experiment 2. 
 
Table A3.1 – Learning task stimuli for ‘animals’ scenario 
Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Black Cat 1  
 
Both 
Black Cat 2  
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Black Cat 3  
 
Both 
Black Cat 4   
 
Both 
Black Cat 5  
 
Both 
Black Cat 6  
 
Both 
Black Cat 7  
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Black Cat 8   
 
Both 
Black Cat 9  
 
Neither 
Black Cat 10  
 
Neither 
Black Cat 11  
 
Neither 
Black Cat 12  
 
Neither 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Black Cat 13  
 
Neither 
Black Cat 14  
 
Neither 
Black Cat 15  
 
Neither 
Black Dog 1  
 
MP manipulation 
Black Dog 2  
 
MP manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Black Dog 3  
 
Neither 
Black Dog 4  
 
Neither 
Black Dog 5  
 
Neither 
Brown Cat 1  
 
Neither 
Brown Cat 2  
 
Neither 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Brown Dog 1  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 2  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 3  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 4  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 5  
 
AC manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Brown Dog 6  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 7  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 8  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 9  
 
AC manipulation 
Brown Dog 
10 
 
 
AC manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Brown Rabbit 
1 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
2 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
3 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
4 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
5 
 
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Brown Rabbit 
6 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
7 
 
 
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
8 
 
 
Both  
Brown Rabbit 
9 
 
  
Both 
Brown Rabbit 
10 
 
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
Brown Rabbit 
11 
 
 
Neither 
White Cat 1  
 
AC manipulation 
White Cat 2  
 
AC manipulation 
White Cat 3  
 
Neither 
White Dog 1  
 
Neither 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
White Rabbit 
1 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
2 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
3 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
4 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
5 
 
 
MP manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
White Rabbit 
6 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
7 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
8 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
9 
 
 
MP manipulation 
White Rabbit 
10 
 
 
MP manipulation 
  
 
 330
Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 Conditions Used 
White Rabbit 
11 
 
 
Neither 
 
A3.1.4. Inference Questions 
Six inference tasks were prepared for the animal scenario. In experiment 1, these tasks 
were presented twice: before and after the learning phase. In experiment 2, they were 
only presented after the learning phase. In each case they were presented one to a page 
in random order. Each inference task page said the following: 
 
The vet is considering the following rule about the animals that she sees: 
   
• If it is not a cat, then it is not black. 
 
The vet is told that the next animal she will see is: 
   
• [premise] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next animal. 
 
[response options] 
 
How confident are you that this conclusion will be correct? Please use the slider 
below to indicate your confidence. 
 
At the bottom of the page was a slider for participants to indicate their confidence. 
Participants had to select one of the response options, select a point on the slider and 
click ‘Next’ to move on. 
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The placeholders [premise] and [response options] were varied between inference and 
negation type conditions. The following table sets out the content used for this 
placeholder for each condition. 
 
Table A3.2 – Inference task stimuli for ‘animals’ scenario 
Condition Premise Response Options 
MP (not) not a cat.  That the animal is not black 
 That the animal is black 
MP (contrast class) a dog.  That the animal is not black 
 That the animal is black 
DA a cat  That the animal is not black 
 That the animal is black 
AC (not) not black.  That the animal is not a cat 
 That the animal is a cat 
AC (contrast class) white.  That the animal is not a cat 
 That the animal is a cat 
MT black.  That the animal is not a cat 
 That the animal is a cat 
 
A3.1.5. Verification Task 
At the end of experiment 1and after the ‘animal’ scenario inference questions in 
experiment 2, a verification task was presented. The task was presented on a single 
page. The verification task page said the following: 
 
 This page contains the final question. [In experiment 1 only] 
This page contains the final question for this scenario. [In experiment 2 only] 
 
For these questions, imagine the vet sees another one hundred animals. Please 
indicate how many of these animals you think are likely to fall into each of the 
categories below? 
 
Your answers should add up to 100. 
 
  
 
 332
The page then had a grid with types of animal (cat, dog, rabbit) listed in random order 
along the top and colours (black, white, brown) listed in random order down the side. 
Each of the nine cells had a box into which participants could enter a number.  
 
Participants had to fill in the grid and press ‘Next’ to move on. If the numbers provided 
did not sum to 100 the page remained up with a message at the top to ‘Please make sure 
all responses in the table add up to 100.’ 
A3.2. ‘Vehicles’ Scenario 
The ‘vehicles’ scenario presented a set of different vehicles (cars, vans and motorbikes) 
in different colours (red, blue and white). This scenario was used in experiments 2 and 
3. 
A3.2.1. Task Instructions  
The following text was provided to participants to participants at the beginning of 
experiment 2  on a single screen: 
 
This study will ask several sets of questions based two scenarios. One scenario 
is based around a vet considering the animals she sees and the other scenario is 
based around a police traffic officer considering the vehicles she sees. 
 
For each scenario, there are three sets of questions:  
1. First you will be presented with pictures of a set of animals that the vet 
has seen or vehicles that the police traffic officer has seen. You will then 
be asked you to identify their colour and type. 
 
2. Then you will be see a set of questions which provide a rule linking the 
colour and type of the animals or vehicles observed and a partial 
description of the next animal or vehicle seen. You will be asked what 
you would conclude about this animal or vehicle and your confidence in 
that conclusion. 
 
3. Here you will be asked to indicate the proportion of different coloured 
animals or vehicles of different types that you have seen. 
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Once you have completed each set of questions for one scenario, you will be 
asked to complete similar sets of questions for the other scenario. 
 
Each question is asking for your view and no questions are trying to catch you 
out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to continue to the first set of questions, click on 'Next'. 
 
The following text was provided at the start of experiment 3 on a single screen: 
 
This study will ask several sets of questions based two scenarios. One scenario 
is based around a quality control manager considering the products that she 
sees produced and the other scenario is based around a police traffic officer 
considering the vehicles she sees. 
 
For each scenario, there are three sets of questions:  
 
1. First you will be presented with pictures of a set of products that the 
quality control manager has seen or vehicles that the police traffic 
officer has seen. You will then be asked you to identify their colour and 
type. 
 
2. Then you will be see a set of questions which provide a rule linking the 
colour and type of the products or vehicles observed and a partial 
description of the next product or vehicle seen. You will be asked what 
you would conclude about this animal or vehicle and your confidence in 
that conclusion. 
 
3. Here you will be asked to indicate the proportion of different coloured 
products or vehicles of different types that you have seen. 
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Once you have completed each set of questions for one scenario, you will be 
asked to complete similar sets of questions for the other scenario. 
 
Each question is asking for your view and no questions are trying to catch you 
out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to continue to the first set of questions, click on 'Next'. 
 
After this, the participant completed questions for either the ‘vehicle’ or alternative 
scenario. The scenarios were randomly ordered. Once they had completed one scenario 
they completed the other. At the start of the ‘vehicle’ scenario, the following 
instructions were provided: 
 
For this set of questions, please consider the following scenario: 
 
A police traffic officer sees a range of vehicles, mostly cars, vans and 
motorbikes. She notices that drivers on the road she is monitoring favour 
vehicles of certain colours. She wants to come up with a rule linking the type of 
vehicle to its colour. She wants this rule to correctly link vehicle type and colour 
as often as possible. 
 
The police traffic officers observes the colour and type of the next 30 vehicles 
that she sees. 
 
The following questions each provide a picture of one of the thirty vehicles that 
the police traffic officer observes and asks you to identify the vehicle and colour. 
Please select the options that you think best describes the vehicle even if you 
don't think the description is perfect. 
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When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question in this set. 
 
After the learning phase, participants were provided with the following instructions 
before the inference questions: 
 
Thank you for completing the first set of questions with this scenario. 
 
Having seen these vehicles, the police traffic officer considers the following 
rule: 
   
• If it is not white, then it is not a van. [in experiment 2 only] 
• If it is white, then it is a van. [in experiment 3 only] 
 
The following questions provide information about vehicles that the police 
traffic officer is due to see as she is considering this rule. You should indicate 
what you think the police traffic officer should conclude in each case and how 
confident you would be that the conclusion selected is correct 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the next set of questions. 
 
After this, participants completed the verification task before moving onto the other 
scenario or completing the experiment. 
A3.2.2. Learning Phase 
The learning phase consisted of pages presented in random order. Each page had a 
picture of an vehicle with two questions below it. Participants had to pick an option to 
respond to each question and click ‘Next’ to move on. The questions (with available 
response options in bullet points – which were presented in random order on each page) 
were: 
 
 What type of vehicle is this? 
 Van 
 Motorbike 
 Car 
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Which colour best describes this vehicle? 
 White 
 Blue 
 Red  
 
The following table shows the pictures of vehicles used in this phase. The table 
indicates whether each picture used in the MP manipulation condition, the AC 
manipulation condition or both experiment 2. The table also indicates whether each 
picture used in the DA manipulation condition, the MT manipulation condition or both 
in experiment 3. 
 
Table A3.3 – Learning task stimuli for ‘vehicles’ scenario 
Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Blue Car 1  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 2  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Blue Car 3  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 4  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 5  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 6  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 7  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Blue Car 8  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 9  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Car 10  
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
Blue Van 1  
 
MP 
Manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Blue Van 2  
 
MP 
Manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Red Car 1  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 2   
 
Both Both 
Red Car 3  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 4  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 5  
 
Both Both 
  
 
 340
Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Red Car 6  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 7  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 8  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 9  
 
Both Both 
Red Car 10  
 
Both Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Red 
Motorbike 1 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 2 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 3 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 4 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 5 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
Red 
Motorbike 6 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 7 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 8 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 9 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
Red 
Motorbike 10 
 
 
MP 
manipulation 
DA 
manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
White  
Motorbike 1 
 
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
White 
Motorbike 2  
 
 
AC 
manipulation 
MT 
manipulation 
White Van 1   
 
Both Both 
White Van 2  
 
Both Both 
White Van 3  
 
Both Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
White Van 4  
 
Both Both 
White Van 5  
 
Both Both 
White Van 6    
 
Both Both 
White Van 7    
 
Both Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 2 
Conditions 
Used 
Experiment 3 
Conditions 
Used 
White Van 8    
 
Both Both 
 
A3.2.3. Inference Questions 
Six inference tasks were prepared for each of experiments 2 and 3 using the ‘vehicle’ 
scenario. In both of these experiments, inference questions were presented after the 
learning phase. In each case they were presented one to a page in random order. Each 
inference task page using the ‘vehicle’ said the following: 
 
The police traffic officer is considering the following rule about the vehicles that 
she sees: 
   
• If it is not white, then it is not a van. [in experiment 2 only] 
• If it is white, then it is a van. [in experiment 3 only] 
 
The police traffic officer is told that the next vehicle she will see is:   
 
• [premise] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next vehicle. 
 
[response options] 
 
How confident are you that this conclusion will be correct? Please use the slider 
below to indicate your confidence. 
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At the bottom of the page was a slider for participants to indicate their confidence. 
Participants had to select one of the response options, select a point on the slider and 
click ‘Next’ to move on. 
 
The placeholders [premise] and [response options] were varied between inference and 
negation type conditions differently for experiments 2 and 3. The following table sets 
out the content used for this placeholder for each condition. 
 
Table A3.4 – Inference task stimuli for ‘vehicles’ scenario 
Experiment Condition Premise Response Options 
2 MP (not) not white.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
2 MP (contrast 
class) 
blue.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
2 DA white.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
2 AC (not) not a van.  That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
2 AC (contrast 
class) 
a 
motorbike. 
 That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
2 MT a van.  That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
3 MP white.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
3 DA (not) not white.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
3 DA (contrast 
class) 
blue.  That the vehicle is not a van 
 That the vehicle is a van 
3 AC a van.  That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
3 MT (not) not a van.  That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
3 MT (contrast 
class) 
a 
motorbike. 
 That the vehicle is not white 
 That the vehicle is white 
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A3.2.4. Verification Task 
After the ‘vehicle’ scenario inference questions in experiments 2 and 3, a verification 
task was presented. In each case this were presented on a single page. The verification 
task page said the following: 
 
 This page contains the final question for this scenario.  
 
For these questions, imagine the police traffic officer sees another one hundred 
vehicles. Please indicate how many of these vehicles you think are likely to fall 
into each of the categories below? 
 
Your answers should add up to 100. 
 
The page then had a grid with types of vehicle (van, motorbike, car) listed in random 
order along the top and colours (blue, white, red) listed in random order down the side. 
Each of the nine cells had a box into which participants could enter a number.  
 
Participants had to fill in the grid and press ‘Next’ to move on. If the numbers provided 
did not sum to 100 the page remained up with a message at the top to ‘Please make sure 
all responses in the table add up to 100.’ 
A3.3. ‘Shapes’ Scenario 
The ‘shapes’ scenario presented a set of different vehicles (circle, square and triangle) in 
different colours (red, blue and yellow). This scenario was used in experiment 3. 
A3.3.1. Task Instructions  
The following text was provided to participants to participants at the beginning of 
experiment 3 on a single screen: 
 
This study will ask several sets of questions based two scenarios. One scenario 
is based around a quality control manager considering the products that she 
sees produced and the other scenario is based around a police traffic officer 
considering the vehicles she sees. 
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For each scenario, there are three sets of questions:  
 
1. First you will be presented with pictures of a set of products that the 
quality control manager has seen or vehicles that the police traffic 
officer has seen. You will then be asked you to identify their colour and 
type. 
 
2. Then you will be see a set of questions which provide a rule linking the 
colour and type of the products or vehicles observed and a partial 
description of the next product or vehicle seen. You will be asked what 
you would conclude about this animal or vehicle and your confidence in 
that conclusion. 
 
3. Here you will be asked to indicate the proportion of different coloured 
products or vehicles of different types that you have seen. 
 
 
Once you have completed each set of questions for one scenario, you will be 
asked to complete similar sets of questions for the other scenario. 
 
Each question is asking for your view and no questions are trying to catch you 
out. 
 
You should try to complete each question as quickly as possible – go with your 
first reaction. 
 
When you are ready to continue to the first set of questions, click on 'Next'. 
 
After this, the participant completed questions for either the ‘shapes’ or ‘vehicles’ 
scenario. The scenarios were randomly ordered. Once they had completed one scenario 
they completed the other. At the start of the ‘shapes’ scenario, the following instructions 
were provided: 
 
For this set of questions, please consider the following scenario: 
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A quality control manager works in a factory and is responsible for checking the 
output of a machine which produces cards with different shapes on them, mostly 
circles, squares and triangles. She is new to this machine but knows that it 
randomly produces shapes with different colours but the machine has certain 
rules dictating which type of shape can be take which colours. She wants to 
figure out one of the rules that the machine uses to link the type of shape with its 
colour.   
 
The quality control manager observes the colour and type of the shapes on the 
next 30 cards that she sees. 
 
The following questions each provide a picture of one of the thirty cards that the 
quality control manager observes and asks you to identify the shape and colour. 
Please select the options that you think best describes the shape even if you don't 
think the description is perfect. 
 
When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the first question in this set. 
 
After the learning phase, participants were provided with the following instructions 
before the inference questions: 
 
Thank you for completing the first set of questions with this scenario. 
 
Having seen these cards, the quality control manager considers the following 
rule: 
   
• If it is red, then it is a circle. 
 
The following questions provide information about cards that the quality control 
manager is due to see as she is considering this rule. You should indicate what 
you think the quality control manager should conclude in each case and how 
confident you would be that the conclusion selected is correct 
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When you are ready to begin, click on 'Next' for the next set of questions. 
 
After this, participants completed the verification task before moving onto the other 
scenario or completing the experiment. 
A3.3.2. Learning Phase 
The learning phase consisted of pages presented in random order. Each page had a 
picture of a card with a shape on it with two questions below it. Participants had to pick 
an option to respond to each question and click ‘Next’ to move on. The questions (with 
available response options in bullet points – which were presented in random order on 
each page) were: 
 
 What type of shape is this? 
 Circle 
 Square 
 Triangle 
 
Which colour best describes this shape? 
 Yellow 
 Blue 
 Red  
 
The following table shows the pictures of cards with shapes on used in this phase. The 
table indicates whether each picture used in the DA manipulation condition, the MT 
manipulation condition or both in experiment 3. 
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Table A3.5 – Learning task stimuli for ‘shapes’ scenario 
Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Blue Square 1  
 
 
Blue Square 2 
 
 
Blue Square 3 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Square 4 
 
DA manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Blue Square 5 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Square 6 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Square 7 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Square 8 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Square 9 
 
DA manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Blue Square 10 
 
DA manipulation 
Blue Triangle 1 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 2 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 3 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 4 
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Blue Triangle 5 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 6 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 7 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 8 
 
Both 
Blue Triangle 9 
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Blue Triangle 10 
 
Both 
Red Circle 1 
 
Both 
Red Circle 3 
 
Both 
Red Circle 3 
 
Both 
Red Circle 4 
 
Both 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Red Circle 5 
 
Both 
Red Circle 6 
 
Both 
Red Circle 7 
 
Both 
Red Circle 8 
 
Both 
Red Square 1 
 
MT manipulation 
  
 
 357
Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Red Square 2 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Circle 1 
 
DA manipulation 
Yellow Circle 2 
 
DA manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 1 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 2 
 
MT manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Yellow Triangle 3 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 4 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 5 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 6 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 7 
 
MT manipulation 
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Picture Label Picture Experiment 3 Conditions Used 
Yellow Triangle 8 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 9 
 
MT manipulation 
Yellow Triangle 
10 
 
MT manipulation 
 
 
A3.3.3. Inference Questions 
Six inference tasks were prepared experiment 3 using the ‘shapes’ scenario. These were 
presented after the learning phase. They were presented one to a page in random order. 
Each inference task page using the ‘shapes’scenario said the following: 
 
The quality control manager is considering the following rule about the cards 
that she sees: 
   
• If it is red, then it is a circle. 
 
A system on the machine indicates that the shape on the next card is: 
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• [premise] 
 
Please select the option below that best describes what she should conclude 
about the next shape.  
 
[response options] 
 
How confident are you that this conclusion will be correct? Please use the slider 
below to indicate your confidence. 
 
At the bottom of the page was a slider for participants to indicate their confidence. 
Participants had to select one of the response options, select a point on the slider and 
click ‘Next’ to move on. 
 
The placeholders [premise] and [response options] were varied between inference and 
negation type conditions for experiment 3. The following table sets out the content used 
for these placeholders for each condition. 
 
Table A3.6 – Inference task stimuli for ‘shapes’ scenario 
Experiment Condition Premise Response Options 
3 MP red.  That the shape is a circle 
 That the shape is not a circle 
3 DA (not) not red.  That the shape is a circle 
 That the shape is not a circle 
3 DA (contrast 
class) 
yellow.  That the shape is a circle 
 That the shape is not a circle 
3 AC a circle.  That the shape is red 
 That the shape is not red 
3 MT (not) not a circle.  That the shape is red 
 That the shape is not red 
3 MT (contrast 
class) 
a square.  That the shape is red 
 That the shape is not red 
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A3.3.4. Verification Task 
After the ‘shapes’ scenario inference questions in experiment 3, a verification task was 
presented. This was presented on a single page. The verification task page said the 
following: 
 
 This page contains the final question for this scenario.  
 
For these questions, imagine the quality control manager sees another one 
hundred cards. Please indicate how many of the shapes of each type on the 
cards you think are likely to fall into each of the categories below? 
 
Your answers should add up to 100. 
 
The page then had a grid with types of shape (circle, square, triangle) listed in random 
order along the top and colours (blue, yellow, red) listed in random order down the side. 
Each of the nine cells had a box into which participants could enter a number.  
 
Participants had to fill in the grid and press ‘Next’ to move on. If the numbers provided 
did not sum to 100 the page remained up with a message at the top to ‘Please make sure 
all responses in the table add up to 100.’ 
